In August 2018, the New York Times reported that the Trump administration was remaking the courts. In particular, the Times, as well as other outlets, noted the pronounced emphasis on originalism and textualism on the part of the Trump nominees. Originalism and textualism are so much a part of the conservative intellectual landscape that it was assumed audiences would see their connection with Trump's judicial appointments.
But that need not be the case. There is no necessary connection between what we now see as conservatism and (certain kinds of) originalism, and indeed, there are still in the academy originalists of different political orientations. Originalism's own beginnings are complex. Justice Felix Frankfurter, for example, confidant of Roosevelt, practiced his own form of progressive originalism in calling for judicial deference to legislative majorities, much as some conservative judges do now as a rejection of judicial activism. In Conservatives and the Constitution, Ken I. Kersch presents a new way to look at the evolution of what may be called conservative constitutionalism. Originalism as it is popularly understood today—an approach that adheres to the “original public meaning” of the words of the Constitution and that tends to emphasize deference to the democratic branches and a more limited role for judges to “make” new law—is in part a response to the dominance of liberal constitutionalism during the 1960s and 1970s. And that originalism was in some ways a repurposed progressive originalism used against the pre–New Deal conservative Supreme Court. But Kersch is right to note that in the postwar period up to the reaction against the Warren Court era, conservative thinking on the Constitution had a different focus.
There was little in this later, narrowed originalism that was necessarily conservative in any theoretical or ideological sense, although it was certainly conservative in its effects in political and historical context, since it was aimed at kneecapping the development of recent liberal precedent. The earlier, more open conservative constitutional thought and theory undertaken outside of legal academia, however, had a deeper ideologically conservative subculture. Its preoccupations were, for instance, the underlying principles of government, often understood in terms of political theory (Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Christianity, the rooted national community). Memory mattered in significant ways. Those stories provided a deep context for contemporaneous legal developments that lent them resonance and meaning beyond the question whether the application of a particular clause of the Constitution has been rightly applied in a contemporary constitutional case (29).
In a chapter entitled “The Alternative Tradition of Conservative Constitutional Theory,” Kersch describes the different factions arguing over what the American constitutional order meant in the postwar period. Much of this will be familiar to those who have followed the conservative wars, but the profusion of thought conducted outside the law schools may be new to those who equate conservative constitutionalism with Federalist Society–style originalism. Kersch examines the debates that preoccupied the neoconservatives, Straussians, traditional conservatives, and others who tried to thresh out what being a conservative devoted to a specific written constitution meant. His scholarly effort to bring these debates to light in a readable fashion is commendable. What his work shows is that conservatives were focused as much on a constitutional order as on the Constitution itself. Even during the more pronounced originalist turn, political theorists such as George Carey noted that an originalist vision was still undergirded by a “constitutional morality,” rooted in British jurisprudence and Christian norms. Kersch could have helpfully extended this argument by referring to the work of Bruce Frohnen, Carey's long-time collaborator, who has drawn this argument to the present, and scholars such as Barry Alan Shain and Donald Lutz, who have shown just how much acceptance of the Constitution as a governing document relied on the Christian localism of the states. Relatedly, the existence of state constitutions—some of which are very liberal and provide all sorts of rights and protections not afforded in the more textually abstemious national constitution—has always proved something of a stumbling block for conservative originalists. They have to acknowledge either that state-level originalism may result in very different, and not very conservative, results than their national originalism, or that some overarching principle can restrain those liberal impulses. In contrast to the usual focus on the Constitution, these questions have been the subject of less scholarly work on the Right.
The word “story” recurs often in this book, and this is not accidental. Kersch explains that conservative constitutional theory was undertaken outside the legal academy, and among popular magazines, private organizations, and self-taught activists, the placement of the Constitution within a larger understanding of the nation and the larger Western tradition is crucial. Kersch expands on some of these stories with supplementary chapters devoted to stories about the market, “evangelical” stories, and “right-wing Catholic stories.” What is interesting in this account is how the lens of conservative constitutional thinking narrowed as political victory under Ronald Reagan solidified. The story of the evangelical constitutionalism, for instance, is largely one of failure. No prominent originalist believes that originalism is supported by a Christian worldview, such that the Constitution should be interpreted in a Christian way. Instead, each school of conservative thought tries to use the language of originalism as an antiprogressive weapon, but without a substantive vision of what the country is—the kind of topic that occupied conservative thinkers through the period Kersch covers—the job of all those Trump judges will be all the more difficult.
The conservative thinker Russell Kirk is a good example here. Kersch spends some time developing Kirk's constitutional vision, particularly his use of the American thinker Orestes Brownson and of John Henry Cardinal Newman, both of whom have a place in Kirk's seminal 1953 work The Conservative Mind. Kirk supported a certain kind of originalism, though he started writing about the law relatively late in his career. But more important for Kersch's thesis, Kirk was quite clear that any constitutional order rested on extraconstitutional foundations. That is, in a sentence Kersch quotes here, “[men's] passions are held in check only by the punishments of divine wrath and the tender affections of piety” (310). Such extraconstitutional foundations were required for any tolerable civil social order. This view, needless to say, fit uneasily with other conservative schools, whose praise of the natural rights background of the Constitution did not always include a sense of the common good or fear of the divine. Kersch matches Kirk's more traditional view with that of other Catholics, who tried to join a Thomist conception of rights with the clearly Protestant-inflected British constitutional tradition the eighteenth century.
In his concluding chapter, “The Development of Constitutional Conservatism,” Kersch suggests how this conservative fight over what the Constitution means has contemporary relevance. For the disagreement between the conservative originalists and what may be called conservative substantialists simply went underground. But the growing recognition among some segments of the Right that it has “lost” the culture war has caused a rethinking of its constitutional positions as well. Kersch thinks that for now the originalism that has been the de facto orthodoxy of the Right provides enough “overlapping consensus” to prevent all-out war. Kersh notes Michael Anton's challenge to the conservative establishment: if you think the Constitution has been “betrayed” or traduced by the Left, the time for a counterrevolution is now, and that would include a reassessment of how we understand the Constitution; as Kirk liked to say, the Constitution was not a suicide pact, meant to be preserved no matter the national emergency. But the nature of that reaction is still forming. “At some point, however, [conservatives] may be forced to ask how complicit their parallel insistence on a rigid textualism and legal originalism has become in the broader Right's restorationist and redemptivist project, as anchored . . . [in a set of] stories about American political identity and nationalism” (382). Those stories go far beyond the text of the nation's founding documents, and its terms are set out in this fine study.
