Smaldino rightly critiques cultural evolutionary approaches for falling short of providing models to fully understand human cultural behavior. In particular, he focuses on the failure of these cultural evolutionary approaches to address emergent group-level traits, which Smaldino defines as collaborations that incorporate role differentiation and organizational complexity. Existing cultural evolutionary approaches focus on models of culture that rely on individual-level mechanisms that yield fitness benefits to individuals; insofar as there is a group benefit attributable to a cultural trait in these models, it is a result of the transmitted information happening to produce a group-wide benefit; the underlying traits remain individually selected. As such, these models do not readily address the complex cooperation that we rightly view as a benefit of the cultural process and which offer group-level benefits. Moreover, the handful of postulated cultural learning traits of the cultural evolutionary frameworks proposed to facilitate cultural learning processes are content-independent; there is little in the cultural evolution models that can account for how psychologically we can process a suite of cultural behaviors that function in an integrated fashion.
However, although cultural evolutionary approaches have failed to consider such psychologically sophisticated processes, Smaldino wrongly suggests that this problem has been previously ignored by the literature. The notion of complex forms of cooperation has been discussed, and not just for humans. Such group-level traits drawing on differentiated roles occur in the behavioral suites of non-human animals, particularly social predators, although these behaviors are not usually thought to be cultural (though there is likely to be some learning, part individual, part socially facilitated). Drawing on Tomasello and colleagues (Reference Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll2005), Smaldino incorrectly suggests that collective hunting behavior in chimpanzees constitutes nothing more than each individual doing their own thing, just in concert. In fact, the hunting techniques of chimpanzees, as well as lions and wolves, show that there is clear role differentiation that can be critical to a successful hunt, with individuals adopting key roles to drive the prey into traps, corralled by other individuals, and the kill made by another.
In humans, group-level adaptations that entail distinct roles have been previously explored (O'Gorman et al. Reference O'Gorman, Sheldon and Wilson2008a). For example, Hutchins (Reference Hutchins1995a; Reference Hutchins1995b) has examined a number of social situations that require close collaboration between team members, analogous to the egg hunters discussed by Smaldino. Hutchins examines cockpit crews working to ensure the safe landing of airplanes, and the crew of a ship in bringing it safely into harbor. Closer to Smaldino's concerns, Wilson (Reference Wilson2002) similarly discusses group-adaptive traits that are highly cultural, such as the water temples of Bali, in the context of cultural adaptations. Smaldino himself identifies norm-enforcing institutions as a means to transmit group-adaptive traits.
The question, of course, is: How can these group-adaptive traits operate through the cultural process? In that sense, a key focus for advances in this area should be to draw from our understanding of social norms. Although often thought of as a behavioral conformity process, norms can be expanded to any cognitive variant that can be socially shared. For example, belief in the Christian god in the medieval cultures of Europe was a norm as much as any religious ritual. Given that humans are equipped to share intentionality (Tomasello et al. Reference Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll2005), conformity around beliefs, goals, intentions, and so on readily come under the remit of our normative psychology. Research suggests that humans are particularly evolved to respond to social norms. Alongside the self-evident conformity that is so evident in human behavior, O'Gorman et al. (Reference O'Gorman, Wilson and Miller2008b) have shown that humans have an enhanced ability to retain knowledge of normative information. Adoption of shared goals and intentions in turn can facilitate individuals engaging in different but coordinated behaviors that target the normative goals. Of course, such a process requires that individuals adopt the appropriate behaviors to achieve the goals, the learning of which may occur implicitly or explicitly.
As long as there are behavioral correlates to the cognitive norms, individuals and groups can regulate the functioning of their members, something that is necessary for any costly norm. Just as the belief in the Christian god yielded concomitant socially visible behaviors (attendance at church services, gestures of respect to religious icons, and so on), so any group goal that has an impact in the actual world will have visible markers of conformity to the shared goals. Individuals who are not readily cooperating will be identifiable and can be brought into line through various evolved mechanisms that prevent free riding on norms (O'Gorman et al. Reference O'Gorman, Wilson and Miller2008b; Wilson & O'Gorman Reference Wilson and O'Gorman2003), including gossip (Ellickson Reference Ellickson2009), ostracism (Spoor & Williams Reference Spoor, Williams, Forgas, von Hippel and Haselton2007), and punishment (O'Gorman et al. Reference O'Gorman, Henrich and Van Vugt2009).
To that end, once specific cognitive norms are established and accepted within a group, subservience to such norms will readily follow, just as subservience to behavioral norms tends to follow. As such, it is worth noting that recognition that the normative process is fundamental to group-level traits means that cooperative dispositions once again are restored to central importance, even for Smaldino's emergent group-adaptive traits. Without cooperation in the form of conformity to costly social norms, there can be no emergent group-level traits.
Smaldino has succeeded in focusing our attention on an important problem for cultural models of human cooperation: Although much of culture may operate in a near-unconscious manner, there are important components where individuals need to be cognizant of particular suites of complex collective behaviors – group-level traits – where members must operate in line with what is known to be necessary to succeed in such behaviors. This is not to say that group members will be cognizant of all the behaviors involved in successful completion of such behaviors, but they will need to be aware of shared goals and likely will be highly sensitive to evidence that group members are not contributing appropriately to those goals.
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Smaldino rightly critiques cultural evolutionary approaches for falling short of providing models to fully understand human cultural behavior. In particular, he focuses on the failure of these cultural evolutionary approaches to address emergent group-level traits, which Smaldino defines as collaborations that incorporate role differentiation and organizational complexity. Existing cultural evolutionary approaches focus on models of culture that rely on individual-level mechanisms that yield fitness benefits to individuals; insofar as there is a group benefit attributable to a cultural trait in these models, it is a result of the transmitted information happening to produce a group-wide benefit; the underlying traits remain individually selected. As such, these models do not readily address the complex cooperation that we rightly view as a benefit of the cultural process and which offer group-level benefits. Moreover, the handful of postulated cultural learning traits of the cultural evolutionary frameworks proposed to facilitate cultural learning processes are content-independent; there is little in the cultural evolution models that can account for how psychologically we can process a suite of cultural behaviors that function in an integrated fashion.
However, although cultural evolutionary approaches have failed to consider such psychologically sophisticated processes, Smaldino wrongly suggests that this problem has been previously ignored by the literature. The notion of complex forms of cooperation has been discussed, and not just for humans. Such group-level traits drawing on differentiated roles occur in the behavioral suites of non-human animals, particularly social predators, although these behaviors are not usually thought to be cultural (though there is likely to be some learning, part individual, part socially facilitated). Drawing on Tomasello and colleagues (Reference Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll2005), Smaldino incorrectly suggests that collective hunting behavior in chimpanzees constitutes nothing more than each individual doing their own thing, just in concert. In fact, the hunting techniques of chimpanzees, as well as lions and wolves, show that there is clear role differentiation that can be critical to a successful hunt, with individuals adopting key roles to drive the prey into traps, corralled by other individuals, and the kill made by another.
In humans, group-level adaptations that entail distinct roles have been previously explored (O'Gorman et al. Reference O'Gorman, Sheldon and Wilson2008a). For example, Hutchins (Reference Hutchins1995a; Reference Hutchins1995b) has examined a number of social situations that require close collaboration between team members, analogous to the egg hunters discussed by Smaldino. Hutchins examines cockpit crews working to ensure the safe landing of airplanes, and the crew of a ship in bringing it safely into harbor. Closer to Smaldino's concerns, Wilson (Reference Wilson2002) similarly discusses group-adaptive traits that are highly cultural, such as the water temples of Bali, in the context of cultural adaptations. Smaldino himself identifies norm-enforcing institutions as a means to transmit group-adaptive traits.
The question, of course, is: How can these group-adaptive traits operate through the cultural process? In that sense, a key focus for advances in this area should be to draw from our understanding of social norms. Although often thought of as a behavioral conformity process, norms can be expanded to any cognitive variant that can be socially shared. For example, belief in the Christian god in the medieval cultures of Europe was a norm as much as any religious ritual. Given that humans are equipped to share intentionality (Tomasello et al. Reference Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll2005), conformity around beliefs, goals, intentions, and so on readily come under the remit of our normative psychology. Research suggests that humans are particularly evolved to respond to social norms. Alongside the self-evident conformity that is so evident in human behavior, O'Gorman et al. (Reference O'Gorman, Wilson and Miller2008b) have shown that humans have an enhanced ability to retain knowledge of normative information. Adoption of shared goals and intentions in turn can facilitate individuals engaging in different but coordinated behaviors that target the normative goals. Of course, such a process requires that individuals adopt the appropriate behaviors to achieve the goals, the learning of which may occur implicitly or explicitly.
As long as there are behavioral correlates to the cognitive norms, individuals and groups can regulate the functioning of their members, something that is necessary for any costly norm. Just as the belief in the Christian god yielded concomitant socially visible behaviors (attendance at church services, gestures of respect to religious icons, and so on), so any group goal that has an impact in the actual world will have visible markers of conformity to the shared goals. Individuals who are not readily cooperating will be identifiable and can be brought into line through various evolved mechanisms that prevent free riding on norms (O'Gorman et al. Reference O'Gorman, Wilson and Miller2008b; Wilson & O'Gorman Reference Wilson and O'Gorman2003), including gossip (Ellickson Reference Ellickson2009), ostracism (Spoor & Williams Reference Spoor, Williams, Forgas, von Hippel and Haselton2007), and punishment (O'Gorman et al. Reference O'Gorman, Henrich and Van Vugt2009).
To that end, once specific cognitive norms are established and accepted within a group, subservience to such norms will readily follow, just as subservience to behavioral norms tends to follow. As such, it is worth noting that recognition that the normative process is fundamental to group-level traits means that cooperative dispositions once again are restored to central importance, even for Smaldino's emergent group-adaptive traits. Without cooperation in the form of conformity to costly social norms, there can be no emergent group-level traits.
Smaldino has succeeded in focusing our attention on an important problem for cultural models of human cooperation: Although much of culture may operate in a near-unconscious manner, there are important components where individuals need to be cognizant of particular suites of complex collective behaviors – group-level traits – where members must operate in line with what is known to be necessary to succeed in such behaviors. This is not to say that group members will be cognizant of all the behaviors involved in successful completion of such behaviors, but they will need to be aware of shared goals and likely will be highly sensitive to evidence that group members are not contributing appropriately to those goals.