Plato and the Virtue of Courage is a nuanced, probing, and beautifully written analysis of Plato's view of courage as it is presented in the Laches and the Republic. Linda Rabieh approaches Plato's works not to discover their order of composition or to place them in the history of political philosophy, but to learn from them about a virtue that is underappreciated in modern life and thought. The feminist critique of courage as an unhealthy assertion of masculine pride is only the latest and most extreme denigration of this essential virtue. More important is the uneasiness about courage that runs throughout liberal theory, both in its contemporary and in its original expressions. Does the proud, assertive, warrior-virtue of courage pose a threat to political orders devoted to peace, security, and comfortable self-preservation? Can the nobility with which courage once shined still be grasped if it is put in the service of the mundane, if sensible, liberal ends? These problems have led modern liberal theorists, going as far back as Hobbes and Locke, to treat courage with suspicion and to focus on softening its excesses. They certainly have not given it the sympathetic and thorough analysis that one finds in Plato.
Yet even modern liberals have reasons to study courage beyond a desire to appreciate the distinctiveness of the modern liberal outlook. For even modern liberalism, Rabieh argues, cannot do away with the need for courage if our political communities are to be defended. Nor can it keep us from being moved with admiration when we contemplate the noble acts of courage that September 11 and its aftermath reminded us have not vanished from our world. Our persistent and deep admiration of courage—of old-fashioned, heroic courage—reveals an aspect of our souls that liberalism has not succeeded in subduing and that liberal theory cannot adequately help us to understand (see 1–3, 17–22). Plato's dialogues, therefore, can help us even today to understand that powerful but mysterious side of ourselves that comes to light most vividly in our awe before courage. Plato's dialogues, however, do not yield their assistance easily. They require the kind of painstaking, detailed, and ever-questioning analysis that Rabieh displays so well. Among its other virtues, Plato and the Virtue of Courage provides a model of the care and patience with which Plato should be read.
Almost half of Rabieh's book is an analysis of the Laches, the Platonic dialogue that most directly raises the question, “What is courage?” Once she turns to her detailed treatment of the Laches, it quickly become clear that Rabieh's intention is not to bask in the glow of courage but to press a set of unsettling questions about the character of courage. In doing so, she follows Socrates' dialectical approach of allowing the questions and even the difficulties concerning courage to arise from an examination of the opinions of Socrates' interlocutors. I cannot do justice here to Rabieh's complex treatment of the dilemmas and tensions that Socrates reveals within the views of Laches and Nicias, two Athenian generals, each with a high regard for courage. But let me try to convey a sense of the questions at the heart of Rabieh's study. Although she dwells in her introduction on the question of the relationship between courage and justice, the deeper question in her study of the Laches is the question of the relationship between courage and prudence. If courage at first appears to transcend a prudent concern with one's own advantage, can Laches—an admirer and defender of courage—consistently embrace a view that would sever the connection between courage and prudence? Is it not essential to Laches' view of courage that courage, as a virtue, not only entail a noble willingness to sacrifice oneself but also somehow conduce to the good of the courageous man? Are the dual demands that Laches places on courage, however, fully consistent with one another? If they are not—and if the tension in Laches' view is also discernable in the apparently very different view of Nicias—can this contradiction be resolved? What would a fully coherent and consistent view of courage look like?
Rabieh wrestles with these questions in her long and careful analysis of the Laches. She then turns, in the second half of her book, to the Republic. The primary theme of the Republic, of course, is justice, not courage. But Rabieh turns to the Republic to learn about courage for several reasons. First, the analysis of spiritedness (thumos) in the Republic supplements the treatment of courage in the Laches because spiritedness is the “psychological substratum of courage” (93). Second, the Republic helps to flesh out the critique of “ordinary” courage—Rabieh sometimes calls it “traditional” or “heroic” courage—that is presented in a brief way in the Laches. To flesh out this critique, Rabieh focuses on the education, especially the training in political courage, of the guardians in Socrates' city-in-speech. She also reflects at length on the concerns of Glaucon, whose intense erotic nature leads him to bring out more vividly both the promise and the problems of the form of courage embraced by Laches (see especially 136–37). Lastly, Rabieh turns to the Republic to reflect on the relationship between the ordinary form of courage best seen in a citizen-soldier and the courage that contributes to philosophy. Although the spiritedness that gives ordinary courage its vigor often opposes philosophic openness, Rabieh argues that ordinary courage, and even spiritedness, can help to strengthen the resolve of some of the young as they confront the pains and fears that lie on the path to philosophy. She then raises the further question of how the courage that contributes to the education of a philosophic soul differs from the “purified” courage that emerges out of such an education and belongs to a fully formed philosopher. What is the character of genuine, philosophic courage?
Throughout Plato and the Virtue of Courage, Rabieh asks her readers to begin from an admiration of courage and to follow Plato's Socrates in his respectful yet relentless questioning of it. She asks this of her readers in the best way—not by demanding it of them but by demonstrating it herself.
