The United States House of Representatives has voted for articles of impeachment for “high crimes and misdemeanors” against three presidents. The United States Senate subsequently acquitted Presidents Andrew Johnson (1868) and Bill Clinton (1999) because the charges against them were based on political differences rather than constitutional issues. President Richard M. Nixon resigned his office in 1974 before facing a trial in the Senate, tacitly admitting that he had committed the crime of obstructing justice in the Watergate affair. A fair reading of this meticulous, comprehensive study of the Iran-Contra scandal by Malcolm Byrne would lead a US citizen to conclude that President Ronald Reagan broke US laws and deserved impeachment. When he approved the transfer of arms to Iran, Reagan violated the Arms Control Export Act (1976), which required congressional approval of weapons shipments abroad and prohibited sales to supporters of terrorism. The president also violated the Boland Amendments, which banned the transfer of military equipment to the contras, the US-backed counterrevolutionaries who sought to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Byrne further demonstrates that high officials in the Reagan administration, including Vice President George H.W. Bush, shielded Reagan from impeachment by effectively engaging in a wholesale cover up of the abuses of presidential power. The Iran-Contra scandal was tied to Lt. Colonel Oliver L. North, the energetic and often wacky marine who worked in the administration. But Colonel North did not instigate policies; he carried out President Reagan's general directives.
Byrne is the deputy director and research director at the National Security Archive, the Washington-based institute that for the past three decades has fought against government secrecy. In the field of inter-American relations, he and colleagues such as Thomas Blanton, Kate Doyle, and Peter Kornbluh have done invaluable work forcing government agencies to release documents on the US embrace of Latin America's Cold War dictators, including the genocidal President Efraín Ríos Montt (1982–83) of Guatemala. In this study, Byrne had available to him the massive documentary record on Iran-Contra, which includes congressional hearings, the internal investigation conducted by Republican Senator John Tower from Texas, and the three-volume report by special prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh. Byrne is the absolute master of this evidence. He overwhelms the reader with sixty-four pages of footnotes. Byrne has supplemented the publicly available record with scores of interviews with government officials, Central Intelligence Agency clandestine operatives, Iranian, Israeli, and Nicaraguan actors, and former diplomats of the Communist bloc. The National Security Archive obtained a classified set of North's handwritten notebooks for the years 1984–86. Most important, Byrne has investigated the memorandums of conversations at the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group, which have been recently declassified. These documents underscore that President Reagan was “the driving force behind both sides of the scandal” (p. 3).
Scholars have wondered whether President Reagan dominated the policy-making process, especially during his second term, when he may have been afflicted with a decline in mental acuity. Byrne's Reagan is not the leader who was content to read inane bromides written on cue cards handed to him by assistants. At meetings and in discussions with aides such as Robert McFarlane, the NSC Advisor, Reagan made clear that he unequivocally supported the mission of the contras to overthrow the Sandinistas and that he regarded congressional efforts to restrain him as unreasonable checks on presidential power. Reagan took such a position even when he was advised by luminaries, such as Secretary of State George P. Shultz, that lawyers such as Chief of Staff James A. Baker believed that to circumvent the will of Congress and ask for third countries to fund the contras would be an “impeachable offense” (p. 78). Testimony by Admiral John M. Poindexter, McFarlane's successor at the NSC, and President Reagan's own testimony at Poindexter's trial in 1990 revealed that Reagan knew about illicit operations in Central America (pp. 140, 227). Vice President Bush also violated the law when in 1986 he approached the new president of Honduras and asked him, as outlined in his briefing points, to supply the contras with military equipment. In turn, the United States would resupply the Honduran military. It would be done “discreetly” and with “deniability” (pp. 172–73). Bush would later testify that he could not recall whether he delivered this message to the Honduran leader, President José Azcona Hoyo. President Reagan also directed the arms-for-hostages initiatives with Iran. He rejected the arguments, in late 1985, of Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger that the trade would be unwise and illegal. Reagan responded by noting that “he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge [sic] that ‘big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages’” (p. 106). On 17 January 1986, Reagan signed the directive authorizing the United States to ship arms directly to Iran, although Byrne concedes that, in this case, Reagan may not have focused on the details of the directive.
Students of the United States’ role in the Middle East during the 1980s are undoubtedly familiar with most details of the administration's fumbling efforts to open a dialogue with Iranian leaders. Byrne's hour-by-hour account of McFarlane's mission to Tehran in May 1986 is, however, fascinating. For a historian who is not a specialist in this field, two points in Byrne's analysis stand out. The Reagan administration implausibly relied on two feckless arms dealers, Manucher Ghorbanifar and Adnan Khashoggi, to represent US interests. With their endless snafus and serial fabrications, the two men predictably confused Iranian officials. Byrne also emphasizes that Israel pushed to establish a military relationship with revolutionary Iran and played a vital role in persuading the United States to use the sale of arms to engage Iran. Almost since the birth of their nation in 1948, Israeli leaders had seen Iran in strategic terms, hoping it would balance off the power of Arab neighbors.
When, in late 1986, the US public became aware of the illegal dealings with the contras and the arms-for-hostages machinations and the link between the two scandals, the Reagan administration worked successfully to distance the president from his own decisions. As Byrne recounts, Attorney General Edwin Meese III was especially effective in making the case that the president was unaware of his own policies. But the documentary evidence sustains the charge that President Reagan was central to the Iran-Contra scandal. This was the conclusion of the special prosecutor. And it is the conclusion of Malcolm Byrne in this impressive and important book.
