Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats is an extraordinary book. Impressively researched, insightful, and lucidly written, Steffen Hertog has laid bare the complexity of the Saudi state, including its history, the ways the state functions, the impact of oil wealth on its institutions, and the behavior of its bureaucrats. The achievement is all the more remarkable considering how difficult it is and has long been for scholars to gain access to research materials and people in the kingdom. It is no exaggeration to write that Hertog's book is the finest book ever written on politics and the state in Saudi Arabia, an unparalleled achievement. The book calls into question some of the core tenets of rentier theory, the framework through which oil states have typically been understood, and suggests compelling new ways to think about structures of power, rent seeking, and efficiency in oil-producing countries.
The Saudi kingdom's ruling family, Al Saʿud, hold considerable political power. Leading members of the family control most of the main levers of decision making, including key ministries and institutions. More important, they have direct access to the massive oil revenues that flow into the country's coffers and benefit disproportionately from the wealth and power bestowed by oil. Over the course of the late 20th century, the Al Saʿud used wealth generated by oil to construct an elaborate centralized state characterized by sprawling institutions and a bloated bureaucracy. The family's senior princes have treated the state's ministries as personal fiefdoms, with leaders assuming direct personalized control over government institutions. In the process of constructing a political leviathan, the regime's rulers have exercised power over society by redistributing their oil wealth in exchange for political quiescence. In effect, they provided citizens and subjects with jobs and welfare rather than political power. The bloated bureaucracy has often been inefficient, unprofessional, and corrupt. Citizens seek access to the state in order to win a share of the “rents” (revenue) generated from oil. The Saudi case therefore appears to correspond to basic claims of rentier theory that governments redistribute wealth rather than provide opportunities for political participation. Yet Hertog demonstrates that not all of the Saudi system conforms to the model.
Hertog's work reveals a number of wrinkles in the conventional wisdom on Saudi Arabia and the politics of oil states. Inefficiency and corruption exist in Saudi Arabia but so too do efficiency and professionalism. Where rentier theory predicts uniform patterns of government behavior, particularly in regard to corruption and paralyzing rent seeking, Hertog finds diverse patterns of behavior. As he points out, Saudi Arabia has experienced a wide range of regulatory and political performance over time, from the existence of patronage networks that inhibit efficiency to “lean and well managed ‘islands of efficiency’“ (p. 5). Although corruption is present, its existence alone does little to tell us about unsatisfactory policy results. Hertog documents and examines these diverse outcomes in considerable empirical detail through several rich case studies. Beginning in the 1990s, Saudi Arabia's leaders sought to push through a series of regulatory reforms that would allow for increased foreign investment, entry into the World Trade Organization, and a start to weaning the country off its dependence on foreign labor. Each of the reforms met with mostly, albeit not entirely, unsatisfactory results. The failure of the kingdom's leaders to successfully usher in systematic regulatory and bureaucratic reform revealed the limits of their power and the inertia of a political order that was vertically fragmented and disconnected.
Hertog also shows that ways in which the Saudi state took shape from the 1950s through the 1970s best explain diverse political outcomes. The oil boom of the 1970s was instrumental in shoring up the clientelist and fragmented nature of the state, but the period of the boom was not the genesis of the modern Saudi state. The disjointed nature of the kingdom's political system began to take shape as early as the 1950s and crystallized under the leadership of Faisal in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Overlapping centers of power emerged early on, laying the foundation for bureaucratic and institutional inertia as well as creating the conditions for administrative excellence in places such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency in the 1950s and the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation in the 1970s. Most important, where earlier studies of the kingdom point to the oil boom as a period of political transformation, Hertog points to it as the moment in which existing relationships and patterns were cemented. In essence, the nature of the Saudi state was sealed during the boom rather than being transformed by it.
Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats is overwhelmingly convincing in attributing the failures and successes of the Saudi state to its fragmented structure. Like all good books, it raises important questions for future research. Hertog's institutional focus does the hard work of establishing a baseline for thinking about the structure of the Saudi state. The result is the clearest and best documented work yet on the nuts and bolts of the Saudi government as well as its complicated bureaucracy and distribution of power. Missing, however, is any substantive discussion of ideology—the question of whether the state encouraged or promoted a sense of belonging to, or meaning in, the institutions it created. What did it mean to be a bureaucrat or a technocrat in Saudi Arabia? Does ideology matter in the world of Saudi statecraft and politics? Finding meaning in institutions was not and perhaps should not have been one of Hertog's objectives, but it is precisely the impressive nature of his accomplishment that makes it possible to think of new ways of extending the analysis.
