Brian Leiter’s Why Tolerate Religion? has already received considerable praise for its perspicuous presentation of a tightly-reasoned argument for liberty of conscience. Indeed, the book is doubtless clear and to the point, without excess elaboration, but therein may lay a flaw. For in the brevity of his treatment of religion especially, critics such as Stanley Fish (New York Times) and Ray Pennings (Cardus’ Comment) find a foothold.
Leiter, a University of Chicago philosopher and legal scholar, begins with a quandary that issues from the 2006 Canadian Supreme Court decision accommodating the Sikh kirpan in Canadian public schools. The religious requirement that a Sikh boy must wear this ceremonial dagger was allowed, one may recall, though the boy may be attending public school, where weapons generally are banned. For contrast, Leiter poses a hypothetical rural rite of passage in which a boy is given a hunting knife by his father, which he must wear as part of his identity within his community, even though, again, he may be attending public school. Leiter plausibly speculates that the rural boy’s claim of conscience will not fare so well in court as did the Sikh boy’s claim. The difference is religion. Religious claims of conscience seem to be privileged in many Western democracies, in that they may well win exemptions from generally applicable laws more frequently than claims of conscience lacking the support of religion. But why tolerate religion, Leiter asks, and answers: “not because of anything to do with it being religion as such”. (7)
Leiter begins his argument by carving out the situation definitive of principled toleration. The virtue of toleration, if virtue it is, is not called for by behaviour or expression to which one is merely indifferent, nor is it called for by offensive situations about which one lacks the ability to do anything. Rather, principled toleration is required in those situations where the practices and beliefs of others are regarded as objectionably misguided and in error, and where one has the capacity to suppress these practices and beliefs but refrains from doing so for moral reasons. Chapter One reviews the moral reasons for toleration, and Leiter selects two representative approaches: John Rawls’s quasi-Kantian theory of toleration and J. S. Mill’s utilitarian defence of liberty. Much of this is familiar territory, and of course, the point is simply to establish a theoretical basis for the argument to follow.
What features might be distinctive of religion is the subject of the second chapter, and Leiter is careful to point out that while religious belief and practice already falls under matters of conscience, his concern is whether there is any reason to treat religious claims differently from other claims of conscience. Is religion uniquely valuable, such that it merits special protections (as it seems, in fact, to receive)? Leiter proceeds by testing criteria against a number of counter-example cases that, while not ordinarily considered religions, may be included unintentionally in his concept of religion. He settles on four features that, taken jointly, are distinctive of religion. Believers typically take the requirements of religion to be categorical, as imposing compulsory acts or prohibitions. Further, at least some doctrine of a given religion is intended to be insulated from evidence and reason, as having a status different from everyday beliefs and not subject to the rules of common sense reckoning. Third, religion concerns a metaphysics of ultimate reality, though Leiter points out that, for the purposes of his argument, the essence of this third feature is captured by the denial of the relevance of empirical considerations. Finally, religion typically provides existential consolation, a rationale for the suffering and death of mortal existence.
Leiter’s dispatch of the case for principled toleration of religion is strikingly brief. First, he dismisses Rawls’s argument for toleration, since, while one might conclude the desirability of equal liberty of conscience and that one should accept some categorical demands, there would be no way to assess the value that religion as religion might confer on either of these from behind the veil of ignorance. Without quite a bit more information than would be allowed behind the veil, how could one assess the value of accepting categorical demands insulated from evidence and reason? This leaves only utilitarian support for toleration. Mill’s notion of “experiments in living”, that the value of different ways of life must be determined by an experimental trial, offers some justification for tolerating religious claims, since this can provide the information missing in Rawls’s argument. But here, side-constraints imposed by the Harm Principle threaten to derail the case for religious toleration entirely. For while Leiter acknowledges that significant good can come from religion (e.g., opposition to Nazism), much harm also seems a likely concomitant (e.g., the Crusades). Indeed, one might go so far as to suggest that the combination of categorical demands with insulation from evidence and reason is especially likely to result in harm, since this would dismiss exactly the reasons why someone should not burn people at the stake, for example. Whatever the worth of religious experiments in living, the open question of whether the resultant harms are outweighed by the benefits undercuts any conclusion that religious claims of conscience are especially deserving of toleration. Once you add in the fact that non-religious worldviews may be able to provide the same benefits without the drawbacks, it seems unlikely the utilitarian argument can succeed.
In one of the most interesting chapters in the book, Leiter reviews and discards Martha Nussbaum’s competing account of the moral foundation for religious liberty. Toleration, Nussbaum claims, is too grudging a regard for what she terms the “infinitely precious”, “sincere quest for meaning”. (72) Rather, ought we not accept different religious consciences out of respect for the role they can play in our lives? Perhaps it’s pertinent to point out that religion may not be the best, or even a good, means of seeking life’s meaning, but instead, Leiter teases out a crucial ambiguity in Nussbaum’s case. The concept of respect can be read in a minimal or a substantial way. Minimally, respect implies no more than recognition of the moral limits imposed by the existence of other people. In this, respect is not obviously different from toleration. More substantially, respect entails a positive appraisal of, and esteem for, the worthy attributes of persons or institutions. Clearly, this second sense of respect is what Nussbaum’s argument needs, but Leiter has already provided ample reason for scepticism that religion’s mixed bag of benefits and detriments really qualifies it for positive appraisal. So, the most plausible ‘respect’ owed to religious claims of conscience is only toleration anyway.
In the final chapter, Leiter returns to practical concerns and examines existing legal regimes of liberty of conscience. As noted, Western democracies tend to privilege—if not de jure then de facto—religious claims of conscience. Leiter also reviews such policies as the French laïcité, the German prohibition of Nazi symbols and the American establishment clause. Having argued that religious claims of conscience deserve toleration only as claims of conscience and not as religious, he considers what alternative regimes of law might be found more fitting than some of these policies. To avoid privileging religion, he considers two broad policies: the extension of exemptions to universality, allowing all claims of conscience, or alternately, denying all claims of conscience equally. The policy of universal exemption has some obvious and fatal flaws. Consider the chaos that would ensue from tailoring law to meet individual needs, or the empirical problem courts would face of distinguishing the genuineness of such claims. Leiter, however, emphasizes the burden-shifting effect of exemptions, since, for example, when religious exemptions from military service are granted, this social burden falls on those unable to claim exemptions for whatever reason, which is patently unfair. Avoidance of burden-shifting becomes an important qualifier to the ‘no exemptions’ stance, Leiter’s preferred policy. Most of the remainder of the chapter is spent defending this view from concerns that it would constitute an impermissible intolerance of religion. Finally, the book closes by briefly considering the implications of Leiter’s argument for religious establishment, notably concluding that both establishment and disestablishment can be consistent with the no exemptions policy. So, on Leiter’s argument, neither the Sikh boy nor the hypothetical rural boy should be exempt from the prohibition of weapons in public schools.
What of critics like Fish and Pennings then? Both critics take issue with Leiter’s construal of religion, but neither offers any indication of which feature is inaccurate, or of how his definition is overinclusive or underinclusive. Rather, Fish complains that religion is protected in Leiter’s account only at the expense of “not having its doctrinal tenets taken seriously”, and that “virgin births, salvation and damnation” are not mentioned. After pointing out that Leiter’s analysis “unfolds without reference to any special status for religious claims of conscience”, Fish bizarrely asks why there should be a “religion clause” (sic) in the American Constitution. Having claimed that Leiter makes no distinction between “[r]eligion, philosophy, morality, [and] therapy”, he points out that religion has a clause in the Constitution while philosophy, morality and therapy do not, the implication seemingly being that this is satisfactory to establish the relevant differences, which Leiter evidently should heed. For his part, Pennings complains that Leiter reduces religion to a merely private matter, defining away everything that doesn’t “fit his scientific framework”, and Pennings takes this reduction to mean that, for Leiter, religion is just “whatever you want it to be”. Leiter’s definition is inadequate because there is no mention of religion’s “public utility”, its “institutional elements”, or even “the notion of institutional religious authority”. Further, Pennings complains that since we are on “the terrain of everyday questions about how to live peaceably alongside each other”, Leiter can’t address the issues adequately with abstract “concepts such as toleration, rights and religion—as if these were philosophical problems to be solved.” (Of course, these are philosophical problems, Pennings notwithstanding.)
It is difficult to see how either gets such claims out of Leiter’s book, but at least the question-begging is easy to see. Fish and Pennings simply assume without argument the status of religion that Leiter’s argument puts in question. If Leiter makes religion into a merely private matter, this is surely because it will be private individuals who make the claims of conscience that Leiter wishes to evaluate. Whatever advantages their definitions might have, neither Fish nor Pennings offer any suggestion of how they would helpfully inform the handling of claims of conscience, which was the whole of Leiter’s point.
