My aim is to clarify the nature and purpose of Berkeley's arguments in the third chapter of Alciphron. Most read the chapter as an attack on Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. This makes sense, given that Berkeley goes to the trouble of quoting, sometimes directly, sometimes in mosaic fashion, from Shaftesbury's Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, both in the main text and in the footnotes. But some think – as I will argue, mistakenly – that Berkeley takes aim at two different Shaftesburys, an early Shaftesbury and a late Shaftesbury. Others fail to recognize the near explicit references to Francis Hutcheson's elaboration of some of the main themes of Shaftesbury's moral theory, assuming, perhaps from the fact that Hutcheson is not quoted, that Shaftesbury is the sole intended target of Berkeley's criticisms. Less well understood, as well, is the nature of Berkeley's criticisms of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and the extent to which they depend for their success on the truth of idealism. I will concentrate on elucidating the mistakes that Berkeley attributes to both of his opponents, and then ask whether, and to what degree, they are guilty of the errors Berkeley lays at their door.
1. Shaftesbury's Moral Theory and Hutcheson's Elaboration
Shaftesbury's philosophical output was published in pieces over the course of many years, and eventually collected in his Characteristics, published in 1711. Characteristics is a sprawling and meandering work that moves, sometimes within a single essay, through various topics, including history, literary theory, aesthetics, and moral philosophy. My focus here is on Shaftesbury's ethics.
It is in the second essay, Sensus Communis, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, that Shaftesbury first turns, somewhat abruptly, to the topic of ‘morality and religion’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 37).Footnote 1 There he proposes numerous criticisms of an approach to morals he associates with Epicurus among the ancients and with Hobbes among the moderns. According to the Epicurean/Hobbesian picture, there are no moral requirements, rules, or virtues that apply or exist antecedent to the social compact. Moreover, our motivation and obligation to morality or virtue stem from what is in our own interests. But for Shaftesbury, virtue, which he connects to ‘a social feeling or sense of partnership with humankind’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 50), is natural. Indeed, ‘faith, justice, honesty and virtue must have been as early as the state of nature’, for otherwise there would have been no obligation to obey the social contract (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 51). And what is natural, in the relevant sense, ‘in any creature or any kind…is that which is preservative of the kind itself and conducing to its welfare and support’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 51).
Regarding the motive to be moral, Shaftesbury distinguishes between ‘the mere vulgar of mankind’ and the ‘man of a liberal education’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 59) or ‘good breeding’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 60): whereas the latter is motivated to be virtuous for its own sake (since virtue is ‘estimable in itself’ – (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 46)), the former ‘often stand in need of such a rectifying object as the gallows before their eyes’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 59). Well-bred humans, he tells us, act ‘from nature, in a manner necessarily and without reflection’: they never deliberate about whether to commit ‘rude or brutal’ actions on the basis of ‘prudential rules of self-interest and advantage’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 60).
In the Soliloquy, Shaftesbury recommends the process of dividing oneself into two persons, in such a way as to have a critical dialogue with oneself (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 83) and examine one's own affections and passions. The end result of soliloquizing, he tells us, is that one ‘must undoubtedly come the better to understand a human breast, and judge the better both of others and [one]self’, and this judgment will help in the ‘regulation and government of those passions on which the conduct of life depends’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 132). Self-criticism, Shaftesbury concludes, will make us ‘grow wiser, prove less conceited and introduce into our character that modesty, condescension and just humanity which is essential to the success of all friendly counsel and admonition’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 162).
In the first part of An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, which (unlike the other essays) takes the form of a philosophical treatise, Shaftesbury deepens his account of goodness and virtue. One of the guiding questions of the Inquiry is whether atheists can be virtuous. To answer this question, Shaftesbury finds it necessary to give an account of atheism and then of the nature of virtue, which he does by first providing an account of the nature of goodness.
Perfect atheism is the belief that there is ‘nothing of a designing principle or mind nor any cause, measure or rule of things but chance, so that in nature neither the interest of the whole nor of any particulars can be said to be in the least designed, pursued, or aimed at’. Perfect theism, by contrast, is the view that ‘everything is governed, ordered or regulated for the best by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 165).
To define goodness, Shaftesbury begins by pointing out that parts of larger natural systems are good or ill inasmuch as they make for the good or ill of the systems of which they are the parts, and whether an animal is a part of a larger system depends on whether ‘there be anything which points beyond himself and by which he is plainly discovered to have relation to some other being or nature besides his own’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 168). Thus, animals that may appear ill or bad, when considered in isolation, may indeed be good when considered as parts of larger systems.
But what makes human beings good or bad? Shaftesbury argues that diseases and convulsive fits cannot make humans bad, and that being hindered from doing the mischief they desire or abstaining from executing an ill purpose through fear of punishment or the allurement of reward does not make humans good (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 169). Instead, what makes human beings good or bad is the state of their affections or passions. Thus, ‘a good creature is such a one as by the natural temper or bent of his affections is carried primarily and immediately, and not secondarily and accidentally, to good and against ill’, whereas ‘an ill creature is…one who is wanting in right affections of force enough to carry him directly towards good and bear him out against ill or who is carried by other affections directly to ill and against good’, where the relevant good or ill is thought of as the public good or ill, the good or ill of the species (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 171–172).
But goodness, says Shaftesbury, is not sufficient for virtue. Non-human animals can have all manner of good affections, i.e., affections that conduce to the public good, such as generosity, kindness, constancy, and compassion (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 173). But they are incapable of virtue, because they lack the ability to form ‘general notions of things’ or to reflect on their affections (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 172). Virtuous human beings, by contrast, are humans who are good (i.e., their affections carry them, primarily and immediately, towards the public good) by virtue of the fact that they disinterestedly approve upon reflection of their good affections and either have no ill affections or counter such ill affections as they have by disinterested disapproval of those affections (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, pp. 172–177). Shaftesbury thinks of what is agreeable or disagreeable in our affections as a matter of harmony or dissonance (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 173), so that the second-order discernment involved in being affected by one's affections is a kind of responsiveness to moral beauty.
Shaftesbury goes on to claim that all human beings are both naturally good (inasmuch as they naturally possess affections, such as pity, love, and kindness, that tend to the public good) and naturally virtuous (inasmuch as they have a natural liking for their good affections and a dislike of their contraries) (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 178). In this way, all human beings have what Shaftesbury calls ‘the sense of right and wrong’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 177 ff.), which he also identifies as a ‘natural moral sense’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 180). And he theorizes that, in order to become ill or vicious, human beings must either be corrupted by ‘the force of custom and education in opposition to’ their natural moral sense (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 179) or find themselves unable to withstand their own selfish affections or ‘sudden, strong and forcible passion’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 182), even as they retain their moral sense.
The role of religion in Shaftesbury's theory of virtue is complicated. On the one hand, false religions sometimes teach the love and admiration of an ill deity (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 180), so that their adherents lose the proper understanding of the public good and become ill or vicious as a result. And if religions teach that one should submit to the will of a deity, even a good deity, ‘through hope merely of reward or fear of punishment’, then ‘there is in this case…no virtue or goodness whatsoever’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 183). But on the other hand, religion sometimes portrays God as a ‘true model and example of the most exact justice and highest goodness and worth’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 182), in which case religion serves the cause of virtue. And even hope of divine reward and fear of divine punishment can support virtue by counteracting selfishness and other ill affections (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 185). Moreover, religion can sustain virtue in a way that atheism cannot, for the theist who recognizes that all is for the best exhibits greater patience, constancy, and acquiescence in the face of ill accidents than does the atheist, who tends instead towards ‘a natural kind of abhorrence and spleen’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, pp. 190–91). But ultimately Shaftesbury insists that, even if true religion can be supportive of virtue, it is possible for atheists to be virtuous.
In the second part of the Inquiry, Shaftesbury defends the classical Socratic/Stoic position that virtue is sufficient for happiness. The central claim is that social love and other natural affections that tend toward the public good, which are active and not suppressed in virtuous human beings, naturally result in ‘community or participation in the pleasures of others and belief of meriting well from others’; and out of these arises ‘more than nine-tenths of whatever is enjoyed in life’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 205). In addition, rational creatures are naturally self-reflective, and, in their soliloquizing moments, experience self-reproach regarding any of their affections that conduce to ill. They will therefore be happier if those affections are extinguished or counteracted (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 208).
In The Moralists, Shaftesbury brings all of the themes discussed in the previous essays together in the shape of a wide-ranging and sprawling dialogue, with the addition of an argument by design for the existence of a deity (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, pp. 274–76) and criticisms of versions of the cosmological argument (such as Locke's) that appeal to ‘a first cause, a first being and a beginning of motion’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 278). Shaftesbury's version of the design argument presupposes that the universe is beautiful, in the sense that all of its parts are carefully designed to work in harmony so as to form a ‘universal system and coherent scheme of things’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 275). This assumption, which Shaftesbury thinks would be obvious to ‘any fair and just contemplator of the works of nature’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 275), also grounds a theodicy. For, as one of his characters in the dialogue puts it, ‘if nature herself be not for man but man for nature, then must man, by his good leave, submit to the elements of nature and not the elements to him’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 280). We can therefore understand the bad things that happen to good or innocent people (especially natural evils, such as earthquakes) as necessary by-products of a universe that is the best of all possible worlds. (It is not for nothing that Leibniz, writing of Shaftesbury's Characteristics in 1712, says: ‘I found in it almost all of my Theodicy before it saw the light of day…If I had seen this work before my Theodicy was published, I should have profited as I ought and should have borrowed its great passages.’)Footnote 2
In five Miscellaneous Reflections on the five essays that comprise the Characteristics, Shaftesbury recapitulates yet again, in the same order but in the same loose manner of ‘rambling from subject to subject, from style to style’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 393), some of the main themes of the book. It is clear that Berkeley read these reflections carefully, for in both the first (1732) and second (1752) edition of Alciphron 3 he quotes (more or less accurately) from several passages in the third and fifth Miscellanies.
In 1725, Francis Hutcheson published An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (in two treatises, one on beauty and one on virtue) in large part ‘to recommend the Lord Shaftesbury's Writings to the World’ (Preface).Footnote 3 One of Hutcheson's most important contributions takes the form of a defense of Shaftesbury's claim that we are all endowed with a moral sense, distinct from a sense of our own self-interest or advantage. According to Shaftesbury, ‘it is full as impossible to conceive that a rational creature, coming first to be tried by rational objects and receiving into his mind the images or representations of justice, generosity, gratitude or other virtue, should have no liking of these or dislike of their contraries…Coming therefore to a capacity of seeing and admiring in this new way, it must needs find a beauty and a deformity as well in actions, minds and tempers as in figures, sounds or colours’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 178).
Hutcheson offers various arguments for the existence of a moral sense, a ‘perception of moral good [that] is not deriv'd from custom, education, example, or study’ (Hutcheson, Reference Hutcheson and Leidhold2004, p. 99). The most important argument for our purposes appears in the following passage:
A covetous man shall dislike any branch of trade, how useful soever it may be to the publick, if there is no gain for himself in it; here is an aversion from interest. Propose a sufficient premium, and he shall be the first who sets about it, with full satisfaction in his own conduct. Now is it the same way with our sense of moral actions? Should any one advise us to wrong a minor, or orphan, or to do an ungrateful action toward a benefactor; we at first view abhor it: assure us that it will be very advantageous to us, propose even a reward; our sense of the action is not alter'd. (Hutcheson, Reference Hutcheson and Leidhold2004, p. 95)
Hutcheson is providing reasons to accept Shaftesbury's claim that our representations of vicious actions in particular elicit from us a sense of moral deformity. Sense, here, is opposed to reason, which is conceived as an instrument used to calculate what is to one's own advantage. Hutcheson's argument is that if the sense of deformity were simply the manifestation of rational self-interest, then our evaluation of particular acts of injustice (such as wronging minors or orphans) would become positively, rather than negatively, valenced. But we do not experience such a change: if you explain that wronging a child will be advantageous to me, my evaluation of the act of wronging does not change from negative to positive. So, the sense of moral deformity, like the sense of taste or hearing, must be a faculty distinct from the faculty of instrumental rationality.
2. Berkeley's Criticisms of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson
In the third chapter of Alciphron, Berkeley takes aim at Shaftesbury's Characteristics, but also at Hutcheson's elaboration of Shaftesbury's moral sense theory. I will discuss Berkeley's central criticisms in the order in which they are presented.
First, a note about the characters in Alciphron. Lysicles and Alciphron are described as ‘free-thinkers’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 1.1, p. 32), hostile to superstitious prejudices and religious beliefs that are used to keep ordinary people in subjection to despotic government, and ultimately hostile to theism itself, treating atheism as ‘the very top and perfection of free-thinking’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 1.9, p. 44).Footnote 4 Lysicles keeps fairly consistently to the views defended by Bernard Mandeville in The Fable of the Bees, and plays no role in the discussion that will occupy us. Alciphron appears to move from one free-thinking philosophy to another, in keeping with Berkeley's claim that free-thinkers are ‘writers of different opinions’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 1.1, p. 32). Euphranor and Crito are friends, with the former speaking for philosophy and the latter for religion. And the reason Berkeley describes them as friends is precisely that, as he sees it, philosophy, using reason, helps the cause of religion, which is virtue and salvation.Footnote 5
Berkeley's central criticism begins with an exposition of a moral theory in section 3 that is recognizably Shaftesbury's. Alciphron tells us, among other things, that ‘infidels’ can be just as virtuous as theists, perhaps even more so because if they are virtuous then it is not through ‘fear or hope’, the kind of motivation that is inconsistent with virtue; that ‘there is an idea of Beauty natural to the mind of man’, that men are naturally delighted by the contemplation of it, and that it ‘attracts without a reason’ as a matter of ‘untutored judgment’; that beauty is a function of order and symmetry perceived by ‘a certain interior sense’, whether in the case of ‘corporeal things’ or in the case of the ‘moral world’ (all of which explains why ‘men's first thoughts and natural notions are the best in moral matters’); that the ability to sense this beauty depends on ‘a delicate and fine taste’, of which every rational creature has more or less; and that systems of rational beings are formed and held together by ‘mutual sympathy’, a ‘propension towards doing good to our kind’ and a ‘delight in beholding the virtuous deeds of other men, or in reflecting on our own’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.3, pp. 116–118).
Berkeley's first criticism of Shaftesbury's moral theory appears in section 4. There Euphranor tries to tie Shaftesbury's conception of moral beauty (‘to kalon’) to the Platonic concept of the profitable (ophelimon), and to the Aristotelian concept of the laudable (epaineton) (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.4, p. 118).Footnote 6 After some brief skirmishing, Alciphron replies that he does not identify moral beauty with either the Platonic or the Aristotelian conception of it (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.4, p. 119).
Prompted by Euphranor to give a better explication of moral beauty (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.4, p. 119), Alciphron refuses on the grounds that it is ‘an object, not of the discursive faculty [i.e., reason], but of a peculiar sense, which is properly called the moral sense’, in the way that the eye is adapted to the perception of colors and the ear is adapted to the perception of sounds (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.5, p. 120). It is at this point that Alciphron comes to represent Hutcheson's elaboration of Shaftesbury's moral theory. For it is not Shaftesbury, but Hutcheson, who emphasizes that moral beauty is the object of a special faculty of sensing. In his Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design, Hutcheson provides two main arguments for this conclusion. The first is that the pleasure deriving from our perception of beauty ‘does not arise from any knowledge of principles, proportions, causes, or of the usefulness’ of objects, ‘nor does the most accurate knowledge increase this pleasure of beauty’ (Hutcheson, Reference Hutcheson and Leidhold2004, p. 25). The second is that ‘the ideas of beauty and harmony, like other sensible ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any resolution of our own, nor any prospect of advantage or disadvantage, vary the beauty or deformity of an object’ (Hutcheson, Reference Hutcheson and Leidhold2004, p. 25).
Berkeley's immediate response (in the mouth of Euphranor) is that our natural affections (such as compassion for the distressed and tenderness for our own offspring) are not equally distributed among human beings: some of these affections are ‘strongest and uppermost in one mind, others in another’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.5, p. 120). Among commentators, there is, I believe, some confusion about Berkeley's point here. According to Paul Olscamp, Berkeley is trying to tell us that ‘given the variation in men's appetites and passions, the moral sense theory leads to moral anarchy and relativism’ (Olscamp, Reference Olscamp1969, p. 168). According to Laurent Jaffro, Berkeley's point is that a moral sense ‘would be subjective – and as such arbitrary – insofar as it is identical with “passion or inward feeling”’. Jaffro also claims that Berkeley is here reusing an argument from Passive Obedience, to the effect that ‘tenderness and benevolence of temper’ should not be ‘the sole rule of our actions’, because ‘they may possibly betray us into as great enormities as any other unbridled lust’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Vol. 6, p. 23; Jaffro, Reference Jaffro and Daniel2007, p. 168). Adam Grzelinski thinks that Berkeley is accusing Shaftesbury of utopianism: ‘Berkeley…stresses the utopian nature of this way of thinking, and accuses Shaftesbury of excessive optimism…The sublime beauty of the human spirit and heroic virtue are not accessible to all. Such experience…is but the emotional disposition, which is too labile and impermanent to serve as a foundation for ethics’ (Grzelinski, Reference Grzelinski and Charles2015, p. 218).
But none of these commentators has quite understood why Berkeley thinks that the unequal distribution of natural affections constitutes a problem for Shaftesbury. Berkeley is not here worried about anarchy, or relativism, or subjectivity, or arbitrariness, or great enormities, or lability, or impermanence. What worries Berkeley is that if moral conduct is a function of natural affection, then the fact that some affections are stronger in some minds and other affections are stronger in others entails that the rule that one should follow one's natural affections will be ‘a very uncertain guide in morals’, given that it will ‘infallibly lead different men different ways, according to the prevalency of this or that appetite or passion’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.5, p. 120). Thus, for example, strong compassion for the distressed in some will lead them to help those in dire need, while weak compassion in others will lead them to ignore the needs of others; strong tenderness for offspring will lead some to care for their children, while weak tenderness will lead others to neglect them; and strong patriotism will lead some to fight for their country, while weak patriotism will lead others to avoid military service. Berkeley's presupposition here is that moral theory should offer us universal and consistent moral guidance. A true account of morality should not recommend opposite courses of conduct to two persons who are in exactly the same situation.
How successful is this criticism? As I see it, Berkeley is either confused or treating Shaftesbury unfairly. (I suspect the former.) Recall that Shaftesbury's theory provides for two levels of affection. The first-order affections that matter to virtue and vice are affections toward the good or ill of others, affections such as generosity, compassion, and love (and their opposites: stinginess, malice, and hatred). To possess affections that tend to the public good is to be a good human being, but not yet to be a virtuous human being. Virtue requires second-order affections directed at first-order affections, namely, approval of affections that tend to the public good, and disapproval of affections that tend to the public ill. Moral beauty (or deformity), according to Shaftesbury, lies in the first-order affections and the actions that those affections produce. Perception and appreciation of this beauty (or deformity) is what our moral sense delivers, at the second-order, not at the first-order. So, whether our first-order affections, such as those Berkeley discusses (fellow-feeling, tenderness toward offspring, affection towards friends, indignation against injustice) are unequal in strength across the human population is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of Shaftesbury's theory of virtue, thought of as the approval of good and the disapproval of bad first-order affections. Presumably, Shaftesbury is aware that some people feel more compassion for strangers than do others, that some people are more patriotic than others, and so on. But first-order affections are not the ultimate moral guide. What matters, for Shaftesbury, is virtue. For example, I might find in myself a certain degree of misanthropy (a first-order affection). Reflecting on this, I experience disapproval of this misanthropy. This disapproval (a second-order affection) leads me to counteract the misanthropy in various ways, perhaps by informing myself about the needs of others and about the ways in which their lives are similar to mine. This is virtue in action, and what Shaftesbury recommends. It is not Shaftesbury's view that we should simply follow whatever first-order affections we find in ourselves. I conclude that Berkeley's ‘uncertain guide’ criticism of Shaftesbury in Alciphron 3.5 fails.
It is at this point in the exchange that Alciphron offers an argument for the view that the second-order perception of moral beauty (in particular) issues from a sensing, rather than from a reasoning, faculty:
Make an experiment on the first man you meet. Propose a villainous or unjust action. Take his first sense of the matter, and you shall find he detests it. He may, indeed, be afterwards misled by arguments, or overpowered by temptation; but his original, unpremeditated, and genuine thoughts are just and orthodox. How can we account for this but by a moral sense, which, left to itself, hath as quick and true a perception of the beauty and deformity of human actions as the eye hath of colours? (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3:6, p. 121)
As I have already noted, this argument belongs to Hutcheson, rather than to Shaftesbury. In response, Berkeley (speaking through Euphranor), answers as follows:
May not this be sufficiently accounted for by conscience, affection, passion, education, reason, custom, religion; which principles and habits, for aught I know, may be what you metaphorically call a moral sense? (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.6, p. 121)
There is confusion among commentators about the substance of this reply. Grzelinski, for example, argues that Berkeley is worried that ‘the passions can be partial’ when ‘deprived of the guidance of reason’, and that ‘in reality altruism too frequently shows a certain partiality’ (Grzelinski, Reference Grzelinski and Charles2015, 219). But there is no sign of concern about the excessive partiality of first-order or second-order affections in Euphranor's reply. Stephen Darwall claims that Berkeley's point is that ‘the reflective responses that Shaftesbury attributed to a ‘natural moral sense’ could be explained better on other grounds’ (Darwall, Reference Darwall and Winkler2005, 317). But this doesn't seem quite right, given that Euphranor doesn't explicitly suggest that conscience, education, reason, custom, and religion do a better job of explaining why it is that people react with horror when one proposes that they commit some unjust act. Jaffro claims that Berkeley's criticism of Alciphron's argument for the existence of a moral sense is that ‘such a hypothesis is superfluous’ (Jaffro, Reference Jaffro and Daniel2007, p. 205). This is closer to the truth of the matter. Berkeley's point is that because reason, embodied in religious conscience, is sufficient to explain the initial reaction of horror at the prospect of committing an injustice, it is not necessary to hypothesize a special moral sense to explain the reaction.Footnote 7 Jaffro goes on to say that ‘the point against the moral sense is that it does not explain how morality can be enforced; it even seems to exempt us from the necessity of any enforcement of morality’ (Jaffro, Reference Jaffro and Daniel2007, p. 205). But there is no sign of any concerns about the enforcement of morality in Euphranor's response to Alciphron's Hutchesonian argument.
How good is Berkeley's ‘superfluity’ response to Hutcheson? Berkeley is suggesting that one's reaction of horror at the thought of committing an atrocity might well be the product of reason and education, and that the immediacy of the reaction, the lack of deliberation involved in rejecting it as an option, might simply be the product of custom. It must be granted that this is possible. But Hutcheson might reply by pointing to the same horror and lack of deliberation in young children who understand that they are being given the option to wrong a friend, but who have not yet demonstrated the laws of nature (see footnote 7) or experienced a religious upbringing that emphasizes the rewards of heaven and the punishments of hellfire in an afterlife. It is an empirical question whether Hutcheson is right about this, and in the absence of relevant data, it is difficult to say who has the better of the argument.Footnote 8
This brings us to the most important and central criticism of Hutcheson's version of Shaftesbury's moral theory. After a brief interlude in section 7, Euphranor shifts his attention to the Hutchesonian conception of beauty, focusing first on the beauty of sensible objects (in sections 8 and 9), and turning next to the beauty of a moral system (in section 10). In section 8, Euphranor offers an argument that beauty in sensible things ‘is an object, not of the eye, but of the mind’, that is, an object of reason rather than of a hypothesized moral sense (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.8, pp. 123–24). The argument is straightforward, and I reconstruct it as follows:
1. Beauty in sensible objects consists in a certain symmetry or proportion.
2. Proportion in a sensible object implies a mutual relation of size and shape in the object's parts that makes the whole complete and perfect in its kind.
3. An object is perfect in its kind when it answers the end for which it was made.
So,
4. Determining whether a sensible object is beautiful requires comparing its parts one with another, considering them as belonging to one whole, and referring this whole to its use or end. (from 1, 2, 3)
5. Comparing parts, considering them as belonging to a whole, and referring this whole to a use or end is the work, not of sight only, but of reason through sight.
So,
6. Determining whether a sensible object is beautiful is the work, not of sight only, but of reason through sight. (from 4, 5)
At the end of section 8, and throughout section 9, Berkeley illustrates and defends the conclusion of this argument by looking at examples of human artifacts (chairs, doors, clothes, pillars, and entablatures). In each case, Euphranor argues that the beauty of the artifact is a function of whether the relation of its parts to each other (i.e., its proportions) is subservient to the end for which it was made (offering a convenient seat in the case of a chair, a convenient entrance in the case of a door, the freedom, ease, and convenience of the body in the case of clothing, supporting a building in the case of a pillar, and giving firmness and union to a building, as well as protecting it from the elements, in the case of an entablature).
In section 10, Berkeley extrapolates from his discussion of sensible beauty to the case of moral beauty. For most commentators who pay attention to this argument (not all do), the extrapolation is straightforward.Footnote 9 Just as the beauty of a sensible object is a function of the end for which it was made, so the beauty of a moral system is a function of the end for which it was made. And wherever there are ends, there must be an end-setter. In the case of a moral system, Berkeley supposes that the relevant setter of ends is God. So, determining whether a moral system is beautiful is the work of reason, working out how the parts of that system, namely human beings, are parts of a unified whole that is subservient to some divine goal or purpose. Because God is good, his purposes must be so too, and thus his aim in creating the moral system is ‘the common benefit of the whole’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciprhon, Ch. 3.10, p. 129). Two things appear to follow from this. First, moral beauty, like the beauty of sensible objects, is perceived by reason, rather than by sense, contrary to Hutcheson's version of moral sense theory. And second, because in this life it is evident that many of the wicked are not punished and many of the virtuous are not rewarded, the beauty of a moral system depends on the implementation of divine justice in an afterlife, and thus requires, as Crito puts it early in the dialogue, ‘Providence, the Immortality of the Soul, and a future Retribution of rewards and punishments’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.3, p. 118). It will not do, then, to suppose, as Shaftesbury does, that virtue, which involves approval of moral beauty and disapproval of moral deformity, is possible for atheists or for those who treat ‘the great points of Faith’ as ‘exploded conceits’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.7, p. 122).
Before asking whether Berkeley's central criticism of Hutcheson and Shaftesbury succeeds, I want to emphasize an aspect of the criticism that seems to have escaped commentators. Consider that Shaftesbury is not bereft of resources to respond to Berkeley's criticism. Like Berkeley, Shaftesbury thinks that human beings are parts of a greater whole, ‘a system of all animals’; and this system of all animals is itself ‘comprehended in one system of a globe or earth’, which system is itself part of a larger system that is itself part of ‘a system of all things’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 169). Moreover, Shaftesbury believes that a design argument establishes something that is central to Berkeley's criticism, namely the existence of an intelligent deity who created and maintains the universe for certain purposes. So, Shaftesbury could accept a great deal of what Berkeley says, including the thesis that beauty is a matter of rational proportion that is fitting to an end and the thesis that there is a supreme intelligence guiding and disposing the universe according to its own purposes, without going as far as to accept that moral beauty presupposes rewards and punishments in an afterlife or that virtue requires instrumental reasoning to determine which forms of behavior will be rewarded, and which punished, after death. For, according to Shaftesbury, there is no reason to suppose that the good of the system of all things, the good of the universe as a whole, requires that the virtuous be rewarded and the wicked punished: the good of the universe is compatible with the ill of the solar system, the good of the solar system is compatible with the ill of the planets, the good of the planets is compatible with the ill of the Earth, the good of the Earth is compatible with the ill of the system of animals, the good of the system of animals is compatible with the ill of humanity, and the good of humanity is compatible with the ill of particular human beings. Shaftesbury, like Leibniz, thinks that the universe is the best of all possible worlds, but that it is possible that the best universe might well require the ill of certain parts.Footnote 10
So, we need to think about why Berkeley and Shaftesbury part ways where they do, especially given how many assumptions they share. The central question is why ‘the beauty of a moral system, with a supreme Intelligence at the head of it’, necessarily requires protection of the innocent, punishment of the wicked, and rewarding of the virtuous (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.10, p. 129). According to all the commentators of whom I am aware, there is no clear answer to this question. We have hit rock bottom. Berkeley looks at the universe that Shaftesbury describes, and finds it deformed. As Crito puts it: ‘Is it not, I beseech you, an ugly system in which you can suppose no law and prove no duty, wherein men thrive by wickedness and suffer by virtue?’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.11, p. 130). Shaftesbury looks at the same kind of universe, designed by a supreme deity for its own purposes, and finds it beautiful, indeed sublime. The disagreement has all the marks of a stalemate, one to which the proper response on either side appears to be an incredulous stare.
But in actual fact Berkeley and Shaftesbury have sharply differing conceptions of the universe's denizens. Shaftesbury, like his ex-tutor Locke, is a materialist. He simply takes for granted that the universe is composed of material substances existing outside of our minds, that rocks, plants, animals, the Sun, the Moon, the galaxy, and the vast proliferation of stars in the firmament are all out there in an external world. But, as we know from the Treatise and the Three Dialogues, Berkeley denies that matter exists, indeed he denies that matter is even possible (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, PHK p. 9), concluding that all physical objects are nothing more than collections of ideas (because they are collections of qualities, all of which, whether primary or secondary, are ideas – (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, DHP, p. 175, p. 187, p. 194)), and consequently, because ideas do not subsist by themselves and hence fail to be substances (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, PHK p. 89), that the only substances that exist in the universe are minds (including God) (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, PHK p. 33). So, the moral system of which Berkeley speaks is, as Crito emphasizes, ‘a system of spirits’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.11, p. 129).Footnote 11 It is a system of spirits, not because Berkeley thinks that only minds are relevant to the question of moral beauty, but because he thinks that minds are the only substances in the universe. It is on the strength of this thesis that Berkeley can confidently deny what Shaftesbury affirms, namely, that it is possible for the good of the universe to require the collective ill of human minds. For in Berkeley's universe there is no system of substances greater than the system of minds, no greater system whose good might best be served by the ill of all or most of those minds. The good of the universe just is the good of those minds, and the good of human minds simply consists in those minds getting what they justly deserve (rewards in the case of virtue, punishment in the case of vice).
There is therefore no stalemate here between Shaftesbury and Berkeley, and the debate does not reduce to a battle of incredulous stares. Whether Berkeley is right or wrong about the necessary connection between the existence of moral beauty and ‘the great points of Faith’ hinges in large part on whether idealism is true or false. It is here, perhaps more than anywhere else, that the systematicity of Berkeley's philosophy becomes manifest. Metaphysics and morals are not autonomous in Berkeley's worldview. And this fact is, if I may say, one of the most beautiful aspects of his philosophical corpus.
It is now appropriate to ask whether Berkeley's criticism of Shaftesbury succeeds. As to the main point of difference between them, the answer is that which of them has the better of the other depends in large part on whether Berkeley's arguments for idealism, and against materialism, are persuasive.Footnote 12
But this is not the only place where one might object to Berkeley's argument. Hutcheson, in particular, who is far more concerned than Shaftesbury is to establish that beauty is perceived by sense, rather than by reason, refuses to accept that beauty always requires proportion, or at least the kind of proportion that is subservient to an end. In a footnote added to the fourth edition of section IV of the Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design (1738), Hutcheson responds directly to Berkeley's criticism:
’Tis surprising to see the ingenious author of Alciphron alledging, that all beauty observed is solely some use perceived or imagined; for no other reason than this, that the apprehension of the use intended, occurs continually, when we are judging of the forms of chairs, doors, tables, and some other things of obvious use; and that we like those forms most, which are fittest for the use. Whereas we see, that in these very things similitude of parts is regarded, where unlike parts would be equally useful: thus the feet of a chair would be of the same use, tho’ unlike, were they equally long; tho’ one were strait, and the other bended; or one bending outwards, and the other inwards: a coffin-shape for a door would bear a more manifest aptitude to the human shape, than that which artists require. And then what is the use of these imitations of nature, or of its works, in architecture? Why should a pillar please which has some of the human proportions? Is the end or use of a pillar the same as of a man? Why the imitation of other natural or well-proportioned things in the entablature? Is there then a sense of imitation, relishing it where there is no other use than this, that it naturally pleases? Again; is no man pleased with the shapes of any animals, but those which he expects use from? The shapes of the horse or the ox may promise use to the owner; but is he the only person who relishes the beauty? And is there no beauty discerned in plants, in flowers, in animals, whose use is to us unknown? (Hutcheson, Reference Hutcheson and Leidhold2004, p. 210, note 17)
As Hutcheson sees it, then, similarity of parts is required for beauty, even when the proportions of shape and size (as in the case of the legs of a chair) are sufficient for the relevant object's purpose. It follows that proportionality that subserves a given end is not sufficient for beauty. A coffin-shaped door is better suited to permit the entry and exit of human bodies, and yet is counted ugly by comparison to rectangular doors. It follows that proportionality that subserves the end of ingress and egress is not what makes doors beautiful. Pillars are thought to be more beautiful if they have human proportions, but human proportions do not subserve the end of a pillar, which is to support a floor or roof of a building. The beauty of an entablature, which is connected to its imitation of natural or well-proportioned things, has nothing to do with its purpose, which is to give firmness and union to a building and to protect it from the weather. We recognize the beauty of animals that are not in any way useful to us, and we recognize the beauty of plants and animals without being able to refer them to any use at all. All of these remarks, taken together, suggest a different account of beauty than that of proportionality subserving an object's end or purpose. Hutcheson himself proposes that beauty consists in uniformity in variety, a theory of beauty that is designedly non-teleological. But even if Hutcheson's theory is mistaken, it will be difficult for Berkeley to argue that his own teleological theory is compatible with widely-held commonsensical ascriptions of beauty and ugliness to sensible things.
We have looked at Berkeley's central criticism of the Hutchesonian version of Shaftesbury's moral theory. But Berkeley has one additional criticism, placed in the mouth of Crito in section 13 of Alciphron 3, a section in which aspects of Shaftesbury's ethical views are summarized as belonging to a character called ‘Cratylus’. This feature of the criticism has misled at least one commentator, Laurent Jaffro, who infers from the fact that Alciphron offers two different expositions, one in section 3 and the other in section 13, that ‘Berkeley was well aware that Shaftesbury had changed his mind concerning the moral sense and that in the Soliloquy he had substantially modified the views he had expressed formerly in his Inquiry concerning Virtue’ (Jaffro, Reference Jaffro and Daniel2007, p. 206). As Jaffro sees it, the Shaftesbury of the Inquiry defends a Hutchesonian conception ‘that regarded the sense of right and wrong as analogous to our sensory organs’, whereas the Shaftesbury of the Soliloquy ‘had developed a quite different conception, according to which the moral sense, as a moral taste, has to be developed and trained’ (Jaffro, Reference Jaffro and Daniel2007, p. 206). Jaffro then reads Berkeley's criticism as an accusation of elitism ‘insofar as [Shaftesbury's Soliloquy conception of the moral sense] supposes a personal achievement’, a ‘matter of refined education and some kind of connoisseurship’ (Jaffro, Reference Jaffro and Daniel2007, p. 208).
Jaffro's reading, according to which Berkeley has realized that the views of early Shaftesbury and late Shaftesbury, despite being published all together at the same time in 1711, contain different conceptions of the moral sense, is mistaken. The most important piece of textual evidence that Berkeley doesn't take Shaftesbury to have changed his mind in the way Jaffro suggests is that according to the earlier section 3 exposition, the appreciation or ‘relish’ of moral beauty requires ‘a delicate and fine taste’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciprhon, Ch. 3.3, p. 117). So, even if Shaftesbury did change his mind regarding whether the moral sense is acquired by means of a refined education, Berkeley shows no signs of having picked up on the change. Furthermore, as I will explain, Berkeley's criticism of Cratylus has nothing to do with elitism.
Still, Jaffro's question, why Berkeley would provide two different expositions of Shaftesbury's ethics, is a good one. The answer, as I see it, is that the views represented as belonging to Cratylus, are supposed to constitute the practical, rather than the theoretical, aspect of Shaftesbury's moral outlook. We can see this in Crito's summary of Cratylus's views in section 13. Crito begins by telling us that Cratylus ‘did, under the pretence of making men heroically virtuous, endeavour to destroy the means of making them reasonably and humanly so’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciprhon, Ch. 3.13, p. 132). The problem, Crito tells us, is that Shaftesbury's view that we should leave it to ‘taste or relish’ to be ‘what will influence’ moral conduct is a practical recipe for disaster: it is ‘as if a monarch should give out that there was neither jail nor executioner in his kingdom to enforce the laws, but that it would be beautiful to observe them, and that in so doing men would taste the pure delight which results from order and decorum’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.13, p. 133). The better alternative, according to Crito, is the inculcation of religious beliefs, including belief ‘of a future state of rewards and punishments’, to motivate virtuous conduct in the citizenry, something that Shaftesbury however apparently dismisses as ‘children's tales and amusements of the vulgar’ (Berkeley, Reference Berkeley, Luce and Jessop1950, Alciphron, Ch. 3.13, p. 133; see Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 414).
But Berkeley is not being fair to Shaftesbury here. For Shaftesbury is an elitist, in the sense that he thinks that there should be different rules for the common folk on the one side and the educated elite on the other. This comes through in a few places in the Characteristics. Recall that in Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury writes: ‘I know, too, that the mere vulgar of mankind often stand in need of such a rectifying object as the gallows before their eyes. Yet I have no belief that any man of a liberal education, or common honesty, ever needed to have recourse to this idea in his mind, the better to restrain him from playing the knave’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 59). And in the third Miscellany, he says this:
Thus, we see, after all, that it is not merely what we call principle but a taste which governs men…Even conscience, I fear, such as is owing to religious discipline, will make but a slight figure where this taste is set amiss. Among the vulgar, perhaps, it may do wonders. A devil and a hell may prevail where a jail and gallows are thought insufficient. But such is the nature of the liberal, polished and refined part of mankind…[that they do not apply] the notion of a future reward or punishment to their immediate behavior in society, [looking] on the pious narrations to be indeed no better than children's tales or the amusement of the mere vulgar. (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, pp. 413–14)
So, when taste in the educated person is set amiss, Shaftesbury doesn't offer religion as a corrective, but rather philosophy, part of the aim of which is to point out that ‘the proportionate and regular state is the truly prosperous and natural in every subject’ (Shaftesbury, Reference Klein1999, p. 414; see also Book II of An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit). But in the case of the vulgar, Shaftesbury is happy not only with the threat of jail and execution to deter vicious conduct, but also dissemination and inculcation of the religious story that vicious conduct will ultimately be punished by the devil in hell, even if not in this life. So, it is not that Berkeley accuses Shaftesbury of elitism for offering us a moral theory that is true only of elite connoisseurs of moral beauty. Instead, Berkeley accuses Shaftesbury, unfairly, of promoting a moral practice that will bring about anarchy and vicious conduct.
But Shaftesbury's elitism does present a problem, even if it is not a problem to which Berkeley draws our attention. One of Shaftesbury's recurring refrains is that every human being, whether educated or uneducated, recognizes that certain forms of conduct (killing, maiming, betraying, cheating, stealing, and so on) are morally deformed and naturally recoils from the deformity. There is a fellow-feeling in all of us, a beneficent disposition towards the downtrodden and the desperate. We have a natural love for our offspring. All of these phenomena convince Shaftesbury that we are designed and born to promote the good of the human species, and of the larger systems of which humanity is a part. So why, then, would fear of the gallows or of a hellish afterlife ever be needed to keep the common folk in check? The answer, I imagine – though this is speculative because Shaftesbury does not consider the objection – is that philosophical reasoning about the pleasures and satisfactions of virtue is likely to be lost on the unrefined and the uneducated whose natural moral sense, for one reason or another, has been corrupted or overwhelmed by passion or selfishness. This is, indeed, an unfortunate, uncomfortably undemocratic position to hold. Whether it is true depends on empirical facts about the degree to which the underprivileged are open to the philosophical cultivation of their moral affections.Footnote 13
