The “sympathetic relation”

In the second paragraph of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith asserts that we can only understand how others feel by “conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” (TMS I.i.1.2). This describes projective sympathy: the imaginative act of placing ourselves in another’s position, adopting their perspective to grasp their experience and feelings.Footnote ⁴ This “feeling-with” is what Smith calls sympathy and what allows us to relate to each other.Footnote ⁵ It marks the first stage in the sympathetic process that leads to moral judgment and underlies all forms of interpersonal relation. This initial step highlights both our capacity and our desire to reach beyond ourselves—to access others’ viewpoints through imaginative projection. We are capable of this due to our psychological faculties, and we are motivated by a recognition of our epistemic limits: others may perceive or understand aspects of reality that we cannot.

Smithian sympathy is also mutual. When a spectator enters into an agent’s situation, he evaluates the agent’s feelings by comparing them to what he himself would feel under similar circumstances. If the spectator disapproves of him, the agent attempts to adopt the spectator’s viewpoint to understand the basis of this rejection. Through this reciprocal process, both parties adjust their emotions to reach alignment. This emotional concord—“mutual sympathy”—is what Smith identifies with the feeling of approval (TMS I.i.3.9). It is inherently pleasurable because it reassures us of our emotional belonging within the broader human community.Footnote ⁶ This desire to belong, alongside the epistemic drive to access information beyond our perspective, reveals the deeply interdependent nature of human beings.

An individual’s perspective is naturally limited and can only be refined through engagement with others in a sympathetic process that enables the comparison of viewpoints and fosters epistemic collaboration, ultimately yielding a more comprehensive perspective. In the moral sphere, the impartial spectator fulfills this role by offering an increasingly less partial view of reality.Footnote ⁷ By promoting perspective-taking, sympathy helps counteract self-deception and sharpens moral judgment, thereby strengthening the epistemic position of all participants.

For this process to succeed, however, it must be grounded in mutual recognition of equal epistemic and moral authority. Only when each perspective is given equal consideration can the resulting shared view be genuinely valid. Participants must therefore engage as epistemic and moral equals. Following Stephen Darwall, I refer to these dynamics as “second-person relationships”Footnote ⁸—the kind of reciprocal engagement that, I argue, forms the basis of social interaction and underpins Smith’s moral philosophy.Footnote ⁹ These relationships arise when individuals recognize one another as intentional agents engaged in reciprocal interaction. Specifically, A stands in a second-person relation to B when A regards B as someone who can be addressed, and who can, in turn, address A on similar terms.Footnote ¹⁰ Such interaction requires a share standing: the mutual capacity to make claims, set expectations, and hold each other accountable.Footnote ¹¹

This standing also presupposes emotional openness and mutual access to one another’s feelings—conditions made possible through projective sympathy.Footnote ¹² Only through sympathy can we grasp how the other regards us, interpret their reactions to our attitudes, and enter a space of mutual accountability. For instance, one person’s guilt corresponds to another’s resentment or blame not merely as reciprocal attitudes, but as an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the other’s moral demand.Footnote ¹³ In second-person relationships, then, individuals feel entitled to make claims and, importantly, accept the other’s authority to do the same. This reciprocal recognition involves becoming vulnerable to the other’s feelings, which is what happens in Smith: to sympathize is to embrace this mutual accountability—to grant each other a status grounded in respect, reciprocal authority, and shared obligation.Footnote ¹⁴ Thus, sympathetic or second-person relationships necessarily involve mutual recognition as moral and epistemic equals.

Unintended consequences of sympathy

According to Smith, the virtue of justice arises from sympathetic interaction. Though naturally inclined toward self-preference, we learn to view ourselves through the eyes of others, recognizing that we are “but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it” (TMS II.ii.2.1). Acknowledging that others do not share our self-love, we adjust our behavior, treating others as equals and resenting those who deny this equality, whether toward ourselves or others. Justice, for Smith, thus stems from resentment moderated by the impartial spectator and functions to protect persons, property, and promises (TMS II.ii.2.2).Footnote ¹⁵ Rooted in sympathy, justice preserves peace and subsistence by securing individual rights and liberty.Footnote ¹⁶

Another virtue directly elicited by sympathy is self-command. In early life, parental judgments—biased in our favor—shape our sense of morality. Genuine moral development, however, begins in broader social contexts, where peer disapproval introduces us to more impartial assessments. That moment marks a turning point in the formation of conscience and moral life (TMS III.3.22) and is due to the process of sympathy enabling us to understand such disapproval, prompting us to moderate our feelings to make them socially acceptable. Sympathy, for Smith, breaks self-absorption by revealing the plurality of perspectives and interests. It fosters self-distancing and objectivity, enabling us to regulate emotions in line with social norms. This forms the foundation of what Smith calls the “great school of self-command” (TMS III.3.22), a lifelong moral education occurring through our interactions with friends, strangers, business partners, and political counterparts. Because all interaction involves sympathy, every relationship becomes an opportunity to cultivate self-command: “that command of the passions which subjects all the movements of our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct require” (TMS I.i.5.1). From this process, mutual respect and a sense of personal dignity emerge.

Smith’s emphasis on sympathy reflects his broader view of human beings as inherently social. We come to know ourselves through the gaze of others,Footnote ¹⁷ becoming spectators of our conduct and developing a sense of identity and self-respect. Sympathy also reveals our dependence on others and our recognition of their worth. It affirms social interdependence while sustaining the individuality of each person. For Smith, community and individuality, dependence and autonomy, are not opposites but are mutually reinforcing. As Samuel Fleischacker observes, Smith’s thought is remarkable for combining a socially grounded conception of the self with a profound respect for individual freedom: social embeddedness and autonomous moral agency are not only compatible, they are also interdependent.Footnote ¹⁸

The exchange relationship

Exchange relations in the Wealth of Nations are grounded on the same second-person, sympathetic relationship that The Theory of Moral Sentiments identifies as the basis for moral judgments. However, important differences exist. As Smith explains, we evaluate the propriety of another’s feelings in two contexts: first, when the object of emotion is unrelated to ourselves or the person being judged; and second, when it directly affects one or both (TMS I.i.4.1). The latter is the domain of moral judgment, where agent and spectator exchange perspectives in search of mutual sympathy, the alignment of sentiments that, in the moral domain, equates to approval. Ralph Lingdren calls such judgments those of “practical consequence” or “vital concern,” distinguishing them from matters of taste or speculation.Footnote ²³

Smith describes the latter as dealing with “matters of great indifference,” where disagreement does not imply disapproval. As he writes, “[t]hough your judgments in matters of speculation, though your sentiments in matters of taste, are quite opposite to mine, I can easily overlook this opposition” (TMS I.i.4.5). In such cases, opinions are exchanged without expectation of agreement or risk of offense. This is what happens in free exchange, where the absence of a deal incurs no grievance.Footnote ²⁴ Yet free exchange also entails mutual accountability: parties must be free to accept or reject terms, affirming consent and resisting coercion.Footnote ²⁵ A transaction is valid only if both retain the right to say no, what James Otteson calls the “opt-out option.”Footnote ²⁶ Unlike sympathetic relationships that aim at moral judgment, in this sympathetic relation it is equally legitimate to accept or to decline. This is the form of economic relationship Smith defends in the Wealth of Nations, both for its efficiency and its moral value.Footnote ²⁷ It is efficient because it promotes prosperity, even among the least advantaged.Footnote ²⁸ It is moral because it fosters mutual respect and a sense of personal dignity.Footnote ²⁹

This dual superiority, I argue, stems from free exchange being rooted in the same sympathetic structure that underlies moral judgment, inheriting both its epistemic and moral strengths. The conditions for entering into free exchange mirror those of the sympathetic relationship: second-person competence, equal standing, and self-command. Second-person competence involves mutual openness and the capacity for projective sympathy, elements which enable agents to “address” each other.Footnote ³⁰ This cognitive ability, rather than mere self-interest, is what makes free exchange possible. Animals also pursue benefit, but humans are distinct in that they “know what is in one another’s interests and can therefore pursue their interests together—can address [themselves] … to the self-love of [the other].”Footnote ³¹ Through projective sympathy, we become aware of others’ needs and feelings and grasp the advantages of cooperation.Footnote ³² This second-person relationship also entails mutual accountability, grounded in reciprocal recognition and respect. As Smith explains, “[i]n the race for wealth … he may run as hard as he can … in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end.” The violation of fair play is intolerable because, in the eyes of the spectators, the competitors are equals: “they do not enter into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other” (TMS II.ii.2.1, emphasis added).

Effectiveness of free exchange relations

In sympathetic relationships, mutual openness allows agents to adjust attitudes through shared signals. In the case of free exchange, the market functions as a signaling system where individuals communicate intentions and interests to determine prices. For the system to work effectively, agents must be “(a) rationally pursuing some interest… and (b) mutually disinterested—uninterested in the projects of the people with whom they are exchanging.”Footnote ³³ Exchange yields optimal outcomes only when driven by self-interest; introducing other motives distorts the process.

The requirement of “self-interest” aligns with the structure of sympathetic interaction, in which each perspective is treated as equally valid. In sympathetic processes, participants begin from different standpoints but work toward a mutually acceptable viewpoint.Footnote ³⁴ If one perspective is imposed on the other or given undue weight, the outcome would fail the test of the impartial spectator. Success depends on each party affirming her partial view, with all entering the interaction as equals. The same principle applies in the market: if exchange were driven by affection, compassion, or coercion—thus creating inequality—prices would be distorted.

Genuine competition, where agents rationally pursue self-interest within the bounds of fair play, ensures that diverse perspectives generate optimal outcomes. This contrast of information drives efficiency. “[S]elf-interest normally motivates attention to detail,” allowing each agent to judge, “in his local situation, … much better than any [other] can do for him.”Footnote ³⁵ Moreover, when all participants enter exchanges freely, transactions occur only when everybody gains. Thus, free exchange becomes a positive-sum game, benefiting all parties.Footnote ³⁶ As a result, self-interest not only supplies the market with the richest informational input, but also ensures that transactions occur only when mutually advantageous.

Moral advantage of free exchange relations

Smith describes free exchange relations as “fair and deliberate” (WN I.ii.2). “Deliberate” implies that both parties enter the exchange voluntarily and retain the freedom to withdraw.Footnote ³⁷ Because each agent acts in their own interest, the transaction requires persuasion, that is, convincing the other to engage. Persuasion, for Smith, is linguistic and rational: it appeals not to personal feelings but to the other’s interests. Unlike animals, which depend on submissive behavior to obtain what they need, humans persuade through speech. Thus, Smith writes, “the propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another, … [seems to be] the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech” (WN I.ii.1–2).Footnote ³⁸ In Lectures on Jurisprudence, he adds that this disposition to trade is rooted in “the naturall inclination every one has to persuade” (LJA vi.56).Footnote ³⁹

To persuade the other to exchange, I must present my proposal in terms of what benefits the other. This means appealing to “[her] regard to [her] own interest” or to “address ourselves to [her] self-love,”Footnote ⁴⁰ because individuals are fundamentally motivated by their own interest.Footnote ⁴¹ As Smith famously states, “[w]e address ourselves not to their humanity”—not to good will or compassion—but to self-interest (WN I.ii.2, emphasis added). This idea echoes The Theory of Moral Sentiments, where he argues that “it is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence … that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love,” but rather “a stronger love, a more powerful affection … the love of … dignity, and superiority of our own characters” (TMS III.iii.5). In both cases, Smith notes that feelings of humanity and benevolence, though present, are not sufficient for proper behavior. Moral conduct, just as market persuasion, arises from the interaction of dignified, independent agents.

Hence, “deliberate exchange” presupposes both freedom and a degree of equality. To persuade by appealing to others’ self-love, we must address them as peers: “We stand in front of who gives our dinner with equal dignity and pride.”Footnote ⁴² Such exchange expresses mutual independence and “respectability,” which refers to “a recognition of ourselves as entitled to have our interests taken into account in others’ decision-making.”Footnote ⁴³ In other words, this expresses the recognition of our mutual authority and equal standing as free and dignified beings.Footnote ⁴⁴

Smith also calls exchange “fair,” meaning that any spectator can go along with it. Fairness, here, implies that this relationship is grounded in a sympathetic process.Footnote ⁴⁵ In market dealings, I moderate my self-love to sympathize with the seller and obtain the information required to persuade him. The seller does likewise, resulting in a mutually satisfying deal: an agreement that reflects neither party’s initial stance, but one shaped through interaction between two free, equal, and mutually respectful agents.

Sympathetic effects in the market

Building on the previous discussion of how free exchange is rooted in sympathetic relationships, we can now consider how these relationships shape not only the structure of the market, but also the character of its participants. If the market functions as a network of second-person interactions—where agents recognize each other’s authority and negotiate on equal footing—then the moral effects of sympathy should be visible within this system.

One such effect is the cultivation of self-command, a virtue developed through repeated market interactions. By moderating the expression of our needs and attending to those of others, we learn to regulate our emotions. Thus, the discipline imposed by the marketplace—“the ordinary commerce of the world” or “the bustle and business of the world” (TMS III.iii.7, III.iii.25)—provides the conditions for developing this virtue.Footnote ⁵³ The market becomes a school of virtue not in spite of its self-interested structure, but because self-interest must be communicated respectfully and persuasively.

In addition, commercial society also fosters other virtues, particularly among the middle and lower classes, where the pursuit of virtue often aligns with the pursuit of economic success.Footnote ⁵⁴ Market relations involve the mutual recognition of freedom and equality, creating fertile ground for the exercise of character and responsibility.

Most importantly, commerce makes independence widely accessible, even to the poorest.Footnote ⁵⁵ “The market nexus,” explains Elizabeth Anderson, “makes individuals respectable in the eyes of those with whom they transact, as people who must be persuaded rather than ordered to serve others.”Footnote ⁵⁶ This transformation of social standing is, for Smith, the central moral achievement of commerce: it fosters dignity and legitimizes the demand for equal respect. In contrast, dependence corrupts, enervates, and debases the mind.Footnote ⁵⁷ Servile labor renders people “idle, dissolute, and poor,” and tends to “corrupt the industry” of others (WN II.iii.12). For Smith, then, a system that promotes independence and self-direction is “not just one advantage of commerce but its most important advantage: the main reason for preferring it to other economic systems.”Footnote ⁵⁸

Paradoxically, commerce fosters independence by vastly expanding our interdependence. In earlier times, great lords sustained multitudes of servants and courtiers under their direct control. In contrast, in commercial societies, “each tradesman has a thousand customers. He is obliged to all, but not dependent on any of them.”Footnote ⁵⁹ Independence and equality thus emerge from a web of mutual dependencies, where all become “mutually the servants of one another” (WN III.1.4). These ties are not hierarchical but reciprocal, structured by sympathy, mutual authority, and accountability. In this way, “commerce is an equalizer, as it gives equal dignity to all,”Footnote ⁶⁰ reinforcing both social cohesion and individual freedom.Footnote ⁶¹

Revolution of public happiness

However, because sympathy cannot flourish amid extreme deprivation, both moral and economic independence require individuals to have a degree of control over their material conditions. In this light, wealth becomes a necessary means to happiness. As Smith famously states, “[n]o society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable” (WN I.viii.36). For him, the economic system best suited to secure widespread prosperity, ensuring that everyone has the means to live, is the free market.

Importantly, subsistence in this context refers not only to the basic necessities of life, but also the social conveniences that allow individuals to live well and with dignity within their communities.Footnote ⁶² As Ryan Hanley observes, Smith’s primary motivation for investigating the cause of the wealth of nations is commerce’s potential to provide for the poor.Footnote ⁶³ A well-governed society, Smith writes, brings about “that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people” (WN I.i.10). Commerce, he argues, delivers “the two greatest blessings men can possess”: “[O]pulence and freedom” (LJA iii.111). Opulence ensures broad access to material goods, while freedom empowers individuals to become self-directed agents, that is, independent traders capable of shaping their own lives. When justice is maintained, commerce creates a virtuous cycle: the more individuals engage in mutually beneficial transactions, the more general prosperity increases.

Moreover, because the size of the market depends on the extent of exchange relationships (WN I.iii.1)—which are themselves rooted in sympathetic relations—an increase in sympathetic relations expands both the market and the conditions necessary for widespread well-being.Footnote ⁶⁴ In this way, economic growth and moral development reinforce one another, grounded in the very structure of sympathetic engagement.

The system of (second-order) natural liberty

In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith criticizes the presumptuous “man of system” who imagines he can arrange society like pieces on a chessboard, ignoring that “in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon it” (TMS VI.ii.2.17). This figure sees himself as epistemically and morally superior, which is a double error that impairs genuine sympathy, sustains self-deception, and fosters social disorder. A similar issue arises in economics: the government best suited to promote prosperity is one that refrains from interfering with individuals’ choices, allowing their own “principles of motion” to guide their actions.

This is the essence of Smith’s “obvious and simple system of natural liberty”: a spontaneous, self-regulating order emerging from individuals acting on their natural inclinations. In sympathetic relationships, “the judgment of ordinary people, as regards their own affairs, is far better than politicians and political theorists generally assume, and far more likely to be sensitive to the details of their local situations than decisions made on their behalf by a legislator or government bureaucrat.”Footnote ⁶⁷ Their interactions produce signals—particularly through prices—that help coordinate behavior for mutual benefit. As participants increase, so does the flow of information, distributed through sympathetic processes that help each person make better decisions.

However, while natural, this system is not unmediated. Smith’s vision is not one of laissez-faire, but of institutionally mediated liberty. Institutions are essential to ensure that sympathy operates fairly, market participants are treated equally, and abuses are corrected.

To secure freedom, sympathetic relationships must observe justice (TMS II.ii.2.1). While resentment may arise spontaneously in face-to-face interactions, large societies require formal laws to enforce justice and equality. “The rules forbidding harm to anyone,” says Fleischacker, “are rules that implicitly represent everyone as equal: equally worthy of the respect, at least, that forbids us from harming them.”Footnote ⁶⁸ By safeguarding individual freedom and rights, justice provides the foundation for sympathetic processes to flourish. It establishes a framework of security and order within which the desire to improve one’s condition, and other passions, can interact productively to generate the greatest collective benefits.

Pro-sympathy or liberal policies

Effective public policies are those that promote growth,Footnote ⁶⁹ which in turn depends on the size of the market—that is, the extent of trade relations rooted in a network of sympathetic relationships. Thus, policies that stimulate growth align with those that encourage social interaction and enable the exercise of sympathy. This is confirmed by examining Smith’s policy recommendations. Some are mandatory because they set the basic structure for fair and efficient exchanges. Others depend on national circumstances. In both cases, I argue, the goal is to support and sustain sympathetic relations.

Mandatory policies form the foundational structure of the system of second-order natural liberty, which, as Smith asserts, arises when “all systems either of preference or of restraint [are] completely taken away.” This system upholds justice, which implies the equal status of all market participants, with no privileges and no authority to treat others as inferior. Accordingly, these policies prohibit coercive practices such as forced labor (slavery, serfdom, or feudal tenancy); forced recruitment or placement through apprenticeships, corporations, or quotas (WN I.x.c.11–14)Footnote ⁷⁰; and constraints on the movement of people or capital (WN I.x.c.34).Footnote ⁷¹ To ensure fairness in exchange, Smith also opposes selective subsidies, protective tariffs, sumptuary laws, income ceilings,Footnote ⁷² price controls, and monopolies. He advocates open ports and free foreign trade (WN IV.iii.c.14–15).Footnote ⁷³ The purpose of these policies is to uphold equality among agents and foster the economic and sympathetic relationships that drive market growth and shared prosperity.Footnote ⁷⁴

Beyond essential policies, Smith advocates context-dependent measures aimed at prevention, national defense, and the relief of the poor. Preventive actions include, for instance, a “public stamp” to guarantee the quality of money and prevent fraud as well as standards regulating the size and quality of linen and woolen cloth (WN I.iv.7). Regarding defense, Smith supports import tariffs when necessary to protect industries vital to national security, arguing that defense “is of much more importance than opulence” (WN IV.ii.24–30). He also endorses temporary export bans on grain during famines and restrictions on small-denomination banknotes to prevent destabilizing bank runs (WN IV.v.b.39, II.ii.94). Although these measures may appear to violate natural liberty, Smith contends they are justified when the liberty of a few endangers that of society as a whole. Nevertheless, such interventions are not true violations of natural liberty. Smith acknowledges that for markets to function freely, certain conditions must be met, such as protections against fraud, guarantees of quality, and, most importantly, the subsistence of society. Therefore, policies that secure the existence of society override all other considerations; without society, there is no wealth, no freedom, and no possibility of happiness.Footnote ⁷⁵

A third category of context-dependent policies that is central to the Wealth of Nations concerns support for the working poor: “There is now a broad agreement among Smith scholars that he regarded poverty as deeply problematic and sought ways to combat it.”Footnote ⁷⁶ Smith insists that no society can be happy when the majority live in misery, and he affirms that “[i]t is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged” (WN I.viii.36). Accordingly, he advocates laws and institutions that protect and uplift the most disadvantaged. His proposals include progressive taxation—or at least a progressive bias in tax policyFootnote ⁷⁷—and the promotion of high and rising wages (WN I.viii.44). Aware of the power imbalances that undermine free bargaining, Smith consistently prioritizes empowering the poor to strengthen their independence. As he notes, “[w]hen the regulation… is in favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable” (WN I.x.c.61).Footnote ⁷⁸

Adam Smith is concerned not only with absolute poverty, but also—though less explicitly—with what Dennis Rasmussen calls “relative poverty,” or extreme economic inequality. Such inequality distorts sympathy and undermines public morality and happiness.Footnote ⁷⁹ As Smith observes, “because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, … we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty” (TMS I.iii.2.1). This natural disposition, while fueling economic growth and supporting social order, also corrupts moral sentiments, for it leads us “to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition” (TMS I.iii.3.1).

Because “the chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved” (TMS I.ii.5.1), the poor suffer not only material deprivation, but also the social shame and invisibility that often accompany poverty. This creates a paradox in which the very inequality that emerges as a by-product of commercial prosperity ultimately distorts or inhibits sympathy.Footnote ⁸⁰ As Smith notes, “[o]pulence and freedom, the two greatest blessings men can possess, tend greatly to the misery of this body of men [the underprivileged]” (LJA iii.111).Footnote ⁸¹ If this were the full picture, the system of natural liberty would be self-undermining. Markets depend on networks of sympathetic relationships, yet if rising wealth deepens inequality and thereby erodes sympathy, the very success of the market threatens its own foundation: the system of second-person sympathetic relationships that sustains it.Footnote ⁸²

Although Smith does not address this issue directly, his theory offers valuable insight to deal with it. It is not inequality per se, but extreme inequality that distorts sympathy,Footnote ⁸³ because sympathetic relations rely on mutual recognition of dignity and respectability. When the social gap is too wide and sympathetic admiration and approval concentrates exclusively on the wealthy, the poor feel invisible and too ashamed of their condition to meet others as equals.Footnote ⁸⁴ Moreover, our “tyranic disposition” (LJB 134) and strong “love to domineer” (WN III.ii.10) explain why the better-off do not spontaneously extend sympathy downward. This is why the system of second-order natural liberty is concerned not only with meeting “the three great wants of mankind” (“food, cloathing and lodging”) (LJA vi.24; WN I.xi.c.2), but also with ensuring access to the goods necessary for social respect.Footnote ⁸⁵ Sympathetic engagement arises only among individuals who regard one another as equals; thus, people must feel equally worthy of respect and capable of claiming their rights in order to establish these relationships. This does not require material equality, but rather equality in independence. In an exchange, if one party is desperate and must accept unfavorable terms or feels inferior and submits out of obedience or fear, the resulting relationship is neither free nor mutually beneficial.Footnote ⁸⁶ By contrast, when both possess material and moral independence, differences in wealth do not compromise their equal standing; the less affluent party still expects respect and fair treatment.

Finally, Rasmussen highlights another condition that may counteract sympathy distortion. In Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith argues that inequality can be beneficial if “the distribution of fortunes descends fairly steadily and evenly, from the very wealthy to the very poor.”Footnote ⁸⁷ In such contexts, identification across social classes remains possible, even indirectly: my friend’s friend has some connection to me even if I do not know him. When such relational proximity exists, sympathy and mutual respect can persist. Therefore, beyond eliminating absolute poverty and guaranteeing the means to live without shame, public policy may legitimately promote a more even distribution of wealth, within the bounds of justice.