2. Two-level game framework

The two-level game model developed by Robert Putnam (Reference Putnam1988) bridges domestic and international politics, and illustrates the interaction between the political processes at the two levels. A national leader faces international negotiations (Level I) and domestic negotiations (Level II). The simultaneous game takes place at these two levels. The leader tries to reach an agreement with other leaders in foreign countries, while making efforts to get the agreement accepted by the legislature, the local governments, and other domestic political actors.

Putnam's two-level game theory centers on the concept of a ‘win-set’. Both national leaders involved in international negotiations have a range of alternatives that could win the necessary support in the domestic political scene. A two-level game model aims to analyze the international negotiations from the perspective of one country through win-sets, and illustrates the impact of the domestic politics on the success of international negotiations.

The successful international agreement must fall inside the Level II win-sets. Larger win-sets in both countries with an overlapping range make a Level I agreement more likely. Conversely, smaller win-sets with no overlap would cause the international negotiation to break down. On the other hand, a smaller win-set at Level II might give the national leader an advantage in the international negotiation with little room for compromise. While a large win-set would provide more chances to reach an agreement, it also gives opportunities for the counterpart to challenge for better conditions. The interaction between the two levels and the political developments may change the initially determined win-sets of the two countries.

The initial win-sets of Japan and the United States on the Futenma issue can be illustrated by the single linear graph in Figure 1, which represents a simple zero-sum game between J and US. J_M and US_M represent the maximum outcomes for Japan and the United States, respectively. The United States would not mind maintaining the Futenma Air Base as it was as represented by US_M in order to maximize the Marine's capability to react in a contingency. For Japan, especially for the people in Okinawa, due to the risk reality of the potential for accidents, they wanted to avoid that scenario. For Okinawans, the relocation outside the prefecture was the most desired, represented by J_M on the linear graph.

Figure 1.

Win-sets of the United States and Japan

J₁ and US₁ represent the minimal outcomes that could be ratified, as of May 2006 when the two governments reached an agreement. Nago City did once agree on the current Henoko plan. But in January 2007, Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro demanded the relocation place be moved further off the shore in order to reduce noise pollution and increase the construction business for local companies (illustrated as Henoko2 in Figure 1). Thus the win-set shrank from J₁ to J₂. But the US government maintained its position with the current plan (illustrated as Henoko1). Defense Minister Akio Kyūma secretly visited Okinawa to push for the suggestion from Nago, but US Council General Kevin Maher in Okinawa refused it. (Shimoji, Reference Shimoji2012: 68–71) Thus, the new request from Nago created a gap between the two governments which prevented the base construction from starting.

In February 2009, Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed an agreement to move marines to Guam, breathing new life into the existing plan. Three months later, this agreement was ratified by the Diet, and was akin to a treaty fully backed by Japanese law. The LDP government was about to implement this agreement, but a power shift in the DPJ took place before the implementation.

The analysis in Figure 1 suggests that the two governments could reach an agreement if the United States stretched its win-set to US₂. While Japan's win-set was defined as a result of political negotiations and compromises of various domestic groups, the US win-set could be decided simply by the decision of the US government, especially the military, without the involvement of political actors outside the government. Hatoyama could have sought a compromise of the US government in this direction.

But this was not what Hatoyama did. Hatoyama at the beginning explored the possibility of relocating the Futenma facility outside Okinawa. Soon he realized it was unrealistic. Then, he and his cabinet members looked for alternatives which would be more politically acceptable to the people in Okinawa, illustrated as ‘Dream Plan’ in Figure 1. The DPJ government was hoping that Washington would understand the meaning of the power shift from the LDP to the DPJ, and would show political flexibility to stretch its win-set to US₃ to ratify the DPJ's ‘dream plan’.

3. Hatoyama's misunderstanding

Hatoyama based this hope on misinformation on the American position regarding Futenma Air Base. In early August 2009, before the general election, the DPJ sent two staffers to Washington upon the request of the US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell who wanted to learn about the DPJ's position on various foreign policy issues.Footnote ¹ Most of the questions the American officials asked were on the DPJ's policy toward Afghanistan. The DPJ opposed the LDP government's policy to dispatch SDF vessels for refueling activities in the Indian Ocean which would assist multinational naval vessels to fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, as doing so was not based on the clear request from the United Nations Security Council. The DPJ had expressed their policy not to extend legislation to continue SDF activities in their 2009 manifesto. After the discussion, the two DPJ members of staff were of the impression that US interest in the Futenma base was limited. When they came back to Japan from Washington, they reported to Hatoyama that the US government would compromise on the relocation issue (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 70–5). This led to Hatoyama's disillusioned view that the US would stretch its win-set to accept an alternative to the Henoko plan.

After the general election, the DPJ, without a single majority in the upper house, needed to form a coalition with the Socialist Party and the People's New Party (PNP). The three-party coalition would hold a stable majority in the upper house, and a more than two-thirds majority in the lower house, which would be able to override the upper house's decision. Negotiation over policy among the three parties began on 2 September. On the night of 8 September, Socialist leader Mizuho Fukushima made a phone call to Hatoyama and asked him to include the Okinawa base issue in the three-party agreement (Fukushima, Reference Fukushima2011: 36–7). The following day, the three parties made a policy agreement, which included the same language as in the DPJ's 2009 manifesto, simply mentioning the reexamination of US military bases in Japan (DPJ, 2009). Although the agreement did not explicitly mention Futenma, Fukushima interpreted it as the first step toward the relocation of the Futenma Air Base outside of Okinawa (Fukushima, Reference Fukushima2011: 38). If the DPJ government puts high priority on maintaining the coalition with the Socialists, the coalition government's win-set shrinks to exclude the current plan as well as any relocation plan within the Okinawa prefecture.

On 16 September, the Hatoyama Cabinet was formed. At the press conference held at the kantei, the new foreign minister Katsuya Okada raised the Okinawa base issue as one of the three issues he would tackle within the first hundred days, along with the climate change and assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Seifu Internet Television, 2009). Two days later, Okada met with US Assistant Secretary of State Campbell, who reasserted that the relocation of Futenma must be based on the 2006 agreement. Okada told Campbell that all the four Okinawan lower house members elected in the last general election promised the base would be relocated outside the prefecture, and that the DPJ had been opposed to the previous relocation plan made by the LDP government (MOFA, 2009a). Therefore, he implied that the US government needed to stretch its win-set to accept an alternative plan. Okada maintained his position that the DPJ government would conduct a thorough review and investigate other possibilities to make the final decision.

But during the years of negotiations, many alternate sites for Futenma were proposed. Outside of Okinawa, plans to move to Iwoto, Guam, Hawaii, or Japan Self Defense Force (SDF) bases on the mainland were suggested. However, all of them were rejected as the US military contended the Marine fight operations needed to remain on Okinawa because of its close proximity to amphibious fleets in Sasebo and training areas on Okinawa as well as to potential trouble spots such as North Korea and Taiwan Straits. Moving to two more remote islands in Okinawa, Iejima and Shimojishima, were proposed, but considered too costly and not acceptable to the local community. Consolidating with the Kadena Air Base was considered, but rejected as there would not be enough space for both Marine and Air Force operations.

Therefore, the government officials in Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, who had experienced negotiations with Okinawa and the United States, recognized that the current plan was the only acceptable option to fall in the range of both the US and domestic win-sets (Iokibe et al., Reference Iokibe, Ito and Yakushiji2008: chapter 6; Morimoto, Reference Morimoto2010: chapter 8; Moriya, Reference Moriya2010a: chapter 3). Reflecting such sentiment, the new defense minister Toshimi Kitazawa stated on 17 September that it would be very difficult to ‘materialize the ideal’, such as relocation outside Okinawa or Japan (MOD 2009a). Kitazawa told the author, ‘Unless there is a major change in the international environment, I thought that we should not break the existing agreement with the United States.’Footnote ²

Foreign Minister Okada quickly criticized Kitazawa's statement: the defense minister should not make such a statement without prior consultation with other cabinet members (MOFA, 2009a). But Kitazawa testified, ‘Mr. Okada is a very earnest man. He asked me to give him time to explore many opportunities.’Footnote ³ In the 21 September meeting with Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in New York, Okada told Clinton that ‘the Japanese government would consider concrete measures [for the Futenma relocation] in the days to come, and that he would hope to work in close cooperation with the US’. (MOFA, 2009b). After the meeting, Okada was asked by a Japanese journalist whether it would be possible to choose the current relocation plan after a thorough review. Okada's answer was ‘Of course. It should not take long as [the MOFA] has all the documents [from past negotiations]’ (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 85). Okada kept the Henoko plan within Japan's win-set, and was willing to consider a realistic option.

On the same day, Hatoyama met US President Barack Obama. In the summit meeting, the two leaders did not get into concrete issues surrounding the Futenma relocation (Kantei, 2009a). When Hatoyama was asked by a Japanese journalist in Pittsburg whether he had changed his stance on relocating the Futenma base outside Okinawa, he replied ‘I have no intention to change my basic thinking’. Hatoyama maintained that the US primary interest was on Japan's assistance to Afghanistan, and Washington would stretch its win-set to accept a new military base plan.

Hatoyama also hinted that it could take time to reach a final decision on Futenma by saying that ‘we need to figure out whether we should make the decision by the end of this year’. The year-end deadline had been considered vital for the decision to implement the current relocation plan because the next mayoral election in Nago City would be held in January 2010. Based on Hatoyama's comment, Okinawa's local newspaper, The Ryukyu Shimpo, published an extra digital edition with a large front line, ‘Futenma will be relocated outside the prefecture’ on September 25 (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 2009a).

4. Okinawa's request and American compromise

On the same day, Defense Minister Kitazawa visited Okinawa to meet Governor Hirokazu Nakaima. Nakaima told Kitazawa that relocating Futenma outside Okinawa might be unrealistic, and that it would be beneficial for the Okinawan people to accept the existing plan. Kitazawa took the governor's comment seriously, and promised that he would deliver it to the Hatoyama Cabinet (MOD, 2009b). At a press conference at the end of his Okinawa visit, Kitazawa clearly stated his realistic position by stating that it would be very difficult to choose a new option, and that any new option outside of Okinawa would take many years (MOD, 2009c). Governor Nakaima and Defense Minister Kitazawa showed their support to pursue the existing plan to relocate to Henoko.

Two weeks later, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister Yoshikatsu Nakayama on a television talk show suggested that the prime minister might reach a decision that was potentially in conflict with the DPJ manifesto. When asked about Nakayama's statement, Hatoyama said that ‘I would not deny the possibility for change due to time factors’ (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 97–8). Hatoyama's statement was interpreted as heading toward accepting the existing plan. The following day, Hatoyama explained that the final decision should be made in consideration of three factors: the feeling of the Okinawan people; the Japan–US agreement; and the three coalition party agreement. This further confused the media on which direction the prime minister wanted to go on the Futenma issue. An American government official expressed his confusion to the author, ‘Different officials in Japan give us different opinions. We do not know who is responsible over the Futenma issue.’Footnote ⁴

One week later, Land and Transport Minister Seiji Maehara who was also a cabinet minister in charge of Okinawa Affairs visited Okinawa. Maehara was known as an expert on national security issues, and had been involved in the 1996 Futenma relocation agreement as a representative of Sakigake. In Okinawa, Maehara expressed his doubt about the relocation to Henoko and his willingness to look for another option (Ryukyu Asahi Hoso, Reference Ryukyu2009).

Foreign Minister Okada echoed Maehara's call by suggesting Futenma be integrated into Kadena Air Base. This plan had been proposed by the Japanese government a couple of times in the 1990s, involving the integration of the 36th Marine Air Group into Kadena and the transfer of Marine training to Iejima, a remote island in Okinawa. However, this plan was strongly opposed not only by US forces, but also by the cities surrounding the Kadena base – Okinawa City, Chatan and Kadena – for noise and other environmental reasons.Footnote ⁵ At the 23 October press conference, Okada declared that: ‘The longer it takes, the longer the danger of Futenma remains. Considering that, I think that in fact the relocation outside the prefecture is not an option we can think of.’ Okada admitted that the Kadena integration plan was an option (MOFA, 2009c).

When US Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Tokyo on 21 October, Okada suggested the Kadena option. Gates said that to review it was fine, but emphasized the Henoko plan was the only possibility. Gates met with Defense Minister Kitazawa and Prime Minister Hatoyama. He repeated the same message: ‘The Futenma relocation facility is the lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenma realignment, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without a relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and the return of land in Okinawa.’ At the same time, Gates hinted at some compromise from the US side: ‘With respect to some modest change in the runway of a few tens of meters or whatever, we regard that as a matter between the government of Okinawa and the people of Okinawa and the government here in Tokyo’ (MOD, 2009d).

This statement meant that Washington stretched its win-set to US₂ to accept Okinawa's request to move the runways further offshore. This opened a window of opportunity, as the US government had earlier refused any change to the original agreement. With the flexibility that Secretary Gates showed, the final agreement could have been made by the end of 2009. But Prime Minister Hatoyama did not take this opportunity.

At the 27 October, press conference, Defense Minister Kitazawa presented a new interpretation of the existing Henoko plan: ‘the current agreement between Japan and the US already includes an overseas relocation to Guam, as well as a domestic relocation outside Okinawa to Iwakuni Air Base. The primary step of the plan was indeed the relocation outside Okinawa – to the mainland and abroad – after which it was decided that the remaining functions would be moved to the coast of Henoko’ (MOD, 2009e). Kitazawa, therefore, argued that the current plan would meet Hatoyama's promise of relocating outside the prefecture and the nation, if only in part, and expressed his support for the Henoko plan. Hatoyama, however, flatly denied Kitazawa's interpretation. Hatoyama in his 7 November e-mail stated, ‘As the previous government did not have any doubt about the Japan–US relations based on the dependence on the US, it did not explore new possibilities. But we would like to clearly express our own will on this issue . . . and to explore all the possibilities’ (Kantei, 2009b). Hatoyama still expressed his will to pursue an alternative to the current plan.

5. Dominant domestic political calculation

On 13 November, US President Barack Obama visited Tokyo to meet Hatoyama. Hatoyama and Obama agreed to a high-level Working Group to find a solution to the Futenma relocation issue. Hatoyama told Obama that he understood ‘the need to resolve the issue as soon as possible within the Working Group’, and that he ‘would personally work proactively so that various upcoming discussions would further reinforce and develop the Japan–US alliance’ (Kantei, 2009c). Obama pressured Hatoyama by expressing his desire to resolve this issue ‘expeditiously’ (MOFA, 2009d). Hatoyama revealed in an e-mail exchange between himself and Obama over the Futenma issue: Hatoyama, ‘Please trust me’, Obama, ‘Absolutely, I trust you’ (Kantei, 2009d). During the meeting and in a letter written later in the month, Hatoyama promised to resolve it before year's end. (Pomfret, Reference Pomfret2009; and Bader, Reference Bader2012: 45)

On the following day, however, Hatoyama made statements which would destroy the trust the Americans had for him. During his visit to Singapore to attend the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, Hatoyama told journalists that he had not promised to resolve the Futenma issue by the end of the year. He even said that ‘the president wants to think that the solution would be based on the current plan. But if that is the basis, we did not have to set a Working Group’ (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 128). This statement created doubts among the officials in Washington on whether or not Hatoyama was serious about solving the Futenma issue.

The first meeting of the Working Group was held on 17 November in Tokyo. Attending were Foreign Minister Okada and Defense Minister Kitazawa from Japan, and Ambassador John Roos and Assistant Defense Secretary Wallace Gregson from the United States. They agreed to make a solution at an early stage. Prime Minister Hatoyama expressed that he would respect the decision made by the group (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 2009b). This statement was widely interpreted as Hatoyama's acceptance of the current plan.

On 27 November, Hatoyama met with the governor of Okinawa Hirokazu Nakaima. As Nakaima had publicly stated that he would accept the Henoko plan if the base could be shifted further off the shore, the meeting was interpreted as a step toward an early acceptance on the current plan. The same day, the coalition partners of the DPJ began their discussions. Socialist leader Mizuho Fukushima and PNP leader Shizuka Kamei held a meeting, and agreed to set up a project team on Futenma. After the meeting, Fukushima and Kamei held a press conference to announce that the solution for the Futenma issue would not be made by the end of year. Fukushima contacted DPJ leaders to tell them that her party opposed the early decision.

According to the report of Mainichi Shimbun journalists, a Socialist member lobbied Ozawa to block the early resolution on Futenma in order to avoid a breakup of the coalition. Until this time, Ozawa had kept himself away from the policy-making circle on the Futenma issue as he promoted centralized policy making by the cabinet. But if the issue on the table could jeopardize the coalition government's stability, he could not stay away. Without the support from the Socialist Party, it would be very difficult for the Hatoyama government to pass any legislation in the Diet. With Ozawa's agreement and aiming at keeping the three party coalition government together, his close associate and the leader of the DPJ upper house members, Azuma Koshiishi, requested Defense Minister Kitazawa to postpone the decision for the sake of maintaining the coalition (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 138–9).

Hatoyama now had to make a choice between maintaining the coalition government and good relations with the United States. As Ozawa preferred the former, Hatoyama had to follow him. On 30 November when Governor Nakaima requested Hatoyama to make a prompt decision on the current plan, the prime minister showed hesitation to move forward. On 3 December, Hatoyama told Foreign Minister Okada and Defense Minister Kitazawa that he had given up on reaching a solution by the end of the year, and asked them to continue negotiations with the United States. In addition, Hatoyama asked the two ministers to continue to explore the possibilities of alternative plans to Henoko (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 156).

According to classified data obtained by WikiLeaks, Maehara met with US Ambassador Roos on 9 December, and told him that ‘five DPJ cabinet members (Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, and Maehara) met on the evening of 8 December and agreed that they could not accept moving forward with the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) because of opposition from the DPJ's coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDP)’. However, Maehara expressed, ‘if the US does not agree to any alternative to the existing FRF plan, the DPJ would be prepared to go ahead with the current relocation plan and let the coalition break up if necessary after Golden Week (29 April to 5 May in 2010)’ (Wikileaks, 2009a). According to Maehara, the DPJ just needed time to explore other possibilities before making the final decision as DPJ leaders had publicly stated, but would be willing to take the current plan as the final decision, if allowed this time.

On 17 December, at a dinner to wrap up the UN climate-change summit in Copenhagen, Hatoyama informed US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that he would delay a decision about Futenma until the next year. According to Foreign Vice Minister Mitoji Yabunaka, Hatoyama also confirmed to Clinton that ‘The current Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan would be the fallback if no other alternatives are found’ (Wikileaks, 2009b). After the dinner, Hatoyama told Japanese reporters that he had obtained ‘full understanding’ from Clinton about Tokyo's need to delay the decision in order to explore other possibilities. Upset by Hatoyama's comment, Clinton met with Japanese Ambassador to the US, Ichirō Fujisaki, and reasserted that the US position had not changed. The trust relationship between Hatoyama and the US government officials drew a big question mark.

During 15–18 December, the author was visiting US government offices to discuss on the US–Japan relations. One high official told the author, ‘There are about 50 people in Washington who deal with Japan. Half of them want to pressure hard on Japan on the base issue, and the other half are against American strong pressure.’Footnote ⁶ During this week, an interagency meeting on Japan was held at the White House. Japan handlers in the government confirmed a view that Futenma was just one of many important issues between the two countries, and that Washington would wait until the DPJ government finally agreed to the current plan.

On 25 December 25, Hatoyama publicly announced that the decision on Futenma would be made by the end of May, including examination of new locations. Hatoyama revealed in an interview the reasons for the May 2010 deadline:

Ozawa and Koshiishi, who handled DPJ's diet policy in the upper house, held the same view (Shimizu, Reference Shimizu, Takeshi and Masato2011: 146). The domestic political calculation was dominant to postpone the decision.

6. The impact of Nago mayoral election

Three days later, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano announced that the kantei (or the prime minister's office) would set up the coalition-party committee to examine the Okinawa base issues, headed by himself. The kantei had finally shown interest in the base issue. Through to the end of May, this committee was expected to serve as a forum where the Socialist Party and the PNP members could express their opinions on the Futenma issue. The Futenma issue was now on the shoulders of CCS Hirano.

For the mayoral election of Nago City, the DPJ's headquarters in Okinawa decided to support Susumu Inamine, a candidate who had publicly stated his strong opposition against the current replacement plan to Henoko. DPJ Secretary General Ozawa sent his deputy, Kōji Satō to Okinawa. Satō met with corporate representatives of the local construction companies, and told them not to vote for the incumbent mayor, Shimabukuro, who was seen as a pro-base politician and supported by the LDP (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 169–73). The result of the election on 24 January, 2010 was a victory for the anti-base candidate Inamine. The DPJ as a political party effectively killed the possibility for Nago City to accept the current plan. As a result, it became difficult for the government to keep the Henoko plan within its win-set.

CCS Hirano was surprised by the election result, as the media had predicted victory for Shimabukuro. The loss of the pro-base mayor made it more difficult for the Hatoyama Cabinet to handle the Futenma issue. The following day, at a regular press conference, Hirano stated that there was ‘no need to take the election result into consideration’, in order to maintain the current replacement plan as an option. This statement, however, angered people in Nago. Nago City Council Chair Hiroshi Ashitomi, for example, said ‘It seemed that the Hatoyama administration is sensitive to the US government's moods. If the government continues to ridicule Okinawans, I think the people's rage will burst with unexpected vigor’ (Akahata, 2010).

7. Dream plans

Political leaders of the Hatoyama government explored alternatives to the Henoko plan. Earlier, Foreign Minister Okada had suggested the Kadena integration plan, but had given up on that idea by early December (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 152– 3). Defense Minister Kitazawa tried to revitalize the old plan with a land-based heliport inside Camp Schwab. The PNP policy committee chairman Mikio Shimoji agreed with this plan, and tried to bring it to the three-party committee. But this met with strong objection from the Socialist Party. CCS Hirano came up with a plan to build a man-made island off the White Beach Naval Base. But Hatoyama personally rejected Hirano's plan because it would destroy a beautiful beach (Mainichi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Reference Mainichi Shimbun2010: 178–90 and 208–9). Hatoyama had his own plan.

On 31 March, Hatoyama revealed at a Diet session that he had a ‘plan in mind’. According to Hatoyama, ‘the plan is at least as effective as, and probably more effective than the current plan, which means more acceptable’ when considering a reduced burden to Okinawa and maintaining a deterrence capability.Footnote ⁷ Later, Hatoyama testified his secret plan which was the partial relocation of the Futenma facility to Tokunoshima, Kagoshima prefecture (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 2011).

The Tokunoshima plan was originally suggested by Hatoyama's close associate, Seishū Makino. Tokunoshima is an island 200 km away from the Okinawa main island, and had space for the relocation of the Futenma base. Hatoyama secretly ordered Makino to approach the local leaders of the island. When Makino's visit in late January 2010 was scooped by The Asahi Shimbun, CCS Hirano stated that he had no knowledge about the plan. After the scoop was out, citizens in Tokunoshima began an anti-base campaign.

Hatoyama sought a meeting with President Obama during the nuclear summit in Washington to explain the current situation on the Futenma issue. But no official meeting was set. Instead, Hatoyama had an unofficial meeting during a working dinner on 12 April. At the meeting, when Hatoyama began describing his difficulty over Okinawa, Obama interrupted and said: ‘Let's cut to the chase. You said ‘trust me’ last November, meaning to trust me to work this out. I am trusting you to do so. It hasn't happened yet. It must happen soon’ (Bader, Reference Bader2012: 46). The Washington Post ran an article to portray Hatoyama as ‘the biggest looser’ at the summit. According to the article, Hatoyama had failed to impress Washington with his unreliability on the Futenma issue, and became ‘increasingly loopy’ in the opinion of some Obama administration officials (Kamen, Reference Kamen2010).

On the same day, Tokunoshima citizens held an anti-base meeting to which 15,000 people attended on an island with a population of just 26,000. Two days later, Deputy CCS Kinya Takino made a phone call to the local leaders of Tokunoshima to set up a meeting with CCS Hirano. But with no room for discussion, the leaders refused to meet Hirano. Hatoyama still put a hope in the Tokunoshima plan. On 28 April, he met with former Diet member from the island, Torao Tokuda, who had maintained strong influence, and asked for his cooperation. But Hatoyama could not gain his support (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 2011). The prime minister finally gave up this ‘plan in mind’, and decided to go back to the Henoko plan.

8. Going back to the original plan

On 4 May, Hatoyama visited Okinawa for the first time as prime minister, and met with Governor Nakaima. The prime minister apologized to the governor by saying, ‘It is realistically very difficult to move all [the Futenma facilities] to outside the prefecture. We will have to ask Okinawa to bear the burden’ (Yomiuri Shimbun, Reference Yomiuri2009). Later asked by journalist about the reason for his change, Hatoyama replied that he had not thought the presence of marines in Okinawa would work as a direct deterrent against war when he made the ‘out of the prefecture’ statement. But Hatoyama changed his thinking as he described, ‘As I learned further, I realized the role of the marines within the entire US forces in Okinawa, and the cooperation of all the facilities constituted a deterrent . . . If you say [my thinking] was shallow, you may be right.Footnote ⁸

But the political situation in Okinawa drastically changed. As the anti-base candidate won the mayoral election, Nago City no longer accept the Henoko plan. Respecting the local government's will, Governor Nakaima no longer supported the current plan even with some modification. Japan's win-set thus shrank to J₃ in Figure 2. With the gap between J₃ and US₂, which was the American minimum for ratification, there was now no possibility to reach an agreement.

Figure 2.

Final Win-sets of the United States and Japan

On 10 May, Prime Minister Hatoyama held a cabinet committee meeting with Foreign Minister Okada, Defense Minister Kitazawa, Minister for Okinawa Affairs Maehara, and CCS Hirano to finalize the government proposal for the agreement with the United States. While the committee members decided on Henoko as the replacement sight as in the existing plan, the possibility to build a pile supported pier-type runway would be explored. It also included transferring some training off of Okinawa to Tokunoshima Island, studying US–Japan shared use of bases in order to further lighten the impact on Okinawa, and discussing a ‘green approach’ to the bases. In the final agreement at the foreign and defense ministers (2 plus 2) meeting on 28 May, most of the Japanese proposals were included. Although it did not explicitly mention a pile supported pier type runway, it supported environmentally sensitive construction of the replacement facility which can be ‘completed without significant delay’ (MOFA, 2010).

On the same day, the Hatoyama Cabinet had to approve the joint statement. But Socialist Leader Mizuho Fukushima, as a cabinet minister, refused to sign the document which clearly specified the relocation site as Henoko. She was asked whether she would sign it or resign as a cabinet member, but she refused both (Fukushima, Reference Fukushima2011: 69–76). As a result, Fukushima became the fifth cabinet minister in postwar history to be dismissed. With Fukushima's dismissal, the Socialist Party announced it would leave the coalition government. This time, the Hatoyama Cabinet chose the alliance with the United States over maintaining the coalition with the Socialists.

The breakoff of the Socialist Party created a very difficult political situation for the Hatoyama government. The DPJ, with the PNP now, only had barely more than a majority of seats (122 out of 242) in the upper house, losing a majority in several standing committees. The three-party coalition with a two-third majority in the lower house could override decisions in the upper house even after an election loss in the forthcoming upper house election, which would enable the DPJ administration to run the government. Without the Socialists, the DPJ now had to win big in the July election.

According to Asahi Shimbun polls, however, Hatoyama's approval rate of 71% in September 2009 declined steadily throughout his tenure. In mid-May 2010, after his decision to go back to the current plan on Futenma, it dipped as low as 21%. Of the respondents, 61% believed that Hatoyama's acceptance of the Henoko plan was violating a campaign promise (Asahi Shimbun, Reference Asahi2010). Many DPJ upper house members voiced that they could not run their election campaign under the unpopular prime minister. On 2 June at the DPJ Diet members’ meeting, Hatoyama announced his resignation. He cited breaking a campaign promise to move the Futenma base outside Okinawa as one of the two main reasons for his resignation along with the Socialist's break-up from the coalition.

About the author

Tomohito Shinoda is Professor of International Relations at the International University of Japan, located in Niigata, Japan. He received his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. His research covers Japan's politics and foreign policy, international relations in East Asia and US–Japan relations. His publication includes Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shift (Columbia University Press, 2013); Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach in Foreign and Defense Affairs (University of Washington Press, 2007); and Leading Japan: The Role of the Prime Minister (Praeger, 2000).