The two books under review superficially seem to deal with the same topic, but they are actually quite different. Global Jihad, by Glenn E. Robinson, is a broad historical and analytical overview of global jihad that offers an interesting and compelling theory on how to view its main subject. Alexander Thurston’s Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel, in contrast, takes a far narrower approach to transnational—yet simultaneously very local—politics among rebellious groups in a specific region. Both books are also very good but for different reasons.

Global Jihad consists of an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion that is, in fact, the longest chapter in the entire book, followed by a short epilogue. The introduction provides background information about the Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian Revolution, and jihadism against the “near enemy” (i.e., supposedly apostate regimes in the Muslim world itself). It also introduces the author’s idea of jihadism as developing in four distinct though overlapping waves, as well as his contention that global jihad can be seen as a “movement of rage.” The rest of the book is spent explaining these four waves and why each of them represents a movement of rage.

The first chapter deals with the first wave, which the author calls “Jihadi International” (1979–90): the efforts by ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam (1941–89) to rally Arabs to the cause of jihad in Afghanistan and beyond. Chapter 2 focuses on the second wave, the “America First!” strategy (1996–2010), which refers to Osama bin Laden’s (1957–2011) move away from the failed revolutionary jihads against the regimes of the Muslim world (the “near enemy”) to attack the alleged source of their strength: the West (the “far enemy”). The third wave, discussed in chapter 3, is labeled “Caliphate Now!” (2003–17) and is mostly associated with Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (1966–2006), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (1971–2019), and the Islamic State (IS). Chapter 4 deals with the fourth wave, which Robinson calls “Personal Jihad” (2001–present); it is strongly rooted in the ideas of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri (b. 1958) and revolves around the far less organized lone wolf attacks committed by only vaguely connected individuals.

The conclusion of the book states that global jihad can be compared to other violent social movements, but that the categories usually employed to analyze such movements do not always suffice. After discussing several comparative frameworks that the author finds lacking, Robinson uses the term “movements of rage” that, following Ken Jowitt, he defines as “a neomillenarian amalgam of charismatic leadership and apocalyptic ideology, combined with a strategy of nihilistic violence” (p. 164). Robinson then compares the four waves of global jihad discussed in chapters 1–4, concluding that each one constitutes a movement of rage, though to varying degrees.

Thurston’s Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel treats jihadists as political actors who “fight in wars and have radical visions of politics” and “also participate in local, national, and regional politics,” including “through the management of strategic relationships. They negotiate with power brokers, build alliances, and respond to the demands of constituencies. They are, meanwhile, prone to politicking within their own ranks” (p. 2). More specifically, this book focuses on politics within jihadist organizations, their engagement with the surrounding politics, and the interaction between these two.

Although many publications take a macro-level approach to jihadism by focusing on, for example, the views of major ideologues (as Robinson also does) or take a micro-level approach by concentrating on the radicalization of individuals, Thurston applies a meso-level analysis by looking at jihadist field commanders. They may not control or guide entire organizations, but they are the daily decision makers who are far more susceptible to local political demands than the heads of global groups or individual fighters. Thurston analyzes jihadist groups internally and externally: he looks at vertical hierarchies within groups, horizontal relationships between field commanders, and external relations with other political actors.

Through this lens, the author examines jihadists in six countries. The first two chapters focus on Algerian jihadists: chapter 1 concentrates on the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) and the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), whereas chapter 2 deals entirely with the latter and its successor, Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The way these groups spill over into and affect local groups in Mali and its immediate neighbors is the subject of chapters 3 (Northern Mali), 4 (Central Mali), and 5 (the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso borderlands). Finally, chapters 6 and 7 examine how these organizations and local governments behaved in the Libyan town of Derna and Mauritania; the book ends with a policy-relevant conclusion.

Both books are highly recommended reading for students of jihadism: Robinson’s book can be compared with similar broad studies of radical Islamism, globalized Islam, or Jihadi-Salafism, such as those by Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy, and Shiraz Maher. Although readers can benefit from all these books, Robinson’s is at once narrower and broader than those: it focuses on a smaller subset of groups (global jihadists) yet is more appealing to a broader audience because it integrates the political science literature on violent organizations in general. Although scholars of jihadism will find little new information on the subject in the book’s first four chapters, it does provide a well-written and well-structured overview of the phenomenon of global jihad. Moreover, the author’s lengthy conclusion on movements of rage rightly tries to demystify jihadist organizations by comparing them to other violent groups: it deserves to be taken seriously, even by those who disagree with it.

Thurston’s work is equally well structured and well written, yet is the mirror image of Robinson’s work because it provides a new and highly original analysis of the type of everyday politics that rebellious groups in North Africa and the Sahel engage in, yet ends with a conclusion that should be of broad interest to scholars and policy makers alike. As such, he provides a crucial bridge between the work done by scholars such as Robinson, who focus on the big picture and major historical developments, and psychologists and sociologists who focus on the radicalization of individuals. His work provides a fascinating analysis of how local field commanders bargain with, concede to, negotiate with, cajole, pressure, and sometimes even kill those around them to achieve their goals, which often involve self-preservation.

This does not mean that the books under review are without faults, however. Although Robinson’s analysis of the four waves of global jihad is solid, he does push his findings too far sometimes. The link he establishes between ‘Azzam’s ideas on a caravan of fighters going from Afghanistan to other Muslim countries to liberate them from non-Muslim occupation and Sayyid Qutb’s view of permanent revolution (pp. 44–45) seems far-fetched, for example. Although ‘Azzam’s caravan may possibly be described as “permanent,” it was certainly not a revolution against (nominally) Muslim regimes, which is precisely what Qutb intended. Similarly, the author misses the mark when he tries to tie ‘Azzam’s ideas on jihad and tawhid (the unity of God) to Salafism (pp. 17, 45–46), which can only be done when one approaches this rather superficially. Likewise, his attempt to describe, albeit carefully, all four waves as movements of rage, even though only the Islamic State can really be said to have a truly apocalyptic ideology, seems a bit of a stretch.

Thurston does not have a similar overarching framework in which he analyzes his case studies but—oddly for a book focusing on jihadists—fails to define precisely what he means by “jihadism.” To be sure, the author does mention in footnote 1 on page 1 that he uses the term “to designate various movements that have arisen since the 1980s. These movements talk about jihad in ideological terms that break with the mainstream Sunni tradition’s restrictions on how jihads should be conducted.” This definition is, however, not only vague—what are these breaks with Sunni tradition, for example, and what does he mean by “Sunni tradition,” which is highly diverse?—but also incorrect in the sense that many of the jihadist practices that, say, al-Qa‘ida has employed, have roots in or can be traced back to classical Islam, even if they are applied in a different time and context and with modern technology. This also makes one wonder why the diverse bunch of people dealt with in this book—apart from the fact that they are all African, Muslim, and engaged in violence—should all be gathered under the label of “jihadist.”

These are not trivial issues. Many studies on the subject suffer from the lack of a specific definition of “jihadism,” which raises the question whether the term really has much explanatory value, even to those who use it. Yet none of these points takes away from the fact that both books are very good and sophisticated analyses of a phenomenon that is still misunderstood by many. As such, both are must-reads for scholars and policy makers alike.