Responding to Genocide is an important contribution to the burgeoning field of genocide (and mass atrocity) prevention. This is social science at its best: the attempt to use research findings about causes of genocide and other mass atrocities (crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing) to suggest policies that can mitigate or eliminate those causes. But it is still an academic field in its infancy, and there are numerous aspects that need to be investigated. In this volume, editors Adam Lupel and Ernest Verdeja try to move the debate further by exploring how “political factors shape the nature of international responses” to genocide and other mass atrocities and how those factors “limit or enable the chances of success” (p. 3). Their collection brings together contributions by well-known authors on genocide prevention, conflict prevention, and the responsibility to protect. It should be read by all policy-makers and scholars interested in preventing genocide.

In the first part of the book, two chapters summarize the current state of debates regarding the causes of genocide. Frances Stewart compares quantitative studies on the causes of civil war and of genocide. While there are numerous similarities in the causes of both civil war and genocide, Stewart notes that there are three major differences: Countries with low per capita incomes are at the greatest risk for civil war but those with intermediate levels of income are the most associated with genocide; autocratic or totalitarian regimes are most likely to initiate genocide, while civil wars are more likely in intermediate regimes; and civil war is a predisposing condition for genocide (p. 70). These differences are important – particularly because policy-makers and officials often assume that policies designed to prevent conflict will also prevent genocide (so genocide prevention requires no additional or special policy measures). The findings raise thorny problems for policy-makers, since fostering a transition from authoritarianism to a more democratic regime will lessen the risks of genocide but increase those of civil war, which in turn is associated with an increased risk of genocide.

Barbara Harff, who a decade ago developed a model to assess the risks of genocide, then reviews efforts to develop and use early warning models to try to inform policy responses to potentially genocidal situations. She notes that work is still needed to understand the process leading to genocide, why elites choose to carry out genocide, and which policy interventions at what point are most likely to lead to genocide prevention. In any given situation, these questions could be answered differently, which highlights the need for well-informed analysis.

In his chapter, I. William Zartman considers the role that mediation and diplomacy can play in preventing genocide, and points out that the parties on the ground – “especially the repressing party” – have to be willing to be mediated (p. 131). Without this, third parties may have to impose sanctions to encourage the repressing party to consent to mediation. Unfortunately, Responding to Genocide does not include a chapter on the role that sanctions and other coercive measures may play in preventing genocide, which would complement Zartman’s argument and provide further analysis of some of the tools available to policy-makers to try to prevent genocide and other mass atrocities, as well as what limits exist on the use of sanctions.

The second part of the book considers the roles that various actors – transnational civil society, regional organisations, the United Nations – play in genocide prevention efforts. The overall message is that these actors could do considerably more to strengthen their capacities to prevent genocide. Iavor Rangelov’s chapter offers a useful corrective to the oft-heard argument that civil society can press governments and international organizations to take preventative action against massive human rights violations such as genocide. Instead, civil society does not speak with one voice when it comes to questions such as “is it genocide” and “what should be done.” Rangelov argues that civil society should focus instead on advancing “those humanitarian norms and novel legal and policy instruments that, once in place, set the terms of the debate and guide the international response to any particular crisis” (p. 152).

Regional organisations are also divided. Timothy Murithi argues that the internal divisions and the lack of capabilities within the African Union and Arab League have inhibited their responses to incipient or ongoing genocides, as in the AU’s efforts in Darfur and the Arab League’s response to repression in Syria. He proposes that regional organisations should focus on providing early warning and trying to de-escalate tensions, but that they will still need to “develop coherent genocide prevention strategies” if they are do this effectively (p. 176).

The ups and downs of the UN’s responses to mass atrocities are reviewed by Colin Keating (New Zealand’s former ambassador to the Security Council) and Thomas Weiss. Keating argues that despite the Security Council’s many failures to prevent or halt mass atrocities, there is hope for “better outcomes in the future” (p. 181). Even after a “pushback” following the 2011 intervention in Libya, there is still support for interventions in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali. Weiss is less sanguine, pointing out that the “North-South theatre” with its “empty performances” constitutes a real political obstacle to enabling interventions to halt mass atrocities, alongside a serious lack of military capability beyond that of the United States, and a shocking reluctance to coordinate among the many UN agencies that could help protect the people. But even Weiss notes that the Libya example “suggests that it is not quixotic to utter ‘never again’ and occasionally to mean it” (p. 235).

In their conclusion, Lupel and Verdeja consider the crucial question of how to “create” political will to respond to potential or ongoing genocides. Firstly, there should be further development and diffusion of norms against the use of violence on civilians and favouring international cooperation to prevent or halt such violence. Secondly, awareness needs to be cultivated that halting mass atrocities is in the common interest of all states. Thirdly, in any particular situation of potential or actual violence, strategies need to be devised that are appropriate to the context. Finally, strong leadership, especially by democratic states, is needed to enable effective genocide prevention (pp. 251–3).

Responding to Genocide identifies the major stumbling block to preventing and halting genocide – differences among states and other actors. Governments need to know that there is a risk and agree to take concerted action to address it. They need to be willing and able to impose coercive measures as a last resort, if structural prevention and softer direct prevention measures have failed. Debates about semantics – whether a “genocide” is the issue or not – should not foil the primary objective of preventing massive human rights violations. This volume highlights how difficult (but not impossible) it is to overcome that stumbling block. It points to some improvements that could strengthen the capacity of various international actors to prevent genocide, but does not cover others (such as the use of sanctions or measures such as monitoring missions). It would also have been illuminating to broaden the discussion to include obstacles to action, such as the cost (in money and in lives) of preventive measures, the ways bureaucracies can inhibit early warning, and the perennial problem that crisis-response crowds out prevention (in terms of resources, and the attention and time of politicians and officials). Reducing such obstacles could improve the ability of governments and international organisations to prevent genocide. While that does not necessarily improve the will to respond, such measures could improve the capacity of those actors that are willing to do so.