In The Socratic Individual, Ann Ward sets out to “investigate the cause of the renewed interest in Socrates” among certain post-Hegelian thinkers, namely, Kierkegaard, John Stuart Mill, and Nietzsche. Her aim is to elucidate the roots of the twentieth-century political philosopher Leo Strauss's “turn to Socrates,” which she claims is “a manifestation of a philosophic movement that began in earnest in the nineteenth century” (1). The importance of the subject matter speaks for itself; serious students of political philosophy will no doubt take a keen interest in the issues Ward examines. Her study also has much to recommend it, not least the bold decision to approach such a rich period in the history of philosophy through the apparently narrow question, What is Socrates? Seth Benardete once remarked, “What philosophy is seems to be inseparable from the question of how to read Plato.” If so, then how a thinker understands Socrates, generally the Platonic Socrates—that is, what place he gives him in his thought—might well provide peculiarly direct access to what he takes philosophy to be.
Ward is at her best when discussing each of the texts under consideration. She sets the stage with a discussion of the introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of History, where “the coming together of the universal and the particular, the ideal and the real, in the modern liberal state, means that the Socratic form of philosophy, like history, should and does cease” (14). In other words, Hegel's deification of the state, as Ward puts it, entails that “the universal, rational idea and the divine are not above the state but rather comprehended by it,” so that “Socratic skepticism . . . should cease when the modern state comes into being” (23). Consequently, “there is no more need for either philosophical or political greatness” (25).
In two successive chapters, Ward reconstructs Kierkegaard's attempt to rescue this lost greatness in the figures of Abraham in Fear and Trembling and Socrates in On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates and Philosophical Fragments. Beyond the universal and ideal embodied in the modern liberal state, Kierkegaard identifies “a passionate particularity or subjectivity” (71). Arguing for the primacy of passion and love over reason, Kierkegaard aims to expose the limits of the Hegelian deification of the state as encompassing the universal and ideal. A chief exemplar of this higher, passionate type is Abraham in his sacrifice of Isaac; but Socrates's ability to relate to his interlocutors ironically, while imparting to them knowledge of ignorance, accomplishes more, placing him nearly on the level of God or “the god.” Properly understood, Ward suggests, Kierkegaard's eulogy to Abraham is, more fundamentally, a veiled eulogy to Socrates (52, 55).
Similarly, Mill “locates human greatness . . . in the passions that make us different and set some unique but indispensable individuals at odds with the reigning social and moral order of their time” (78), though he departs from Kierkegaard's tendency to identify Socrates and the god in their providing the condition for learning the truth, namely, knowledge of ignorance (79; cf. 71–74). Mill's progressive Socratism sees the cultivation of diverse individuals, whose “conflicting ideas ensure access to the whole truth” (80), as necessary to the improvement of the general welfare of men. Such freedom, however, requires “question[ing] the truth of Christianity and faith in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.” Mill thus brings philosophy and faith into opposition, over and against Kierkegaard's drawing them together (89).
Ward ends the main exposition with a chapter each on Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy and Beyond Good and Evil. Like Mill and Kierkegaard before him, Nietzsche attempts to rescue a new sort of individualism, though he differs in seeing Socrates as part of the trend of democratic leveling (92). In The Birth of Tragedy, Socrates is rather “the true opponent of Dionysus” (93), whose tragedies speak to “our deepest wish to return to an undifferentiated material being prior to the creation of the cosmos” (98). Such passionate self-forgetting thus requires the abandonment of Socratic science and rationalism. Yet Nietzsche eventually replaces this opposition between Socrates and Dionysus with a synthesis at the end of Beyond Good and Evil, where Dionysus returns in a Socratic form—not as an idealist, however, but again as imparting knowledge of ignorance (120).
The above suffices to illustrate the fruits of Ward's exegeses. But how do they fit together and inform her more general claim about the cause of this trend and its culmination in Strauss? Here, the book seems to transgress the limits of its analysis. As regards the unity of these chapters, are we to understand Kierkegaard, Mill, and Nietzsche as responding directly to Hegel? Ward seems to be of two minds on this question. Whatever the case, more should be said on this point. Regarding Strauss, things are more complicated. Readers of Strauss will wonder why Ward does not devote a chapter to “The Problem of Socrates,” the first lecture and very title of which evoke the last thinker she discusses, Nietzsche. The absence, too, of a chapter on Socrates and Aristophanes, the work by Strauss most in dialogue with Nietzsche, will likewise leave readers wanting. And what about Strauss's debt to al-Farabi, whose silence on the doctrine of the forms and the immortality of the soul seems to have guided him in his recovery of a nonidealistic Plato? As it stands, Ward's interpretation of Strauss is filtered almost entirely through Thomas Pangle's and Catherine Zuckert's interpretations of Strauss's interpretation of the place of the doctrine of the forms in Plato's political philosophy. These are fine scholars to invoke, no doubt, but Ward's thesis nevertheless calls for direct and sustained engagement with Strauss's work. As it stands, we are given only some cursory remarks in the book's brief conclusion.
But the most basic question concerns what it means to speak of the “cause” of interest in Socrates. Does renewed interest in Socrates really begin with Hegel? Why not with Rousseau, who in the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts models himself on Socrates? Rousseau's critique of the sciences there and of reason more generally, as a late and in many ways lamentable development, guided Kant in his subordination of theoretical reason to practical reason, echoing Rousseauean self-legislation, and so initiated the late modern concern with history and culture, in which Hegel would come to play an essential role. For this reason, Strauss himself refers to Kant and Hegel as “Rousseau's great successors.” Even if we credit Hegel with initiating a movement of Socratic individualism, does that suffice to make him “the cause . . . of the revival of interest in the person of Socrates and his philosophic way of life” (1, emphasis added)? That cause might lie further back even than Rousseau, as far back as Descartes's demotion of Socratic wonder and skepticism or, still further, in the project of scientific mastery that Descartes borrowed from Bacon, and Bacon from Machiavelli. One is even tempted, when speaking of causes, to look to the sempiternal possibility that Socrates embodied and which myriad historical and political conditions have actualized and may still actualize. It may be, therefore, that the cause of such modern Socratics as Rousseau, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche is not historical in character but rather natural.
