Roe Fremstedal's Kierkegaard on Self, Ethics, and Religion: Purity or Despair aims to show that Kierkegaard's arguments are “more relevant and defensible than often thought” (251). To emphasize the reasonableness of Kierkegaard's philosophical contributions for today's readers, Fremstedal fits Kierkegaard's ethical and religious insights in the framework of Kantian practical anthropology, that is, of inquiry into what free and rational moral agents can and should make of themselves (16).
The book is organized into four parts. First, Fremstedal establishes wholeheartedness as Kierkegaard's fundamental principle, defining it as an unwavering life project that requires an unconditional moral obligation (49). Second, he argues that Kierkegaard's moralism is noneudaimonistic in a Kantian sense. It aims at some highest good for its own sake, rather than prudentially or self-interestedly aiming for happiness under particular conditions (80). Third, Fremstedal tries to refute characterizations of Kierkegaard as a defender of hidden religious inwardness and of a subjective theory of truth (157 and 168). Instead, and fourth, Fremstedal argues that Kierkegaard offers moral reasons to believe in God (245).
Fremstedal's “broadly Kantian reading” rejects the notorious image of Kierkegaard as defending irrational individual faith in unremitting polemic against Hegel (254). His approach chimes with thirty years of scholarship written largely to debunk this widely received characterization of Kierkegaard. Fremstedal confirms some intuitions in Ronald M. Green's paradigm-shifting 1992 study Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (SUNY Press). However, he avoids Green's controversial claim that Kierkegaard intentionally obscures Kant's influence. There is a dearth of references to Kant and Ficthe in the thirty-two printed works of Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter: each is mentioned only twenty-three times; each is mentioned more in Kierkegaard's dissertation, The Concept of Irony, than anywhere else. While Green considers this to be a problem for the Kantian influence thesis, Fremstedal does not. His implication is that in a post-Kantian context, Kierkegaard's resemblances to Kant and Fichte are unsurprising.
Fremstedal does not discover a local context of mid-nineteenth-century Danish Kantians in which Kierkegaard operates, in the way that Jon Stewart's 2003 study Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge University Press) introduces the Danish Hegelian targets of Kierkegaard's polemics against Hegel. Anyone looking for historical details about Kierkegaard's reception of Kant will find nothing more specific than what Green offered thirty years ago: “Kierkegaard knew Kant's critique of ethical eudaimonism from his studies at the University of Copenhagen” (77); “In Denmark, Kant was known for his strict and rigorous ethics, an ethics that Kierkegaard seems largely sympathetic to” (91).
The real historical contribution of the book is unexpected. Fremstedal rediscovers Kierkegaard's overlooked dialogue with the bluntly anti-Hegelian and decidedly un-Kantian theologian Magnús Eiríksson (195n7 and 205). In response to Eiríksson's criticism, Kierkegaard clarifies what it means to believe in virtue of the absurd (201). Kierkegaard explains that what is absurd to the understanding of the nonbeliever is no longer absurd to the understanding of the believer who has made a conversion or “leap” to a new religious outlook. Furthermore, Kierkegaard suggests that readers like Eiríksson are misled by neglecting his signed writings in favor of his pseudonymous works. Fremstedal's careful analysis of this neglected exchange deserves serious attention from Kierkegaard scholars.
Fremstedal is less concerned with the historical Kierkegaard and more concerned with Kierkegaard's arguments, and he does not explore their historical development. Fremstedal believes the entire pseudonymous and signed corpus from 1839 to 1854 shares an overlapping critique of eudaimonism (89–90). He begins with the presentation of selfhood in The Sickness unto Death (1849), then deploys it to strengthen the case for the ethical in Either/Or (1841). Thus reconstructed, Kierkegaard's argument goes like this: if we are to avoid despair and double-mindedness, and achieve selfhood and a meaningful life, then we need a wholehearted commitment to moral responsibilities (44). Such moral commitments must issue agent-neutral and categorial imperatives as a matter of duty; therefore, they require a conversion or a leap to a wholly different ethical outlook than ordinary egoistic eudaimonism. Fremstedal quotes Kierkegaard's papers of 1843–1844 that describe a leap to the ethical that resembles the more famous leap to faith (83). Kierkegaard's notes indicate Lessing and Jacobi. While Fremstedal makes clear that Kierkegaard's debt to Hamann “goes beyond Kantianism” (191), it is less clear how Lessing and Jacobi respectively work in the framework of Kant's practical anthropology. If Kierkegaard's basically “Kantian” project somehow develops through explicit engagements with Lessing and Jacobi, the significance of their mediations deserves more careful accounting. This would better specify Kierkegaard's particular post-Kantian context.
Fremstedal's ambition to show that Kierkegaard is a post-Kantian overshadows Kierkegaard's greater ambition as a philosopher. Kierkegaard's ambition reflects a nineteenth-century concern, that philosophy must begin from absolute starting point to be legitimate, rather than the more relaxed contemporary assumption (apparently shared by Fremstedal) that the most defensible arguments on relevant topics concern philosophy. Kierkegaard's narrator in the unfinished Johannes Climacus rejects modern philosophy's method of radical doubt in favor of ancient philosophers who (as far as he remembers) begin with wonder. Lest philosophy be an arbitrary discourse about whatever people happen to be curious about, however, there must be a single absolute object of wonder. On this occasion, an individual's desire to be a coherent self does not count as a sufficiently nonarbitrary starting point for philosophical thinking. Instead, a desire to access eternal truth (and not merely stipulate it) leads Johannes Climacus in Philosophical Fragments to encounter the wonder, much like the knights of infinity that Johannes de Silentio briefly describes in Fear and Trembling. This experience is not a symbol that represents a transcendent idea, like the mediation category in Kant's third Critique (188). Kierkegaard's receptivity to direct revelation may not really imperil autonomy, but it seems like enough to make Kant nervous (191).
Although Fremstedal does not examine Kierkegaard's politics directly, his Kierkegaard anticipates the discourse ethics of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, which in turn informs the contemporary political theory of deliberative democracy. Fremstedal points to the hero of Fear and Trembling, who falls silent once he has addressed every counterargument with public reasons. He credits Vittorio Hösle's 1992 article “Kan Abraham reddes?” for this upshot: that “practical reason therefore requires dialogue rather than monologue . . . anticipates the central idea of Habermas's discourse ethics” (70). Those who do not read Norwegian may consult the 2013 translation “Can Abraham Be Saved?” in God as Reason: Essays in Philosophical Theology (University of Notre Dame Press). Here, a more circumspect Hösle argues that discourse ethics understates, and Kierkegaard overstates, the range of situations where it is morally or practically impossible to discuss what must be done publicly (294). Fremstedal does not consider Two Ages, where Kierkegaard denies that the newspaper-reading public is a realm of argument and reason giving, and further undermines his place in any proper genealogy of contemporary discourse ethics and deliberative democracy.
By showing the resemblance of Kierkegaard's arguments to Kantian practical anthropology, Fremstedal defends the coherence of Kierkegaard's settled ethico-religious position. However, his selective procedure overlooks Kierkegaard's themes that resist reconciliation with Kant, that seem less relevant to modern secular discourse, and that are less defensible to professional philosophers. I have suggested that these include Kierkegaard's account of what philosophy is, of the experience of religious conversion, and of the practical limitations of moral discourse.
