1. Introduction
It is well known that a single utterance, on a single occasion, can serve multiple purposes. When, for example, a woman says, ‘I'm not feeling well’ in response to an invitation to a date, her utterance both describes her state of wellbeing and it also functions as a refusal of that invitation. When a particular utterance serves such multiple purposes, it is an indirect speech act. In this case, the direct and literal assertion (that the speaker is not feeling well) also manages to communicate the woman's indirect and non-literal refusal.
In a provocative essay, Rod BertoletFootnote 2 argues that there are no indirect speech acts. According to Bertolet, this woman's utterance is not really a refusal. It merely functions as one. Appealing to considerations of theoretical simplicity and some clever examples, Bertolet suggests that, although utterances can serve the purpose of more than one speech act, only the direct speech act is actually performed. As a result, on Bertolet's view, such an utterance will constitute only one speech act.
In what follows, we present Bertolet's argument and then offer a response to it. As we shall see, although Bertolet is right that functioning as a certain speech act is insufficient for actually being that speech act, we argue that indirect speech acts meet a further condition that warrants countenancing them. Since this paper deals primarily with the ontological status of indirect speech acts, we begin with a brief presentation of the standard account of indirect speech acts.
2. Indirect Speech Acts
Besides stating facts, utterances can also do things. For instance, when Rachel says, ‘I promise to take out the trash,’ her words not only have the effect of convincing me that she will take out the trash, they also constitute a promise. Following Austin, we shall say that the action constituted by an utterance is its illocutionary force. In this case, Rachel's statement has the illocutionary force of promising.Footnote 3
Some speech acts have two illocutionary forces. That is, the utterance does two things simultaneously. Suppose a diner asks, ‘Can you pass the salt?’ While this is literally a question about the addressee's physical abilities, most would take it as a request to pass the salt. Thus, the utterance has the illocutionary force of questioning (the addressee's physical abilities) and another illocutionary force of requesting (the salt). Since the request is indirectly performed through the direct question, this utterance is an indirect speech act. On the standard account, indirect speech acts involve two distinct illocutionary forces. In the case at hand, ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is both a question and a request.
There is a sense in which the indirect speech act is more important than the direct one. After all, in this dining context, the speaker's primary reason for speaking at all is to perform the indirect request. Thus, the primary illocutionary force is to request and the secondary illocutionary force is to question. As one can see, the primary illocutionary act of requesting is performed indirectly by way of performing the secondary illocutionary act of questioning.
Consider another example. Suppose that David approaches Monica at a club and says, ‘Hey, let's dance,’ to which Monica replies, ‘I don't like this song.’ Notice that Monica's utterance is literally a statement about her dislike of a particular song. However, in this context, her utterance is also a rejection of David's invitation. Moreover, to reject David's invitation is Monica's primary illocutionary intention and she satisfies that intention by way of making a statement about her dislike of a particular song. As one can see, on the standard account, this utterance constitutes two distinct illocutionary acts: the primary indirect illocutionary act of rejecting (David's invitation to dance) and the secondary direct illocutionary act of stating (her dislike of a particular song).
In addition to this standard account of indirect speech acts, it is also important to distinguish between three different types of indirect speech acts.Footnote 4 First, Type I are utterances that are typically not indirect speech acts, but, in a specific context, have (or function as having) indirect force. Monica's utterance in the dance example above is a case in point. In most situations, saying ‘I do not like this song’ would merely be a statement about the speaker's dislike for a particular song. In other contexts, however (e.g. as a response to an invitation to dance), saying such words also constitutes a rejection.
The second type, Type II, are utterances that usually have (or function as having) indirect force. After all, in most contexts, ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is a request for the hearer to pass the salt. This is so when cooking in the kitchen, shopping in the supermarket, and de-icing the driveway. In fact, it seems that certain syntactic forms (e.g. ‘Can you X?’) have become established ways of performing indirect requests.Footnote 5 So much so that it can even seem unnatural to interpret such utterances as the literal (direct) question.
Finally, Type III are utterances that always (that is, in all contexts) have (or functions as having) indirect force.Footnote 6 This is because some such utterances have syntactic markers of indirect force.Footnote 7 Consider, for example, the utterance, ‘I'd like a chardonnay, please.’ The presence of ‘please’ marks this utterance as an indirect request in all contexts. ‘Please’ is used in requests for the sake of politeness. Thus, it is a syntactic marker of the indirect request.
3. Bertolet's Challenge
As we shall see, Bertolet argues against this standard account. On grounds of theoretical simplicity, he contends that we have insufficient reason to posit indirect speech acts. According to Bertolet, ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is a question but not a request. Since his theory posits just one illocutionary act (namely, that of the direct speech act), his theory is alleged to be simpler than the standard account which posits two distinct speech acts (both the direct and the indirect speech act).
Of course, sometimes ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is just a question. After all, there are contexts in which it is merely a query about the physical capabilities of the addressee. Suppose, for instance, that Aaron, who has a broken arm, is at the doctor's office and, in order to inquire about Aaron's mending arm, the doctor asks, ‘When you are at the dinner table, can you pass the salt?’ In this case, the utterance is merely a question. The doctor wants to know how Aaron's arm is doing (and he does not want Aaron to get him anything). Advocates of the standard account of indirect speech acts would readily agree that ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is here merely a question. Thus, no one (involved in this debate anyway) denies that ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is sometimes just a question.
Bertolet, by contrast, is making the stronger and more controversial claim that ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is always – that is, in all contexts, just a question. Even when one diner asks another, ‘Can you pass the salt?’ Bertolet insists that the utterance is merely a question. As one can see, by denying the indirect request force of this utterance, Bertolet is clearly departing from the standard account.
Now, Bertolet recognizes that there is an important difference between how the utterance ‘Can you pass the salt?’ functions in the doctor's office example and how it functions in the dining example. In the latter case, but not in the former case, ‘Can you pass the salt?’ does the work of a request. The speaker says what she says in order to (non-authoritatively) get the salt passed and the addressee takes the utterance as an attempt to (non-authoritatively) get her to pass it.Footnote 8 Clearly, since Bertolet maintains that ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is here still just a question, he will need to account for the request-like functioning of this utterance in this context.
Bertolet accounts for this by arguing that, in such dining contexts, ‘Can you pass the salt?’ functions as a request without being one. As one can see, he relies on a distinction between being a certain speech act and merely functioning as that speech act. In order to illustrate this distinction, we offer an example much like Bertolet's own.Footnote 9
Suppose that Peter walks into a room, sees a bowl of yummy jellybeans in front of his friend Linda, and then proceeds to ‘gaze longingly’Footnote 10 at them. Suppose further that, as a result, Linda realizes that Peter wants some jellybeans and so she gives him some. In this example, Peter gazes as he does in order to (non-authoritatively) get the jellybeans and Linda interprets Peter's gaze as a (non-authoritative) attempt to get her to give him some.Footnote 11 In other words, Peter's gaze does the work of a request. As Bertolet stresses, although Peter's gaze does the work of a request, it is not one. Since the gaze is not even speech, it simply cannot be the speech act of a request. Clearly, as this example shows, merely functioning as a request is insufficient for being one.
As this jellybean example illustrates, the mere fact that an action does the work of a particular type of speech act (in this case, a request) is insufficient for establishing that it is that particular type of speech act. As Bertolet emphasizes, this raises a challenge for the standard account of indirect speech acts: the mere fact that they do the work of the indirect speech act is insufficient for them to actually have indirect force. After all, the dull book I use as a fly swatter certainly serves the purpose of a fly swatter, but that does not thereby make it a fly swatter! As a result, the proponent of the standard account owes us an explanation. Such a defender must be able to say what makes it the case that indirect speech acts actually have indirect force as opposed to merely functioning as having such force.
In what follows, we respond to this challenge. We argue that indirect speech acts do in fact have indirect force. They actually have such force in virtue of functioning as having that force via linguistic communication. Since our response relies on a distinction between communication and linguistic communication, we turn now to a brief discussion of this important distinction.
4. On Linguistic Communication
Simply put, communication is the act of getting certain (somewhat complex) intentions across to someone else.Footnote 12 This can be done in many different ways. Communication is successful, regardless of the mechanism, so long as the recipient understands what the speaker is trying to get across. Suppose, for example, that a boy wants a certain toy and jumps up and down excitedly while pointing to the toy. Once the parents recognize what their son wants to convey to them, the boy has successfully communicated. As we shall see in this section, linguistic communication is a specific kind of communication distinct from communication more generally.
Notice, first, that communication does not require words or symbols of any kind. Recall, for instance, our jellybean example. When Peter gazes longingly at Linda's jellybeans, he manages to communicate his desire that Linda share them with him and he does so without saying a word. As one can see, communication does not require the use of words or symbols.
As a result, one might be tempted to think that linguistic communication is communication that also happens to involve words or symbols. Although this is a necessary condition of linguistic communication, it is not sufficient. There are occasions when speech is present, but it plays no role in the addressee's recognition of the speaker's communicative intention. This can happen, for instance, when the speaker uses language that is not heard by the addressee, and thus those words are not used to figure out the speaker's communicative intention.
Imagine, for example, that Jimmy sees Mike exclaim from across the street, ‘It's a beautiful, sunny day!’ Suppose further that, as Mike speaks, a loud truck drives by and drowns out all of his words. Suppose finally that, although Jimmy did not actually hear what Mike said, he nevertheless manages to figure out what Mike intended to get across because he knew that Mike said something; he noticed that Mike pointed to the sky and he knows that Mike is perpetually appreciating good weather. Since Jimmy recognized what Mike intended to get across (i.e. that it is a beautiful, sunny day), this is a case of successful communication. Despite this, and although words are involved, this is not a case of linguistic communication. Since Jimmy did not even hear what Mike said, he could not use Mike's utterance to figure out what Mike was trying to communicate. As one can see, the presence of words is insufficient for communication to be linguistic.
Next, one might think that communication is linguistic so long as the words uttered are actually heard by the addressee. However, even this is not sufficient. Consider a slightly revised version of Searle's captured soldier example.Footnote 13 A recently captured American soldier, in a Russian prison camp during World War II, believes that the only way to avoid being killed by his captors is to make them believe that he is both German and useful. With this goal in mind, he points to a medicine bag and authoritatively shouts something in German. (As it turns out, the captured soldier does not actually speak German but merely knows a single line of German poetry that he was forced to memorize in grade school, so that is what he utters.) Since the captured soldier intends for his words to be taken as an order for the medicine bag, and since his audience takes it as an order for the medicine bag, this is a case of successful communication. Although this is a case of communication, it is not linguistic communication. This is so precisely because, although the Russians heard what the captured soldier said, their recognition of the soldier's communicative intention (to order) is not brought about by their understanding of the meaning of what he actually said. They figured out that he intended to order them (to give him the medicine bag) because of the authoritative tone of his voice, the fact that he was pointing to the medicine bag, and other contextual information. As one can see, merely hearing the words is insufficient for communication to be linguistic. The addressee's recognition of the speaker's communicative intention must be brought about by the addressee's understanding (of the conventional meaning) of the words actually uttered.
In sum, there are three important conditions required for communication to be linguistic. First, speech must be used. It must be the case that the speaker uses words in an attempt to get her communicative intention across. Second, the words must be heard by the addressee. Third and finally, the addressee must understand the conventional meaning of those words and that understanding must play an important role in the addressee's recognition of the speaker's communicative intention.
In the following section, we rely on this important distinction between linguistic communication and non-linguistic communication. As we shall argue, an utterance is an illocutionary act with force p so long as it functions as having that force and it does so via linguistic communication. Then, in § 6, we argue that indirect speech acts actually have indirect force because they satisfy these conditions.
5. On Illocutionary Acts
Recall, first, the jellybean example. When Peter gazes longingly at the jellybeans, he successfully communicates to Linda that he wants her to share them with him. In fact, his gaze does the work of a request. This means that his gaze counts as a (non-authoritative) attempt to get Linda to share her jellybeans with him, and Linda recognizes this.Footnote 14 Consequently, Peter's gaze serves the purpose of a request. It does exactly what a request would do. In this way, it seems that functioning as a request is a necessary condition of being one.
However, according to Bertolet, although the gaze functions as a request, it is not one exactly because it is not speech. After all, since a request is a type of speech act, only speech can be a request. As a result, functioning as a request, although necessary, is not sufficient for being one.
While plenty of respectable theorists work with a broader conception of speech,Footnote 15 we will not here take issue with Bertolet's rather narrow conception of speech and speech acts. We will henceforth assume that only speech (in the ordinary sense) can constitute a speech act. With this assumption in place, we agree with Bertolet that Peter's gaze is not a request exactly because it is not speech.
Notice that this distinction between speech and non-speech also tracks, at least in this case, the important distinction between communication in general and linguistic communication in particular. Since Peter's communicative intention is recognized by Linda, this jellybean example is a case of successful communication. However, since no speech is uttered, it fails the first condition of linguistic communication. So, although it is communication, it is not linguistic communication.
This suggests that perhaps being a request is no more than functioning as one and doing so via linguistic communication. This is, in fact, the account of requests that we favor and that we shall henceforth use. One might be tempted to insist on the further condition that the utterance in question must have the syntactic form of a request. To require this, however, begs the very question at issue. To insist that only utterances with the syntactic form of a request are requests is to require that all requests be direct. Consequently, such an account would stack the cards in favor of Bertolet's skeptical stance. Thus, any adequate account of requests must at least be open to the possibility of there being indirect requests.
In sum, if an utterance is intended as a (non-authoritative) attempt to get the addressee to do something and if the addressee recognizes this, then the utterance functions as a request. Furthermore, if that utterance functions as a request via linguistic communication, then, on our view, it is a request. That is, so long as the addressee recognizes the speaker's request intention as a proper result of recognizing the conventional meanings of the words actually uttered, then the utterance is a request.
Notice that this account of requests readily generalizes. If an utterance functions as a certain type of speech act and if it does so via linguistic communication, then, on our view, it is that type of speech act. Thus, if a particular utterance functions as a rejection, it is a rejection so long as it functions as one via linguistic communication. In the next section, and with the assistance of Searle's theory of speech acts, we argue that indirect speech acts satisfy these conditions. As a result, we conclude, in opposition to Bertolet, that there is good reason to countenance them.
6. Response to Bertolet
Recall that Bertolet acknowledges that indirect speech acts function as having indirect force. Thus, they will have such force, at least on our account, so long as they function as having such force via linguistic communication. We shall now argue that they do. Since our argument relies on Searle's theory of indirect speech acts, we begin with a brief presentation of Searle's theory.
First, Searle is a proponent of the standard account of indirect speech acts. According to Searle, an utterance is an indirect speech act when ‘one illocutionary act is performed by way of performing another.’Footnote 16 Clearly, he is committed to there being two distinct illocutionary acts. Also, according to Searle, the speaker's primary illocutionary intention is typically to perform the indirect speech act. In the dining example, since the speaker's primary reason for speaking is to get the salt passed to her, the speaker's primary illocutionary intention is to request. This intention is performed via the direct speech act of posing a question.
Second, Searle also supplements the standard account by appealing to his own theory of speech acts.Footnote 17 As we shall see, he accounts for how the addressee is able to recognize the speaker's primary (indirect illocutionary) intention. Using Searle's theory, we argue that indirect speech acts are thus linguistically communicated. Since it is already agreed that indirect speech acts function as having indirect force, the fact that they do so via linguistic communication means that, on our view and contra Bertolet, we have positive reason to countenance indirect speech acts.
6.1. Type I
As we saw in §2, there are different types of indirect speech acts. Some utterances, Type I, do not normally have (or function as having) indirect force. Others, Type II, normally have (or function as having) indirect force. And still others, Type III, always have indirect force. In what follows, we apply Searle's theory of indirect speech acts to all three types and argue that his theory shows that the indirect functioning of the utterance is performed via linguistic communication. We now begin with an example of Type I.
To this end, recall the dance example from §2. David approaches Monica at a club and says, ‘Hey, let's dance,’ to which Monica replies, ‘I don't like this song.’ As argued in §2, this is a Type I indirect speech act. Monica's utterance is literally a statement about her dislike of a particular song, but, in this particular context, her utterance is also a rejection of David's offer. Moreover, rejecting David's offer is Monica's primary illocutionary intention and she satisfies that intention indirectly by way of directly making a statement. Thus, on Searle's (standard) account, this utterance, in this context, constitutes two illocutionary acts: the primary indirect illocutionary act of rejecting (David's invitation to dance) and the secondary direct illocutionary act of stating (her dislike of a particular song).
Searle extends the standard account by explaining how the addressee manages to recognize the primary (indirect illocutionary) intention of the speaker. In other words, Searle accounts for how the indirect speech act is successfully communicated. Appealing to Gricean-style reasoning,Footnote 18 Searle offers a potential reconstruction of how David might come to realize that Monica's statement is really a rejection of his offer:
Step 1: David made a proposal to Monica, and in response she has made a statement to the effect that she does not like the song that is being played (facts about the conversation).
Step 2: David assumes that Monica is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore her remark is intended to be relevant (principles of conversational cooperation).
Step 3: A relevant response must be one of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc (theory of speech acts).
Step 4: But her literal utterance was not one of these, and so was not a relevant response (inference from Steps 1 and 3).
Step 5: Therefore, she probably means more than she says. Assuming that her remark is relevant, her primary illocutionary point must differ from her literal one (inference from Steps 2 and 4).
Step 6: David knows that people normally do not dance to songs they do not like (factual background information).
Step 7: Therefore, Monica probably does not want to dance to a song she does not like (inference from Step 6).
Step 8: A preparatory condition of accepting an offer is to want the thing being offered (theory of speech acts).
Step 9: Therefore, David knows that Monica has said something that has the consequence that she probably does not want to dance with him (inference from Steps 1, 7, and 8).
Step 10: Therefore, her primary illocutionary intention is probably to reject the offer to dance (inference from Steps 5 and 9).Footnote 19
To summarize this in a more straightforward way: David invites Monica to dance. She responds to what he said, but her utterance, on the surface anyway, does not appear to be a response to his invitation. Since David presumes that Monica is a cooperative communicator, he infers that Monica's primary illocutionary intention diverges from the literal meaning of her utterance. That is, David realizes that Monica must mean something more than what she literally said. Using shared background information, David realizes that Monica is unlikely to want to dance to a song she dislikes, so he infers that her primary illocutionary intention is to reject his offer.
Notice that a crucial step in David's reasoning occurs at step 8 when he realizes that what Monica actually said means that an important pragmatic pre-condition for accepting his offer is unmet. As a result, David realizes that Monica intends to reject his offer. Thus, as one can see, Searle's theory of speech acts play an important role in explaining how David manages to recognize Monica's primary illocutionary intention to reject his offer. As Searle stresses, there is an important connection between what Monica actually said and one of the conditions for the indirect speech act that she primarily intended to perform.
Moreover, since David's recognition of the conventional meaning of Monica's utterance plays a crucial role in his recognition of Monica's primary illocutionary intention to refuse his offer, the communication of her refusal is an instance of linguistic communication. Unlike the jellybean example then, Monica's utterance functions as an indirect speech act and it does so via linguistic communication. For this reason, we maintain that Monica's utterance is a rejection. Contra Bertolet, it does not merely function as one.
6.2. Type II
We shall now consider the canonical example of a Type II indirect speech act: ‘Can you pass the salt?’. This utterance is an instance of Type II since it usually (that is, in most contexts) has indirect force (or indirect functioning). As we have argued, an utterance is a request so long as it functions as a request and it does so by means of linguistic communication. In other words, if the addressee's recognition of the conventional meanings of the words uttered plays the proper role in the addressee's recognition of the speaker's communicative intention of requesting, then the utterance is a request. We shall now argue that ‘Can you pass the salt?’ uttered while dining satisfies these requirements and is therefore a request.
Since this is an instance of Type II, the addressee comes to recognize the indirect illocutionary intention in a slightly modified manner. As Searle stresses, there are certain quasi-conventional ways to perform indirect speech acts.Footnote 20 Requests, for example, are typically made indirectly by means of asking a question concerning the addressee's ability (e.g. ‘Can you pass the salt?’), willingness (e.g. ‘Will you pass the salt?’), or desire (e.g. ‘Would you like to pass the salt?’) to perform the task in question. Since these forms have become standardized ways to request, the hearer understands it as a request without really needing to figure it out. As a result, the reasoning involved (in figuring out the primary indirect illocutionary intention from the literal meaning of what is actually said) is said to be ‘short circuited’ in most cases. Even though this reasoning is, in all likelihood, not consciously entertained, Searle nevertheless offers a possible reconstruction of how the addressee comes to recognize the indirect force on the basis of what is actually said:
Step 1: Jimmy asked me a question as to whether I have the ability to pass the salt (fact about the conversation).
Step 2: I assume that he is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore his utterance has some aim or point (principles of conversational cooperation).
Step 3: The conversational setting is not such as to indicate a theoretical interest in my salt-passing ability (factual background information).
Step 4: Furthermore, he probably already knows that the answer to the question is yes (factual background information). […]
Step 5: Therefore, his utterance is probably not just a question. It probably has some ulterior illocutionary point (inference from Steps 1, 2, 3, and 4). What can it be?
Step 6: A preparatory condition for any directive illocutionary act is the ability of [the hearer] to perform the act predicted in the propositional content condition (theory of speech acts).
Step 7: Therefore, Jimmy has asked me a question the affirmative answer to which would entail that the preparatory condition for requesting me to pass the salt is satisfied (inference from Steps 1 and 6).
Step 8: We are now at dinner and people normally use salt at dinner; they pass it back and forth, try to get others to pass it back and forth, etc. (background information).
Step 9: He has therefore alluded to the satisfaction of a preparatory condition for a request whose obedience conditions it is quite likely he wants me to bring about (inference from Steps 7 and 8).
Step 10: Therefore, in the absence of any other plausible illocutionary point, he is probably requesting me to pass him the salt (inference from Steps 5 and 9).Footnote 21
Again, these steps are not intended as a description of the actual reasoning involved. Rather, they merely illustrate a possible reconstruction of how such reasoning might go. In this example too, we see that Searle's theory of speech acts plays a crucial role in how the addressee comes to recognize the speaker's primary illocutionary intention. Exactly because the utterance is a query about the preparatory condition of a request for the salt (see Step 6), and because the assumption that the speaker is requesting the salt makes sense in this context, the addressee is able to infer that the speaker intends to request the salt. In this manner, Searle explains how the addressee comes to recognize the speaker's indirect but primary illocutionary intention. Notice further that this explanation relies crucially on the addressee's understanding of the conventional meaning of what the speaker actually said.
The fact that the addressee recognizes the indirect request intention as a result of understanding the conventional meaning of the words actually uttered shows that this is a case of linguistic communication. Even though the actual reasoning is probably short-circuited, this reconstruction shows how the conventional meaning of the words uttered enables the addressee to recognize the speaker's primary illocutionary intention. Since ‘Can you pass the salt?’ functions as a request and since it does so via linguistic communication, this means that it is a request and, contra Bertolet, does not merely function as one.
6.3. Type III
Consider, finally, an instance of Type III. Suppose Sherman says to the bartender on duty, ‘I'd like a chardonnay, please.’ The utterance is literally a statement about Sherman's preferences, but it is also a request. Moreover, it is an instance of Type III since it must have indirect force (or indirect functioning). That is, it will have (or function as having) indirect request force in all contexts because of the presence of the word ‘please’.
Rather than go through all the details of Searle's account, one can see quite readily how it would go. The bartender notices that the literal utterance (a statement about the speaker's preferences) satisfies a precondition of the speaker requesting a chardonnay, and since the hypothesis that the speaker is requesting a beverage is likely to be true under the circumstances, the bartender realizes that the speaker intends to be requesting a chardonnay. The presence of the word ‘please’ is a further, and rather major, indication that the speaker here intends to be requesting. In this way, we see how the addressee comes to recognize the primary illocutionary intention of the speaker and we see that the addressee's understanding (of the conventional meanings) of the words uttered plays a crucial role in that recognition. As a result, the speaker's request intention is linguistically communicated. Furthermore, since the utterance functions as a request and since it does so via linguistic communication, it is a request. On our account, there is nothing more to being a request.
In this way, we hereby respond to Bertolet's challenge. Although Peter's longing gaze does the work of a request for the jellybeans, we agree with Bertolet that it is not one because Peter's request intention, although communicated, is not communicated linguistically. With indirect speech acts, by contrast, the indirect illocutionary intention is communicated linguistically and, as we argued above, this is all that is required to show that such utterances actually have indirect force. Contra Bertolet then, indirect speech acts have, and do not merely function as having, indirect force.
7. A Potential Problem for Bertolet Regarding Type III
As we shall see, Type III indirect speech acts pose a particular challenge for Bertolet. Consider the following example. When dining, Carl says to Martha, ‘Can you please pass the salt?’ Because of the presence of ‘please’ this utterance will, in all contexts, have (or function as having) indirect force. As a result, it is an instance of Type III.
The problem for Bertolet, who after all denies that the utterance is a request, is that the utterance seems grammatically correct only if it is a request. Modifying the request for the sake of politeness, ‘please’ appears utterly misplaced on Bertolet's view. After all, according to Bertolet, the utterance is merely a question and not a request, but as the following examples demonstrate, ‘please’ is completely misplaced in mere questions:
‘Are you able to please do calculus? ’
‘Can you understand German please?’
Bertolet offers two responses to this objection.Footnote 22 The first we reject as ineffective and the second we accept as what he ought to say given his particular commitments.
7.1. Ungrammatical but Serviceable
Bertolet's first response is to say that utterances such as ‘Can you please pass the salt?’ are strictly ungrammatical (in this case due to the presence of ‘please’) but nevertheless perfectly usable and thus functionally acceptable. After all, such ‘syntactic liberties’Footnote 23 are actually quite familiar. We often use ungrammatical bits of language that manage to serve our communicative purposes perfectly well despite their ungrammaticality. Bertolet urges us to consider, for example, the instructions on a matchbook, ‘Close cover before striking,’ or the warning on a road sign, ‘Slippery when wet.’ Such speech acts are ungrammatical, yet perfectly serviceable. According to Bertolet then, the occurrence of ‘please’ in ‘Can you please pass the salt?’ is relevantly similar to the above-cited examples of ungrammatical but perfectly serviceable utterances.
In response, it is worth noting that there is a salient difference between the sort of ungrammaticality involved with ‘Can you please pass the salt?’ and that involved with these other examples. The cited examples are each shorthand phrases for complete and perfectly grammatical sentences. Since a road sign and a matchbook cover need to impart their messages in such limited space, rather obvious words are eliminated. The matchbook's expanded message would be: ‘Close [the matchbook's] cover before striking [a match]’ and the road sign imparts: ‘[The road is] slippery when [it is] wet.’ In such cases, readers understand the abridged sentence because they can easily fill in the missing words by using context and background information. It may well be that the matchbook instructions and the road sign are perfectly serviceable communicatively exactly because they are, in fact, condensed replacements for perfectly grammatical complete sentences.
The same cannot be said of ‘Can you please pass the salt?’ It is not an abbreviated version of another complete grammatical sentence. If it is just a question, then it is ungrammatical not because we have yet to fill in any missing words, but because mere questions do not take ‘please.’ If, by contrast, the utterance is a request, then the sentence is grammatical because ‘please’ modifies that request. Thus, even if Bertolet is right and the presence of ‘please’ is some form of syntactic liberty, he still owes us an explanation regarding what business the word ‘please’ has appearing in a mere question.
7.2. On Modifying Request-functioning
As we shall see, Bertolet can offer the requisite explanation. Since he believes that ‘Can you please pass the salt?’ is not a request, ‘please’ certainly cannot modify the (non-existent) request. Despite this, ‘Can you please pass the salt?’ nevertheless functions as a request, and according to Bertolet, ‘please’ modifies the request-functioning of the utterance.
Furthermore, there are other examples of adverbs that modify the utterance itself (as opposed to some portion of its content). Consider, for example, the adverb ‘frankly.’ As Searle notes, the modifier ‘frankly’ in ‘Frankly, you're drunk’ modifies the speech act that is performed in uttering that sentence.Footnote 24 Similarly, when Joe utters, ‘Frankly, I never liked your cooking,’ the use of ‘frankly’ modifies Joe's statement itself. (After all, it was quite frank of Joe to just come out and say so.) As one can see then, some adverbs modify some aspect of the utterance. According to Bertolet then, ‘please’ in ‘Can you please pass the salt?’ modifies the request-functioning of the utterance. As a result, on his view anyway, there is no need to explain the presence of ‘please’ by positing the existence of an indirect request.
Given that Bertolet is opposed to countenancing indirect speech acts, this is the response he ought to give. That said, since we have here offered positive reasons in support of countenancing indirect speech acts, we maintain that ‘please’ modifies the indirect request. Thus, on our (standard) view, the syntactic markers of indirect force are just that: modifiers of indirect speech acts.
8. Burden of Proof
One might wonder where the burden of proof lies. Is the onus on Bertolet, for example, to show that indirect speech acts do not exist? Or, alternatively, is it on us to show that they do? We believe that the burden of proof lies clearly with Bertolet. Since he argues that we do not have sufficient reason to countenance indirect speech acts, his skeptical stance regarding them thereby takes on the burden of showing that they do not exist. Furthermore, since the burden is on Bertolet to show that indirect speech acts do not exist, our response to his challenge is sufficient to defend the existence of indirect speech acts. Thus, although Bertolet is right that merely functioning as a certain type of speech act is insufficient for actually being that type of speech act, we have shown that indirect speech acts also meet the further condition of functioning as such via linguistic communication.
Suppose instead, however, that the burden of proof is on us to establish that indirect speech acts do indeed exist. Although we deny that the burden lies with us, it is nevertheless instructive to see what would follow. If the onus were on us to prove that indirect speech acts exist, then what we have done here is strictly insufficient. After all, Bertolet is always free to reject this further condition as inadequate. One might initially be troubled by this consequence but, on reflection, it should not be surprising. Since Bertolet maintains a skeptical stance, he thereby has the rhetorical advantage. He can always remain skeptical by either raising the standards or rejecting premises. Moreover, even if we have not here proven that indirect speech acts exist, since we have successfully responded to Bertolet's challenge, it follows that nothing he says gives us any reason to be skeptical about them.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have responded to Bertolet's challenge. Although we agree that merely functioning as a certain type of speech act is insufficient for an utterance to be that type of speech act, we have argued that when an utterance does so via linguistic communication, it is that type of speech act. Moreover, since indirect speech acts function as having indirect force and since we have shown that they do so via linguistic communication, we have here argued that indirect speech acts actually have indirect force (and do not merely function as having such force). In this way, we defend the standard account of indirect speech acts against Bertolet's attack.
