Introduction
Since 1979, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has convened post-ministerial dialogue meetings alongside its annual ministerial conference with partner countries, including the United States (US), Japan, the European Economic Community (EEC), Australia and New Zealand. These dialogues constituted an additional institutional framework complementing regular bilateral exchanges.
In 1982, however, Leo Tindemans (1922–2014), then Belgian foreign minister and president of the EEC Council, informed the host shortly before the meeting that he would be unable to attend the ASEAN–EEC dialogue in Singapore, citing scheduling constraints and the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. In response, Suppiah Dhanabalan, chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee and Singapore’s foreign minister, expressed profound disappointment and underscored the ‘absolutely essential’ participation of the EEC Council presidency. He rejected lower-level representation and warned that the dialogue would not proceed in Tindemans’s absence.Footnote 1 Simultaneously, Dhanabalan urged his West German counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1927–2016), to press EEC authorities to reconsider.Footnote 2 Tindemans subsequently reversed his decision and attended the meeting in person, reaffirming the EEC’s commitment to ASEAN and emphasising that his earlier cancellation did not signal any change in EEC policy towards Southeast Asia.Footnote 3 He further assured his counterparts of the Community’s full support for ASEAN’s commitment to regional stability and prosperity.Footnote 4
This episode illustrates the inherently ambivalent character of relations between the two regional organisations.Footnote 5 Although EEC–ASEAN relations had been institutionalised at the ambassadorial and ministerial levels since the 1970s, such institutionalisation did not necessarily translate into deeper interregional cooperation.Footnote 6 A historical analysis of interregional cooperation must therefore focus on the concrete practices of communication and interaction that shaped relations between the EEC and ASEAN. As demonstrated above, West Germany, and in particular its foreign minister, Genscher, played a prominent role in this process. Accordingly, this article draws primarily on German archival sources to examine diplomatic practices between the two regions. It also incorporates material from the Historical Archives of the European Union, including documentation of the processes of decision-making and multilateral communication. By analysing interregional communication in response to regional and global crises – such as the Kampuchean conflict and economic distress – it highlights the competing interests and divergent perceptions both within and between the EEC and ASEAN. This article argues that this relationship developed through a convergence of Cold War interests, a contested process of institutionalisation and the enduring influence of colonial legacies.
Beyond Institutionalisation
Recent archival research has provided empirical insight into the motives of individual states in interregional cooperation, as well as the conflicts that shaped decision-making processes. The value of such historically grounded analysis lies, first, in its ability to identify the multiple dynamics underpinning the institutionalisation of EEC–ASEAN relations.Footnote 7 Second, this historical approach situates this process within a broader global context. In particular, it suggests that the convergence between the EEC and ASEAN should be understood against the backdrop of Western Europe’s wider policy reconfiguration towards developing countries, including those in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) region, in Latin America, in South Asia and in unified Vietnam after 1975.Footnote 8 From this perspective, the institutionalisation of EEC–ASEAN relations appears as a historically contingent and internally contradictory process, thereby cautioning against interpretations that portray the two organisations as ‘natural’ partners – a claim frequently overstated in the political science literature.Footnote 9
However, a significant limitation of much historical scholarship lies in its tendency to treat institutionalisation as an inevitable trajectory leading to ever deeper ties between Western Europe and Southeast Asia. This teleological reading is further reinforced by subsequent developments, such as the establishment of the Asia–Europe Meeting in 1996.Footnote 10 Such an approach overlooks the continued relevance of bilateral relations as a key instrument through which states managed their external engagements. It also underestimates the enduring influence of colonial legacies on decision-making and neglects the uncertain and open-ended nature of institutional development during this period. It is therefore essential to foreground the contingency of interregional cooperation and to scrutinise the intentions of individual actors. In this context, West Germany and Singapore emerge as pivotal intermediaries facilitating interregional engagement.
The Logic of Power Balancing
The policy of the social-liberal government of West Germany towards Southeast Asia was primarily driven by its broader détente strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc and its engagement with the so-called Third World. The Helsinki Final Act, signed in the summer of 1975, provided a multilateral framework within which West Germany anticipated that East–West tensions in Europe could be stabilised. Meanwhile, the protracted conflicts in Indochina appeared to be drawing to a close with the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975 and Saigon in the same year to the communists. In November 1975, West German Foreign Minister Genscher commissioned the minister of state, Karl Moersch (1926–2017), to undertake a tour of the five non-communist countries in Southeast Asia shortly before the first ASEAN summit. This mission pursued two principal objectives: first, to assess the regional situation in the aftermath of the Indochina conflicts; and second, to explore the prospects for future cooperation with the region’s non-communist states.
Based on discussions with state leaders, Moersch identified a shared strategic orientation among the non-communist states in the ‘post-Indochina’ context. This centred on the establishment of a regional equilibrium along three dimensions. First, ASEAN member states sought to intensify regional cooperation while maintaining equidistance from the major Cold War powers, namely the Soviet Union, the United States and China. Second, they aimed to develop diplomatic relations with the communist Indochinese states of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Third, they emphasised that regional equilibrium and stability ultimately depended on progress in domestic socio-economic development.Footnote 11 For policymakers in Bonn, ASEAN thus represented a promising framework through which a regional equilibrium – consistent with West Germany’s détente policy in Europe – might be advanced. As a grouping of non-communist states committed to neutrality and economic development, ASEAN appeared capable of acting as a counterweight to both the major powers and the communist regimes in Indonesia, while its non-military character reduced the risk of antagonism. Moreover, it offered a potential platform for intraregional economic cooperation. From the perspective of West Germany, the maintenance of regional equilibrium in Southeast Asia contributed to not only stability in the region but also the broader objective of sustaining détente in Europe. At the global level, cooperation with ASEAN was further perceived as a means of mitigating tensions between industrialised and developing countries.
In the meantime, ASEAN states were adapting their policies towards their former colonisers. Policymakers in the region regarded West Germany as a suitable starting point for reorienting relations with Western Europe. West Germany not only played a leading role in the international economy but was also perceived as relatively free from the historical responsibilities associated with European colonialism in Southeast Asia. The Singaporean foreign minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (1915–2006), was particularly representative of this view. In his meeting with Moersch, Rajaratnam urged the West German visitor to adopt a more active role in the region. Rather than advocating increased investment and technology transfer as compensation for colonial exploitation, he emphasised the ‘intellectual and cultural affinities’ between the two regions, by citing their shared colonial past. By this, he referred specifically to the former colonial powers – the UK in Malaysia and Singapore, the Netherlands in Indonesia and France in Indochina.Footnote 12 Rajaratnam identified potential ‘leverage points’ through which Western European countries might establish more equitable economic relations with their former colonies.Footnote 13 He further cautioned that Western Europe should not ‘repeat the mistake made by Japan, which was only interested in count’.Footnote 14 In this sense, Rajaratnam welcomed a renewed European presence as a means of counterbalancing Japan’s dominant economic role.Footnote 15 At the same time, such engagement was expected to support ASEAN’s policy of maintaining equidistance among the major powers. From Singapore’s perspective, however, deeper economic involvement by former colonial powers should not reproduce earlier patterns of exploitation. By reaffirming its commitment to a liberal international economic order, Singapore anticipated that global economic imbalances could be mitigated through the transfer of capital and technology from industrialised to developing countries.
In light of Moersch’s favourable assessment of ASEAN’s cooperative orientation, the West German government closely monitored the proceedings of the first ASEAN summit.Footnote 16 For policymakers in Bonn, the summit’s declaration confirmed West Germany’s aspiration to deepen cooperation with ASEAN. In other words, the consolidation among the five non-communist countries in the region provided a key impetus for West Germany’s expanding engagement. In the following years, this commitment was translated into concrete action. Genscher, for instance, visited Indonesia and Singapore in April 1977.Footnote 17 In addition, he entrusted another minister of state, Hildegard Hamm-Brücher (1921–2016), with visits to the remaining ASEAN countries – Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand – in November 1977. Such frequent high-level visits were unusual within West Germany’s conventional foreign policy practice and signalled its growing ambition to participate in regional power balancing.
Limits of European Political Cooperation with ASEAN
West Germany’s aspiration to engage in regional power balancing in Southeast Asia on a multilateral basis was met with a largely positive response from ASEAN. The subsequent concern of the West German foreign minister was whether this initiative would also secure support among European partners. Since 1972, ASEAN and the EEC Commission in Brussels had maintained regular contacts on economic matters.Footnote 18 However, individual EEC member states often remained sceptical of ASEAN as a political actor.Footnote 19 In a meeting of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1978, member states expressed divergent views on the prospect of establishing a political dialogue with ASEAN. The Danish presidency of the EEC Council articulated its concerns with particular clarity:
The present time seems not quite ripe for the Nine to suggest a more formal political dialogue, with one or more of the regional groupings, taking into consideration the fragile situation in South East Asia where the countries concerned are still in the progress of ridding themselves of suspicions of each other’s intentions. Finally, the Nine’s political dialogue with third countries has so far been very sparse and primitive. The opening of a formal political dialogue with this region could therefore create an unprecedented situation.Footnote 20
The Danish chairman of the Council thus made clear that reservations were rooted in not only doubts about ASEAN’s cohesion but also the novelty of engaging collectively in political dialogue with another regional organisation. For the EEC, such an initiative would represent a new phase in European integration.
The reservations of the EEC member states were only partially alleviated through Genscher’s personal interventions. For example, at an informal minister meeting of the EEC in Nyborg, Denmark, on 21 May 1978, Genscher sought to persuade his counterparts of the need for Europe to assume a more active role in Southeast Asia. He argued that ASEAN’s interest in the EEC reflected the ‘attractiveness’ of the European regional organisation as an international player.Footnote 21 Addressing concerns – particularly from the UK – regarding a potential ‘major change’ in the principles of the EEC and its possible ‘precedent implications’, the West German foreign minister emphasised that political dialogue with ASEAN would primarily involve a general exchange of views rather than a substantive policy commitment. Following these reassurances, several member states, including the Netherlands and the UK, expressed their willingness to engage in such exchanges with ASEAN.
France, however, remained an exception. While not opposing a joint declaration, it insisted that the formal agenda be confined to economic issues and that political discussions take place only informally.Footnote 22 The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Quai d’Orsay) had two principal concerns regarding closer political relations with ASEAN, both of which reflected France’s colonial past. First, the ‘precedent character’ of an EEC–ASEAN ministerial meeting was repeatedly emphasised by the French delegation within EPC meetings.Footnote 23 As with the British delegation, both major former colonial powers were concerned that initiating political dialogue with ASEAN might establish a precedent for relations with other regional organisations. Within the multilateral framework of the EEC, both countries tended to prioritise postcolonial relations by focusing on economic cooperation with their respective former colonies. Notable examples include the Lomé Convention with the ACP countries and the EEC’s engagement with South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.Footnote 24
Second, France’s historical engagement in Indochina, rooted in its colonial past, led to a comparatively stronger interest in Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos than in other ASEAN member states. From the perspective of the Quai d’Orsay, the initiation of political dialogue with ASEAN risked being interpreted as an ‘ostentatious preference’ for this group of countries. The implications of this for the rebuilding of relations between the EEC and the Indochinese countries were considered potentially detrimental.Footnote 25 In this regard, a political dialogue with ASEAN did not fully align with French interests in the region.
ASEAN countries closely observed differences of opinion among EEC member states, as well as the hesitant attitudes of certain governments towards the establishment of a political dialogue. Since 1972, ASEAN representatives in the capitals of major EEC countries, including Brussels, Bonn, London and Paris, had established coordination committees to facilitate mutual coordination and contact with the EEC. These committees were composed mainly of ASEAN ambassadors, with the chair rotating among them. As a result, ASEAN countries were able to act both collectively and individually to influence the policy-making processes of the EEC Commission and its member states.Footnote 26
Despite the apparent stagnation of discussions within EPC, ASEAN adopted a proactive approach to agenda-setting. For instance, the ambassador of Thailand to West Germany communicated with the Head of the Division for Southeast Asia at the West German Foreign Ministry at a time when EEC member states were still considering the prospect of political dialogue with ASEAN. In his capacity as a representative of the ASEAN countries, Ambassador Anand Panyarachun highlighted two issues he regarded as particularly significant for inclusion in the agenda of the forthcoming EEC–ASEAN ministerial meeting. First, ASEAN called upon the EEC countries to recognise its initiative to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries urged that the final declaration of the meeting include at least an ‘endorsement’ of this initiative by the EEC. Second, the Thai ambassador conveyed the desire of ASEAN member states that the EEC adopt a position on the increasing number of refugees in the region. The joint declaration was intended to appeal to the solidarity of the international community with the ASEAN countries.Footnote 27
The institutionalised contacts between the EEC and ASEAN proved advantageous for not only ASEAN but also the EEC. In light of the general reluctance of European partners to engage in political dialogue with ASEAN, the director of the political department of the West German Foreign Ministry, Klaus Blech (1928–2022), called upon the Singaporean ambassador in Bonn to specify ASEAN’s expectations in concrete terms. According to Blech, this would ensure that discussions within EPC did not ‘move in vacuo’.Footnote 28 Following deliberations between the West German Foreign Ministry and the Bonn ASEAN Group (BAG), the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting in Singapore on 20 September 1978 issued a draft of the political section of the joint declaration.Footnote 29 This draft was then submitted to EEC member states, together with a draft prepared under the German presidency, for further discussion within EPC.Footnote 30
France’s concerns were mitigated only through personal visits of the foreign minister, Louis de Guiringaud (1911–82), to Thailand and Indonesia in September 1978. Moreover, the role of interpersonal contacts in weakening France’s position was noteworthy. During bilateral consultations between the French and West German foreign ministers, Genscher persuaded his French counterpart that engagement in discussions with ASEAN foreign ministers on political issues was inevitable. With regard to the joint declaration, he indicated that the primary objective of the ASEAN countries was limited to securing political recognition of their organisation in regional affairs.Footnote 31 Following Franco–German consultations, the EEC countries reached a consensus on the agenda for the meeting, which was divided into two sessions: formal and informal.Footnote 32 The joint declaration was to be discussed and finalised during the formal session of the meeting, while – at the insistence of the French and British delegations – political dialogue was confined to the informal session. In addition, the German presidency was not permitted to include political elements in its opening statement beyond a general recognition of ASEAN.Footnote 33
An examination of the final joint declaration, issued at the conclusion of the ministerial meeting held on 20–21 November 1978 in Brussels, suggests that ASEAN secured recognition by the EEC as a ‘factor of stability and balance’ in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the declaration addressed the ‘unabated flow of Indochinese refugees’ and called upon the international community to demonstrate solidarity with the ASEAN countries.Footnote 34 Conversely, ASEAN accepted a provision stipulating that future cooperation should not only promote economic prosperity and social justice but also prioritise human rights, in response to EEC demands to criticise human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea. Other ASEAN aspirations in the political sphere, including more institutionalised links with the EEC, stronger support for alleviating refugee flows and recognition of Southeast Asia as a ZOPFAN, were discreetly omitted form the joint declaration.Footnote 35 Moreover, the declaration did not incorporate additional material commitments by the EEC to ASEAN. This outcome reflected the persistence of significant internal divergences among EEC member states in formulating a common policy towards Southeast Asia. Consequently, the joint declaration represented little more than the lowest common denominator among the EEC member states.
Linking Crises, Aligning Positions: Kampuchea and Afghanistan
Unexpected regional conflicts proved pivotal in prompting a shift among EEC member states towards a more coordinated stance on Southeast Asia. Shortly after the EEC–ASEAN ministerial meeting, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in December 1978, overthrowing another communist regime in the region. This intervention constituted a clear violation of the United Nations (UN) Charter, which upholds the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. For ASEAN, it represented a profound challenge to its pursuit of power balance and regional stability, as it effectively dissolved the buffer between Thailand and Vietnam.Footnote 36 In such circumstances, ASEAN became increasingly reliant on political support from Europe.
The intensification of EEC–ASEAN political cooperation was partly realised within the framework of the UN. During the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, ASEAN coordinated efforts to place the Kampuchean conflict on the international agenda and sought the support of EEC member states. The EEC failed to reach a common position on Kampuchean representation in the Credentials Committee.Footnote 37 Nevertheless, they ultimately voted collectively in favour of UN Resolution 34/22 at the General Assembly, which was based on a draft prepared by ASEAN, led by Malaysia.Footnote 38 Notably, while the German delegation urged its European partners to co-sponsor the draft resolution jointly with ASEAN, only Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands agreed to do so.Footnote 39 Most EEC member states did not oppose co-sponsorship in principle; however, due to the firm reservations of the French delegation, the proposed joint démarche by the EEC ultimately gave way to actions by individual member states.Footnote 40 In this context, the eventual collective vote of EEC countries in favour of the ASEAN-initiated resolution may be interpreted, on the one hand, as a constraining effect of the ministerial meeting in the previous year. Having recognised ASEAN as a stabilising factor in the region, it was politically difficult for EEC countries to oppose the resolution, particularly as it avoided direct condemnation of Vietnam and instead emphasised respect for Kampuchea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.Footnote 41
On the other hand, the Kampuchean crisis undermined the inclination of France towards rapprochement with Vietnam. Vietnam’s military intervention escalated regional tensions and posed a direct threat to Thailand. Consequently, EEC member states gradually converged towards a position of passive cohesion, culminating in collective support for the UN resolution.
In 1979, the convergence of two regional crises led to more intensive political cooperation between the two organisations. In November 1979, Vietnam launched a series of offensive operations across the Thai–Kampuchean borders, primarily targeting anti-Vietnamese forces in frontier areas. Following an ASEAN emergency meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December, which sought to draw international attention to these military operations, the Soviet Union deployed its military forces to Afghanistan.Footnote 42 In Kabul, a pro-Soviet regime was installed under Babrak Karmal (1929–96). The crisis in Kampuchea was thus paralleled by events in Afghanistan, and with Soviet military intervention these regional conflicts acquired a global dimension.Footnote 43 Meanwhile, EEC member states became increasingly aware of the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union to global détente. On 15 January 1980, they issued a statement condemning Soviet military intervention. At this juncture, several EEC member states, including Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK, expressed support for the West German proposal to initiate a political dialogue with ASEAN in conjunction with the signing of the cooperation agreement. The forthcoming second ministerial meeting was therefore regarded as having ‘high political significance at the present time’.Footnote 44
Persistent divergences emerged during the drafting of a joint statement on political issues in Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Key issues included whether the two conflicts should be linked and whether the aggressors should be explicitly named. Divergent positions were evident within both organisations. For instance, France, in line with its policy of rapprochement with Vietnam, opposed the explicit naming of Vietnam in the paragraph addressing military intervention in Kampuchea. In response, West Germany argued that it would be untenable to condemn Soviet intervention in Afghanistan without also naming Vietnam in Kampuchea.Footnote 45
Conversely, Afghanistan was notably absent from ASEAN’s initial draft statement. For several EEC member states, including the UK and the Netherlands, it was essential to frame both crises within a common international legal perspective, as both involved violations of state sovereignty through external military intervention.Footnote 46 From this perspective, any condemnation of Vietnam’s actions in Kampuchea required a parallel condemnation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, ASEAN itself was divided on this issue. During consultations with the Italian presidency of the EEC Council, representatives of the Philippines and Malaysia opposed explicitly naming the aggressors in both cases, whereas representatives of Thailand and Singapore were more receptive to the EEC draft.Footnote 47
The outcome of intensive communications within and between the EEC and ASEAN was reflected in the joint declaration on political issues, published at the ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 8 March 1980. The declaration embodied both insistence and compromise on the part of the EEC and ASEAN. The two organisations mutually agreed that the military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan should be condemned as strongly as that of Vietnam in Kampuchea. The ASEAN countries also agreed to support the EEC initiative to neutralise Afghanistan.Footnote 48 At the request of the EEC, ASEAN member states were pressed to take a clear position on the Afghanistan crisis. Conversely, EEC countries were required to adopt a unified position on the Kampuchean crisis, in alignment with the stance advocated by ASEAN. Furthermore, they were requested to recognise and endorse the ASEAN initiative to establish Southeast Asia as a ZOPFAN, on which the EEC countries had failed to reach agreement at the previous ministerial meeting.Footnote 49
Indochinese Refugees: Between Humanitarianism and Politics
From 1979 to 1983, the refugee crisis in the South China Sea occupied a central place in the domestic and foreign policy agendas of ASEAN member states. On the one hand, the capacity of host countries in the region to absorb further refugee inflows was nearly exhausted due to financial, logistical and material constraints. On the other hand, the inhumane conditions in refugee camps were widely criticised by international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the press. ASEAN governments increasingly directed their grievances towards Western Europe. The Malaysian government, for example, called upon the ‘home countries’ of international NGOs to provide greater humanitarian assistance, while ASEAN as a whole urged EEC member states to exert collective political pressure on the ‘source countries’ of refugees.Footnote 50
Consequently, the governments of EEC member states came under considerable pressure. Host countries in Southeast Asia criticised the inadequacy of Western assistance, while international media and NGOs censured industrialised countries that were reluctant to accept refugees. Amid mounting criticism, even the conservative British government under Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013) acquiesced to a substantial increase in refugee admission quotas.Footnote 51 In this context, EEC member states agreed to increase financial contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Furthermore, the European Commission was prompted to reallocate food aid designated for Vietnam to the Indochinese refugees.Footnote 52
On 4 July 1979, the Commission suspended all immediate food aid to Hanoi. Within this context, the West German government adopted a hard-line position, seeking to pressure Vietnam to alter its approach to the refugee crisis. In addition to suspending its own financial and food assistance and in concert with the UK, West Germany urged the Commission to halt all EEC funding to Vietnam.Footnote 53 However, several EEC member states expressed reservations about such punitive measures, warning against the excessive politicisation of what they regarded as a humanitarian issue. Such measures, it was argued, risked not only undermining humanitarian efforts to assist refugees but also exacerbating Vietnam’s economic difficulties. Moreover, proponents of continued assistance to Vietnam maintained that humanitarian aid should not be used as a political instrument.Footnote 54 For instance, at a meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Comité des représentants permanents; COREPER) in Brussels, representatives of the Netherlands and Denmark opposed increasing EEC assistance to Indochinese refugees at the expense of aid to Vietnam.Footnote 55 Conversely, countries adopting a more restrictive position argued that reducing EEC assistance to Vietnam would send a clear ‘political signal’ to the international community, and particularly to ASEAN, in the context of both the refugee crisis and the ongoing Kampuchean crisis.Footnote 56
Claude Cheysson (1920–2012), the EEC commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, represented the more moderate camp. In a report to the COREPER on preparation for the conference on Indochinese refugees in Geneva in July 1979, the French Socialist politician outlined possible measures to address the humanitarian crisis by maintaining aid to Kampuchea and Vietnam. He further suggested that Vietnam should not be isolated at the forthcoming UN conference in Geneva.Footnote 57 According to officials in the West German Foreign Ministry, Cheysson’s proposal clearly indicated an intention to sustain cooperative relations with Vietnam.Footnote 58
This assessment was subsequently confirmed when Cheysson was dispatched as a representative of the EEC Commission to the Geneva conference on 20–21 July 1979. There, he delivered a statement that had not been coordinated with COREPER, reaffirming the Commission’s readiness to support organisations capable of facilitating the departure and reception of refugees ‘more rationally and more systematically’. EEC assistance was therefore to be directed to both countries of origin and those of first asylum.Footnote 59
Under Cheysson’s direction, EEC aid continued to be channelled to Vietnam and Kampuchea in the form of emergency relief.Footnote 60 In Cheysson’s view, the secretary-general of the UN was overly sensitive to the reactions of ASEAN countries, thereby constraining cooperation with the Vietnamese government. In this context, Cheysson confidentially recommended to the president of the Commission that approved food aid be allocated expeditiously to organisations operating in Vietnam and Kampuchea.Footnote 61 At the technical level, the Commission cooperated with the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross to distribute rice, cereals and milk powder to Kampuchean refugees in Vietnam and refugees in northern Vietnam displaced by the Sino–Vietnamese border conflict.Footnote 62 In subsequent years, the Commission approved further emergency assistance, including food and medical supplies, at the request of NGOs such as Caritas Germanica, Catholic Committee Against Hunger and For Development (Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement) and Oxfam.Footnote 63 Formally, the Commission maintained that such assistance was provided in response to natural disasters and was subject to UNHCR oversight. The implementing partners were NGOs rather than authorities in Hanoi. Consequently, these measures were not to be interpreted as a resumption of the suspended food aid to Vietnam in 1979.Footnote 64
ASEAN member states were dissatisfied with their Western European partners over the decision to provide humanitarian aid to Vietnam. For ASEAN, the Indochinese refugee crisis was never merely a humanitarian issue but was intrinsically linked to Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea. In a protest statement, for example, the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC) articulated this position:
Vietnam’s difficulties are not the result of . . . natural calamities, but a consequence of Vietnam’s decision to divert its resources for the military occupation of Kampuchea. . . . If such aid is given now, Vietnam will naturally see such a resumption as a signal that the world is coming to accept the ‘fait accompli’ in Kampuchea.Footnote 65
As a counter-measure, ASEAN member states urged the EEC to support their proposal for a political solution at the UN. From ASEAN’s perspective, the refugee crisis could only be addressed by tackling its underlying cause – Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea – and by restoring the regional balance of power. This, in turn, required the replacement of the pro-Vietnamese regime of Heng Samrin with a coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, comprising the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front under Son Sann (1911–2000), Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–2012) and the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot.
During the drafting of the joint statement for the EEC–ASEAN ministerial meeting of 24–25 March 1983 in Bangkok, ASEAN expressed its expectation that the EEC would endorse this coalition government. However, the German presidency recognised that several EEC member states would not accept language portraying the formation of such a government as a ‘positive step towards . . . the comprehensive political settlement’ in Kampuchea.Footnote 66 It therefore sought to remove any formulation that might imply support for the Khmer Rouge.Footnote 67 As anticipated, France firmly opposed the inclusion of any favourable appraisal of the coalition government.Footnote 68 In consultations between the German presidency and the BAG, these differences proved irreconcilable.Footnote 69 Given the sensitivity of the issue and the time constraints, both sides ultimately agreed to leave the matter for discussion at the ministerial level.
Meanwhile, the Quai d’Orsay announced that the new foreign minister, Claude Cheysson, would combine his participation in the EEC–ASEAN ministerial meeting with a visit to Hanoi.Footnote 70 The stated objective of this visit was to clarify the timetable for Vietnam’s gradual withdrawal of troops from Kampuchea. However, as German officials in Paris observed, Cheysson also sought to position himself as a mediator in the disputes between Vietnam, ASEAN and China. Consistent with his policy of non-confrontation towards Vietnam, he maintained that the Kampuchean crisis could not be resolved in the long term through either the isolation of Vietnam or efforts to promote rapprochement between ASEAN and the communist Indochinese states alone. China – particularly through its military support for the Khmer Rouge and its antagonism towards Vietnam – played a pivotal role in shaping the regional conflicts.Footnote 71 Alongside concerns over the human rights violations of the Pol Pot regime, this vision of a broader Asian détente helps to explain why France did not support ASEAN’s unilateral initiative to establish a coalition government without prior consultation with Vietnam and China.Footnote 72
During the ministerial meeting in Bangkok, discussions between EEC and ASEAN foreign ministers became increasingly tense. Cheysson initially refused to sign the joint declaration, as the contested paragraph still contained an appraisal of the coalition government. He stated firmly that France did not want Vietnam to be isolated in the search for a solution to the Kampuchean crisis and rejected ‘categorically’ any acceptance of Pol Pot.Footnote 73 Cheysson’s threat not to sign the joint declaration prompted strong reactions from ASEAN foreign ministers. The Indonesian foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja (1929–2021), for example, remarked that ‘it is pointless to complain about Pol Pot and do nothing else’.Footnote 74 Dhanabalan, Singapore’s foreign minister, argued that the proposed coalition government was intended to isolate Hanoi diplomatically and psychologically, thereby compelling it to negotiate with anti-Vietnamese resistance groups in Kampuchea. The Thai foreign minister, Siddhi Savetsila (1919–2015), appealed to his French counterpart to demonstrate ‘solidarity’ with ASEAN’s position, warning that a visible rift between the EEC and ASEAN would send a ‘wrong signal’ to external powers such as the Soviet Union and undermine perceptions of Western support for Southeast Asia’s non-communist states.Footnote 75
Only after the personal intervention of Genscher did Cheysson agree to sign the joint declaration. As a compromise, the West German foreign minister proposed a slight amendment to the contested paragraph. In the final text, the establishment of a coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea was no longer described as a ‘positive’ step but rather as a ‘significant’ one in efforts to resolve the Kampuchean crisis.Footnote 76
Following the meeting, Cheysson proceeded to Hanoi, where he reportedly stated that France did ‘not wish the departure of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia so that the horrors of the Pol Pot time could be repeated’.Footnote 77 This statement clearly contradicted the joint statement that he had signed only days earlier in Bangkok. In the view of the Malaysian foreign minister, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie (1922–2010), such self-contradiction revealed not only France’s wavering stance on the issue but also the lack of full support among EEC member states for ASEAN’s initiative. Moreover, he interpreted it as indictive of a residual colonial mentality in Europe. ‘Unless one has a colonialist or imperialist mentality’, Ghazali argued, ‘one could never accept foreign occupation and domination of another country, whatever may be the pretext or excuse, not even to save the people of the country from their own evil government’.Footnote 78 The EEC Commission’s desk officer for Southeast Asia, Robert Hull, once noted that the EEC ‘umbrella’ had enabled Europe’s colonial past in Southeast Asia to be ‘forgotten’ and that EEC–ASEAN cooperation had offered a ‘fresh start’ for Western Europe in this region.Footnote 79 Nevertheless, as Ghazali’s criticism demonstrated, the colonial past was never fully forgotten in Southeast Asian policy circles. Whenever Western actors took positions perceived as misaligned with those of regional postcolonial states, they remained vulnerable to accusations of colonialism and imperialism. In this respect, the EEC–ASEAN relationship continued to be shadowed by the legacy of colonialism.
From Colonial Dependence to Postcolonial Interdependence
Beyond concerns over colonial modes of thinking, ASEAN countries remained deeply preoccupied with the enduring legacy of colonialism in their postcolonial economic relations with Europe. The central challenge lay in restructuring asymmetrical ties inherited from the colonial era, while simultaneously preserving their attractiveness to industrialised countries.Footnote 80 Since 1977, ASEAN member states had submitted annual joint memoranda to the EEC Commission requesting improvements to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which facilitated imports from ASEAN.Footnote 81 These requests increasingly extended beyond primary commodities to encompass a wide range of processed goods, including processed fruit and seafood, plywood, garments and footwear, furniture and electrical appliances. In the global trading system, labour-intensive light industries played a pivotal role in generating employment and enhancing export competitiveness in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. Improved GSP conditions were therefore expected to stimulate ASEAN exports, contingent upon increased access for manufactured goods to the EEC market.Footnote 82 In this sense, a rebalancing of trade relations was envisaged that would direct capital flows in favour of postcolonial countries.
On the European side, however, the EEC declined to grant the ASEAN countries the preferential treatment accorded to ACP countries under the Lomé Convention or to certain Mediterranean countries. The refusal must be understood partly in the context of Europe’s historical and colonial ties with ACP countries and partly against the backdrop of economic recession in Western Europe following the oil shocks of the 1970s.Footnote 83
In this context, the 1980 EEC–ASEAN Cooperation Agreement emerged as a product of ambiguity and compromise. Both sides were formally designated as ‘equal partners’ in the expansion of economic and trade relations.Footnote 84 The nominal equality was reflected in provisions guaranteeing most-favoured-nation treatment within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in commitments to investment promotion and protection.Footnote 85 In practice, however, the asymmetry between these ‘equal partners’ remained evident. In the name of global trade liberalisation, the EEC declined to grant ASEAN preferential commercial access, while offering no concrete commitments in the field of development cooperation.Footnote 86 The proposed participation of the European Investment Bank in joint economic initiatives, as advocated by ASEAN, was ultimately excluded due to opposition from a majority of EEC member states.Footnote 87 In this respect, the agreement revealed the structural asymmetries faced by economically weaker partners in negotiation with industrialised countries.Footnote 88
Nonetheless, ASEAN countries sought to transcend these asymmetries by invoking postcolonial critiques while simultaneously engaging with the prevailing economic discourse of liberalisation. Trade liberalisation and market openness thus became a shared vocabulary in EEC–ASEAN dialogue. Malaysia, as a former British colony, played a particularly prominent role articulating this position. In his statement at the signing of the aforementioned agreement, the Malaysian foreign minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen (1928–2022), emphasised the need for ‘greater liberation of trades and improvements of its GSP by the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and by undertaking measures to improve product access to the EC market, particularly for manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from ASEAN’.Footnote 89 In the context of the prevailing economic crisis in Western Europe, he further urged European partners to ‘rationalise their industries’ by relocating production to Southeast Asia, where abundant raw materials and a skilled labour force were available.
At the ASEAN–EEC Industrial Sectoral Conference in 1983, the Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad, similarly combined advocacy of free trade with a critique of colonial economic legacies. He argued that
some members of the EEC have . . . had a role as the colonial masters of some of the ASEAN countries. The EEC has unfortunately also used its collective strength to deprive ASEAN and other developing nations from a share of the rich markets in Europe, even for manufactured products that are based on the natural resources of these developing nations. . . . Members of the EEC . . . have been happy to keep the nations of ASEAN and other developing countries merely as suppliers of their requirements of raw commodities, both agricultural and mineral.Footnote 90
Against this background, Mahathir called for greater openness of European markets alongside increased investment and industrial cooperation. Through the liberalisation of trade and capital flows from industrialised to developing countries, he envisioned a transformation of colonial dependency into a system of postcolonial interdependence. In this formulation, he promoted a ‘neoliberal’ global order, structured around a functional division of labour in which industrialised countries supplied technology, managerial expertise and market access, while developing countries provided labour-intensive production and investment opportunities. From this perspective, the international trading system required ‘re-liberalisation’ in favour of formerly colonised countries.Footnote 91
In practice, however, ASEAN expectations encountered a reserved response from European counterparts. Against the backdrop of economic recession in Europe and financial constraints within the EEC Commission, European governments were neither willing nor able to accommodate ASEAN demands. This tension often placed EEC representatives in a defensive position during negotiations.Footnote 92 Between growing ASEAN frustration and European economic constraints, the West German foreign minister identified economic cooperation as a central and increasing politicised dimension of EEC–ASEAN relations in the early 1980s.
In his opening statement to the EEC–ASEAN ministerial meeting in Bangkok on 24 March 1983, Genscher emphasised the severity of the global economic crises affecting both industrialised and developing countries. Against this background, he called on both sides to assume ‘global co-responsibility’ by strengthening the cooperation framework established in 1980. Specifically, the chairman of West Germany’s Free Democratic urged resistance to rising protectionism and argued that increased interregional trade and European investment in ASEAN markets would contribute to a more stable global economic system and thereby support international peace and prosperity.Footnote 93
Genscher’s conception of a liberal world economic order extended beyond rhetoric. Three months later, he returned to Bangkok for the ASEAN Partner Dialogue and organised an investment symposium involving major representatives of the German economy, including the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHT), Dresdner Bank, the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and leading private-sector firms.Footnote 94 He also encouraged the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (MEA), as well as his fellow party member, Martin Bangemann (1934–2022), to intensify efforts to deepen economic cooperation with ASEAN countries.Footnote 95 Regular consultations between the West German MEA and the BAG had already been taking place since the signing of the 1980 Cooperation Agreement.Footnote 96
This coordination ultimately contributed to the establishment of a special meeting of the EEC–ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Economic Matters, held in Bangkok in October 1985. Five years after the initial ASEAN request for ministerial-level dialogue with Western European economic ministers, this format was finally realised. However, the limited engagement of most EEC member states was reflected in their decision to send senior officials rather than ministers. By this stage, ASEAN attention had increasingly shifted towards East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, and the EEC–ASEAN economic dialogue had correspondingly lost some of its earlier political salience.
Conclusion
Without question, the EEC–ASEAN relationship underwent a profound transformation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This transformation extended beyond the mere establishment of institutional linkages. First, this article has highlighted the geostrategic dimension of the convergence of interests between the EEC and ASEAN against the backdrop of the global Cold War. The underlying logic guiding the policies of certain states, such as West Germany and Singapore, was one of a balance of power, aimed at promoting regional stability and global détente. In the context of regional conflicts in Kampuchea and Afghanistan, both groupings were drawn closer together in response to the geostrategic challenges posed by the military interventions of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. However, in policy areas such as the Indochinese refugee crisis, divergent interpretations of the nature of the crisis hampered effective cooperation between the EEC and ASEAN.
Second, the article has argued that the strengthening of interregional institutional linkages between the EEC and ASEAN was an option rather than a necessity for their member states. As demonstrated above, bilateral cooperation remained a significant feature of relations between Western Europe and non-communist Southeast Asia. Even within the framework of EEC–ASEAN multilateral cooperation, bilateral ties – particularly those between West Germany and Singapore – played a crucial role in agenda-setting processes. This perspective cautions against a teleological reading of interregional relations. While the institutionalisation of EEC–ASEAN relations had the potential to foster multilateral cooperation among participating states, ASEAN members also experienced frustration due to the limited responsiveness of their European partners. This, in turn, contributed to a gradual reorientation of ASEAN policy priorities towards neighbouring Asian partners from the mid-1980s onwards. In this sense, the institutionalisation of interregional relations did not generate solely centripetal dynamics leading to policy convergence and coordinated global positions; rather, it also produced centrifugal tendencies within both groupings.
Third, the colonial past of Western European countries and the experiences of colonisation within ASEAN member states remained an enduring and salient factor in their relations. ASEAN countries argued that structural imbalances in economic relations between industrialised and developing countries were rooted in colonial legacies. Consequently, they sought increased capital transfers and technological know-how from the EEC within the framework of a postcolonial, neoliberal vision of global order. In this respect, they did not advocate decoupling from European economies. Instead, their emphasis lay on enhanced market access and expanded trade flows. A liberal world trading system was thus conceived as the practical means of overcoming colonial dependency and establishing a new form of global interdependence.
Acknowledgements
The manuscript of this article was first presented at the CMY Junior Scholars Seminar in the Contemporary History of Europe in the World, organised by Prof. Jennifer Allen (Yale University), Prof. Kiran Klaus Patel (Ludwig-Maximillians-University München) and Prof. Pedro Ramos Pinto (University of Cambridge). I am grateful for the insightful comments and critical feedback received at this workshop. I also wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions for revision. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the editor for their careful and stylistic editorial assistance.
