Joseph Sassoon has written the most authoritative textbook on the institutional history of the Baʿth Party in Iraq. His complex historical analysis focuses less on Saddam Husayn's biography and more on the party's networks of domination and hegemony. The important works of Charles Tripp, Eric Davis, and Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett suggested a variety of parameters, such as hegemony, patronage, memory, and capital, by which the history of Baʿthist Iraq could be analyzed. However, since this is the first account based on the Baʿth archives, which have been relocated to the United States, we can now evaluate previous scholarship in light of the new discoveries presented by Sassoon. Moreover, the book successfully destabilizes three perceptions of the Baʿthist state that appear often in the historiography of modern Iraq: the perception of the Iraqi state as a “republic of fear,” as a radical ideological regime, and as a sectarian state.
Sassoon provides a multifaceted analysis of the historical narrative that has represented Iraq as an unbearable hell for its subjects. He demonstrates that for dissidents (religious and secular, Arab and Kurd), Iraq has indeed been a violent, unlivable space. State repression, moreover, did not decline with the regime's maturity, as violence characterized it to the end. The book documents the show trials, imprisonments, and death sentences, as well as other punishments such as home destruction and eviction, meted out by the state. During the 1990s, Iraq was a very difficult place to survive, not only because of the regime's violence but also because of the horrific sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies after the first Gulf War. Resistance, however, remained possible. Fleeing the country, Sassoon suggests, was one form of resistance. Moreover, many Iraqis sheltered activists and insurgents, in both the south and the north, at great risk to themselves. As in Syria, spreading rumors and jokes about the regime was another form of resistance. Sassoon, however, consciously avoids the sensationalism, gore, and drama typical of many other books and articles on Baʿthist Iraq (Efraim Karsh and Amatzia Baram being notable examples). While his book does not lack shocking and appalling stories, Sassoon's aims, it seems, are far more sophisticated than those of some of his predecessors. Writing after the demise of the Baʿth, he is far less concerned with what “the West” should have done in relation to the Baʿth. Rather, he wants to know how the party and the state functioned.
An economic historian, Sassoon offers a highly convincing explanation as to how to understand the manner in which the party operated. He argues that the Baʿth Party structure was similar to that of a large corporation in how it recruited new members, created new branches, amalgamated branches to increase efficiency, and encouraged competition between branches and members. He understands the organization of the party as a pyramid in which, as in any corporation, every section had to report to its superiors. This structure served the regime well (especially in the 1970s) as it pursued objectives such as Arabizing northern Iraq, suppressing support for Iran, and making sure that the state, and the party, maintained a financially sound basis. Within this structure, cooperation with the regime, docility, and compliance all came with rewards. Furthermore, Sassoon proposes that for the vast majority of Iraqis who were not direct victims of oppression, daily life was generally more normal than the image we have of existence under authoritarian systems. Detailing the Baʿthist reward system, which endowed the party's supporters with advantages in domains ranging from acquisition of land to higher education, promotion in the workplace, and a variety of financial benefits, Sassoon explains why the Baʿth was able to attract large numbers of supporters, even after 1991. In this regard, the book profits from occasional yet useful comparisons between the regime and other authoritarian states, thus effectively destabilizing historiographical narratives about Iraqi exceptionalism. Sassoon, moreover, refuses to look at the Baʿth as a monolith; a party that had ruled Iraq since 1968, the Baʿth responded to changing historical circumstances in which the state's ability to use the country's resources generated different relationships to Iraq's subjects. These relationships are meticulously studied in the work, especially in its in-depth analysis of the different intelligence and security services used by the state to gather information about its subjects and ensure their loyalty, by studying the various forms, reports, recruitment documents, and accounts produced by the party and its variety of security agencies.
The second contribution of the book is its attempt to tackle the question of whether Iraq was a radical, ideological, Pan-Arabist state. Sassoon concludes that the regime's ideology was extremely flexible. Indeed, his analysis of party documents makes the reader question whether ideological considerations played any part in the leadership's decision making in many key moments in Iraqi history. The text emphasizes other factors, such as clashes of personalities, careerist ambitions, and practical issues of governance, as the primary motivations behind decision making at the upper echelons of the Baʿth leadership. Sassoon demonstrates how Saddam Husayn himself altered his positions on tribalism, women's rights, and religiosity, according to changing historical and social circumstances. The Iraqi leader certainly had priorities and agendas, but survival was the first, most important, goal, and the president's shrewdness and ability to outmaneuver his opponents and supporters and keep them in a state of disarray (even in the case of his sons) sustained the system. Very relevant to American foreign policies, Sassoon confirms that the regime did not always view the United States as a threat; on the contrary, it was seen by Saddam Husayn during the 1980s as a natural ally in the battle against Iran. Similarly, Sassoon proposes that the party's ambition to attain economic independence meant that the commitment to socialism was often halfhearted, and that the state engaged in processes of privatization in the later decades of Baʿth control.
The book is also a valuable addition to the debate about sectarianism by demonstrating that the Baʿth, for most of its existence, did not judge Iraqis by their religion but rather by their support and loyalty to the party and by their secularism. As Sassoon discloses, some higher echelons of the party had Shiʿa serving in them until 2003. State anxieties about religiosity were also directed against Sunnis. Saddam Husayn viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as a source of danger, since he felt they did not consider any state, including Iraq, as Islamic enough; while he did not clash with them, he mistrusted them. Wahhabism was outlawed in the early 1990s, following the 1991 break with the Gulf states, and was declared a deviation from Islam. In 2000, Saddam Husayn even entertained conspiracies linking the Shiʿi Daʿwa party and the Wahhabis. To Sassoon, the persecution of the Shiʿa derived from Saddam Husayn's desire to limit the power of Iran. He argues, in fact, that Saddam Husayn's obsession with Iran and Khomeini went far deeper than his animosity toward the United States or Israel. As a result, the Daʿwa Party was identified as a major threat in the 1980s and was harshly oppressed; the regime forbade certain religious ceremonies and processions during Muharram and supervised other religious rituals and services, particularly in the south. More broadly, the Baʿth Party monitored all religious affairs, including supervising Friday sermons and replacing untrustworthy imams (both Sunni and Shiʿi). As part of the campaign to nationalize religious affairs, the establishment of the Saddam Institute for the Study of the Holy Qurʾan in 1994 allowed its faculty members, all Baʿthists, to train about 1,000 graduates (by the year 2000) and produce the kind of religiosity desired by the regime.
My critical comments have to do with issues the book glosses over. Sassoon could have written about the logic of the archive itself, and what the absence of certain themes in the archive tells us about Iraqi history, and the possibility of resistance to the regime; the materials that are left outside of the archive are as important, in other words, as the materials in it. Moreover, there are different ways to read the archival documents themselves, often against the grain of their authors, in order to reconstruct voices of resistance and write against nationalist mythologies. Likewise, when writing about the cultural policies of the Baʿth, an appreciation of their reception might be useful. Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr's presidency should have gotten more attention, especially since Sassoon treats the 1970s as the years when the Baʿthist reward system functioned particularly well. Finally, the Baʿth archives arrived in the U.S. in a controversial manner, with an occupying power taking possession of Iraqi archives. This move has been defended by scholars involved in archiving the documents, on the grounds that they were saving documents that would otherwise be lost forever. Clearly Sassoon has an opinion on the matter, but he should have expressed it.
Nonetheless, the book is a treasure trove that includes numerous revelations that will inspire very important dissertations, books, and articles on Iraq in the future. A people who endured a decade-long war in the 1980s, followed by a decade of destitution and poverty in the 1990s, and then a decade marked by an occupation and a civil war, Iraq's citizens deserve to have their story told in a complex manner by many historians. Sassoon's work points to the near impossibility of understanding the constraints under which Iraqis lived, or the impacts of the three horrible decades they endured, and yet his book is also a fascinating start to the reconstruction of the lives of the true protagonists of Iraqi history.
