1
If the traditions about the death of the Buddha are to be believed, the early Buddhist community gathered in Rājagṛha to preserve their master's teachings.Footnote 1 Since the Buddha's teaching career apparently lasted for forty-five years, the magnitude of this task should not be underestimated. We should suppose that the Buddha taught numerous individuals, including those who were his disciples and those who were not; that his teaching comprised individual instruction as well as public sermons and debates; that he taught in a variety of regional dialects; and even that his method of teaching and its content changed from person to person as well as over time. In short, it is likely that there were numerous accounts of the Buddha's ministry at the beginning of the Buddhist Era (c.404 BCE).Footnote 2 It should come as no surprise, then, that at least one Buddhist school mentions a dissenter at the first council: the Pāli account states that although the monk Purāṇa commended the efforts made at this communal gathering, he believed that the teachings preserved differed from his personal experience of the Buddha: “The elders have recited the Dharma and Vinaya excellently, but I will remember it just as I heard and grasped it directly from the Blessed One”.Footnote 3
There is no reason to doubt the story of Pūraṇa, since we can assume that an early Buddhist school would not have invented a tale which casts doubt on the heritage of their texts.Footnote 4 The story might therefore be seen as an admission of partial failure in the attempt to preserve the Buddha's teachings, or at least as an expression of doubt in this regard. On another level, however, the story of Purāṇa creates a more favourable impression. The sincerity of the account suggests that the initial attempts to preserve the teachings were conducted in an open and impartial manner, and even that the early compilers were confident enough of their work to mention dissenting voices. The story therefore gives us a reason to be cautiously optimistic about the authenticity of at least some early Buddhist texts. But how can we be sure of this? Even if an early tradition was confident enough to preserve the story of Purāṇa, how can we trust that their record of events in the Buddha's life – some of which took place decades before the putative first council – is accurate?
The canonical texts answer this question by suggesting that the literary endeavours of the first council were based on earlier attempts to preserve the Buddha's teaching. We can first of all consider the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta. According to this text, which records the Buddha's death and the events leading up to it, the Buddha repeatedly stated the essence of his teaching during his final days: virtue, meditation and understanding.Footnote 5 A more substantial account is found in the Pāsādika Sutta, which reports the reaction of the early Buddhist community to the Jain arguments about the teachings of its leader, Mahāvīra, after his death.Footnote 6 It states that in response to these arguments the Buddha advised his followers to remember the “thirty-seven factors leading to awakening” (bodhipakkhiyā dhammā).Footnote 7 The pretext of both accounts is plausible: we can imagine that before he died the Buddha was keen to stress the main points of his teaching in order to ensure that his community of mendicants avoided the fate of the Jains (doctrinal argument followed by schism). But even if these accounts are historically plausible, the antiquity of the teachings contained within them cannot be verified. There is no early independent witness to the Pāsādika Sutta, and the earliest witness to the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta is Aśoka's Rummindei inscription, from around the middle of the third century bce,Footnote 8 roughly 150 years after the Buddha's death. Both texts might have been altered by Buddhists of a later age in order to authenticate any particular teaching.
Other early evidence is more compelling. A number of texts in the Pāli canon refer to the Aṭṭhakavagga and Pārāyanavagga, suggesting that these verse collections were closed early in the period of canonical compilation. These references consist of verse citations in which each collection is named,Footnote 9 although in one place the bhikkhu Soṇa is said to recite the entire Aṭṭhakavagga in the presence of the Buddha:
And then the Blessed One rose at dawn and made the following request of the venerable Soṇa: ‘Let it occur to you to speak the Dhamma’. The venerable Soṇa assented to the Blessed One with the words ‘Yes, master’, and chanted all the sections of the Aṭṭhakavagga in an intoned voice.Footnote 10
Taken at its word this passage suggests that some Buddhist texts were composed while the Buddha was alive and even recited in his presence. Once again, however, there is no independent witness that could confirm the existence of the Aṭṭhakavagga during the Buddha's life.Footnote 11 Other texts from the Suttanipāta are mentioned in Aśoka's Calcutta-Bhairāṭ edict,Footnote 12 and although these are almost certainly younger than the Aṭṭhakavagga, this does not definitely push the latter back to the Buddha's life in the fifth century bce.
While this evidence on the antiquity of early Buddhist literature is inconclusive, a defining feature of it suggests that very old traditions about the Buddha were preserved. Numerous texts portray the Buddha as a master of adapting his instruction to particular didactic situations – what is generally referred to as the Buddha's ‘skill in means’ (Skt. upāya-kauśalya).Footnote 13 According to T.W. Rhys Davids, the portrayal of the Buddha in the long discourses of the Dīgha Nikāya suggests that their composers “may have had a sufficiently clear memory of the way [the Buddha] conversed, [and] may well have even remembered particular occasions and persons”.Footnote 14 Once again, however, since these early skill in means texts are not verified by any external evidence, we cannot trust their content just as we cannot be entirely sure if Plato reported the dialogues of Socrates accurately. This example is particularly useful. There is little doubt that Plato's accounts of Socrates’ dialogues reflect the personality of the latter to some degree. And yet it is also clear that Plato uses Socrates as a mouthpiece for his own views: where the historical Socrates ends and the Platonic Socrates begins is not easy to establish. The same is true of the early Buddhist texts: we do not know where the historical Buddha ends and the views of the early redactors begins.
2
Although the authenticity of early skill in means texts cannot be assumed, they nevertheless represent our best chance of recovering authentic teachings of the Buddha. For it is only in these texts that we glimpse something of the Buddha as an historical person, and so only these texts allow us to speculate meaningfully about his teachings. Furthermore, it can hardly be the case that the Buddhist composers and redactors erased all traces of the Buddha from the early texts, or redacted their teachings into a completely different form; the historical Buddha must be there somewhere. The problem, then, is one of identification: how can authentic ‘skill in means’ texts be detected among the large collection of early Buddhist literature? Considering that ‘skill in means’ teachings dominate the 186 discourses that make up the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas, for example, and much more besides, there is no lack of textual sources to consider. But where might one begin?
It would be useful if some reference to ‘skill in means’ teachings, or at least some point of contact with them could be found in the epigraphical or archaeological record, since this material evidence can be dated and so provides a firm historical starting point. If relevant evidence could be found in the Buddhist monuments of the Aśokan period (mid-third century bce), for example, it might be possible to ascribe some ‘skill in means’ teachings to the first century or so of the Buddhist Era, i.e. within a few generations of the Buddha's life, when people who had witnessed the Buddha personally were perhaps still alive. This would be early enough to speculate meaningfully on the authenticity of a particular teaching. But what monumental evidence might pertain to the notion of the Buddha's ‘skill in means'? Such evidence can in fact be found in Aśoka's Nigali Sagar edict, which records Aśoka's Buddhist activity in the fifteenth and twenty-first years of his reign. Although this edict is not directly related to the Buddha's ‘skill in means', the myth it refers to has implications for the early understanding of the Buddha's religious attainment and his subsequent method of teaching:
When king Priyadarśin, beloved of the gods, had been anointed fourteen years, he had the funerary mound (stūpa) of the Buddha Konākamana doubled (in size). And when he had been anointed [twenty] years, he came himself and worshipped (there), [and] had [a stone pillar] erected.Footnote 15
According to early Buddhist tradition the Buddha Konākamana is the fifth of six past Buddhas, the Pāli canon giving the full list as Vipassin, Sikhin, Vessabhu, Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana and Kassapa.Footnote 16 The origins of this myth are obscure, but its point is fairly clear: by placing the historical Buddha in a lineage of extraordinary religious teachers, the significance of his life and teaching is thus exaggerated to cosmic dimensions. Whatever its origins, by the time this myth is referred to in the Nigali Sagar edict a number of related beliefs must have reached an advanced stage of development. Most obviously, since the myth assumes that the seven Buddhas had achieved the same religious attainment, it implies that they had all made the same discovery, i.e. a complete understanding of the Buddhist Dharma (‘doctrine’, or more generally ‘religion’). This in turn implies that the complete awakening of a Buddha had been distinguished from the lesser attainment of an Arhat (the Buddhist saint who nevertheless attains liberation from the incessant cycle of rebirth), for the early Buddhists cannot have believed that only seven human beings had attained liberation over such a vast stretch of cosmic time: the belief must have been that only seven had attained the full awakening of a Buddha in contrast to numerous other beings (Arhats) who had merely attained liberation. This distinction of religious goals indicates that full Buddhahood had been exalted to an attainment of the most difficult kind, one within range of the few dedicated to a lengthy and arduous path. Thus the myth of past Buddhas implies the notion that they had all been ‘Bodhisattvas’, those ‘devoted to awakening’,Footnote 17 who struggled over countless births to attain the complete awakening of a Buddha, an attainment that confers special rewards such as a supernatural body replete with thirty-two marks. All of these beliefs are implied by the myth of past Buddhas, and all are stated in the discourses of the Pāli canon.Footnote 18 The Nigali Sagar edict implies that these beliefs had reached an advanced stage of dissemination by the mid third century BCE, and if so they can probably be taken back to the early third or late fourth century BCE.
The importance of this mythological complex for the subsequent history of Buddhism in India cannot be underestimated. Particularly important in Buddhist India was the myth of the Buddha as a Bodhisattva: already in about the third century BCE, numerous narrative accounts of the Buddha's former lives during his career as a Bodhisattva were being composed, in a corpus that eventually came to include hundreds of Jātakas and Avadānas as well as the Pāli Apadāna, Buddhavaṃsa and Cariyāpiṭaka.Footnote 19 So popular were these past-life stories that depictions of them dominate the architecture of important Buddhist sites from the second and first century BCE.Footnote 20 It also seems that the cult of the Bodhisattva provided considerable inspiration for the subsequent emergence of Mahāyāna Buddhism,Footnote 21 and that aspects of the myth played an important role in the cult of relic worship at stūpas (as seen in the Nigali Sagar edict). Although relic worship is a universal religious phenomenon, in the Buddhist world it is underpinned by the notion that the Buddha had attained a supernatural body, this being a direct somatic expression of the virtue and other spiritual qualities accumulated over the long Bodhisattva path.Footnote 22 This belief thus makes sense of epigraphical and literary evidence which states that the relics of the Buddha are infused (paribhāvita) with his positive spiritual qualities, especially his virtue (sīla):Footnote 23 the notion that bodily relics of the Buddha possess spiritual attributes is logically connected to the idea that the Buddha came to possess a remarkable body as a result of the spiritual qualities he perfected over numerous past lives.Footnote 24 The myth of past Buddhas and the complex of beliefs surrounding it thus seems to have been a fundamental aspect of Buddhist belief and practice from the third century bce onwards; the first steps towards this understanding must therefore have taken place already in the fourth century bce.
Among the various aspects of the mythological complex concerning past Buddhas, the notion that the Buddhist Dharma is periodically rediscovered is particularly relevant to the idea of Buddha's skill in means. This belief is of course compatible with the notion that the Buddha was able to adapt his teaching according to context, but the notion of a single revelation affects the understanding of the Buddha's skill in means in a small but significant manner. For once this belief had emerged, the role played by the Buddha in thinking out his insights and developing his ideas must have been diminished. In other words, with the doctrine of the Buddha's ‘Dharma revelation’ an important aspect of his life is minimised and ultimately lost: the more human picture of the Buddha as a thinker trying to formulate a message that would resonate with the Gangetic India of the fifth century bce. But even if this aspect of the Buddha's teachings was soon glossed over, this cannot have been the case in earlier times, when the memory of the Buddha was still fresh in the Buddhist community. During this nascent period in the religion, we should expect there to have been traditions about the Buddha's teaching that did not conform to the later myth. There would perhaps have been stories about how new teachings were formulated in the process of the Buddha communicating his ideas to his disciples, and thus how new doctrines were developed as the Buddha exercised his ‘skill in means’.
If any of this is correct, the Nigali Sagar edict gives us a criterion by which to assess the antiquity and authenticity of a skill in means teaching: if such a teaching should depict the Buddha in the process of developing his ideas, it must predate the belief in the Buddha's awakening as a sort of ‘one-off’ revelation. Such a text could therefore be taken back deep into the fourth century bce, when there would still have been persons who had witnessed the Buddha's teaching directly. Beyond this point, when all living contact with the Buddha had disappeared, and with the belief in past Buddhas and related matters gaining in importance, would any early composer have dared suggest that the Buddha changed his mind, or that he developed his ideas throughout the course of his ministry? Probably not.Footnote 25 Texts that state or imply this understanding must therefore be very old, and are more likely than not to be authentic: an early Buddhist would not have composed them unless they were based in a firm tradition that could be taken back to the Buddha and his immediate disciples. This means that if we are looking to recover an authentic teaching of the Buddha, we should look for a skill in means teaching which depicts the Buddha in the process of developing his ideas.
3
It is unlikely that a text on the origin of a Buddhist doctrine would be heralded or even noted in the early Buddhist literature, given the eventual importance attached to contrary mythological beliefs. How, then, might such a teaching be identified? A simple way would be to focus on a doctrine peculiar enough, in Buddhist terms, to suggest an ad hoc formulation by the Buddha. If a skill in means text which makes good sense of this sort of doctrinal peculiarity could be found, there is a good chance that it has recorded the occasion on which the Buddha formulated it. A prime example of such a peculiar teaching is the doctrine of five aggregates (khandha/skandha: form, sensation, apperception, volitions and consciousness),Footnote 26 the most important early Buddhist analysis of the human being. According to Gethin
the five khandhas, as treated in the Nikāyas and early abhidhamma, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṃkhārā and viññāṇa are presented as five aspects of an individual being's experience of the world. . .Footnote 27
This phenomenological understanding seems to make good sense of the textual evidence. If the five aggregates did not define the different aspects of an ‘individual being's experience of the world’, the following passage from the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta would make no sense:
Here, bhikkhus, the bhikkhu contemplates: ‘Form is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; sensation is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; apperception is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; volitions are thus, their arising is thus, their fading away is thus; consciousness is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus’.Footnote 28
The list of five aggregates appears, then, to articulate a relatively straightforward doctrine of experience. And yet this list does not look as if it was discovered by the Buddha as he sat under his tree of awakening, or even formulated by him in the abstract. For it contains a logical peculiarity about which the canonical texts make no comment. The problem is that since the items ‘sensation’ (2), ‘apperception’ (3) and ‘volitions’ (4) are all forms of ‘consciousness’ (5), there would seem to be no need to complete the list with this fifth and final item. This can be seen in the above passage from the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, where the bhikkhu is said to observe his experience in terms of the five aggregates. Since the first four items describe different aspects in the process of consciousness, the final part of this practice (the observance of the rise and fall of consciousness) would seem to serve no purpose. Indeed the position of ‘consciousness’ in this contemplative practice disagrees with numerous other early Buddhist accounts of cognition, according to which ‘consciousness’ precedes ‘sensation’ and ‘apperception’.Footnote 29 The list of five aggregates seems to have got this order wrong.
There is no easy explanation for the peculiar form of this list.Footnote 30 All the teachings on the five aggregates, such as those contained in the Khandha section of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, do not explain why conditioned experience is analysed in this manner. The list is also unusual when considered in comparison with other early Buddhist lists. A common feature of early Buddhist thought is its summation in doctrinal lists, no doubt in order to aid the preservation of teachings in a period of oral transmission: the precise list was a much used mnemonic device in the earliest period of Buddhism.Footnote 31 It follows that these lists were constructed with great care, a fact which can be seen in their logical progression: the Four Noble Truths, the Noble Eightfold Path, the Four Establishments of Mindfulness, the Seven Factors of Awakening, the Five Faculties/Powers and so on.Footnote 32 Alone among these formulations, the list of five aggregates does not display the inner coherence that seems to have been the norm. The notion that it was formulated in the abstract implies that no careful thought was given to its final form. But this explanation will not do, for it is hardly likely that this list, in contrast to all the others, was not properly thought out. So how is it to be explained? If the list does not look like a product of abstract deliberation, it is possible that it was formulated by the Buddha as he exercised his skill in means. We should therefore look for a skill in means text that makes sense of the list's peculiar order.
A good place to begin would be the Alagaddūpama Sutta. This text not only contains a long teaching culminating in the list of five aggregates, but also explains the rational behind the ‘skill in means’ approach to teaching, when the Buddha claims that his teachings are motivated by the pragmatic concern of helping his disciples attain liberation. This explanation of teaching motive – which occurs early in the Sutta and so contextualises the teaching that follows – is a response to the case of the bhikkhu Ariṭṭha, who reports his understanding of the Buddha's teaching as follows:
As I understand the Blessed One's teaching, what he has said are obstructing thoughts do not lead to an obstruction for the person who indulges in them.’Footnote 33
The meaning of this statement is not entirely clear. But since both Ariṭṭha's fellow bhikkhus and the Buddha go on to state that sensual pleasures (kāmā) offer little enjoyment (appassādā),Footnote 34 this misunderstanding would seem to concern the Buddha's teaching on sensual pleasure. Ariṭṭha thus seems to have thought that the action itself (indulgence in sensual pleasure) does not matter so long as the thought behind it is absent (i.e. without the desire for such pleasure); such an interpretation implies that sensual pleasure can be pursued so long as a person does not desire it. In other words, it would seem that Ariṭṭha has misunderstood the Buddha's stress on the intention behind the act, rather than the act itself, as the morally efficacious factor.Footnote 35 The Buddha is obviously opposed to Ariṭṭha's belief, and notes his disapproval by stating that ‘it is not possible to pursue sensual pleasures without lusting, devoid of lustful ideas and thoughts of lust’.Footnote 36 It seems, then, that Ariṭṭha has taken an overly literalistic view of the Buddha's teaching, perhaps even for personal gain.
In response to the case of Ariṭṭha the Buddha states two similes. The first is that of the water-snake (alaga, after which the discourse is named), which condemns an excessively literalistic approach to his teachings: this approach is compared to grasping a snake incorrectly by the tail, since when held in this way it is free to bite a person and possibly kill him.Footnote 37 The second is the simile of the raft, in which the Buddha explains that his teachings are pragmatic and useful only in so far as they lead to the religious goal (the cessation of suffering), just as a raft is constructed only for the sake of crossing over a river.Footnote 38 The Buddha underlines this point by stating that just as it would be incorrect for a person who has crossed a river by raft to carry it around on his head afterwards, so too would it be incorrect to grasp on to the Buddha's teaching after achieving its purpose.Footnote 39 This explanation does not fit easily with the later myth of the Buddha's revelation: far from suggesting that Buddhist doctrine is abandoned after the religious goal has been attained, this myth states that the doctrine is only realised in all its glory when a person achieves the highest religious goal possible by becoming a Buddha. This suggests the possibility that the Alagaddūpama Sutta was composed before the later myth emerged, during a time when the origin and purpose of early Buddhist doctrine was understood differently. If so, it is quite possible that this text is very old and that its subsequent teaching on the five aggregates is an authentic example of the Buddha's skill in means.
4
After the simile of the raft, the Buddha explores the theme of grasping at ideas and doctrines by delivering a teaching on the misunderstanding of experience by an ‘ignorant’ person. The teaching begins when the Buddha outlines six views (cha diṭṭhiṭṭhānāni) as follows:
Here, bhikkhus, the ignorant, ordinary person who ignores the noble ones and is neither skilled nor trained in their teaching, who ignores the virtuous ones and is neither skilled nor trained in their teaching, regards form. . . sensation. . . apperception. . . volitions. . . what is seen, heard, thought, cognised, attained, sought after and pondered by the mind, as well as the view ‘The world is the self, and when I die I will be fixed, intransient, eternal and not subject to change; I will remain the same for ever more’ as ‘This is mine, I am this, this my self (attā)’.Footnote 40
In this short passage the Buddha speaks of six ways in which personal identity can be misunderstood. The first four of these views are based on the first four of the five aggregates: an ignorant person is said to believe that form, sensation, apperception and volitions constitute his true identity or self (‘This is mine, I am this, this my self).Footnote 41 In this context we might expect the object of the fifth misconceived view to be ‘consciousness’. But the Buddha instead mentions a pericope found in other early texts: ‘what is seen, heard, thought, cognised, attained, sought after and pondered by the mind’.Footnote 42 This is highly unusual. The list of five aggregates emerged from the early Buddhist period as a doctrine of fundamental importance, and it is unlikely that later transmitters of the Pāli texts altered its canonical occurrences; it is unlikely that they would have replaced ‘consciousness’ with a pericope taken from other contexts. We must assume, then, that this peculiarity is very old. Indeed the Chinese Sarvāstivādin version of the text includes a virtually identical list of six views, a fact which suggests that this pericope was found in the pre-Aśokan antecedent of the text.Footnote 43 The pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ is almost certainly part of an early or original version of the Alagaddūpama Sutta rather than a later emendation or insertion.
The pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ is also peculiar because it does not seem to continue the Buddha's analysis of the various aspects of experience that an ignorant person might misconceive. All its contents seem to be assumed by the fourfold list that precedes it: “what is seen, heard, thought, cognised, attained, sought after and pondered by the mind” are logically encompassed by sensation, apperception and volitions. It seems, then, that this peculiar pericope is just as superfluous as the fifth aggregate of ‘consciousness’. So why is it mentioned? The only plausible answer to this is that the pericope paraphrases Yājñavalkya's teaching in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (IV.5.6) that when the ātman is “seen, heard, thought of and perceived (dṛṣṭe śrute mate vijñāte) then the whole world is known”.Footnote 44 Since the first four items of this list match the first four items of the Buddhist pericope, a close relationship between the two texts is hard to deny. But did the Buddhist text draw on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad or vice versa?
The notion of a Buddhist allusion to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad is, according to Bronkhorst, “far from certain”.Footnote 45 But there are further Upaniṣadic references in the Alagaddūpama Sutta: the sixth view that the Buddha objects to (‘The world is the self . . .’), for example, is clearly an allusion to the early Upaniṣadic notion of a macrocosmic ātman. This surely shows that the Buddhist text drew upon Upaniṣadic ideas rather than vice versa. This direction of influence is also the most logical. For only when understood in this way does the Buddhist text make sense: the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ is redundant unless it makes another point, such as that an ignorant person might mistakenly identify with the Upaniṣadic ātman. It would seem then, that whoever devised this teaching drew upon a number of sayings from the early Upaniṣads, and did so in order to include them within an analysis of the various ways of misunderstanding experience. To those aware of the Upaniṣadic text the Buddha's point would have been clear: no aspect of one's experience, not even the experience of the Upaniṣadic ātman, should be regarded as one's real identity (attan).
This explanation leaves one aspect of the Pāli pericope unexplained. If “what is seen, heard, thought of and cognised” is a direct allusion to BU IV.5.6, why does the Buddha also mention that which is “attained, sought after and pondered by the mind” (pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā)? There is in fact a simple explanation for this. In the Pāli canon the verb anuvicarati often refers to the practice of meditation.Footnote 46 Since the verb pariyesati has the sense of seeking the religious goal – the famous ‘Discourse on the Noble One's Search’ (Ariyapariyesana Sutta: M no. 26) is sufficient proof of this – it would seem that the Pāli pericope covers the possibility that the Upaniṣadic ātman might be realised through meditation (a possibility explicitly stated at BU IV.4.23).Footnote 47 By adding a few words suggesting the attainment of the religious goal through meditation, the Buddha adapts the Upaniṣadic pericope to suggest that identifying oneself with the ātman, through meditative realisation or otherwise, is misconceived.
As noted above, the reading of the fifth view as an allusion to an Upaniṣadic formula is supported by the sixth and final view, in which personal identity is imagined in the terms “The world is the self, and when I die I will be fixed, intransient, eternal and not subject to change; I will remain the same for ever more”. This seems to recall at least two other Upaniṣadic statements, as has been pointed out by Norman,Footnote 48 and is clearly a reference to the Upaniṣadic doctrine of a ‘world self’. Thus the Buddha extends his analysis of misconceiving experience to point out the mistake of identifying with the Upaniṣadic ātman (perhaps realised through meditation), and with this ātman understood as a macrocosmic essence. Norman has also noted that the way the Buddha articulates personal identity in this teaching (‘This is mine, I am this, this my self’) is a first person reformulation of the ‘Thou art that’ (tat tvam asi) of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.Footnote 49 Thus it would appear that the aim of the teaching on six misconceived views is quite specific: by pointing out ways in which an ignorant person might misunderstand experience, the Buddha is mostly concerned with Upaniṣadic notions of personal identity.
5
In outlining these six views the Buddha does not point out why they are mistaken; they are simply stated to be the views of an ignorant person as a matter of course. But after the Buddha explores the psychological implications of accepting or not accepting the sixth misconceived (in response to his disciples’ questions),Footnote 50 he then explains why he objects to its referent, the Upaniṣadic ‘world self’:
“If, bhikkhus, the self exists (attani sati), might one be able to infer: ‘I possess a property of the self (attaniyaṃ)’?” “Yes, master”. “And if, bhikkhus, a property of the self exists (attaniye sati), might one be able to infer: ‘I possess the self (attā)’?” “Yes, master.” “But if both the self and a property of it cannot truly be perceived, would not the view ‘The world is the self, and when I die I will be fixed, intransient, eternal and not subject to change, and will remain the same for ever more’ be complete and utter nonsense?” “How could it not be complete and utter nonsense, master?”Footnote 51
When the Buddha asks if the self (question one) or a property of it (question two) exists, he is really asking if such a thing can be perceived. This much becomes clear when the Buddha goes on to ask (question three): “if both the self and a property of it cannot truly be perceived. . .”. The argument, then, is that a person's belief in a macrocosmic ātman must be empirically justified. Should one be able to perceive a self (attan) of the kind described, one might be able to infer that one possesses a property of it (attaniya). If, on the other hand, one were to perceive a property of this self, one might be able to infer that one possesses such a thing. In both cases the Buddha is stating that the rational basis for believing in the ‘world self’ is empirical. It would seem that the absence of empirical verification was the reason why the Buddha originally stated that this notion of personal identity is that of an ignorant person.
After this empirical refutation of the Upaniṣadic ‘world self’, the Buddha deals with the five other views in a similar fashion. In this final part of the teaching, the Buddha shows how conceiving personal identity in these five ways lacks empirical justification:
“What do you think, bhikkhus: is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, master”. “Is that which is impermanent satisfactory or unsatisfactory?” “Unsatisfactory, master”. “And is it suitable to regard that which is impermanent, unsatisfactory and subject to change as ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?” “No, master”.Footnote 52
The same teaching is applied to feeling, apperception, volitions and consciousness: each is said to be impermanent, unsatisfactory and not fit to be regarded as one's self. In this simple teaching, then, the Buddha points out that the five categories that encompass conditioned experience are neither enduring nor unchanging, and that there is therefore no empirical justification for believing them to constitute one's true identity or self. This empirical argument seems to have been formulated with reference to the Upaniṣadic ātman. This much is suggested not only by the use of the formula ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’, as we have already seen, but also by the Buddha's choice of questions. Norman has pointed out that the concept of ‘self’ under discussion is an Upaniṣadic one, since the final answer in this series of questions can only be given
by those who know, in advance, that the term attā is by definition nicca and sukha, and therefore anything which is anicca and dukkha cannot be attā. This gives us a clear indication of the type of attā which is being discussed. It is the Upaniṣadic idea of an ātman which is nitya and sukha, and this is in complete agreement with the fact, noted above, that some of the phraseology of the non-Buddhist view which is being rejected has Upaniṣadic echoes.Footnote 53
Although this ‘not-self’ teaching continues the anti-Upaniṣadic themes that precede it, it is important to note that it differs from the initial section on the six misconceived views in one crucial respect. Instead of mentioning ‘what is seen, heard, thought, cognised, attained, sought after and pondered by the mind’, the Buddha simply mentions ‘consciousness’ (viññāṇa). This is unexpected. Given the Upaniṣadic context noted by Norman, we should expect the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ to appear in its original position after ‘volitions’. But this change is well suited to the form of the Buddha's enquiry, which has moved from an initial definition of six misconceived views to an empirical examination of them, in the form of a series simple questions about conditioned experience (‘Is form permanent. . .’ and so on). But since the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ is a recapitulation of BU IV.5.6, and so indicates the (meditative) experience of the Upaniṣadic ātman, it does not fit a simple analysis of a person's conditioned experience. It therefore makes sense for the Buddha to substitute the pericope with a simpler definition of the Upaniṣadic ātman, one about which a series of empirical questions can be more easily asked. The initial statement of misconceived views must therefore be altered, and this is achieved by replacing the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ by the term ‘consciousness’. This term is very well suited to this context, for it fits a direct question about conditioned experience and does not depart from the Upaniṣadic orientation of the teaching: in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, for example, the ātman is described as a ‘mass of consciousness’ (vijñānaghana/prajñānaghana),Footnote 54 and summed up in the words ‘consciousness, bliss, brahman’ (vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma).Footnote 55
It would appear, then, that using the term ‘consciousness’ (viññāṇa) instead of the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ makes no difference to the initial list of views, but simply presents it in a more suitable empirical form. By stating that ‘consciousness’ is neither unchanging nor satisfactory, the Buddha moves from a more abstract Upaniṣadic reference (‘what is seen. . . etc.’) to one that fits more easily into a series of empirical questions. Thus the initial list of misconceived views is altered in order to formulate an empirical denial of the Upaniṣadic ātman: the replacement of the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ by ‘consciousness’ is an intentional change that facilitates a more explicit critique of Upaniṣadic thought. The structure of this teaching looks like a good example of the Buddha's skill in means: in order to criticise a contemporaneous idea, an initial list of incorrect views is adapted to the important five aggregate doctrine. One way of reading this adaptation would be to assume that the five aggregate teaching had already been formulated before this skill in means teaching was devised. If so, it would seem that the fivefold list has been cleverly adapted to highlight the error of Upaniṣadic thought: an elaborate discourse was created by deviating from the list of five aggregates (the initial replacement of ‘consciousness’ by the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ and the addition of a reference to the Upaniṣadic ‘world self’), before returning to it to conclude the teaching. It could be argued, then, that Buddhist doctrine has been handled in a very deft and subtle manner, either by the Buddha himself or by those followers of his who authored/redacted the Alagaddūpama Sutta.
There are problems with this interpretation, however. If the list of five aggregates pre-existed this teaching, and was adapted in order to criticise Upaniṣadic thought, why were the two Upaniṣadic references not simply added after the complete fivefold list? It makes no sense to omit ‘consciousness’ from the initial analysis, since its inclusion would only make the argument against Upaniṣadic thought more complete. Furthermore, if the list of five aggregates really was altered, we must suppose that this was done for a particular reason: the replacement of ‘consciousness’ with the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ and the description of the Upaniṣadic ‘world self’ must have been made with some didactic purpose in mind. But what is this purpose? In the case of the Upaniṣadic ‘world self’ this is clear enough: whoever composed the teaching wanted to rubbish this idea on empirical grounds. No such purpose can be seen, however, in the case of the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’. The formula is not taken up later in the teaching and seems to serve no purpose whatsoever: it is a didactic dead-end, being badly suited to the Buddha's eventual empirical enquiry. This part of the teaching looks more like it was devised on a whim, as if whoever created it had no clearly defined plan, but was interested in exploring certain ideas, wherever that might lead. Such a structure cannot be explained on the hypothesis that it was entirely the work of early Buddhist composers, for all the early evidence indicates that they worked in groups, which implies discussion, deliberation and so a certain degree of planning.Footnote 56 This skill in means discourse can better be explained, then, as an ad-hoc teaching of the Buddha himself, in which he responds to a particular didactic situation by developing and pursuing a theme in discussion with his disciples.
This interpretation makes good sense of the meandering course of the teaching. The Buddha begins by using the case of Ariṭṭha to explore the problem of attachment to ideas. He points out six ways of misconceiving personal identity, four of which concern a person's identification with the various aspects of conditioned experience (form, sensation, apperception and volitions), and two of which concern early Upaniṣadic ideas (the ātman described at BU IV.5.6 and the ‘world self’). The teaching is then taken up with a dialogue on the psychology of those who do or do not accept the sixth view (the Upaniṣadic world-self), which is concluded when the Buddha analyses it from an empirical perspective. This sets the stage for a similar empirical enquiry into the first five views, although a new form of enquiry is now needed, for it would be absurd to ask whether form and so on ‘can truly be perceived’. The Buddha thus devises a different series of questions based on the fact that ‘form’ etc. are aspects of a person's everyday experience: he asks whether or not they are permanent, satisfactory and suitable to be considered as one's true identity or ‘self’, questions which aim to prompt reflection on conditioned experience. This enquiry fits the first four items of the initial list of views well, but there is a problem with the fifth view: since the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ is not a part of a person's everyday experience, and in fact little more than a textual citation (of BU IV.5.6), it cannot be treated in this empirical fashion. It would also be cumbersome for the Buddha to ask about the permanence and so on of ‘what is seen, heard, thought, cognised, attained, sought after and pondered by the mind’. The pericope must be replaced with a simpler item more suitable to the empirical enquiry, and so the allusion to the Upaniṣadic ātman of BU IV.5.6 is replaced by ‘consciousness’. This is a very good choice, for ‘consciousness’ is both the basic factor of everyday experience and a definition of the ātman according to the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
The structure of the teaching is therefore coherent yet unpredictable: the Buddha explores the six views partly by responding to his disciples’ questions and partly by adapting them during the course of his empirical enquiry. This does not appear as if it was composed by a committee of Buddhist composers, but looks more like the manner in which a religious teacher might go about his business, i.e. explaining his ideas according to circumstance and prevalent ideas. In other words, this looks like an ad hoc teaching of the Buddha, in which he uses his didactic skill to fashion a discourse in response to the case of Ariṭṭha. But if this is the best possible explanation of the teaching's structure, we must reckon with an unexpected implication. I mentioned earlier that the list of five aggregates is unusual, in Buddhist terms, because of its peculiar order: if the logic of early Buddhist epistemology had been followed, ‘consciousness’ would have been listed as the second rather than the fifth aggregate. For this reason I suggested that the list would make better sense if understood not as a doctrinal formulation conceived in the abstract (when it would surely have been constructed more carefully), but as a formulation made according to the demands of a particular didactic situation, one that would explain why consciousness appears as the fifth and final member of the list. This hypothesis is substantiated by the Alagaddūpama Sutta. For in this text we see exactly the didactic conditions which can explain the peculiar order of the five aggregate list: as the Buddha enquires into his initial list of six misconceived views, he replaces an elliptical and empirically useless Upaniṣadic reference (‘what is seen etc.’) with a direct and empirically useful one (‘consciousness’). This looks like an ad hoc deviation from what was quickly seen to be pragmatically useless, the Buddha adapting to the demands of the didactic situation. If we accept that the order of the five aggregates is unusual, and suspect it would be better explained as a product of the Buddha's skill in means, we have a perfect solution in the form of the Alagaddūpama Sutta. This skill in means text thus appears to contain something quite unexpected: contrary to the tradition that the Buddha discovered the entire Dharma at his awakening, it suggests that at least one important doctrine was formulated by the Buddha in the process of teaching. The Buddha seems to have chanced upon a useful fivefold analysis of conditioned experience as part of an elaborate response to the case of Ariṭṭha.
6
If this reading of the Alagaddūpama Sutta is correct, it means that the Alagaddūpama Sutta is old and most probably authentic: it must predate the myth of past Buddhas, and does not even look like an original creation of early Buddhist composers. But before we conclude this, we must ask a question of fundamental historical importance: is it plausible to suppose that the Buddha formulated some of his teachings as a response to ideas contained within the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad? Other early Buddhist evidence suggests that it is. The Pāsādika Sutta states that the former teacher of the Buddha, Uddaka Ramaputta, taught the aphorism ‘seeing he does not see’ (passan na passati). This aphorism corresponds to a passage in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (IV.3.23) where Yajñavalkya describes the nondual awareness of deep sleep as a state in which a person ‘although seeing, does not see’ (pasyan vai tan na pasyati),Footnote 57 a state in which a person identifies with the nondual ātman. This correspondence suggests the possibility that the Buddha gained knowledge of the early Upaniṣadic thought through Uddaka Ramaputta. Since other evidence places Ramaputta in or around Rājagṛha,Footnote 58 the ancient capital of Magadha, it would seem that a religious group promulgated the teachings of the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa, perhaps before it was incorporated into the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,Footnote 59 at the very centre of the ancient kingdom of Magadha during the Buddha's lifetime.
This Buddhist evidence corresponds to what we know of the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa. Witzel has noted that the Eastern kingdom of Videha is mentioned in only this section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,Footnote 60 and Olivelle has pointed out that it is hostile to Brahmins from the Vedic heartland of Kuru-Pañcāla, apparently in order to present Videha as an equally important centre of Brahminic learning.Footnote 61 Thus it appears that the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa originated in the kingdom of Videha,Footnote 62 i.e. to the East of the Vedic heartland of Kuru-Pañcāla and within the bounds of what Bronkhorst has called ‘Greater Magadha’.Footnote 63 It is easy to imagine that certain teachings of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, especially those contained in the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa, flourished among Brahminic groups of Greater Magadha, and that the Buddha came into contact with them when he joined the community of Uddaka Rāmaputta in Rājagṛha.
An alternative view of the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa has been proposed by Bronkhorst. Based on the comments of Kātyāyana and Patañjali on sūtra 4.3.105 of Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, which seem to allude to the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa, Bronkhorst has argued that it post-dates the Buddha. His analysis begins with Kātyāyana's point concerning an exception to the rule stated in this sūtra:
A prohibition [of P.4.3.105] purāṇaprokteṣu brāhmaṇakalpeṣu [must be stated] after yājñavalkya etc., because [they are] of the same time.Footnote 64
According to Kātyāyana, then, some works related to Yājñavalkya are excluded from this Pāṇinian rule about Brāhmaṇas and Kalpas uttered by ancient sages (purāṇaprokteṣu brāhmaṇakalpeṣu), apparently because these works are ‘of the same time’ (tulyakālatvāt), probably as Pāṇini. What are these works? According to Patañjali they are the ‘Brāhmaṇas’ of Yājñavalkya (yājñvalkāni brāhmaṇāni).Footnote 65 On this evidence Bronkhorst notes:
We learn from this that, according to Patañjali, the brāhmaṇas uttered by Yājñavalkya, rather than Yājñavalkya himself, are meant to be considered ‘of the same time’ in this vārttika. The sense requires (in spite of the commentator Kaiyaṭa) that the brāhmaṇas uttered by Yājñavalkya are of the same time as Pāṇini.Footnote 66
Since the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa is split up into fifteen sections called brāhamaṇas, it would seem to identify with what Patañjali refers to as ‘the brāhmaṇas of Yājñavalkya’ (yājñvalkāni brāhmaṇāni). Bronkhorst thus concludes that ‘the composition of the Yājñavalkya-kāṇḍa took place late: later than the date usually assigned to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as a whole’;Footnote 67 that “parts of the late Vedic literature may well have been composed at the time of Pāṇini, and perhaps even at the time of Patañjali”;Footnote 68 and most significantly that the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa was composed “at a time after the Buddha”.Footnote 69
How seriously is this evidence to be taken? Bronkhorst is probably correct in believing that Kātyāyana and Patañjali refer to the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa, which for them defied Paṇini's rule about “Brāhmaṇas and Kalpas uttered by ancient sages”. If this means that Pāṇini was not aware of a Vedic corpus including the ‘Brāhmaṇas’ of the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa, it implies that the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa was added to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad after Pāṇini, who probably lived “in the middle of the fourth century bce”.Footnote 70 But even if this interpretation is correct, and the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa was added to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad in the years between the Aṣṭādhyāyī and its commentators Kātyāyana and Patañjali, it does not necessarily mean that it was composed in this period, as Bronkhorst believes. Although Patañjali's explanation of Kātyāyana seems to support this interpretation (the brāhmaṇas uttered by Yājñavalkya being “of the same time” as Pāṇini: tulyakālatvāt), it is hardly likely that Patañjali – writing centuries after Pāṇini – had accurate information about the date when the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa was composed. This is especially true if the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa originated in the unorthodox Brahminic circles of ‘Greater Magadha’, as seems to have been the case. If the Yājñavalkyāṇḍa circulated in the renunciant milieux of Greater Magadha, any Brahminic tradition of its date would probably not refer to its initial composition in this non-Vedic area, but to the point at which it was first accepted by the orthodox tradition. And for the orthodox tradition, the only date that would have mattered is the point at which the text was included in the Vedic corpus: if the Yājñavalkyāṇḍa was included in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad around the time of Pāṇini or soon after him, any tradition on the dating of this text would simply have fixed it to the Pāṇinian era; its pre-Vedic history would have been of little interest. The fact that Patañjali ascribes the Brāhmaṇas of Yājñavalkya to the Pāṇinian period therefore indicates only that this was the point at which is was accepted in the Vedic corpus (as part of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad within the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa).
The grammatical evidence adduced by Bronkhorst does not, therefore, show that the Yājñavalkyāṇḍa postdates the Buddha, but only indicates that it was not included in the Vedic corpus before or even during his life. In fact if we allow a reasonable amount of time for this text to have been formed and circulated in its pre-Vedic guise, it is quite likely that it existed before the fourth century bce. If so, we should assign it to roughly the fifth century bce, the exact period of the Buddha's life. Or perhaps slightly earlier than this – the fact that the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa is set in Videha only makes sense if it was composed when this kingdom had an independent existence. But since this kingdom had been absorbed into the Vṛji confederacy (the other notable partner in which was the Licchavī clan) by the time of the Buddha's adult life, it suggests that the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa was composed just before the Buddha, or at least during his early years. The text can thus be pushed back to around the beginning of the fifth century bce.Footnote 71
The Yājñavalkyāṇḍa would thus seem to have been composed among the renunciant schools of Videha, within the cultural region of Greater Magadha, at around the beginning of the fifth century bce. This pre-Vedic – but not necessarily pre-Brahminic – heritage was, obviously, not properly acknowledged by the orthodox Brahminic tradition. But before it was accepted in the Vedic corpus, it would seem that the Buddha had emerged as a critic of its important ātman philosophy, and formulated at least one of his most important teachings – the five aggregates – with reference to it.
7
This Brahminic evidence suggests that the early Buddhist texts which respond to Upaniṣadic ideas could be ascribed to the Buddha. The Alagaddūpama Sutta is certainly a response to early Upaniṣadic ideas, and indeed an extraordinary example of a skill in means text. In such texts it is not usually possible to tell where the historical Buddha ends and the Buddha of the early composers/redactors begins. But if the argument proposed here is correct, the Alagaddūpama Sutta would appear to be unique in depicting the Buddha in the process of formulating his thoughts. It is doubtful that the literary license of the early redactors stretched so far. The teaching is probably authentic, a fact suggested by the rather personal note on which it ends:
‘What do you think, bhikkhus: of the grass, sticks, branches and foliage in this Jetavana that a man might pick up or burn or do as he wishes with, do you suppose: “That man is picking up or burning us, or doing as he wishes with us”?’ “No, master. Why? Because that is not our self (attā) or a property of it (attaniyaṃ)”. “In just the same way, bhikkhus, abandon what is not yours, and when you have abandoned it will be to your benefit and happiness in the long run. And what is not yours? Form. . . sensation. . . apperception. . . volitions. . . and consciousness is not yours. Abandon them, for when you have abandoned them it will be to your benefit and happiness in the long run”.Footnote 72
The reference to a man picking up grass and so on in the Jetavana is clearly a reductio ad absurdum of the Upaniṣdic concept of a world self. The Buddha implies that if the grass, sticks and so on in the Jetavana are not part of oneself, then the Upaniṣadic notion of personal identity with a world self is foolish. This is, perhaps, the Buddha's simplest empirical argument. But the Buddha builds on this simple teaching by inviting the analogy between the parts of the Jetavana and the five aggregates. The implication is that just as the notion of personal identity with the outside world is misconceived, so too is the notion of identity with that which makes up a person's phenomenal being. The Buddha effectively ridicules the Upaniṣadic identification of world and individual and then internalises its meaning. This is hardly the work of a later exegete or redactor, and surely an attempt to preserve an important occasion in the Buddha's teaching.
The same could be said of the earlier sections of the Alagaddūpama Sutta, in which the Buddha is depicted as a master of human psychology and communication. Since his aim is the spiritual transformation of his disciples, the five aggregate teaching avoids a direct statement of objective truth: it does not state that there is no Upaniṣadic ātman – and thus no true identity – in conditioned experience, although this is the implicit meaning of the teaching. The Buddha instead teases this truth out in stages, by leading his disciples through a careful examination of experience in terms of five categories: each aspect of conditioned experience is gradually shown to be impermanent, unsatisfactory and so not one's ‘self’. Since the questions that lead to this conclusion require empirical reflection, the understanding of it by the Buddha's audience is based on personal experience. It is not accepted as an article of faith or abstract philosophical knowledge: the disciples effectively take part in the Buddha's thought experiment and so discover an important truth by themselves. The purpose of this method of teaching is quite obviously soteriological. By avoiding positive statements of truth the Buddha leaves his disciples in a cognitive vacuum, a state of detachment from ideas about reality and identity in which potential misunderstandings have been negated. This seems to be an essential step on the spiritual path as envisaged by the Buddha, a path summarised at the conclusion of the five aggregate teaching as follows:
When the learned, noble disciple sees things in this way, bhikkhus, he becomes disillusioned with form, sensation, apperception, volitions and consciousness. Being disillusioned he becomes dispassionate, and through dispassion he is released (vimuccati). When released there is the knowledge: ‘it is released’ (vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti ñāṇaṃ hoti),Footnote 73 and he understands (pajānāti): ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, done is what had to be done, there is no more of this state’.Footnote 74
By negating potential misunderstandings of conditioned experience, the Buddha paves the way for detachment from it and eventually liberation. In other words, the ultimate purpose of this highly psychological approach to teaching is spiritual: the denial of a true identity in conditioned experience is framed in such a way as to begin the process of personal transformation.
The Buddha emerges from the Alagaddūpama Sutta as a teacher of considerable intuition and didactic skill. Although this is exactly what the tradition of the Buddha's skill in means would lead us to suspect, the Alagaddūpama Sutta goes much further into the specifics of this teaching method by apparently depicting the Buddha in the process of formulating his thoughts. This account must predate the mythological tendency in early Buddhism, according to which the Buddha realised the Dharma on one monumental occasion. Since this idea had probably arisen already in the fourth century BCE, we must be dealing with a piece of Buddhist tradition that goes back deep into the first century of the Buddhist Era. Indeed very early biographies of the Buddha already anticipate the myth that Buddhas attain a complete realisation of the Dharma at their awakening. According to the standard account preserved in the Pāli Vinaya Mahāvagga,Footnote 75 as well as the parallel texts of different sects,Footnote 76 the Buddha's awakening was triggered by an insight into the Four Noble Truths,Footnote 77 the first of which (the Noble Truth of Suffering) includes the list of five aggregates: it states that suffering is “in short, the five aggregates of attachment”.Footnote 78 The Buddha is therefore said to have ‘discovered’ the list of five aggregates during his awakening, in a text that can perhaps be taken back to the Second Council of Vaiśālī, i.e. probably some time between 350 BCE and 300 BCE.Footnote 79 According to the present study, however, the Alagaddūpama Sutta must predate this understanding of the Buddha's awakening, and if so we can probably push it back to within about fifty years of the Buddha's death. It must therefore be among the works composed during the period when traditions about the Buddha and his teachings were first being gathered. This period would also have been one in which other early Buddhist teachers made their own contribution to the Buddhist Dharma. But we have also seen that the narrative in the Alagaddūpama Sutta does not follow any preordained plan, which would be expected if it was entirely the work of early Buddhist composers. The text looks like a very early attempt to remember an important moment in the Buddha's teaching – the occasion on which he articulated the simile of the raft and then formulated the doctrine of five aggregates.
Like all the early texts that claim to report the Buddha's teaching, the Alagaddūpama Sutta is no doubt a less than perfect record; it has probably not preserved all the details of this occasion in the life of the Buddha.Footnote 80 At the same time, this discourse is complex and yet fundamentally coherent: there are no sections which disturb the flow of teaching, and nothing suggesting that it contains any serious errors or interpolations. The text does not look as if it was formed arbitrarily. If so, are we to believe that a peculiar list came to be found in a peculiar text by chance? This seems too much of a coincidence, and is hard to explain according to what we know of early Buddhist thinkers (who must have fashioned the list if the Buddha did not) or composers (who must have produced and redacted the text): both the list and the structure of the text have a highly peculiar – and indeed personal – form that cannot be adequately explained as a result of the collaborative efforts of the early saṅgha.Footnote 81
If this reading of the Alagaddūpama Sutta is correct, we can understand why some early texts claim that the Buddha's teachings were preserved and transmitted during his life. Indeed this study would seem to confirm the suspicion that the story of Purāṇa was retained precisely because the early Buddhist tradition was confident of the works it had created at the early councils. This means that before the mythological tendencies that arose in the fourth century bce, and even before early Buddhist teachers made their own contributions to the growing corpus of oral tradition, there was an historical tradition that attempted to preserve the Buddha's teaching, including something of the manner of its development. No doubt the latter was glossed over by later mythological elements, but this does not conceal the historical aspects of the early texts.Footnote 82 If so, we should not regard the textual record of the early Buddhist period as a mythological construction,Footnote 83 and should be careful not to dismiss the distinction between myth and history in the study of early Buddhist literature.Footnote 84 This literature clearly contains much more than just mythological or idealistic constructs of the past. Indeed it might have preserved something of the Buddha's real skill in means, that is to say, his ability to translate a religious vision into a set of ideas and practices that inspired an unprecedented movement – the first world religion.
Abbreviations
All Pāli citations are from Pāli Text Society editions; citations from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad are taken from Olivelle Reference Olivelle1998.
- A
Aṅguttara Nikāya
- BU
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
- D
Dīgha Nikāya
- DOP
Dictionary of Pali, edited by Margaret Cone. Oxford: Pali Text Society (2001).
- It
Itivuttaka
- M
Majjhima Nikāya
- OED
Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, prepared by J.A. Simpson and E.S.C Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1989).
- PED
Pali English Dictionary, edited by T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede. London: Pali Text Society (1921–1925).
- S
Saṃyutta Nikāya
- Th
Theragāthā
- Ud
Udāna
- Vin
Vinaya
