This work focuses on the performance of Iranian foreign policy following 9/11 and the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq from the perspective of a neoclassical realist theory of international politics. Its argument is that Iran has faced a relatively favorable strategic environment after 9/11, since the United States has toppled Iran’s two rival regimes to its east and west. However, Thomas Juneau argues that Iran has failed to make use of this opportunity to become a regional hegemonic power, although it has tried hard to do so. He explains Iran’s suboptimal foreign policy performance by analyzing the mistakes committed by its policymakers in their strategic choices. Specifically, he argues there has been a sizable gap between Iran’s ambitions and what it has actually achieved. The central puzzle of Squandered Opportunity is “to explain why, how, and with what consequences Iran’s foreign policy has been suboptimal” (p. 7).
The author accounts for this puzzle in seven main chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 set out the “strategic analysis variant of neoclassical realism”—the main theoretical innovation of the book—and a specification of variables explaining Iranian foreign policy (p. 15). In the following two chapters, Juneau operationalizes the two generic variables in all neoclassical realist analyses: Chapter 3 focuses on the main independent variable, that is, “power;” Chapter 4 presents the intervening variables as the main theoretical novelty of all neoclassical realist work. In this specific case, Iran’s status-seeking behavior in the Middle East and the world, the Islamic regime’s specific identity, and the factional infighting of Iranian politics are the three domestic variables that work as the “transmission belt” between Iran’s power vis-à-vis other actors in world politics and its foreign policy.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present the case study. In Chapter 5, Juneau argues that Iran has been successful in influencing Iraq in terms of maximizing its power, security, and clout, whereas it failed to achieve similar results in the Arab—Israeli conflict (Chapter 6) and with respect to its nuclear program (Chapter 7). He concludes that despite some success, Iran’s foreign policy has generally underperformed and the country continues to suffer from these mistakes. Juneau concludes the book with the bleak prediction that Iran’s power and influence will deteriorate in the near future.
Squandered Opportunity is a rare book that synthesizes advanced theoretical analysis with detailed case study and regional expertise. Its rich theoretical framework has the potential to illuminate a path for scholars who wish to pursue case studies and engage modern-day foreign policy puzzles without giving up on strong theoretical insights. The strategic analysis variant of neoclassical realism is a framework that moves away from the parsimonious world of neorealism to achieve specificity and accuracy in analyzing foreign policy.
First, Juneau dissects the concept of power into smaller parts (such as geography, economy, military, population, economy, alliances, public mood, and regional appeal) to define it more broadly, rather than only considering territory and conquest. Second, he does not shy away from defining a “good amount” of intervening domestic variables. In this sense, he has successfully increased the number of intervening variables with a greater degree of specificity. The result is a very realistic choice of domestic variables specific to the Iranian context, such as high status aspirations, a revolutionary rejectionist identity based on nationalism and Shiism, and the factional political balance that has tilted toward hard-liners and traditional conservatives.
The author also does a good job of defining “foreign policy” in this book by conceptually separating it into four parts: “power, security, and influence-maximization; actual and ideal national interests; foreign policy strategies; and the consequences of sub-optimal behavior” (p. 6). By introducing such a foreign policy definition, he also successfully avoids the debate (and its pitfalls) as to whether states maximize power, security, or influence. He argues that at any given time, a state seeks to maximize all three. The result of these theoretical expansions and contractions is a rich foreign policy framework that speaks directly and successfully to international relations theory. In this sense, the book will appeal to all consumers of the academic market: highly theoretical, foreign policy analysis, area studies, or policy oriented.
On the basis of this theoretical framework, the book questions the casual chain suggested by neoclassical realist theory in which power as the main independent variable is filtered by domestic factors, which leads to foreign policy. The main hypothesis suggests that when faced with weaker structural constraints, states will deviate from optimal outcomes due to the increased effect of domestic politics, which proved malicious in the Iranian case. Therefore, serious consequences arise when actual interests diverge from the ideal or structurally induced interests. These inconsistencies produce five generic scenarios in which capabilities and intentions differ. These are overreach (ambitions outweigh capabilities), understretch (capabilities exceed ambitions), refusal to let go (capabilities and ambitions declining, but the former faster), accelerated retrenchment (capabilities and ambitions are declining, but the latter faster), and “Hail Mary” (when capabilities decline and ambitions suddenly spike) (p. 54). The book successfully shows how Iran’s ambitions exceeded its capabilities in the decade and a half from 2001 to 2014, which resulted in a historical example of “overreach” and negative consequences.
My biggest criticism of the book is its strong conclusion about the underperformance of Iranian foreign policy. I agree with the author that Iran has faced an opportunity to become a stronger actor regionally and globally but has not succeeded due to domestic malaises for the most part. However, it is difficult to call Iran’s foreign policy an apparent example of underperformance. Iran is still secure and has harnessed a significant amount of power despite the difficulties mentioned in the book. Its revisionist regime and allies survived some of the most tumultuous times within, arguably, the most destabilized region in the world. More importantly, its regional relations seem more influential than ever. Especially after the signing of the nuclear deal with Germany and the five permanent UN Security Council Members in 2015, Iranian policymakers have found the long-sought-after room for maneuver domestically and internationally. Iran appears to be one of the most influential actors in the region since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011. It has not only helped the Assad administration to survive, but also gained some success in regional sectarian proxy conflicts in Bahrain and Yemen.
Despite all the difficulties that are brilliantly discussed by Juneau, Iran has shown considerable success with regard to the main objectives of a state as understood by different variants of realism, such as survival, security, power maximization, and influence. I believe this relative success was made possible by one key domestic variable: Iran’s 2,500-year-old state tradition represented by the high quality of its bureaucracy and flexible leadership, which was omitted in Juneau’s analysis. Observing the difficulties in domestic and foreign affairs, the Iranian regime has changed the course of its hard-line foreign policy that resulted in its recent relative success.
Overall, Squandered Opportunity offers an outstanding analysis that will be of great interest to scholars of IR theory, foreign policy analysis, realism, Iran, and the Middle East.
