I. INTRODUCTION
The classics of economic liberalism paid modest attention to the specific problems of the peripheries. In the words of one of the main scholars of the idea of development, before the emergence of the field of development economics in the mid-1940s, the mainstream of Western economists had “very little” to say about the world outside western Europe.Footnote 1 The validity of this general perception notwithstanding, we shall argue in this article that Russia was an exception to this rule. Perhaps due to her ambivalent location as a nation considered not fully European (neither completely Asiatic) and to her status as a major player in the international arena despite her modest economic achievements, from the eighteenth century onwards, the “Russian case” called the attention of some of the most prominent Western minds, including the first economists. Moreover, by discussing Russia’s economy, they came to notions and concepts regarding development and backwardness that, to a great extent, informed twentieth-century debate. The aim of this article is to explore the way in which Russia as a case study affected the evolution of ideas on economic growth or development. I shall point to a number of instances in which debates on the “Russian case” contributed to shaping general notions of economic progress. The evidence of things Russian raised doubts about common economic views, thus enabling new thinking that pointed either to criticism of liberal orthodoxy, or to expansion and refinement of its arguments. Indeed, Russia was an awkward presence: European yet Oriental, powerful but backward, she did not completely fit in the main taxonomies of the time. Not surprisingly, this seemingly paradoxical location spread doubts on the validity of those taxonomies and helped to spark new views. In addition, the era of the great reforms in Russia in the 1860s and the policies implemented by the Russian rulers—sometimes inspired by Western economic views, but sometimes self-fashioned—offered unparalleled opportunities for “testing” the validity of economic doctrines in non-Western contexts.
II. EXCLUDING RUSSIA FROM THE MAP OF CIVILIZATION
Before the emergence of the liberal school of economics, it was by no means obvious that there was such a thing as “economic growth” as distinguishable from other aspects of the well-being of a nation. Moreover, the ideal of a continuously growing accumulation of wealth was alien to most thinkers of the eighteenth century, who tended to believe instead that social harmony depended on the moderation of riches and consumption. Indeed, at that time the economy was not a realm thought of as something independent from moral and political considerations. The idea of social happiness or bonheur was not principally related to that of wealth (Grenier Reference Grenier1990). Before Adam Smith’s emphasis on the Wealth of Nations, a fundamental debate took place apropos “civilization” and its alternative meanings. As is well known, that concept appeared for the first time in France in 1757 to express the notion of an expansion of Reason, not just in the political or legal spheres, but also in the realms of the arts, literature, morality, and sciences. The new concept implied that an enlightened nation was one not simply “policée”—that is, endowed with a political and legal order—but also rich in philosophical, artistic, literary, and scientific culture. Thus, “civilization” came to express a new awareness of the unitary and coherent advancement of humankind, from the primitive peoples to the most sophisticated modern Europeans. Very soon, in the ideas of the Physiocrats and the Scottish Enlightenment, the new concept was linked to growth in the economic sphere, so the unitary process of civilization meant the synchronous advancement of production, social and political relations, manners, culture, arts, and sciences (see, among others, Starobinski Reference Starobinski1983). This new belief immediately called into existence its negative image: the idea of a relative “backwardness” of some nations with regards to others. In France, for example, the word “retard” appeared for the first time and spread together with the notions of progress and civilization (Bouchard Reference Bouchard2008, pp. 72–94). These notions would soon after become fundamental as parts of Europe’s self-perception and of the narrative of Western superiority. But before this narrative became dominant, the seemingly paradoxical Russian case generated a most interesting controversy.
Russia was one of the key examples (arguably the most important) in the debates on civilization, at least in eighteenth-century France. Before the new concept emerged, the figure of Peter the Great had sparked great expectations in the Republic of Letters. Starting with Leibniz in the early eighteenth century, the myth of Peter as model of enlightened monarch found numerous believers, the most enthusiastic of which was Voltaire. Being a tabula rasa, as Leibniz used to put it, void of the ancient institutions and social prerogatives that made the advance of Reason more difficult elsewhere in the old Europe, Russia appeared to some of the most important philosophes as the ideal land for the project of the enlightenment. Such a new nation offered a sort of blank sheet for rational projects of reform. In that scenario, nothing could be timelier than a powerful monarch such as Peter or Catherine the Great, who were apparently willing to sign the much-awaited contract between power and reason. The prospects of such alliance and the example of the astonishing progress of Russia—a source of “light” for Europe, a nation “sortie du néant” (“which emerged out of nothing” in Voltaire’s words) only a few decades before, a true miracle of Reason—were so appealing that most of the philosphes decided to overlook the dark aspects of the rulers in St. Petersburg. Indeed, the very expression “enlightened despotism” was nothing but a sweet promise in the ears of the founders of French economic liberalism: the Physiocrats (Perrot Reference Perrot1992). The bitter debate among the philosophes that these expectations sparked is well knownFootnote 2. Of those who engaged in it, the most interesting case is that of Diderot, for he was one of the first to perceive a link between the socio-economic condition of a country and its prospects of civilization. By examining the Russian case, Diderot, who was initially one of the devotees of the “Russian mirage,” came to the conclusion that “civilization” cannot simply be implemented from above by the policies of an enlightened monarch, but is instead the fruit of a long process of socio-economic development.
Diderot became interested in the Russian case around 1766, following a debate among Physiocrats. As Gianluigi Goggi has pointed out, in 1766 one of the leading Physiocrats, the abbé Baudeau, published in the Éphémérides du citoyen a series of articles on Catherine the Great’s 1762–1763 appeals to foreign colonists to settle in Russia under special conditions. Fearing that this proposal was part of a plan for the expansion of Russian power, the French government had reacted with hostility. In this context, Baudeau set out to defend Catherine’s intentions by arguing against the mercantilist doctrine according to which any progress of one nation cannot but be at the expense of the others. According to the abbé, far from being part of an expansionist policy, Catherine’s reforms ought to be considered from the viewpoint of philosophy and enlightenment. This is when the new concept of “civilization” steps in to make a distinction between the general development of a nation and its possible political will to hegemony. In Baudeau’s terms, civilization is a state but also corresponds to a political project to deliver and develop a nation. In this process, a particular social group of “businessmen and craftsmen” plays a fundamental role, for Russia should “naturalize” the arts and sciences, rather than simply importing them. This task can be achieved only by following the slow march of “nature”; in this respect, Catherine’s project to establish colonies appears to Baudeau as the right thing to do, but only as a first step in a vaster project. Once the establishment of colonies had enlarged the population, in the second stage the colonists would become rich landowners and increase production. Wanting to enjoy their wealth, the colonists would then encourage trade and, in the third stage, a national industry, and a class of “craftsmen and merchants” would be born. This, in its turn, would bring prosperity and freedom for society as a whole; that is, “civilization” (Goggi Reference Goggi1994, Reference Goggi2001).
Baudeau’s ideas strongly influenced Diderot’s perceptions of the obstacles to civilization in Russia. Another influence was that of Prince A.M. Golitsyn, the Russian ambassador in Paris, whom Diderot had met (and quite likely also Baudeau). Through Golitsyn—one of the most important advocates of the abolition of serfdom in his country—Diderot probably became familiarized with the Russian debates on that matter (Karp Reference Karp and Karp2000). The philosophe’s interest in Russia was directly related to issues that we would today call “development.” From his contribution to the first edition of the Histoire des deux Indes (1770) to that of the second (1774), Diderot’s examination of the Russian case became deeper and longer. He insisted that the emergence of a “third estate” was indispensable for Russia to acquire a genuine civilization, an idea that he probably took from Golitsyn and was very much part of the debate in St. Petersburg (Griffiths Reference Griffiths1979; Jones Reference Jones1977). The reforms he recommended included also the emancipation of the Crown serfs, the encouragement of similar measures among the nobles, and, of course, the settlement of foreign colonies. Instead of bringing European artists and scientists to Russia, the rulers should “begin by the beginning”; that is, by fostering the “mechanic arts and the lower conditions,” which, in turn, would give birth to native artists and philosophers. This and no other is the proper way of civilizing a nation, for it follows “the constant progression of nature.” In 1773, Diderot finally accepted Catherine’s invitation to visit Russia. In St. Petersburg he discussed these issues for several weeks with prominent Russians who were part of the local debate, especially with Catherine II and the brothers Naryshkin (Raiskii Reference Raiskii1982). His manuscripts of that time, known as Mélanges pour Catherine II, presented a vast program of reforms for the Empire, of the kind he had earlier envisioned for the Histoire des deux Indes. But he now added some interesting observations concerning the gap between the extraordinarily rich nobility and the common peasants. Part of his recommendations pointed to the necessity to somehow breach that social distance.Footnote 3 After he returned from his trip, however, Diderot seemed to have lost confidence in the will or the capacity of the empress to undertake the measures he recommended. In his contribution to the third edition of the Histoire des deux Indes (1780), he appears more skeptical regarding Russia’s chances of achieving civilization at all. The most important obstacle he perceived was the gap between the two existing social “classes” and the lack of a “third estate” in-between. “Tyrants will never freely consent to the extinction of servitude,” he observed. But even if they did, the elevation of the peasants “from the degraded state of slavery” to “the dignity of liberty” and the creation of a third estate would probably take “many centuries” (Diderot Reference Diderot and Versini1994, III, p. 662). Thus, in the late Diderot, “civilization” no longer appears as the product of the will of an enlightened monarch or the projects of a philosopher, but rather as the outcome of a long process of socio-economic development. By examining the Russian case (indeed, the very concept of civilization very rarely appears in other contexts in his work), the optimism of the philosophe–projector turned into the pessimism of the philosophe–social scientist, who found what we would call today “structural causes of backwardness.” Interestingly enough, more or less at the same time, Diderot’s thought shifted in other areas. His distrust of unlimited power and of the sovereignty of Reason became deeper, while at the same time he emphasized more the role of “commerce” and of social free initiative as engines of progress. His initial hopes of Russia as the appropriate land for the advancement of civilization gave way to a renewed appreciation of the social arrangements of western Europe. Thus, having been considered for a while as the perfect space for the progress of enlightenment, Russia was later expelled from the map of civilization.
Those late shifts in Diderot’s thought brought him closer to the general trends of nineteenth-century liberalism. However, he was not a modern liberal economist: in his thought, economic growth per se never became the main aim of policy. His ideal of social bonheur required that the civilization process be stopped at an intermediate point, “between the infancy of the savage and our decrepitude”—just as the happiness of individuals, which, for the philosopher, was located in a “mediocrity,” the middle ground between extreme poverty and excessive wealth (Diderot Reference Diderot and Versini1994, I, p. 903). Indeed, Diderot perceived the risks of extreme “class” inequality, which he condemned both on political and on moral grounds. In fact, he actively participated in the famous international debate on the “two luxuries” (Margairaz Reference Margairaz and Marseille1999; Perrot Reference Perrot1995). Against the opinion of Christian moralists, of Rousseau, and of other writers, Diderot refused to condemn superfluous consumption on the grounds that, to some extent, it generated general prosperity by helping to better distribute wealth. However, he was not ready to embrace the other position of the debate. Against those who, like Mandeville, praised any sort of luxury consumption, Diderot (together with Beccaria, Saint-Lambert, Deleyre, and Condillac) argued there was a good luxury and a bad one, depending on the characteristics of the different nations. It was precisely the analysis of the Russian case that helped him formulate this subtle difference. Thus, bad luxury is related to the “senselessness” in the use of wealth that comes together with a “too unequal distribution” of it. Where bad luxury prevails (as in Russia), it is because society is divided into just “two classes, a narrow class of rich citizens and a numerous class of poor citizen.” In such cases, luxury is nothing but a sign of depravity and corruption. On the contrary, in nations with “three classes, the rich, the comfortably-off [aisés] and the poor,” superfluous consumption (i.e., good luxury) plays a positive role for society as a whole and, therefore, should be allowed. A wise prince must ensure that wealth remains always fairly distributed; however, this has to be done without limiting people’s freedom or disregarding the right to property (Diderot Reference Diderot and Versini1994, I, pp. 889, 892). Summing up, through his observations of Russia, the late Diderot developed a specific line of thought on social equality and its importance for historical progress. Aware of the importance of the creation of a third estate in Russian debates at that time, Diderot came to the conclusion that such a social group—defined as an urban independent class in-between the rich and the poor—was at the same time a precondition for, and an outcome of, civilization. Unlike nineteenth-century liberals, Diderot understood this aurea mediocritas as an unstable and fragile balance that requires social and political energy to maintain it.
III. CLASSIC ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND THE “APPRENTICES”
To be more precise, after the eighteenth-century Russian “mirage” faded away, Russia was not totally excluded from the map of civilization, but rather sent to its furthermost periphery. In the early nineteenth-century imagination, places like France and England were clearly situated at its core, while most of the world was considered “barbarous” and therefore out of the map. Russia was too different to take her as an equal, but too similar to exclude her for good. This uncertain location was partially “normalized” by granting her the status of an “apprentice.” The philosopher Théodore Jouffroy made it very clear in 1826:
Among the peoples spread on the surface of the earth, there are not even two with exactly the same state of civilization. … However, when one contemplates mankind from a higher point, one sees that it is divided into some great aggregates where all the nations from the world come to line up with few exceptions. They are like families of nations, each of them having their own flag and particular path. There are many inequalities between these families; the nations that compose them are not equally advanced, but they all follow each other along the same path and are pulled by the same movement. Thus, for example, although the civilization of Russia is far from that of France or England, it is easy to see however that the Russians are engaged in the same system of civilization as the French and the English. They are behind us, admittedly, but they follow us: the same ideas attract them, the same light directs them towards our common goal, around which they, like us, revolve although they are farther away. They are younger children of the same family, weaker pupils of the same school of civilization. One could not say the same of the Turks, even if they belong to Europe just like the Russians. It is obvious that they belong to a different civilization. In spite of the powerful attraction that we have exerted on them ever since they came to camp among us, they did not follow our ways. There is between them and us something altogether different than there is between the Russians and us. Russia is the last planet of our system; European Turkey belongs to another, and it would be as difficult to lead the Turks along our path as to prevent the Russians from following it
(Jouffroy Reference Jouffroy1866, pp. 73–74).The “barbarous” outer space was, to a great extent, out of the radar of the founders of liberal economics. For the moment, little attention was also paid to the “apprentices.” In fact, the laws governing the accumulation of wealth were supposed to be universally applicable, as denoted by the generic title of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which, in addition, presented a very optimistic account of the economic performance of several European countries, including the empire of the czars (Smith Reference Smith1852, p. 85). The notes added by Germain Garnier to the 1802 French translation of Smith’s classic (and then also included in later editions in English) were even more optimistic in the claim that individual interest and private accumulation of wealth can only benefit humankind as a whole. The recent achievements of Russia and the USA were, for Garnier, the most eloquent examples of that. Indeed, in Garnier’s notes Russia appears extensively as an example of the positive role of foreign investments and free trade when it comes to generating economic progress (Smith Reference Smith and Garnier1802, V, pp. 124–129, 198–199). Some years later Jean-Baptiste Say shared this optimism with regards to the prospects of economic growth for Russia; as proof he pointed to the “progress she has already undergone, despite despotism and serfdom” (see his notes in Storch Reference von Storch1823, III, pp. 24–25). Optimistic voices continued to be heard throughout the nineteenth century (Dréolle Reference Dréolle1848; Schnitzler 1856–Reference Schnitzler1869; Belly Reference Belly1873). For Jeremy Bentham, the difference between more or less civilized nations within Europe could be viewed as stages in a single timeline: “England and France have been what Russia, Poland and a part of Germany now are” (Bentham Reference Bentham1864, p. 209).
However, Russia also appeared in a more negative note among liberal economists. One of the issues related to economic backwardness that almost never failed to appear was the absence of a “middle class” or “bourgeoisie.” As we have seen, this idea was already implicit in the eighteenth-century debate on the need of a “third estate” for the civilization of the empire (both among Russians and Westerners). The absence of a “third estate” of independent farmers and entrepreneurs was central in the explanation of backwardness in Richard Jones’ An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth and on the Sources of Taxation (1831). Only such a class, “freed from oppression and enabled to collect and preserve capital,” would be “fitted gradually to bring into action” the great territorial resources of Russia and “Eastern Europe” (pp. 27–28, 59–60). This example serves Jones to conclude that
the most efficient direction of labor, and the accumulation and contrivance of the means to endow it with the greatest attainable power, seem to be the peculiar province, the appointed task, of a race of men, capitalists, distinct from both laborers and landlords, more capable of intellectual efforts than the lower, more willing to bring such efforts to bear on the improvement of the powers of industry, than the higher, of those classes
(Jones Reference Jones1831, pp. 157–159).From the early nineteenth century onwards, Russia’s backwardness due to the absence of a bourgeoisie truly became a cliché among liberals.Footnote 4 When François Guizot outlined the master narrative of the West’s exceptionality with his famous Histoire de la civilisation en Europe (1828–1830), the “middle class” became the main protagonist of the adventure of civilization; not surprisingly, Russia and the Slavic world were given no role at all in this story. Among French economists, the “missing bourgeoisie” was also a central element in the explanation of Russia’s backwardness. In the words of one of the most prominent of them, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Russia was in need of both a “rich middle class” and a “petite bourgeoisie,” the classes that give France its well-being and provide savings for investments.Footnote 5 However, the argument of the missing bourgeoisie was somewhat puzzling: if, on the one hand, it was meant to be the indispensable agent of economic progress, it was, on the other, also considered the outcome of it, as nineteenth-century liberals were more skeptical than their predecessors regarding the possibility to create such a class “from above” (e.g., Beaumont Reference Beaumont1854). Both cause and consequence of economic growth, the key to the creation of a native bourgeoisie was related, as we shall see, to other “absences” in Russia’s society: private property, capital, and “individual initiative.”
Indeed, these three absences are pivotal in John Stuart Mill’s analysis of economic backwardness—arguably the most insightful of those produced by the liberal tradition in the nineteenth century. In his Principles of Political Economy (1848), Russia (often together with Hungary and Poland) is among the most recurrent examples when it comes to explaining differences between more and less successful areas of the world, economically speaking. In addition to the already mentioned issue of serfdom, the Russian case appears in relation with a crucial discussion of the reasons for the differential “degree of productiveness of productive agents” in diverse regions. The main issue at stake is the productivity of labor, which, according to Mill, depends not only on the way it is applied to the work itself, but also, to a great extent, on “a previous application of labor to produce the capital required” for that work. The relative abundance of capital—and not only the quality of labor or certain geographical advantages—appears to Mill as one of the fundamental explanations of England’s economic superiority vis-à-vis Russia. His description of the difficulties in the accumulation of capital and the solutions he envisioned are of utmost importance. Regarding the former, Mill pointed to two reasons: the limit to the increase of production may spring either from a certain infirmity in the “effective desire of accumulation” among the local population, or from the lack of profitable opportunities for those who possess capital or chances of saving some. But how can the industry and the desire of accumulation be increased in such countries?
The means are, first, a better government; more complete security of property; moderate taxes … and more advantageous tenure of land, securing to the cultivator, as far as possible, the undivided benefits of the industry, skill and economy he may exert. Secondly, improvement of the public intelligence, the decay of usages or superstitions which interfere with the effective employment of industry, and the growth of mental activity making the people alive to new objects of desire. Thirdly the introduction of foreign arts, which raise the returns derivable from additional capital to a rate corresponding to the low strength of the desire of accumulation, and the importation of foreign capital, which renders the increase of production no longer exclusively dependent on the thrift or providence of the inhabitants themselves, while it places before them a stimulating example …
(Mill Reference Mill1848, I, pp. 225–226).These considerations, as Mill points out, apply “to the less civilized and industrious parts of Europe,” such as Russia and Hungary (but also Spain and Ireland), and in general “to all the Asiatic populations” (ibid., I, pp. 119–120; see also II, pp. 245–246). Thus, the relation between the notion of the “apprentice” and the economic claims of the “master” becomes apparent. Indeed, Mill was a firm advocate of colonial expansionism, on the grounds that it would bring progress to the colonized (Jahn Reference Jahn2005; Varouxakis Reference Varouxakis1999). Yet, he did not imagine that the advancement of countries of “backward civilization” was an easy task to accomplish. Although the introduction of foreign capital and foreign “arts and ideas” may in theory accelerate the process of development, in practice it is attended in backward countries with “a thousand obstacles” arising from their culture, institutions, and “social relations.” Thus, having little capacity to generate internal saving, countries that are “beginning to be civilized” (like Russia) need to attract capital, but foreign capital will migrate there only “under the inducement of a very great extra profit” (Mill Reference Mill1848, I, pp. 232–233; II, pp. 111–112).
Interestingly, the very importance of private property for the economic prosperity of nations—a matter of doctrine for liberals—was often discussed by taking Russia as an example. This was particularly the case after the 1840s, when a crucial debate took place throughout Europe, unleashed by Romantic and socialist authors who found in certain Slavic institutions, such as the egalitarian peasant communes, or the artel,Footnote 6 an example worthy of imitation. In the nineteenth century, some quarters of the Romantic movement rejected capitalism—whose social organization was atomizing social “community,” liberalism—that turned individualism into a doctrine, and the bourgeoisie—whose behavior embodied all the dangers described above. In this respect, Romanticism offered some attractive elements for socialists, but also for some conservatives seeking to re-establish order. From this viewpoint, far from being the land of barbarism, Russia and eastern Europe could help to regenerate Europe. Why was the Slavic world fitted for such a task? Because its society was supposedly still organized around the peasant commune or mir. Europeans needed only either to recover or to emulate this element that Russia still had not lost. These ideas started to be discussed under the influence of a German conservative writer, baron August von Haxthausen, who discovered the very existence of the mir for the European public (including many Russians). His three-volume Studien über die inneren Zustände, das Volksleben, und insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands (1847–1852), immediately translated into French, English, and other languages, was enormously influential. Other authors, such as the Polish Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz, who taught at the Collège de France between 1840 and 1844 the Russian socialist émigré Aleksandr Herzen, and the German left-wing Hegelian Bruno Bauer were also influential.Footnote 7 These ideas circulated with such intensity that liberals felt the need to respond. Some of the leading French economists, for example, spent decades combating such notions, especially after some prominent Russian economists endorsed them. Perhaps one of the best examples can be found in the four-volume Dictionnaire d’économie politique, edited by Coquelin and Guillaumin in 1852. The summa of the economic knowledge of the time, the Dictionnaire compiled articles on every significant theme, written by some of the most important economists. Among these articles, a discussion of the Russian commune is found in “Property,” one of the longest and undoubtedly focusing on a central part of the liberal doctrine. This article, written by Léon Faucher—a prominent economist, journalist, and politician—argues for the unrestricted individual right to property and against socialist ideas; “civilization” and “prosperity,” Faucher argues, are in direct relation to the extension and security of private property. Hence, the “barrenness” and “immobility” of the “Orient”—of which Russia was, for the author, a good example—and the wealth and high development of the “West.” It is interesting that Faucher deals with the Russian commune under the heading “On communism and socialism,” where he argues that all the experiences of communism or socialism have been ephemeral and ended in failure. True, the Russian commune seemed to prove the contrary, but it was not a complete form of communism (the houses and the harvest remain the property of individuals), and it would surely disappear quite soon (Faucher in Coquelin and Guillaumin Reference Coquelin and Guillaumin1852, II, pp. 460–472). Similar opinions were repeated on many occasions, as the economists insisted that the egalitarian commune and the periodical redistribution of lands were an impediment to the emergence of individual freedom and hard work, and prevented the peasants from introducing improvements and diversification in agricultural production. Moreover, the degree of “individualization” of property was considered to be a sign of the relative level of “development” of nations. Some of the leading economists of the second half of the nineteenth century, such as Gustave de Molinari, Louis Wolowski, and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, wrote extensive texts on this matter, not only combating the opinions of Russian authors, but also those of some Western economists such as the Belgian Émile de Laveleye, who still, in the 1890s, partially endorsed the idea that the mir was a valuable institution.Footnote 8
Needless to say, serfdom or “slavery” was also consistently pointed to as a hindrance to the empire’s economic growth and as an impediment to the emergence of individual initiative. As Alessandro Stanziani has recently argued, the case of Russian serfdom was part of a wider debate on labor’s status, initiated among some of the main philosophes in the second half of the eighteenth century and continued by the economists of the following century. Contrary to common wisdom, in western Europe, in both thought and practice, the boundary between free and forced labor remained uncertain well into the nineteenth century. Nor was it obvious for everyone that wage labor was preferable than other types of arrangements (progressive voices often considered the situation of workers under “wage slavery” worse than that of peasant serfdom). A clearer line between free and coerced labor started to be drawn in the 1750s. At that time, a group of philosophes (Diderot was one of them, together with Baudeau, Mirabeau, and other physiocrats) radicalized their criticism of colonial slavery and of the guilds at home. The condition of slaves and apprentices was discussed together with the fate of Russian serfs, an issue under debate in Russia and elsewhere, as was pointed out earlier. While to a great extent this criticism was formulated on moral and political grounds, it was also claimed that coerced labor was less productive and dynamic—something that was then (and still is) far from being an undisputed fact. This debate intersected with the liberal narrative of Western “progress,” so the presence of forms of forced labor became a sign of the relative degree of advancement of a nation. Thus, having left the times of the “serfs de la glèbe” behind, France was portrayed as being more advanced than Russia (especially after Catherine the Great’s expected emancipation of the serfs failed to materialize); however, the continuity of the guilds made France more backward than England. Indeed, free labor became one of the key elements in the making of Western identity and in its sense of superiority vis-à-vis the “Oriental” and “backward” lands, where coerced labor predominated (Stanziani Reference Stanziani2008).
Among the economists, it was quite common to use Russia and eastern Europe as examples to illustrate the negative effects of serfdom on economic progress. Adam Smith himself pointed out that the continuity of “slavery” in Russia and in other eastern European regions
demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person who can acquire no property can have no other interest but to eat as much and to labour as little as possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own maintenance can be squeezed out of him by violence only and not by any interest of his own
(Smith Reference Smith1852, p. 159).Thomas Malthus also used the Russian case to criticize serf labor on economic grounds (Malthus Reference Malthus1817, I, pp. 435–438). The same can be said of Richard Jones, who dedicated large sections of his most important book, An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, to proving that the “inefficiency” of agricultural production under coerced forms of labor was responsible for the “backward state of civilization” in Russia and throughout “Eastern Europe” (Jones Reference Jones1831, pp. 20, 25–28, 47–49, 56, 62–65). A similar use of the Russian case can be found in John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political Economy, which repeats Jones’ ideas on this regard (Mill Reference Mill1848, I, pp. 21, 25, 295–296). Other Western economists (and of course also the Russian) often repeated similar arguments regarding Russia and serfdom, something that by the mid-nineteenth century had become commonsensical knowledge. For example, the doctrinal article on “Serfdom,” written by Gustave de Molinari, in Dictionnaire d’économie politique drew mainly from the Russian case (in Coquelin and Guillaumin Reference Coquelin and Guillaumin1852, II, pp. 610–613; Faucher Reference Faucher1847).
The abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861 was an exceptional context for the economists to reflect on economic development. Three years before the reform, the prospects of the emancipation and its alternative formulations were already matter of intense debate among economists, not only in Russia but also in western Europe. In the Société d’économie politique (SEP), the French economists’ most important association, Russia was the theme of main sessions in 1857, 1858, 1862, and later; Russian colleagues were especially invited to explain not only the situation of their country, but also the state of economics as a discipline in the empire.Footnote 9 Russian debates were also fairly well known, thanks to prominent Belgian economist Gustave de Molinari. Indeed, Molinari was a specialist in the Russian economy, on which he wrote several texts. From 1857 onwards the journal that he edited, the Économiste belge, paid special attention to Russia; and the following year Molinari became a regular contributor to the Russian journal Russkii Vestnik. In 1860, 1865, and 1876, he traveled in Russia “to publicize the principles of economic freedom,” where he delivered a series of highly acclaimed (although controversial) lectures. The diverse voices in the Russian debates were summarized in his book Lettres sur la Russie, published in Brussels, Leipzig, and Paris in 1861 (Ronin Reference Ronin1993; Braet Reference Braet, Stols and Waegemans1989). Since 1858 Molinari had insisted that the emancipation process should lead not only to the end of serfdom, but also to the dissolution of the mir (the communal lands ought to be privatized). Before 1861, other prominent economists recommended the same. In the words of Auguste Jourdier, the idea was to transform the peasants into a class of “small and medium-size farmers” like “those existing almost everywhere in the West.” It was assumed that only “freedom” was needed to achieve such goal: if the peasants were turned into property owners, they would spontaneously become market-oriented farmers, thus cementing the economic progress of Russia’s agriculture and, eventually, nurturing industrialization and strengthening the local bourgeoisie.Footnote 10 From this point of view, the Emancipation Act of 1861 was a great disappointment. Economists such as Molinari and others protested for the decision to maintain the mir and the collective ownership of the land; for them, slavery to the nobles simply changed to “slavery to the commune,” thus limiting individual initiative. In the years to come, economists blamed the absence of private property and the persistence of communal practices for Russia’s backwardness.Footnote 11
The role of the government as a modernization agent was also debated among nineteenth-century liberal economists. In this regard, a crucial doctrinal ambivalence becomes evident. As we have seen, the eighteenth-century debate took it for granted that the monarch had to play a central role in projects of “civilization.” When thinkers such as the late Diderot came to conceive civilization as a slow process of socio-economic development rather than a project “from above,” they acquired a more skeptical disposition regarding the role of governments. Following Adam Smith, nineteenth-century liberals radicalized this way of thinking. The intervention of governments in the economy was rejected as something both unnecessary and harmful. With the idea of a self-regulating market as engine of economic growth, it was demanded from rulers a most circumspect attitude in economic matters. Yet, the special situation of peripheric regions introduced tensions in this reasoning. The usual explanations of backwardness, as we have seen, rested on the idea that there were “missing elements” in certain nations. If the bourgeoisie, capital, and a strong sense of individuality and of property were absent, no development could be expected. But these elements, as we have seen, were conceived of as both cause and consequence of economic growth. How to initiate the work of progress when its natural agent is not there? The obvious answer was “the government,” which seemed to contradict the basic liberal principle that governments should keep their hands out of the economy.
Some liberals resolved this seeming inconsistency by presenting the notion that the State has responsibilities and tasks that differ according to the degree of development of a nation. Russia once again was the case that enabled this doctrinal distinction. For example, presenting the main tenets of liberalism in the Introduction of his “Manual of Political Economy,” Jeremy Bentham argued that “national wealth” was generated primarily by “sponte acta,” “individuals acting for themselves.” Government actions with regards to the economy (“agenda”) are acceptable only in a small number of specific cases; the “watchword of government” ought to be “Be quiet.” However, if among the members of a community the fundamental “requisites” of “power, knowledge or intelligence, or inclination” are lacking, then “in such cases the interposition of government may be desirable.” In fact, the discrimination of actions to be left in the hands of sponte acta or included as agenda varies considerably “according to the different circumstances of the several political communities.” The case that Bentham chooses as an example is Russia:
The greater the degree of opulence, the greater the list of sponte acta—the less, therefore, that of agenda. In England, abundance of useful things are done by individuals, which in other countries are done either by government, or not at all. Docks, harbors, canals, roads; institutions for relief against misfortune in a variety of shapes, and from a variety of causes…. In Russia, under Peter the Great, the list of sponte acta being a blank, that of agenda was proportionally abundant
(Bentham Reference Bentham1843, p. 35).Interestingly enough, the image of the “blank sheet” appears in relation to Russia with the opposite connotation to Leibniz’s or the early Diderot’s tabula rasa. For the latter, it was a positive fact, which made the project of civilization easier and gave more freedom of action to the enlightened prince. For Bentham, the blank list was a deficiency that needed to be remedied by a more active role of the government.
This general principle notwithstanding, liberals had troubles in drawing the line of acceptable State intervention in concrete cases. The advocates of protectionism presented similar claims to argue in favor of protective tariffs for native industries—a policy that orthodox liberals, of course, condemned. As we shall see, prominent members of the “national school” of economics such as Friedrich List presented the Russian case as an example of the positive role of protectionism for economic development. Liberals, on the contrary, devoted much energy to condemning Russia’s “artificial industry” (Faucher) and to showing the deleterious effects of high tariffs on the finances of the empire. Instead of wasting public funds to foment industrialization, the way to economic growth was engaging in international free trade, allowing foreign investments, and having a strict control over government expenditure.Footnote 12 Russian economists and policy makers often criticized these recommendations on the grounds that they disregarded the special situation of latecomers; in some cases, prominent figures of economic science in the West engaged in heated debates with them. When, in 1864, Louis Wolowski, for example, argued that Russia was a “poor” country “arriérée dans la carrière de la civilization.” and that she marched towards bankruptcy, he received numerous attacks in Russia, to which he responded with one of the first careful and detailed analysis of the empire’s financial situation to be published in France (Wolowski Reference Wolowski1864).
In other realms, the dividing line was not so obvious. For example, in 1862 an interesting session took place at the Société d’Économie Politique on the following questions: “By using his authority to emancipate the serfs of the empire, isn’t the Emperor of Russia implementing socialism? Can such a direct intervention of the government on the constitution and regime of land property be considered in agreement with the economic doctrine of freedom?” The participants were puzzled by the questions. Jules Duval did not know how to respond, but suggested that, perhaps, the reality of “the Orient” required that other elements be taken into account. Joseph Garnier approved the reforms, but nevertheless pointed to the presence of a dangerous “socialist” facet with regards to the government manipulation of property. Other participants, on the contrary, saw nothing wrong with the reform per se.Footnote 13 Disappointment with the Russian emancipation helped Molinari to clarify the general issue of the role of governments in economies of diverse degrees of development. In his main doctrinal works, he presented a unitary theory of human advancement. The economic progress of the world was, for him, a process that runs parallel to the enhancement of the intellectual competences of humans and of their capacity for “self-government.” To each step in the economic power of society corresponds an intellectual evolution and a reorganization of political power. While total freedom and self-government are the expected end of the industrial era, earlier stages required different forms of “tutelage” (i.e., harder forms of political authority). In Molinari’s view, tutelage plays a sort of formative—and therefore positive—role; the more the economy and the intellectual capacity of a nation evolved, the weaker its political tutelage. This principle allowed Molinari to be an advocate of freedom and, at the same time, to justify colonialism, imperialism, and, to some extent, also the political exclusion of “incapable” people at home on the grounds that “inferior races” and inferior “classes” still needed tutelage. For him, the Russian situation was a border case: as in all backward societies, the tutelage of nobles and czars over the peasants had been something natural. However, contemporary Russia was an example of the abuse of tutelage, as in 1861 the government had not used its power to develop private property and a stronger sense of individuality, but rather to reinforce “State socialism” and economic collectivism.Footnote 14
Summing up, the issue of the use of State power for economic purposes in underdeveloped areas remained an area of ambivalence for liberal doctrine. Liberals were prone to condemn abuses, especially if they affected the freedom of trade or the right to individual private property. However, they were also ready to overlook them on the grounds that a good “tutelage” has the responsibility to enact certain changes in nations that may not be spontaneously willing to accept them, due to the lack of “intellectual capacity” or of the sense of “individual freedom” and property.
IV. REFINING THE IDEA OF “CIVILIZATION”
The debates that we have analyzed so far were fundamental in giving more economic depth to the idea of “civilization,” thus relating economic growth to other aspects of human progress. There is still one crucial influence of the Russian case in this matter that deserves our attention: the discovery of “immaterial capital.”
The origins of this notion are related to the thought of Heinrich von Storch, a leading German–Russian economist of the early nineteenth century, whose work gained international reputation. Born in Riga (then part of the Russian empire), Storch had a successful academic career in St. Petersburg. In 1799 he was appointed teacher of political economy to the grand dukes Nikolai and Mikhail. In 1815 he published his masterpiece, the six-volume Cours d’économie politique (it appeared in French in St. Petersburg and was later reprinted in Paris; it was also published in Italian and, in a shorter version, in German). The Cours was originally intended as a textbook for the instruction of the grand dukes (McGrew Reference McGrew1976). Strongly influenced by Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say, Storch endorsed the basic tenets of liberalism, including free trade, the division of labor, and the subsidiary role of the State. However, he also differed from his Scottish master in some crucial aspects. The main one was perhaps the very definition of economics as a discipline. As Storch argues in the Preface to his work, “until now” political economy was conceived as the science of the “wealth” of nations, a purely material concern. However, the “prosperity of nations” should be regarded as the combination of the wealth and the civilization of its inhabitants. Indeed, a “theory of civilization” should be an essential part of the science of values. This standpoint, which, to some extent, raises doubts on the assumption that the economy is a sphere independent from others, had deep effects in the rest of the argument. The most important one is that it enabled the formulation of a theory of “internal goods,” the most original and influential of Storch’s ideas. Economics, according to the Cours, deals with two types of goods: “material or external” and “immaterial or internal.” The former are those usually considered as wealth: tangible goods that can be bought and sold. The latter can be acquired, but are not exchangeable for money; they constitute “our moral property” and they are “part of our being.” Among internal goods, Storch distinguishes three categories: 1) “physical goods” like good health, vigor, ability, and others; 2) “intellectual goods” like reason, enlightenment, taste, etc., and 3) “moral goods” like sociability, moral sentiments, freedom, etc. Internal goods need to be taken into account, as “all of them may serve as means of production”; they may have no “price,” but they certainly have a “value.” Material production and immaterial goods cannot exist without each other; their reciprocal dependence is a fact of social life. For it is evident that “men cannot generate wealth unless they are provided with internal goods, in other words, if they have developed their physical, intellectual and moral faculties, which presupposes the means for that development, such as social institutions, etc.” This is why the prosperity of a nation cannot be reduced to its “national wealth”—that is, the mass of external goods that can be exchanged for a price—but must encompass also its “civilization.” The growth of one requires the development of the other. Indeed, the maximum degree of development of a nation comes at a point when the prosperity is such that a deep division of labor becomes possible in the production of internal goods, thus enlarging “immaterial capital.”Footnote 15
As Joachim Zweynert has argued, the theory of “internal goods” was truly a “Russian concept”; that is, it emerged in the specific context of Russia’s condition of relative backwardness. Indeed, although it influenced some nineteenth-century Western economists, it only became part of the “canon” of economics in Russia.Footnote 16 Unlike the situation in countries such as England or France, the issue at stake in Russia could not but be “civilization,” and not just economic growth. Storch was explicit that not only was his viewpoint developed having Russia’s peculiar reality in mind, but that his discussion on the relationship between “immaterial capital” and material wealth was influenced by the eighteenth-century debate on the civilization of Russia, particularly on the convenience for the empire to hire Western scientists and artists to foment the development of local culture—nothing but worthless “exotic plants” for a still uncivilized nation, in the opinion of some Russian and Western commentators of the time (Storch Reference von Storch1823, I, p. x; III, pp. 349–350).
The theory of “internal goods” was dismissed at the time by J.-B. Say, who considered it as something plainly absurd and incomprehensible.Footnote 17 However, later on, the idea that there existed also forms of “immaterial capital” became accepted knowledge among Western economists, and Storch was credited as pioneer.Footnote 18 This concept became important as a bridge between the economists’ focus on economic growth and the more holistic vision of civilization inherited from the Enlightenment. A good example of this is the article “Civilisation” of the aforementioned Dictionnaire d’économie politique (Coquelin and Guillaumin Reference Coquelin and Guillaumin1852) written by Gustave de Molinari. Following Storch—whom he quotes as authority—Molinari defines civilization as the “collection of all progresses, both material and moral, that humankind has experimented so far.” Thus, the article deals with the capacity of societies to increase the production of material goods, but also with the enlargement of the “immaterial capital of humankind.” Civilization means the “development of human’s power over nature”; the external sign of such process is the broadening of the “division of labor”: “The country in which labor is most divided in all is diverse branches, and in which, for the very same reason, social relations are most developed, will be the country where civilization is most advanced.”
In a typically liberal way, Molinari depicted civilization as a “natural fact,” a “never-ending [indéfini]” process “inherent to human nature.” However, it was obvious that it was not “equally developed in all nations.” When discussing the reason for such “uneven development,” Molinari added a dimension that was absent in Storch’s work. The different degrees of civilization are due to the “inequality of physical and moral faculties given to the different variations of the human species.” Or, to put it “in economic language, to the quantity of natural goods, both internal and external, that the Creator has given to each people.” Thus, the degree of civilization depends on the moral attributes originally given and on the geographical setting of a nation. If two nations located in similar environments received different endowments of internal goods, then clearly the one originally benefited in this way will develop faster than the other. Inversely, among peoples of a similar endowment of internal goods, those located in favorable geographical settings will be the most advanced on the road of civilization. Beyond this general principle, Molinari points to other elements that may be “causes of backwardness [retard]”: any sort of limitation on individual initiative (that is, “freedom”) and on private property. Molinari’s piece also included a fierce response to those who argued that the material improvements of the past century had worsened social inequality. On the contrary, he argued, “progress works towards more equality, or at least its continuous tendency is that of reducing social inequality to the level of natural inequalities” (Molinari 1864, pp. 370–377). Thus, although Molinari used Storch’s ideas to correlate material and non-material (or “moral”) aspects of the progress of civilization, he also reframed the Russian economist’s views by inserting them within an unmistakably racist interpretation of uneven development. In this way, the relative lack of “internal goods” could be analyzed alternatively as an economic issue and as a naturalized distinction in a hierarchy of human races.
V. “UNORTHODOX” ECONOMIC THINKING AND THE PERIPHERIES OF CAPITALISM
The concrete effects of the advancement of capitalism in nineteenth-century Europe in terms of raising inequality and social unrest, and the negative impacts of free trade in some of the peripheries, led more and more people to the conclusion that there was something wrong with the views of economic liberalism, perhaps even with “progress” altogether. A vast and indeed diverse intellectual movement came to question liberalism’s main tenets. Attacks were aimed at the doctrine as a whole (in extreme socialist and right-wing ideologies) or at least to one or more of its assumptions; for example, its disregard for the social effects of economic accumulation, its refusal to acknowledge that the State needed to play a more active role, or its stubborn rejection of any type of protection for nascent industries. We shall deal in this section only with critiques of economic liberalism formulated in economic terms and that contributed different notions of economic development that made an impact in Western debates.Footnote 19
As Cowen and Shenton have demonstrated, the notion of “development” emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century as an alternative to the idea of “natural progress.” Whereas the latter was understood as an unintentional, immanent process, the former implied a process, but also a state (“being developed”) and an intentional action (“to develop”). This subtle change in concepts was influenced by the general dissatisfaction with the effects of progress and laissez faire politics, especially with the fact of the growing inequality and the associated rising social disturbances. The notion of development was used to reconcile progress with order; for example, in Saint-Simonian circles (Cowen and Shenton Reference Cowen and Shenton1996). This intellectual environment was fertile for re-examinations of aspects of the dominant liberal orthodoxy. And the Russian case was again used for such purpose.
An interesting example of this is Jean Simonde de Sismondi, one of the first economists who questioned the idea of progress on the grounds that it was producing a growing social inequality. After espousing the ideas of economic liberalism for some years, Sismondi came to the conclusion that the spontaneous march of the economy was leading to more poverty and that some form of State intervention was indispensable to correct that. His ideas became better known after he published his Nouveaux principes d’économie politique in 1819, where the case of Russia, together with those of Hungary and Poland, was used to explain the negative effects of extreme inequality and luxury consumption for the development of industry and for the general welfare of society (Sismondi [1819]1827, pp. 284–285).
Another interesting example is that of Louis Say, brother of Jean-Baptiste. An important businessman, Louis Say was concerned with the effects of free trade on French industry. From the early 1820s, he published a series of economic treatises criticizing the ideas of the liberal school, including his brother’s. His texts combine a most interesting reflection on the economic effects of social inequality and of international trade among nations of a different degree of development. In his Considérations sur l’industrie et la législation (1822), he argued against Adam Smith’s ideas that commercial exchanges between nations should be considered from the point of view of the relative “utility” of the goods exchanged, rather than judged for their pecuniary value. According to Say, the only way of knowing if trade is being profitable for a nation is “to examine whether the mass of objects imported has more utility as means of production and as means of consumption, than the mass of objects that this nation exports.” There is real gain for a nation only if the total “utility” thus acquired exceeds the exported utility, independently of the pecuniary value of the goods exchanged. For the pecuniary value of an article of trade may not always reflect its relative utility for different nations; it may be the case that a nation gets less utility than it gives away, even if, in terms of the pecuniary value, the relation is even. Louis Say explains this seeming paradox by comparing personal and national trades in two possible scenarios. If we divided the total wealth of a nation over its total population, he argues, then the resulting wealth would be that of, say, a comfortably-off shopkeeper of an economic stature more or less in-between that of the richest and of the poorest inhabitants. A person in such position would never trade part of the goods that are indispensable for feeding his family in exchange for superfluous goods of the same value. The shopkeeper would decide to trade only if by doing that he could increase the total “utility” in possession of his family. If the average trader of the nation behaved more or less like this person, then it would be clear that international commerce would be advantageous in terms of the utility acquired for the country as a whole. But the situation would be completely different in the second scenario:
But in certain nations, for example in Russia or Poland, where there is a great disproportion in fortunes, the whole nation cannot be represented any longer by one individual of average fortune; for there are there two completely different classes, namely, a tiny class of extremely rich individuals, and a very large class of extremely poor individuals. In the first class are the great landowners and those who govern; in the second, the farmers. By the nature of the political institutions of such a country, these farmers are forced to give up almost the totality of the product of the land, be it in kind or in money, for the benefit of the great landowners or of the government officials. It follows from this situation that this class becomes miserable and is deprived of the means of sufficiently nourishing itself with wheat and dressing itself suitably with articles made of flax, hemp and wool. The tiny class of great landowners and officials cannot put up with consuming the products that we have just mentioned. So, as they lack consumers or rather purchasers in the place of production, these products fall to a very low price. Consequently, the merchants buy them and transport them to richer countries, where there is, by consequence, a competition of purchasers such that they obtain for these products a better price. But the great landowners and the government officials who receive the money coming from the sale of corn, hemp and wool, which were unnecessary for them, need instead lace, cambric, silk, expensive furniture, jewels and thousands of other luxury or fantastic products. The price of these is higher, but their utility is much lower than that of the products that they sold. Then the same merchants who bought these luxury articles at a low price in the industrial nations, sell them at a very expensive price to the landowners or rulers of Russia or Poland. It is obvious that, in this case, even if the collection of objects that went into and out of Russia and Poland had the same pecuniary value, these nations have contributed with a higher sum of utility, which explains their want of wealth….
The problem in such cases, for Say, cannot be resolved by regulating international trade (which he does not recommend), but by having a more fair distribution of wealth among citizens (Say Reference Say1822, pp. 370–375). In fact, his main concern regarding the distribution of wealth was related not so much to the issue of international trade, as to its general effects on production. The same example taken from Russia (sometimes extended to Poland and to Turkey and “the Orient” in general) reappears in later works. In his Traité élémentaire de la richesse individuelle et de la richesse publique (1827), Russia and Poland are used as examples to argue that an “unequal distribution of pecuniary revenues has a negative impact in the growth of a State’s wealth.” The production of wheat for exportation in those countries is so large that they are “the barn of Europe.” However, due to a too-unequal distribution of income, their population is plunged into poverty. The extremely wealthy live on the peasant’s work, but they spend their revenue in luxury goods. Thus, this conspicuous consumption encourages the production of superfluous goods that have no utility for the vast majority of families, while the price of wheat is kept always too low for being a profitable occupation. Of course, as Say makes it clear, economic growth needs a certain level of inequality, as only those who have certain wealth may develop the intellectual capacities that industrial production requires and amass the capital needed for investments. But when this inequality becomes extreme, it becomes a cause of “the impoverishment of a State” (Say Reference Say1827, pp. 146–154). The same argument reappears in Say’s Études sur la richesse des nations et réfutation des principales erreurs en économie politique (1836), where the Russian case is used twice to criticize the idea implicit in Adam Smith that the individual accumulation of wealth will always be of advantage to the whole nation. In situations in which wealth is too unequally distributed—as in present-day Russia or in Ancien Régime France—the prosperity of the rich implicitly bears the impoverishment of the nation (Say Reference Say1836, pp. 21–22, 41–42).
Say’s (and Sismondi’s) arguments on social inequality, consumption, and their effects on general prosperity are obviously related to the aforementioned eighteenth-century debate on the “two luxuries.” In fact, the Russian case was, by the 1820s, an obvious example in relation to this debate; for instance, in economic treatises by Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy.Footnote 20 What is important for our purposes is to note that the continuity of the debate on the two luxuries (and of the Russian example) contributed to cast doubts on one of the main tenets of economic liberalism: the idea that there is no contradiction between individual accumulation and the wealth of a whole nation. At least in cases of extreme social inequality, it was simply not true that the “invisible hand” of the market would ensure that the happiness of certain individuals would turn into happiness for all. In other words, the argument on the impact of inequality on growth introduced the issue of class into economic consideration. However controversial and confusing, Say’s remarks on the role of international trade in non-developed countries also undermined the liberal confidence in the universal convenience of free trade.
Claims such as Say’s were rejected by the mainstream of liberal economics; among others, by David Ricardo and by his own brother. However, he made an impact in perhaps the most influential of all books questioning liberal orthodoxy, Friedrich List’s The National System of Political Economy (1841), which explicitly mentions Louis Say and also Storch. From the latter List took the idea of the interdependence between economic progress and “civilization” in its political and cultural dimensions. As Zweynert has argued, List’s notion of “productive powers” was quite possibly developed after Storch’s concept of “internal goods.”Footnote 21 Moreover, both authors sought to rethink economics from the viewpoint of a relatively backward nation; hence their insistence that “cosmopolitan” thinking should make room for specific national realities and needs for “development.” Louis Say was quoted on a similar issue as an authoritative source against the doctrines of Smith and J.-B. Say. However incipiently, Louis Say had discovered—according to List—that “wealth of nations consists not in material property and in its exchangeable value, but in the power of producing it in a continuous manner.” This conceptual shift that Storch and Louis Say contributed to was fundamental in List’s theory of “infant industries” and on his notion that, in relatively backward economies, the State should play an active role in fostering the “productive powers” and in protecting local manufacture from the trade of more advanced countries.
Beyond these intellectual influences, the Russian case also had a central place in List’s argument. His National System consists of four books, the first of which is entirely devoted to examining nine historical examples of the relationship between national development, public policies, and international trade. Russia is one of them, deserving a whole chapter of her own. The successful reforms initiated by Peter the Great are taken as “a manifest proof of the powerful influence which national unity and political institutions exercise over the economical prosperity of nations.” Indeed, Russia owes to the imperial authority the foundations of her manufactures, her vast progress in agriculture and population, the facilities offered to her interior traffic by the construction of canals and roads, a very large foreign trade, and her standing as a commercial power. Due to military and political circumstances, Russian manufacture grew up protected for decades. This lasted until, under the influence of liberal doctrines, the emperors decided to favor free trade, which meant the ruin of Russia’s home manufactories by the excessive import of foreign products. This finally forced the empire to take up an independent system of trade in 1821; the protection of the local industry by high tariffs, recommended by Count Nesselrode—“the most clear sighted and profound statesman of Russia”—contributed to a new wave of prosperity for the country’s economy. This example was extraordinarily important for List, who, as a conclusion, urges his fellow Germans “to cast into the fire the cosmopolite system and to learn wisdom from the example of Russia.” This enthusiasm, however, did not prevent him from ending this chapter with some less flattering observations on Russia’s future, which are in agreement with the usual canon of liberalism:
[T]he want of civilization and proper political institutions may hereafter prove a great obstacle to the advance of Russia in industry and commerce, unless the Imperial government should succeed in advancing general civilization, in accordance with the claims of industry, by establishing good municipal and provincial organizations, by first regulating and then completely abolishing all servitude, by creating a middle class of educated men and free peasants, by improving the methods of interior communication and, finally, by facilitating the means of transportation to Asia.Footnote 22
List’s ideas were enormously influential throughout the world. In Russia, they had a great impact on the development of economics in general, and also on the design of the policies of rapid industrialization implemented in the 1890s by Minister of Finance Sergei Witte, which, in turn, became one of the standard case studies for the analysis of industrial development in backward contexts during the twentieth century.Footnote 23
Although it falls beyond the scope of this article, we cannot finish without at least mentioning the extraordinary influence that the Russian case and Russian debates had in the late Marx’s re-examination of his own ideas regarding development. This issue is well known; we shall summarize here only its most important contours. When Karl Marx wrote the first volume of Capital, his conceptualization of economic development as an historical process was not so distant from that of the liberals in some crucial aspects. Like them, Marx also believed in economic progress as a cosmopolitan, evolutionary, single-path process. The less-developed countries, in terms of industrial growth, could see their future reflected in the mirror of the most advanced. The expansive dynamics of capitalist production would soon entrain even the nations “without history.” However, in his later years Marx initiated a profound re-examination of this belief, which took him to a more realistic comprehension of the heterogeneity of social formations in the world and, moreover, their relatedness. Several events and intellectual influences played a role in this shift, but his contact with things Russian was probably the most important. In 1870–1871 Marx studied Russian on his own, as his wife put it, like it was “a matter of life or death.” He was particularly interested in the fate of capitalist development in a predominantly agrarian country, the theoretical contribution of Russian authors in this regard, and the presence of a revolutionary movement that had already developed a political understanding of that peculiar situation. The feasibility of a distinct “Russian path” vis-à-vis the Western (or capitalist) development was a matter of intense debates among Russians from the times of the early controversy of Slavophiles vs. Westernizers. Within the socialist tradition, starting with Herzen, the main issue at stake was the possibility to use the collectivistic forms of production and sociability still present in the Russian peasant communes as foundations for the new society, thus bypassing the capitalist phase of development. Some of those who supported this claim had used Marx’s own conceptual framework to prove that capitalism, in a backward country like Russia, would play only a destructive role, without giving birth to other forces—such as a large proletariat—able to create a Western-like socialist movement. Both their empirical investigations and the political programs of populist revolutionary organizations (which also made use of Marxist ideas) immediately attracted Marx’s attention. Their hypothesis obviously challenged his evolutionary understanding of history.
Marx had already collected and read a large variety of Russian books and statistics when, in 1881, he was asked a difficult question. Vera Zasulich —an activist from the group that, led by Plekhanov, was then moving away from the vernacular socialism and adopting instead the ideas and strategies of the German social democrats—sent him a letter requesting his opinion on the issue of the possibility to bypass capitalism by using the peasant communes as foundations of a new socialist order. Marx spent three weeks working on an answer to that question. He finally sent a brief letter to Zasulich; to the great disappointment of Plekhanov’s group, his answer was positive. Marx also made it clear that the laws of capitalist development he had explained in Capital applied only to “Western European countries”; no “historical fatality” could be derived for other areas of the world. During those weeks, however, Marx had produced a longer draft that he never sent, in which he presented a deep examination of the matter. Some of the ideas of this manuscript, which was revealed to the public only in 1924, are extraordinarily interesting as they contradict his own earlier belief in the most advanced nations as “mirrors” for the less developed. The draft reflects on the meaning and historical possibilities that spring from the fact that capitalist and strong non-capitalist elements coexist in Russia, as it is exposed to the influence of the world market and the pro-capitalist action of the State. The idea that relatively backward societies can “jump” from lower to higher stages of development, and do so by adopting peculiar forms, is clearly stated, both with regards to the passage from pre-capitalist realities to highly developed forms of capitalism, and from the former straight to socialism. Indeed, some of the notions presented by Marx in these drafts anticipate later debates on “uneven development” and the “advantages of backwardness,” which would emerge only in the mainstream of the economic science after the Second World War, and also to question the idea of economic development as a cosmopolitan, single-line process.Footnote 24
VI. CONCLUSION
In the debates that we have analyzed in this article, the Russian case was one of the main examples in the making of ideas and notions that became fundamental for the liberal tradition:
– The idea that “civilization” or “progress” is not something that may be introduced from above by a political project but, rather, is the outcome of a slow process of socio-economic development.
– The image of a single historical path of economic progress, with nations located relatively ahead of others.
– The belief that backwardness relates to the absence or relative weakness of the agents of European progress: the middle class or bourgeoisie, a sense of individual initiative, and private property.
– The view that free labor is more profitable than coerced labor.
– The premise that peasants, especially if they organize according to communal principles, are a hindrance to agricultural modernization and, therefore, to economic growth.
– The notion that the government in backward nations must play a more active role in the economy, which should not include, however, the protection of local industry by “artificial” means (tariffs or subsidies).
– The idea that there is an “immaterial” component of economic growth, and that civilization supposes the advancement of material production but also of social relations and political constitutions.
The Russian case was also key in challenging some of the assumptions of this orthodox liberal view on economic growth and in exploring alternative notions. These “unorthodox” economic views used the analysis of Russia’s reality or the results of Russia’s economic policies to put forward:
– The concept that there is a national dimension to economics that cannot be assimilated to the interests of individuals or of humankind as a whole.
– The idea that economic policies cannot be the same for all nations and that relatively backward countries need not only a more active role of the State, but also tariffs to protect native manufactures. To put it in other words, the idea that the “teachers” are not always good for the “apprentices.”
– The notion that growth doesn’t necessarily mean development and that profitable trade, measured in its pecuniary value, doesn’t always entail a real advantage for a backward nation.
– The view that social inequality and luxury consumption may hinder economic development.
– Finally, in Marx, the foundations for a critique of evolutionary, single-line conceptualizations of economic development.
Although much of the information about things Russian in these debates was limited and prejudiced, Russia was not simply an inert object of a Western discourse. Both its peripheral location and the impact of its policies and intellectual life contributed to raise doubts regarding the adequacy of Western conceptual frameworks. It was the efforts of the czars to “Europeanize” their country that attracted the interest of philosophes in the first place and of the economists later. The peculiar use of western European concepts such as “third estate,” “civilization,” or “enlightenment” in Russian debates played an important role in the solidification of their meaning elsewhere. The ambivalence regarding the role of czars such Peter the Great—autocrats but also reformers—helped to reshape the thinking about the relationship between the political sphere and economics in backward contexts. Likewise, the changing policies of the empire regarding tariffs, and the context of the 1861 emancipation, offered an exceptional arena for reflecting on the economic problems of underdeveloped areas. Moreover, the presence of the egalitarian peasant commune, its discovery and use as part of the Romantic revolt throughout Europe, forced the liberals to underline the centrality of doctrines of individual autonomy and private property. Finally, the challenge of the populist brand of socialism helped Marx to reconsider his earlier views on historical and economic development. Thus, from its very paradoxical location in the map of civilization (between Asia and Europe, barbarity and modernity, economic weakness and political power), to the resistance of its intellectuals and policy makers to adjust to the roles the liberals had in mind for the “apprentices,” Russia caused interference in the dominant taxonomies of Western thought. As with all paradoxes, Russia’s awkward presence was good for thinking. Needless to say, other examples—particularly India and China—were also relevant as cases under consideration in the emergence of notions of economic development and backwardness. However, her paradoxical location and the presence of a solid body of “native knowledge” gave Russia a unique and distinct place in this regard.
Despite the debates and notions that we have analyzed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the birth of development economics still had to wait until the end of the Second World War, as the process of decolonization and the new status of the Soviet Union as a super-power forced Western elites to take more seriously the problems of the less-developed areas of the world. It was in this context that the main theories of development and explanations of backwardness were designed, discussed, and tested. Initially, “development” was considered a synonym of “economic growth,” its factual evidence being the increase of per capita product. In the 1960s more emphasis was placed on the social and qualitative aspects of development, and certain negative effects and distortions of economic growth in backward countries were identified, which, in turn, gave birth to critical theories of underdevelopment and dependence (Arndt Reference Arndt1987, pp. 1–4, 44–51). The dispute between a liberal “orthodoxy” and heterodox views reproduced then a good deal of the issues and preoccupations that we have analyzed in this article. Indeed, although new notions and ideas sprang out of this international debate, much of its primordial conceptual foundations can be traced back to the notions we have already analyzed; for example, in those contributed by List, Mill, or Marx.Footnote 25 The relationship between inequality and growth and between specialization and development, considered apropos Russia in the works of Sismondi and Louis Say, continue to be to this day a contentious issue among economists.Footnote 26 On the other hand, the importance of the assessment of the pre-revolutionary Russian economic achievements in the work of some of the twentieth-century pioneers—such as Alexander Gerschenkron, W.W. Rostow, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, or Paul Baran, to mention but the most obvious cases—together with the direct influence of Russian economic thought (most visible in the rediscovery of Aleksandr Chayanov’s theory of peasant economies in the 1960s) makes one wonder if the Russian case did not continue to play a similar role in the birth of development economics. But this, of course, should be the matter of another article.
