Miller starts his book with the following radical claim: ‘people in developed countries have a vast, largely unmet responsibility to help people in developing countries.’ He goes on to base this ultimately on an empirical analysis of the transactions between developed and developing counties, arguing that it is the abuse of transnational power which gives rise to this responsibility.
The corollary of this line of argument is radical too: that the responsibility is not grounded in a rational ethical theory. His case rather depends on empirical evidence, and he uses a series of (contentious) examples to illustrate this basis.
A rational ethical theory starts with individuals and imposes an element of impartiality to derive a theory of justice. The individuals have interests and objectives. For some the objective is to maximise utility – and ethical debate focuses on whose interests – and whose utility – should be taken into account. Social contract theory, from Locke onwards, defines society as an agreement between consenting individuals who recognise that the good of the whole may be better served in a civil society, rather than through some sort of brutal Hobbesian struggle.
The advantages of the rational approach are many, and not least it might be possible to construct – through the imposition of impartiality and a bit of altruism – that Miller's claim has some validity. But Miller does not tolerate this option: indeed he hardly engages with this tradition, confining himself to criticisms of utilitarian arguments about ‘the principle of sacrifice’ and the avoidance of spending on luxuries, and to a cosmopolitan view of economic justice, extrapolating the duties to one's compatriots on the global stage.
It does not aid Miller's case that neither of these two ethical theories is particularly robust, and that he simply ignores vast swathes of ethical arguments about equity and equality. Had he not done so, he might have also recognised claims which take a far less radical view of our responsibilities. There is no room for Hume or Burke anywhere in Miller's account.
What is perhaps most odd is that in taking the view that our responsibilities are grounded in empirics, there is little recognition of the rather obvious empirical fact that most people do not adhere to his claim: very few people are prepared either individually or politically – through their votes – to transfer more than a tiny proportion of their income and assets to developing countries. If the argument is an empirical one, then it stands or falls on empirical analysis. It is therefore rather inconvenient that the ‘facts’ point to a very different conclusion.
Miller's empirical case is based upon his examples – the ‘flawed processes’ that govern global relationships; greenhouse gases and ‘greenhouse justice’; ‘modern empire’ (by which he means in practice the ‘American Empire’); and ‘imperial excess’ (by which he means the ways in which America props up client regimes and ‘the violent destruction inflicted and sponsored by the United States’).
Given the crucial role that empirics play in Miller's argument, it might be expected that the chapters covering these selected topics would comprise a balanced appraisal of the evidence. They do not. The case of greenhouse gases, for example, is presented with a selective bias which largely assumes the problem and neglects crucial salient facts about the science and the distribution of the impacts. Reading this chapter, it all seems so simple: the United States is the problem. What is required for Miller is a ‘model of teamwork’. There is no public goods theory here, no serious engagement with game theory and the architecture of global agreements, and no serious account of the role of China in the growth of emissions. Presumably the Americans are supposed to transfer lots of their wealth to the authoritarian Chinese communist government in the hope that as a result they will stop burning coal.
When a bold claim of responsibility is based upon empirics, and illustrated by specific examples, it is usually helpful to ask why the particular examples have been chosen. Miller does not explain – and it is interesting to note what he leaves out. In blaming so much on the Americans, there is little mention of the other ‘evil’ regimes. There is little engagement with the nature of the regimes like that of Mao and the murder of millions of his own people, and no serious concern for the terrible things inflicted by Saddam Hussein, the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
And so too is the solution: a global social democracy – a ‘movement of social movements’ which brings together protest movements, focussed campaigns and ‘public arguments and communities of outlook’. The trouble with this is not the evolving of political movements, but rather what provides a global social democracy with its rationale. It is here that the lack of grounding in ethics and ethical theory is most important.
A more modest approach might have greater chances of success. Not only do developed countries have responsibilities in respect of developing countries, but so do developing countries to themselves. Whilst it is easy to excuse poor governance by blaming it all on the Americans on the basis of client status or some other relationship, it is not obvious that developing countries with relationships with richer countries would all be benign, just and democratic if the vast transfers of resources were actually made. Unsurprisingly, many developed countries place great weight on the extension of liberal democratic principles in world governance, however misguided the applications sometimes are.
The vast transfers to developing countries Miller has in mind must have some chance of success in improving the lot of their people. It is hardly an appealing argument to voters (social democrat or otherwise) to demand these transfers without any means of ensuring success. In each of the examples Miller presents there are practical problems. In the climate change case, what exactly is the point of Europe or America cutting emissions, when China and India are unwilling to join in and China adds two new coal fired power stations per week? Transfers may help – but they are not sufficient.
It is hard therefore to conclude other than that Miller's project is unsuccessful. The case for vast resource transfers should start with an ethical grounding, rather than rely on empirics. And if it is to have an empirical underpinning, it should be done with precision and analytical impartiality. Miller effectively dismisses ethical theory and relies on highly questionable ‘facts’. There are many and better arguments than those Miller advances for global justice.
