Ian Hope, a serving officer in the Canadian Army, has written an interesting and in many ways challenging discussion of early American military thought, and the place of the United States Military Academy at West Point in its evolution. He seeks to uncover “the intellectual world of the antebellum army” by reference to the Enlightenment concept of the science of war that seized the imagination of the pre-1861 generation of regular officers, and which so neatly expressed their burgeoning sense of professionalism. They recognized soldiering as a branch of learning governed by its own principles “that explained empirical evidence and that permitted consistent transfer of knowledge” (2, 4–5, 10). By the 1850s a “standardized mental outlook” (199) prevailed that encouraged the development, so Hope maintains, of a consistent doctrine that governed not just the war in Mexico (1846–48) but also the Civil War (1861–65). The science of war required that knowledge should be applicable and not so abstract that it lacked practical use. It therefore followed that this scientific approach could form “components of an art – considered skill at achieving something” (5, 209, original emphasis). These notions drew upon the Romantic movement and therefore provided an intellectual tool to secure achievement on the battlefield and aid the search for fame and glory. Napoleon's American admirers contended that his great martial achievements rested not only on his unique personal attributes but also on a method and systematic approach to the conduct of war that should be studied and understood. To this end in 1848 Dennis Hart Mahan chaired the Napoleon Club at West Point.
Mahan emerges as the most significant American military thinker before 1861, as he successfully effected an “Americanization” of European ideas (19, 123). West Point was the focal point for the discussion of these ideas because of the unusual priority it accorded engineering. Engineers, the elite of the US Army, were in the vanguard of the development of the concept of the science of war. It was thus intimately related to the engineering solutions posed to answer the problems of US military policy. From 1813 to 1814 successive administrations sought to protect the vulnerable ports of the eastern seaboard from amphibious assault. The three systems of coastal fortification, the third still under construction in 1861, allowed the engineers to “acquire hegemony” (57) over military policy. But this defensive, engineering solution could not provide all the answers, especially on the expanding frontier. West Point graduates gave close attention to the “science of movements,” the designation of “strategic points,” and the techniques of organization, transport and logistics that underlay any strategy of “active defence” (227). Such involvement in defence policy supports Hope's case that some West Point graduates enjoyed much broader horizons than platoon and company tactics. They had acquired some experience valuable in 1861, except the one they needed most – command of higher formations in battle. Some of Hope's insights are valuable but throughout this book he confuses military thought with doctrine, for they are far from identical.
Hope is also keen to dismiss the view that the Swiss thinker Baron Jomini remained a major influence – indeed later historians regarded his influence as emblematic of prosaic thinking, lassitude and rigidity. Hope offers impressive evidence that Jomini “was not well known” in America (156–57, 185). He also claims not only that the Napoleonic synthesis promoted by Mahan was “foundational in American thought” (6, 210–11, 212), but also that “West Pointers functioned in every sense as a modern general staff” (216).
But such an argument is hard to accept. Many Civil War commanders with an engineering or artillery background gave scant indication that they knew how to use a chief of staff, including George B. McClellan, William S. Rosecrans, even William T. Sherman on the Union side, and Braxton Bragg, P. G. T. Beauregard and even Robert E. Lee on the Confederate. McClellan, Rosecrans and Bragg fit the science-of-war model in their ability to raise, train, supply, move and encamp armies, but they lacked the insight to fight across the battlefield effectively, and they lacked trained staff officers to help them. Engineering priorities could not provide all the answers. Hope makes a persuasive case that West Point was a respected and admired institution, but he claims too much for it. A cadet academy could not be the place from which a trained general staff could emerge, only the rudiments of it; that required a general staff college that only gradually emerged after 1875. But Hope's perspectives deserve respect and attention as they are based on careful investigation of the sources, and his monograph is beautifully produced except in one respect – the maps, figures and charts are far too small.
