I. Peace Negotiations and the Efforts to Prevent U.S. Entry into the War, November 1916–April 1917

Undoubtedly, Austria-Hungary was the weaker partner of the so-called Central Powers. Interesting, albeit unsuccessful, debates on the possibility of American-mediated peace negotiations already took place between the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Washington, Constantin Dumba, and Wilson's advisor Colonel Edward M. House in the fall of 1914.Footnote ¹¹ Between 1914 and 1915, the monarchy exhibited a certain willingness to find a modus vivendi with the United States, whose economic and political strength it feared.

Vienna officially accepted the German stance in the dispute over the way the submarine warfare was to be conducted, but behind the scenes, it attempted to curb Berlin's policy. Constantin Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, already tried to prevent an impending conflict between the United States and Germany in May 1915 following the sinking of the Lusitania. Footnote ¹² Dumba's intervention was not successful, however. Berlin rejected the compromise in terms of the submarine warfare because at this point it did not believe that the United States would enter the war.Footnote ¹³

Besides unsuccessful efforts to reduce tensions between the United States and Germany, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy joined Berlin and participated in the efforts to limit the American production of arms. The reason for these activities was the growing warfare material deliveries to the enemy Triple Entente countries. Vienna was actually even more active diplomatically in this matter during the summer of 1915, and it delivered an official protest to Washington in June 1915.Footnote ¹⁴

Austria-Hungary did not necessarily have a more tolerant stance toward the United States than Germany, and it did not unconditionally follow Berlin's position. Its policy thus demonstrated a higher level of independence than American leaders believed, as mentioned above. Although Austria-Hungary was more willing than Germany to compromise regarding submarine warfare, this was not the case when it came to American wartime deliveries to the enemy. Contrary to his German colleague Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, who left command in the hands of his army attaché Captain Franz von Papen, Ambassador Dumba fully participated in the organization of sabotage operations on American warfare industry during the summer of 1915. Dumba mainly counted on support of the strike movement in armory plants, where many immigrants from the monarchy worked. Baron Stephan Burián, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, also supported his plans.Footnote ¹⁵ Because of the communication problems with Vienna, Dumba decided to entrust a part of his correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to allied American news correspondent Francis J. Archibald, who was to deliver the correspondence to Foreign Minister Burián. Dumba did not manage to encrypt certain messages because of time constraints, however. During Archibald's trip to Europe, the documents were confiscated by the British.Footnote ¹⁶ London then used these materials to discredit the Habsburg monarchy in the United States. The publication of the information on the ambassador's subversive actions led to his being recalled and seriously damaged the relations between Austria-Hungary and the United States.Footnote ¹⁷

The position of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in the United States was left empty after Dumba's forced departure, and the Chargé d´affaires Baron Erich Zwiedinek led the diplomatic mission in Washington. He conducted himself much more carefully than his predecessor, and as the Secretary of State Robert Lansing himself appreciated, he significantly limited suspicious activities of Austro-Hungarian diplomatic and consular missions on American soil.Footnote ¹⁸ In spite of this, briefly after starting in his new position, Zwiedinek had to deal with a new serious crisis in the bilateral relations.

It was caused by the sinking of the Italian passenger liner Ancona in the Mediterranean by a German submarine flying the Austro-Hungarian flag on 7 November 1915.Footnote ¹⁹ Nine American citizens lost their lives in the attack on the Ancona. Footnote ²⁰ In a strongly worded protest note dispatched to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 6 December 1915, the United States demanded that the U-boat commander be punished and that the victims and families of those killed be compensated.Footnote ²¹

In the controversy that followed, Vienna decided to take responsibility for the activities of the German U-boat, which it concurrently defended.Footnote ²² This caused quite a paradoxical situation, because while Berlin refused to give the United States affirmation of responsibility for the sinking, it pressured Vienna to mitigate its stance, which was not previously consulted upon with the Germans. Gottlieb von Jagow, the German foreign secretary, was concerned that if Vienna did not do that, diplomatic ties between Austria-Hungary and the United States would be broken.Footnote ²³ Austria-Hungary finally did modify its stance. Vienna then prepared a second note to the Americans in close collaboration with the German Foreign Office. In it, they promised to punish the U-boat's commander and compensate Ancona's passengers and families of those who perished.Footnote ²⁴

Burián's second note was a significant milestone in Austro-Hungarian policy toward the United States. In the end, Vienna took a much more accommodating stance in terms of submarine warfare than Berlin did. Burián probably decided that the risk of confrontation with the United States was bigger than those at Ballhausplatz had realized up to this point, and he continued to accommodate Washington even after the Ancona issue was resolved. He then urged Germans to stop attacking “enemy and neutral civilian steam-liners” while flying the Austro-Hungarian flag.Footnote ²⁵ The conciliatory Austro-Hungarian response thus created the illusion that the Habsburg monarchy was a great power independent of Germany. Paradoxically, it was because of pressure from Berlin that Austria-Hungary took such a stance.Footnote ²⁶

Vienna continued with this policy in 1916 as well. In the well-known controversy surrounding the sinking of the passenger ferry Sussex, Austria-Hungary put a lot of pressure on Berlin to accommodate the requests of the Wilson administration.Footnote ²⁷ The Brusilov offensive and Romania's entry into the war in the summer of 1916 greatly weakened Austria-Hungary's position toward Germany. In the spring of 1916, the Austro-Hungarian command made a serious error by underestimating the Russians and, in spite of Germany's protests, it weakened the Eastern Front because of a planned offensive in South Tirol. The catastrophe on the Eastern Front was prevented by units the Germans pulled back from the Western Front. Thus, the error of the Austro-Hungarian command was one of the causes of the failure of the German offensive near Verdun that was taking place at the same time. The disillusion from the effects of the Brusilov offensive resulted in the Austro-Hungarian command losing its independence.Footnote ²⁸ Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary continued to attempt to influence German policy toward the United States from behind the scenes. News of this, however, penetrated into the American press, which relayed Vienna's concern that the United States would consider breaking all diplomatic ties with the Central Powers for reasons of continued submarine warfare, even in its milder form.Footnote ²⁹

Following the Ancona controversy, Vienna began to seriously consider the consequences of the United States' possible entry into the war. It supported moderate views of its political leaders and rejected attempts of the German navy to intensify the submarine warfare. News that Germany was considering this caused serious concern in Vienna at the end of the summer of 1916. In the fall of 1916, the Viennese Ministry of Foreign Affairs held the belief that such a step would most likely lead to the United States entering the war, which would subsequently lead to defeat for the Central Powers.Footnote ³⁰ It was for this reason that Burián warned the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg of the possible risk and recommended to wait for the results of the U.S. presidential elections in November.

Austria-Hungary was not too concerned with the election results, but was mainly worried that prior to the election, Wilson could not and would not risk his reputation. If the naval warfare was intensified in any way, he would have to declare war on the Central Powers.Footnote ³¹ Contrary to Germany, Vienna did not prefer Wilson's opponent Republican Charles E. Hughes. Chargé d´affaires Zwiedinek did consider Wilson's victory a bigger risk because of his pro-British stance, but at the same time stated that the “only difference between Hughes and Wilson can be taken care of at the barber shop in 5 minutes.”Footnote ³² Concern with the presidential election was well founded, however, because Wilson did not want to give up on the possibility to mediate peace. One could say Lansing was almost unhappy with the president's critical stance toward Great Britain in September because of Britain's encroachment on U.S. rights to the sea. The president apparently did not realize that his criticism of London was pushing him into Germany's arms.Footnote ³³

Even though von Bethmann Hollweg assured Burián that German policy would not change, Vienna continued to be concerned with this dangerous possibility.Footnote ³⁴ In mid October, in spite of the Chancellor's assurances, he took additional steps to prevent the United States from entering the war. He suggested submitting a peace offer to the Entente, together with the Germans; at the same time, he required the publication of “moderate” terms of peace.Footnote ³⁵ Thus, Austria-Hungary certainly did not consider the peace initiative of the Central Powers as an opportunity to justify unrestricted submarine warfare. The Germans refused to publish the peace terms, but Burián succeeded in making the Central Powers agree with the peace initiative toward the Entente in mid November.Footnote ³⁶

Shortly thereafter, Emperor Francis Joseph I died, and his great-nephew Charles succeeded him on the throne. The new emperor was determined to end the war for which he was not responsible as soon as possible.Footnote ³⁷ The American public was notified of this intention as well. Shortly after Charles's ascension to the throne, The New York Times reported that the brothers-in-law of the new emperor, Princes Sixtus and Xavier de Bourbon-Parma, were serving in the Belgian army and actually fighting on the side of Austria-Hungary's enemy.Footnote ³⁸ Later, the newspaper also correctly noted that the emperor wished to end the war “in the earliest possible moment.”Footnote ³⁹ The influential daily thus regarded the developments in Austria-Hungary with sympathy, which may have contributed to the more moderate stance of the administration toward Austria-Hungary in the subsequent controversy over renewed, unrestricted submarine warfare. The emperor had planned to make significant personnel changes in key offices. During the first month of his rule, however, he left the leadership of his foreign policy to Baron Burián, who continued in the negotiations concerning the Central Powers' peace initiative with Berlin.

It was precisely at the time when the changes on the Viennese throne were taking place that the Germans were informed that the newly elected president Wilson was considering publishing his own proposal for ending the European war. Some believe that Bethmann Hollweg and the newly appointed State Secretary Arthur Zimmermann wanted to precede the president's initiative and decided along with their partners in the Central Powers to quickly deliver a peace note.Footnote ⁴⁰ In reality, it was Austria-Hungary who was pushing for this initiative. The Germans wanted to wait for the impending victory over Romania and the fall of Bucharest.Footnote ⁴¹ There were three main reasons behind this. Austria-Hungary was worried about the United States' involvement in the situation and wanted to beat Washington to it. Vienna also believed that the fall of Bucharest would have a bigger impact on the enemy if news of it arrived after the peace initiative was made public. Last, but not least, it did not wish to create the impression that the Central Powers were preparing a victorious peace.Footnote ⁴² Germany won, and the peace initiative was published on 12 December, while the Romanian capital had already been conquered on 6 December 1916.

Even though Burián notified the White House of the peace initiative's content prior to its publication, the Wilson administration was still displeased by the Central Powers' offer.Footnote ⁴³ In spite of House's and Lansing's opposition, the administration nevertheless decided to continue with the preparation of its own peace initiative.Footnote ⁴⁴ The president led a heated discussion on this topic with the colonel in mid November.Footnote ⁴⁵ Lansing, on the other hand, was worried that the Central Powers would accept Wilson's offer and that the Entente would reject it. The United States could then hardly intercede in the war on the side of the Western Powers as the Secretary of State had wished.Footnote ⁴⁶ The president pushed his opinion through. On 18 December 1916, he urged the warring countries to state their peace terms.Footnote ⁴⁷

The newly appointed Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Ottokar Czernin was in charge of preparing the response to Wilson. He was not a career diplomat, for he received his diplomatic experience between 1913 and 1916 as a minister to Romania. He was sent there through nepotism, as he had ties to the successor of Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Este. As most of his contemporaries recounted, he was quite unbalanced, constantly oscillating “between pessimism and optimism, one time saying a situation is hopeful only to label it hopeless the next day.”Footnote ⁴⁸

Czernin delivered the prepared response of the Central Powers to Wilson's appeal to Frederick C. Penfield, the U.S. ambassador to Vienna, on 26 December 1912. Czernin proposed that a conference with all the warring countries be planned at a neutral location, but the response did not contain what was anticipated most with regard to Germany's negative attitude—the peace terms.Footnote ⁴⁹ The Entente did not reject Wilson's appeal per se, but British politicians spoke highly critically of it. Wilson apparently did not appreciate the difference between the ethical standards of the Entente and the enemy.Footnote ⁵⁰ The Entente delivered its peace terms on 10 January, and, according to Czernin, they pointed to the destruction of Austria-Hungary.Footnote ⁵¹ The Entente did not accept the peace terms of the Central Powers.Footnote ⁵²

The Entente's rejection of the Central Powers' peace initiative, together with the Central Powers' unwillingness to state its own peace terms to Wilson, caused a very dangerous situation at the end of 1916. The Germans decided to commence unrestricted submarine warfare, but until that was officially announced at the end of January 1917, Wilson still hoped that the end of the war could be brought about through negotiations. Vienna tried in vain to prevent the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare. At a meeting in Berlin, the second section Chief (Foreign Minister Deputy) Ludwig Freiherr von Flotow warned the German Foreign Secretary Zimmermann that Germany should not underestimate the military capabilities and morale of the American armed forces.Footnote ⁵³ Despite countless protests at a meeting among military and political leaders of the Central Powers in Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian representatives finally accepted the German position that unrestricted submarine warfare begin on 1 February 1917.Footnote ⁵⁴

Wilson, who was most likely completely in the dark, delivered an important speech in the U.S. Senate on 22 January 1917 that presented the conditions under which peace should be negotiated and painted a picture of the way the postwar world should be formed.Footnote ⁵⁵ Officially, Vienna accepted it with a certain degree of ambiguity. For example, Vienna rejected the president's request for the right of self-determination to oppressed nations. It welcomed his insistence on providing all big nations with access to the seas, which Austria-Hungary was in danger of losing if the goals of the Entente in the Balkans were to be realized. The biggest draw in Wilson's key request, however, was peace without winners and losers. Czernin was convinced that the president took on a moral obligation to influence the Entente in this direction.Footnote ⁵⁶

The announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare urged Wilson to break diplomatic ties with Germany. Together with House and Lansing, however, they decided to keep contacts with Austria-Hungary. They shared the view that it would be worth trying to convince the Danubian Monarchy to partake in separate peace talks.Footnote ⁵⁷ There were several reasons for this plan. The American press reported positively on the first steps of the new Emperor Charles I and played up his peaceful ambitions.Footnote ⁵⁸ Austria-Hungary itself seemed to show interest in keeping the best possible relationship with the United States. In mid October 1916, it asked Washington to agree on a new ambassador. Galic Pole Count Adam Tarnowski von Tarnow, the minister to Sofia at the time, was to be appointed to this role.Footnote ⁵⁹ He was without a doubt an elite diplomat, and Count Czernin considered him to be “one of the best and most capable Austro-Hungarian diplomats.”Footnote ⁶⁰ The influential Budapest daily Pester Lloyd noted that Tarnowski's appointment was proof that the monarchy considered its relations with the United States to be of utmost importance. The key factor was, however, that both Wilson and Lansing also viewed Tarnowski's appointment to be an accommodating gesture.Footnote ⁶¹ They therefore forced the British and the French to provide the ambassador and his family a safe passage through the Atlantic.Footnote ⁶² Because of lengthy negotiations concerning the voyage, the count only arrived in the United States on 1 February 1917, the day the Central Powers announced their intention to reinstate unrestricted submarine warfare.

Even though Wilson and Lansing were willing to distinguish Germany from Austria-Hungary in February 1917, the president decided that until the monarchy's stance on the submarine warfare was clear, he would not accept Tarnowski's letters of credence.Footnote ⁶³ It soon became apparent that Czernin was not willing to risk a clash with Berlin to issue a different stance on this sensitive issue. At the same time, he initially attempted to keep Tarnowski in Washington at any cost, in spite of Berlin's skepticism. He thus rejected the request of the German Viennese Ambassador Count Botho Wedel that Tarnowski not hand over his letters of credence until the status between Germany and the United States was clarified. He only agreed to recall Tarnowski if war between the countries broke out.Footnote ⁶⁴ Wilson's position, however, made the handover of the letters of credence impossible anyway.

Shortly after Tarnowski's arrival, the U.S. State Department began to actively work on separating Austria-Hungary from Germany. Colonel House notified the British of this intention, who were in full agreement with him.Footnote ⁶⁵ What worried Vienna was Lansing's February request to clarify Austria-Hungary's stance on the submarine warfare.Footnote ⁶⁶ Czernin did consider the possibility that once Washington received the response that he did not want to openly distance himself from Germany, the diplomatic ties with the United States would be broken.Footnote ⁶⁷

Washington did not, in fact, consider this step at all, but instead was pressuring Great Britain to provide Austria-Hungary with guaranteed territorial integrity and allow it to begin confidential discussions on a separate peace agreement. Questions regarding the submarine warfare were only meant to put the necessary pressure on Vienna.Footnote ⁶⁸ The State Department thus began to show interest in the national tensions within Austria-Hungary.Footnote ⁶⁹ The peace conditions of the Entente from 10 January 1917, which required the release of certain nations from foreign dominance within the monarchy, were probably the impulse for that. The influential daily New York Times also took note of the national issues within Austria-Hungary and published a critical article about the fate of Czech politicians sentenced by Austro-Hungarian courts.Footnote ⁷⁰ The influence of national issues on the political situation in the monarchy was basically not analyzed at all at this time, neither in the retained official documents of the Wilson administration nor in the personal materials for the foreign policy of its decisive members (Wilson, Lansing, House, the Counsellor of the State Department Frank L. Polk, the Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips, etc.). The views of domestic and exiled representatives of the Austro-Hungarian nations played only a minor role in the decision-making process in the spring of 1917. The attempts of some of Wilson's advisors, such as Charles Crane and Norman Hapgood, to inform him of the requests of the individual Austro-Hungarian nations were not successful.Footnote ⁷¹

After some deliberation, David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, reassured the American ambassador that the central regions of the Danubian Monarchy (Austria, Bohemia, and the main parts of the Kingdom of Hungary) would not be separated.Footnote ⁷² One of Czernin's conditions for peace talks to begin was thus met.Footnote ⁷³ Washington was hopeful for the talks to take place, even though on 2 March 1917 it received an unsatisfactory answer to its question regarding Vienna's position on the submarine warfare.Footnote ⁷⁴ It is evident that Wilson was expecting the monarchy to stay intact.

At the end of February and the beginning of March 1917, four highly secret meetings between Czernin and Penfield took place in Vienna. British assurances made a certain impression, but the minister maintained that separate peace was out of the question.Footnote ⁷⁵ Without Germany's participation, he was only willing to negotiate an exchange of prisoners of war and so forth in one of the neutral countries.Footnote ⁷⁶ It is interesting that news of Penfield's attempts to reach a “friendly solution of the situation” made its way into American press. The New York Times stressed with some sympathy that neither Washington nor Vienna wished for a clash.Footnote ⁷⁷

In her work on U.S. and Austro-Hungarian relations during World War I, Carol J. Adams, an American historian, believes that Austria-Hungary rejected the separate peace because “the Germans controlled the Alliance” with the Danubian Monarchy. Czernin apparently realized that if a separate peace were negotiated, Germany could cause Vienna such hardship that it would outweigh any positive impact.Footnote ⁷⁸ However, it is important to impart that London's promises with regard to the territorial integrity of the monarchy arranged by American diplomats could not lead to Ballhausplatz supporting a separate peace. It only meant maintaining the core regions of the monarchy intact, but the loss of “marginal territories” could not be ruled out by any means. In the winter of 1917, Austria-Hungary did not feel defeated, and thus there was no need for German pressure on Austria-Hungary to reject the peace as it was proposed by Lloyd George and Wilson. Austria-Hungary saw it as disadvantageous at that moment.

News from Vienna meant a temporary end of American probes.Footnote ⁷⁹ In mid March 1917, Lansing still recommended that the president agree to the proposed talks at a neutral location, but Wilson did not continue with the peace initiative.Footnote ⁸⁰ News of this fact was announced in the press in an attempt to send a clear message to the American public.Footnote ⁸¹ The reasons behind this decision were to the result of the quickly escalating tensions between the United States and Germany, as well as the unwillingness of the Danubian Monarchy to keep diplomatic relations with the United States, even in spite of the possible entry of the United States into war against its German ally.

At the cabinet meeting on 20 March 1917, all the ministers recommended that the United States declare war on Germany, and the president accepted this recommendation.Footnote ⁸² There were several reasons for this, but this is not the place to analyze them. The preserved sources indicate that Austria-Hungary monitored this development with trepidation, as if watching a natural disaster that it could not do anything about. Highly ranked diplomats strongly criticized Germany's offer of alliance to Mexico (the so-called Zimmermann telegram), which caused an escalation of tensions, but they did not dare distance themselves from it.Footnote ⁸³ At the same time, Vienna tried to avoid spoiling its relationship with the United States any further. It therefore accepted the American proposal to resolve the Ambassador Tarnowski situation, which was slowly becoming unsustainable because of Wilson's refusal to accept the letters of credence. Its basis was the recall of both chiefs of the respective diplomatic missions—Tarnowski and Penfield.Footnote ⁸⁴ In an attempt to leave the channels to the United States open, Czernin briefly considered a very unusual solution: to leave Tarnowski as a civilian in the United States even after all diplomatic ties were broken.Footnote ⁸⁵

The United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917. The declaration of war did not include Austria-Hungary. In his speech to Congress, Wilson stated that it was unnecessary to declare war on the monarchy because it was not participating in the warfare against U.S. citizens.Footnote ⁸⁶ The president was thus still willing to distinguish Austria-Hungary from Germany. He did, however, see its dependence on Germany as a growing problem. In mid April 1917, Wilson said in an interview something to the effect of Austria-Hungary being forced by Germany to break ties with the United States.Footnote ⁸⁷

II. The Breakdown of Diplomatic Ties and the U.S. Declaration of War on Austria-Hungary, April 1917—December 1917

The breakdown of diplomatic ties between the United States and Austria-Hungary, which occurred two days after the United States declared war on Germany, resulted in the United States having less access to information on the political development within the monarchy. After some of the personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Vienna returned to the United States, Lansing's Assistant Secretary of State Phillips met with the ex-chargé d´affaires Joseph C. Grew and was surprised to find his fairly optimistic view of the situation surrounding the Danubian Monarchy. The American press reported information to the contrary, confirming the general scorn with regard to the economic strength of Austria-Hungary.Footnote ⁸⁸ Therefore, Phillips' ex-colleague from Harvard did not confirm the then popular belief that “Austria was on her last legs.” Grew believed that “things were going pretty normally with the exception of high prices and the scarcity of food.”Footnote ⁸⁹ Grew and Graham, the ex-naval attaché, agreed that Austria-Hungary was “completely dominated by Germany.”Footnote ⁹⁰ After returning to the United States, Grew began working at the State Department, where he was put in charge of a new department for German and Austro-Hungarian affairs. He held certain sympathies for Austria-Hungary, finding Austrians to be an “especially kind and friendly people.”Footnote ⁹¹ It is therefore quite a paradox that according to the report of Austrian police, he was considered anti-German by Berlin.Footnote ⁹²

As of spring 1917, the State Department did everything to improve its information base. The legation in neutral Switzerland became a key partner because certain diplomats who worked in Vienna until April, mainly Hugh R. Wilson, Allen Dulles, Ellis L. Dresel, and others, were sent there. Phillips felt that “there is no more important place in Europe for us at the present time than Berne.”Footnote ⁹³ The chief of the mission, Minister Pleasant A. Stovall, was a problem because he was nominated for political reasons, as were many of his colleagues. He was previously the owner and editor of the pro-Wilsonian paper The Savannah Press. He lacked the necessary expertise and language skills for work in Switzerland. He regarded Austria-Hungary as a monolithic enemy power and ignored its complex interpolitical issues.Footnote ⁹⁴ Therefore, Phillips, along with Robert Lansing, tried to persuade Wilson to recall him.Footnote ⁹⁵

The situation gradually improved during the summer of 1917. Stovall's subordinates started giving him more and more material on the enemy powers. The minister still continued to be mostly concerned with “whether Jones or Smith has a passport,” but it was precisely at this time that Allen Dulles began his career in intelligence service. He wrote to his uncle Lansing that he had “fascinating work” that consisted of conducting interviews with all Americans who traveled from the Central Powers to Switzerland and that he was also processing information from enemy dailies.Footnote ⁹⁶

It seemed that even after the diplomatic ties were broken, Austria-Hungary's domestic and international policies continued to be viewed in a more positive light than those of Germany. The emperor's speech delivered at the Imperial Council, which was summoned for the first time since the start of the war, made an especially good impression. On 31 May 1917, Charles pledged to rule constitutionally and was willing to declare peace with any enemy country that gave up on its “intention to endanger the honor and existence” of the Central Powers.Footnote ⁹⁷ The monarchy still tried to avoid conflict with the Americans. The Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army (Armeeoberkommando, AOK), General Arthur Arz von Straussenburg, gave orders to the navy in mid May to “not treat American ships as enemy vessels for now.”Footnote ⁹⁸ News of Dumba being nominated as a member of the House of Lords of the Austrian Imperial Council was the only news that was tarnishing the good impression Austria-Hungary was trying to make at the time.Footnote ⁹⁹

Charles's promises were positively received in Washington. Phillips, who was influenced by Grew, felt that the emperor's speech was much more in line “with popular Government, I believe, than anything which has ever come out Austria.”Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Grew asserted that Emperor Charles was promoting a much more liberal course of action toward his subjects than the deceased Francis Joseph I.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Impressed by the emperor's speech, Lansing turned to the president with a proposal to send the emperor a personal message, which stated that regardless of the broken diplomatic ties, he would provide “some sort of expression of interest and pleasure that his ideals and those of Emperor seem to be near together.”Footnote ¹⁰²

Since the United States entered the war, President Wilson tried to keep all his options open. He decided not to agree to a formal alliance treaty with the Europeans and chose to act as an associated power of the Entente in the war. At the same time, he refused to keep the Allied Powers' commitment to not sign a peace with the enemy.Footnote ¹⁰³ If he had, he would have indirectly agreed with the Entente's peace terms for Austria-Hungary among others. He considered their wording poor because the threat of the collapse of the monarchy apparently would have only strengthened the people's support of its government. The president wished to work on weakening this bond and stressed that the dissolution of Austria-Hungary would only be possible if its people were to agree with it.Footnote ¹⁰⁴

The politics of the United States toward Austria-Hungary once the U.S. became involved in the war was very different from the stances of its European allies. Although the president did not wish to break the monarchy apart without the support of its nations, the Entente committed itself to supporting Italy's claims to part of the Austro-Hungarian territory, as outlined in the Treaty of London in April 1915. Even though after the war Wilson claimed that he was not informed of the content of this treaty (nor about other similar pacts), its existence did not go unnoticed by American diplomats.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ The corresponding statement by the American ambassador in France may not have been delivered to the president, but the same could not be said of the admission of the most competent Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary.

Balfour visited the United States in April 1917 immediately after its entry into the war. The situation on the front was very grave at the time, not only because of the German U-boat attacks and concerns that Russia might enter into peace with the Central Powers separately. The main cause for alarm was the state of the Western powers. Phillips, who was well informed, even concluded that “they had lost the war when we came in (!)” The assistant state secretary doubted that the United States would have even entered the war, had they known the actual state of the Entente.Footnote ¹⁰⁶

During Balfour's visit, much time was spent on the discussion about the future of Austria-Hungary. The British foreign minister even felt that this would actually become the biggest point of contention in the relations with Washington. Although the president was skeptical that it would be possible to dissolve the monarchy, Balfour and the French Ambassador in Washington, Jean J. Jusserand, came to the conclusion that it would be best to weaken the monarchy by granting “quasi-independence to several of its provinces.” A complete collapse of the monarchy was unimaginable even in their eyes at this point.Footnote ¹⁰⁷

Colonel House was very active in the negotiations with Balfour. After initial trepidation, he began an open debate with the British minister concerning the goals in the war. They, for example, agreed to renew the independence of Poland with access to the sea via Gdansk, which Lansing mentioned during his last meeting with Tarnowski. Regarding the rest of Austria-Hungary, they stated that the monarchy would have to cede Bosnia and Herzegovina to the newly reformed Serbia and remain “Bohemia, Hungary and Austria.” They failed to come to an agreement on the fate of Trieste, and House was doubtful that it was appropriate to give the entire region of Dalmatia to Italy. Secret pacts once again came into play at this point. Balfour admitted that London promised Italy “quite a lot of what they were asking.” He, however, supported Rome's claims with a lot of indifference and admitted that it was “being greedy.”Footnote ¹⁰⁸ House and Balfour touched on the issue of peace terms for Austria-Hungary again during a dinner that took place at the conclusion of the minister's visit to the United States. Balfour then agreed with House's proposal that Austria-Hungary and Turkey be provided with “certain concessions” in exchange for their willingness to enter a separate peace agreement or for the persuasion of Germany to end the war.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

Several days later, as per House's request, Balfour sent House the texts from the secret pacts closed between the Allies during the war. The Treaty of London between the Entente and Italy was included as well. He also delivered the notes from the meeting of the British wartime cabinet, during which Balfour spoke of the goals of the Entente. He demanded the breaking up of Turkey, but not of Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary was only expected to leave its outskirt provinces—e.g. Galicia—to the reinstated Poland. He recommended that the Bohemian nations and South Slavs be granted autonomy and supported a shift from dualism to pluralism. He agreed that it would be “a very curious construction,” but it would be no “more curious than what Austria has been through all these centuries…”Footnote ¹¹⁰

Although news from American diplomats—e.g., Sharp's report from early May 1915—concerning the secret pacts may not have necessarily landed on the president's table, now there could be no doubt that the president was fully informed. The statement he made in front of the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in August 1919 was all the more surprising. He said that he only became aware of these pacts at the Paris Peace Conference. It is no longer possible to determine whether he truly blocked this information from memory or whether he purposefully “forgot” about it.Footnote ¹¹¹

When Wilson found out about the existence of the secret pacts in the spring of 1917, he first wanted to modify them. House persuaded him, however, that any such pressure could have a negative impact on the Allies' warfront effort.Footnote ¹¹² The Colonel was nevertheless quite displeased by the scope of requests the Entente was making of the Central Powers, from which “German Imperialists” who also took over Austria-Hungary apparently had the most to gain. He felt that Wilson should have told the truth during this speech on Flag Day—i.e., he should have stated his own peace terms.Footnote ¹¹³

In the speech delivered on 14 June 1917 in Washington, Wilson painted a dark picture of Central and Southeastern Europe suffering under German rule. Austria-Hungary was apparently a mere tool of Berlin's plan to take over all of Europe: “The so-called Central Powers are in fact but a single power,” he stated.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Wilson thus continued to reiterate the idea of the monarchy being dependent on Germany, which was ruining Austria-Hungary's reputation in the United States even before diplomatic ties were broken in April 1917. This idea was not entirely true, however. As was already shown, the monarchy was undoubtedly a weaker partner than Germany in its foreign policy; however, it attempted to leave itself many options open. Carol J. Adams correctly asserts that the German Ambassador in Vienna himself, Count Botho Wedel, rejected the idea of Austria-Hungary's dependence on Germany in the spring of 1917.Footnote ¹¹⁵

According to the president, the United States thus fought to break the influence of German elites who were single-handedly responsible for the current situation. According to Wilson, the Entente's victory in alliance with the United States would give freedom to all nations living under German rule, including Germans themselves.Footnote ¹¹⁶ Strictly in line with House's advice, the president avoided stating anything specific about territories and the fate of Austria-Hungary. The freedom of its nations did not necessarily have to be in contradiction with the continued existence of the monarchy. The president did not want to give up hope of a separate peace between the Entente and Vienna. The skeptical stance of British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who told Ambassador Page that any deliberations on a separate peace with Austria-Hungary were “premature,” did not affect Wilson.Footnote ¹¹⁷

The president's speech was not well received in Vienna. In its daily report to the emperor, the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused on the minister to Mexico, who stated that the Americans were not very eager to fight. This was apparently the reason for Wilson delivering his “seditious speech.” The report reiterated, however, that “almost everyone” was supporting the president.Footnote ¹¹⁸ It also became apparent that the United States' entry into the war revitalized the enemy. In the first half of 1917, the Austrian Ministry of Trade recorded a significant increase in American deliveries to the Entente countries.Footnote ¹¹⁹

In response to the Allies' desperate requests, President Wilson decided to send the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) to Europe. John J. Pershing, a 56-year-old general who led a punitive operation in Mexico in 1916, was named commander in May 1917.Footnote ¹²⁰ Austria-Hungry was informed of the arrival of the American forces, and it estimated that their number would reach one hundred thousand men by the end of the year. They, however, would not be put into action because of a lack of necessary training.Footnote ¹²¹ Even this small contingent was adequate to increase morale, and Pershing was greeted by cheering crowds in Paris.Footnote ¹²² The first American division was sent to the Western Front at the end of October 1917.

Debates with Balfour made Robert Lansing reconsider his view of the situation in Central Europe. He put Albert H. Putney, the leader of the Near-East division at the State Department, in charge of preparing a memorandum on the situation there. Putney had good relations with the representatives of Slavic nations of the Habsburg Empire in exile, including Charles Pergler, an advisor to Tomas G. Masaryk.Footnote ¹²³ Putney made a suggestion to Lansing that the monarchy be significantly decreased in size. He supported Polish and Czech independence, as well as the creation of a South Slavic country, consisting of Serbia together with Croatians and Slovenians living in parts of Austria-Hungary. He proposed that Trieste and Istria be granted to Italy. He did not propose, however, that Slovakia be joined with Bohemia, and also had doubts about connecting Transylvania to Romania. Although the Kingdom of Hungary was to be kept intact (Rijeka was also to remain its port of access to the sea), Austria would only keep the Alpine Lands.Footnote ¹²⁴ Not even the Kingdom of Hungary necessarily had to stay intact. The originally accommodating attitude of the American press toward the monarchy gradually changed during the spring of 1917, and more attention was paid to its actual or perceived weaknesses. The relations within the Kingdom of Hungary were sternly criticized in The New York Times, according to which “the basis, the essence of Magyar policy is the oppression of smaller nationalities.”Footnote ¹²⁵

Lansing did not deliver Putney's memorandum to the president, but he did not discard it, either. He gradually began changing his mind on the National Question of Austria-Hungary. When J. J. Babka from Cleveland asked him in April 1917 to give his opinion on Czech associations organizing a collection for Czech casualties of war and starting propaganda for “free Bohemia,” Lansing's answer was negative. Lansing said that the campaign could cause a “misunderstanding.”Footnote ¹²⁶ In June 1917, however, he was already willing to consider the independence of Poland including the Austrian Galicia (as further discussed below, on page 287).

News that was arriving in Washington in the summer of 1917 was proof that the monarchy was in crisis. The emperor was attempting to ameliorate the situation by calling for an amnesty for political crimes from 3 July 1917, but as the newsgroup at the American legation in Switzerland correctly noted, the reception to it was lukewarm. Although Romanian, Czech, and Slavic leaders in general welcomed the amnesty, Austrian Germans and Hungarians considered it to be thoughtless. In Bern, it was even known that the emperor declared the amnesty without prior consultation with Czernin.Footnote ¹²⁷ Furthermore, the monarchy's economic problems were closely related to political instability. According to Penfield, the ex-Ambassador in Vienna, the last harvest was a total catastrophe. The people were apparently despondent, and fear of famine quickly spread. “These facts,” stated Penfield, “probably explain the emperor's and Count Czernin's almost daily appeals for peace.” Penfield adjusted his more optimistic view of the situation with regard to the monarchy, which even made its way into American press at the end of May 1917.Footnote ¹²⁸ The Ambassador blamed the growing problems with the delivery of supplies for having a crucial effect on the strategic goals of wartime operations that the Austro-Hungarian army led at that time. With a certain degree of clairvoyance, he assumed that the goal of the AOK was to continue on to the Ukraine, occupy the Odessa port, and gain access to the Ukrainian and South Russian sources of grain.Footnote ¹²⁹

The army began an offensive on the Eastern Front in mid July, and its goal, among others, was to free the Austro-Hungarian province (Crownland) of Bukovina that was occupied by the Russians. This goal was attained within a few weeks, but the progress was halted near the original Austro-Hungarian border.Footnote ¹³⁰ Another victory of the Central Powers in the east was an unpleasant surprise for Washington officials, who were still hoping for Austria-Hungary to make an exit from the war with the start of the Russian KerenskyFootnote ¹³¹ offensive on 29 June 1917. It preceded the July counteroffensive of German and Austro-Hungarian units. News from Bern supported this hope, as it stated that the AOK was surprised by the Russian offensive.Footnote ¹³² Lansing had news that at the Vienna meeting both the emperor's peace terms were discussed and that the Central Powers were planning to shortly begin a campaign in the United States to prepare the Americans for a new peace treaty offer.Footnote ¹³³

The Austro-Hungarian governmental officials failed to take a clear stance on the question of a separate peace. During his probes, Prince Sixtus of Bourbton-Parma, the brother of the Austrian Empress Zita, claimed that the emperor was willing to sign the peace. Charles, as well as Czernin, probably considered these probes to be a stepping-stone on the path to overall peace. The ruler was much less patient than his foreign minister, however. Czernin put together a memorandum in April 1917, reiterating the necessity to end the war as soon as possible, and sent it to Charles, who handed it over to the German emperor. The count and the ruler were both uncertain about the question of a separate peace. As opposed to Charles, however, Czernin insisted that his ministry must have everything under its control. From time to time, he also showed more faith in the possible victory of the Central Powers. In the fall of 1917, he asserted that the Entente decided to break down Austria-Hungary at the Treaty of London on 29 April 1917 and that the separate peace would in no way prevent that from happening.Footnote ¹³⁴ In his view, the only hope was a German victory, the occupation of Paris, and then a victorious peace.Footnote ¹³⁵

In the summer of 1917, Czernin had still hoped for a separate peace of the Central Powers with France without the occupation of its capital, and he pressured the Germans to give up the Alsace-Lorraine region in exchange for Galicia.Footnote ¹³⁶ He therefore supported the probes that were conducted in Switzerland by the former diplomat Count Nikolas Revertera, who was there to negotiate peace terms for Paris with the French officer Count Abel Armand.Footnote ¹³⁷ Even here, however, the emperor showed very little understanding for the cautiousness of his minister, who was not willing to let go of Berlin's rejection of the French terms, which included the retreat from Alsace-Lorraine as well.Footnote ¹³⁸

In the summer of 1917, Austria-Hungary was under strong German pressure. During his visit to the Danubian Monarchy at the beginning of July 1917, Emperor Wilhelm warned Charles to stop with his “centrifugal tendencies.”Footnote ¹³⁹ Berlin was not making this up, for similar speculations appeared in the American press as well. The New York Times, citing the London Daily Express, stated that Empress Zita was lobbying for a break from Germany.Footnote ¹⁴⁰ Czernin succumbed to the pressure from Berlin. Neue Freie Presse printed a strongly worded critique of Wilson at the beginning of August.Footnote ¹⁴¹ The semiofficial Vienna newspaper Fremdenblatt assured the monarchy's allegiance to the German ally and insisted on German control over Alsace-Lorraine, all the while proclaiming that regardless of Serbia's fate after the war, “it will never be at the center of the cause of agitation against the monarchy,” and that the South-Slavic issue was its own internal affair.Footnote ¹⁴² The foreign minister took advantage of the success of the Austro-Hungarian army on the Eastern Front and went on the counteroffensive in domestic politics as well. He urged the emperor to let go of plans to call up supporters of a separate peace into the Austrian government.Footnote ¹⁴³

The peace probes continued nevertheless. Washington was generally informed of these activities.Footnote ¹⁴⁴ President Wilson did not object to Armand's discussion with Revertera, but of course assumed that the acceptance and rejection of a supposed peace offer to Austria-Hungary (it was actually France who was the initiator of the negotiations) would be the topic of discussion. He stressed, however, that if peace terms would be acceptable for the people of the monarchy, they would strengthen the peace movement already underway, and the exit of Austria-Hungary from the war would not be preventable.Footnote ¹⁴⁵

It was therefore no surprise for American officials to hear that Emperor Charles met with Wilhelm Foerster, a professor of education from Munich University who was a famous supporter of the reconciliation between Germans and Slavs in the Habsburg monarchy.Footnote ¹⁴⁶ He was received at the Wartholz near Reichenau castle by the lord on 10 July 1917 and shortly after gave a lecture on the federalization of the Habsburg monarchy at the Austrian Political Society in Vienna.Footnote ¹⁴⁷ After his interview with Charles, he traveled to Switzerland, where he used to work at the University of Zurich, and he described his discussion with the emperor to an undisclosed confidant connected to the British Consulate General Zurich.Footnote ¹⁴⁸ American diplomats found out details about the meeting from the British legation. It is possible that the above-mentioned confidant was a former theology professor from the University of Kansas, George Davis Herron, an American who had been living in Geneva since 1914.Footnote ¹⁴⁹ Herron then sent his reports first via the embassy in Paris and later directly via Bern. He would work for almost anyone, though; initially it was for the Italians, and later the British government became interested in his activities.Footnote ¹⁵⁰

The U.S. legation in Bern announced that Foerster's audience with the emperor was open and friendly. Charles I complained of Czernin, as well as of the (already former) Austrian Prime Minister Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic, causing problems with the amnesty, and the emperor gave assurance that he would implement radical interpolitical measures to ensure democracy. He also pledged to grant Poland its autonomy and to comply with the requests of the Czech political parties (in the second version of the report, the term “federation” is actually mentioned). He spoke critically of the Germans and claimed that the “Prussian military spirit” was broken. To counter the overly strong Germany, he proposed the creation of a (utopian) Austro-German confederation. He spoke much more positively of the enemy than of the uncomfortable ally. The emperor apparently even stated that “he could not close his eyes to the reasonableness of many of the Allies' demands.”Footnote ¹⁵¹

These statements were certainly made earlier, for example during the unsuccessful peace probes of the empress's brother Prince Sixtus of Bourbon in Paris and London in the spring of 1917. Charles then recognized the validity of France's claims to Alsace-Lorraine.Footnote ¹⁵² The Americans, however, were not informed of these offers, and this fact only increased the value of the information about Foerster's audience with the Austrian emperor.

President Wilson received the news from Bern and Paris as proof of a crisis within the ranks of the Central Powers. He was, however, fairly careful about the question of the postwar development of domestic policy. For example, he considered the dethroning of the Hohenzollerns in Germany to be quite unlikely, even though he believed in the possibility of democratization. He believed that the “Dual Monarchy would continue to exist,” though the Austro-Hungarian nations would demand emancipation and “each people of the confederation would have liberal autonomy.” The president believed that this would prevent the creation of a German-ruled Mitteleuropa in the future.Footnote ¹⁵³

The peace initiative of Pope Benedict XV in mid August 1917 hampered the president's goals. The Holy Father, together with the Cardinal State Secretary Pietro Gasparri, tried to stop the impending liquidation of Austria-Hungary. He was convinced that the monarchy was an important part of the European balance of power that prevented Protestantism and orthodoxy from entering Central Europe and the Balkans any further. At the same time, both the pope and the cardinal felt a great love for their country of Italy. They, therefore, tried to reconcile the irreconcilable.Footnote ¹⁵⁴

The Pope appealed for disarmament, arbitration, and the freedom of the seas, as well as a bilateral evacuation of occupied territories. Germany was thus supposed to evacuate Belgium, as well as the occupied areas of France, in exchange for the return of the occupied colonies. This meant that peace had to be agreed upon based on a status quo ante. Fundamental exceptions existed, however. In the disputed areas—i.e., Alsace-Lorraine and Trentino—it was the local people who were supposed to decide about their definitive citizenship. It was assumed that Poland would be created again, although somewhat smaller than previously.Footnote ¹⁵⁵

The pope's appeal, dated 1 August 1917, was delivered to the warring powers with a two-week delay, because preliminary negotiations with the Central Powers ended immediately before the final revision of the pope's appeal. The pope's nuncio in Munich, Marquis Eugenio Pacelli (later known as Pope Pius XII), played an important role in the negotiations. This mainly dealt with the clarifications of individual positions and not with the content of the Pope's initiative. Pacelli showed interest in Germany's view, and Austria-Hungary was contacted later on as well.Footnote ¹⁵⁶

Czernin welcomed the note and attempted to persuade the Germans to respond affirmatively. Since the beginning of August 1917, he pressured the new Chancellor Georg Michaelis and the State Secretary Richard von Kühlmann to agree with the restoration of Belgium and to allow for a compromise in the question of Alsace-Lorraine.Footnote ¹⁵⁷ Much to the Germans' dissatisfaction, the count entertained the idea of an Austro-Hungarian mediation between Germany and France, an idea to which the ongoing Armand-Revertera probes contributed.Footnote ¹⁵⁸ Ballhausplatz quickly prepared a response to the pope's appeal and made sure that it was delivered immediately. Michaelis and Kühlmann actually managed to procure the restoration of Belgium with the emperor in spite of the army command's disagreement. They were not, however, willing to include this concession in the response to the pope. Czernin's warning—that unless Berlin receded, it would be the “last straw to break the camel's back”—fell on deaf ears. The Germans sent their formally positive response to the pope via the Munich Nunciature on 19 September 1917. They later made addendums to it, but the Germans overall did not make any concessions and once again failed to specify their goals.Footnote ¹⁵⁹ They also sabotaged Czernin's plan to mediate peace between Berlin and Paris.Footnote ¹⁶⁰

Charles sent the pope his own carefully worded response.Footnote ¹⁶¹ Czernin summarized its content in a speech delivered in Budapest on 2 October 1917, in which he appealed for disarmament, obligatory arbitration, and the freedom of the seas. He also requested that free trade be restored after the war. He failed to take a stance as to the territorial issues, however. Czernin only stressed that the monarchy was not interested in gaining new territories, but insisted that they only forego postwar annexations of surrounding areas if the above-mentioned conditions were met. He also insisted on the territorial integrity of the monarchy.Footnote ¹⁶² He was probably hoping that the pope's initiative would lead to peace or at least unmask Britain, which was accusing Germany of not wanting to give up Belgium.Footnote ¹⁶³

Czernin's attempts to push through an accommodating response to the pope's appeal were met with complete unwillingness by the most important Austrio-Hungarian ally. The positions of the United States and the Entente were even more important. The reaction of the decision makers in Washington was negative. Following a meeting with Franklin K. Lane, the secretary of the interior, Colonel House proposed that a response be sent to the pope that would “leave the door open” and, at the same time, put the blame of leading the war on Germany.Footnote ¹⁶⁴ Wilson was to proclaim that the United States could not negotiate with Germany, because Germany was dominated by Prussian militarists who were not representing the will of its people. The United States was once again playing the role of the protector of democracy and freedom in opposition to autocracy, and American Messianism sounded throughout House's recommendation. House was probably concerned that the president might curtly reject the pope's appeal, and so he focused on problems with war strategy. He stressed that the status quo ante could persuade Austria-Hungary to a separate peace. He also mentioned France's weakness and the unresolved submarine threat.Footnote ¹⁶⁵

Lansing had a different opinion on the matter. In a testimony to the president on 20 August 1917, he wrote that the initiative “basically does not go any further than Germany's peace offer from December of the previous year and it is a mere invitation for negotiations.” The state secretary did admit that the Vatican was calling for the restoration of Belgium and Poland, but he pointed out that the pope failed to mention the future of occupied Serbia and Montenegro and had thus become “probably unwittingly or out of compassion for Austria-Hungary … the agent of Germany.” Because the Entente rejected the Central Powers' December peace offer, Lansing implied, everyone needed to reject the pope's appeal as well.Footnote ¹⁶⁶

The following day on 21 August 1917, the secretary of state sent the president another note on this matter. In it, he focused on the pope's motivation. He did note the pope's “sincere wish for the restoration of peace,” but immediately afterward pointed to an “earnest wish to preserve the Empire of Austria-Hungary (sic) from dismemberment.” This threat was becoming more and more serious, according to the state secretary, because “jealousies and dislikes” were rampant among the nations of the monarchy. The disintegration tendencies were apparently supported by the fall of tsarism in Russia.

Lansing suspected that influence from Vienna had affected the pope's appeal, even though he admitted no proof existed for this theory. Based on the news coming from Bern, he claimed that the people of Austria-Hungary wished for peace, and if the emperor did not end the war soon, civil unrests were likely to occur. According to the state secretary, Charles was attempting to bring about peace as soon as possible, because he also did not wish for any of the other fighting parties to be victorious. Lansing compared this to the popular and true American principle on the inconclusiveness of war, which the governmental officials of the monarchy were now experiencing. Vienna was apparently afraid that victory in the West would make it even more vulnerable to German influence, and that the defeat of the Central Powers would once again mean the collapse of the monarchy. That is why Austria-Hungary searched for a different solution, one that would not, however, be disadvantageous to Germany.Footnote ¹⁶⁷

Lansing correctly suspected that the Entente would reject the pope's appeal. Reports from American ambassadors in London and Paris confirmed this.Footnote ¹⁶⁸ Neither of these countries, however, ended up taking an official stand on the matter. The only one who openly expressed his opinion was Woodrow Wilson. The president accepted House's advice and decided to politely reject the appeal. He showed appreciation for the pope's honorable effort and goals, but he also strongly criticized the official Berlin position. The goal for the United States would be to “relieve the nations of the world from the threat of any military regimes” and governments not accountable to the people. Germany had precisely such a cabinet according to Wilson. The German elites were apparently planning to take over the entire world and had no regard for treaties, international traditions, and honor. He also returned to the old idea that the United States was not the enemy of the German people, for the latter were also the victims of militarism.Footnote ¹⁶⁹

Both at home and in the countries of the Entente, Wilson's response to the pope was met with mixed reactions. William Phillips considered it to be “impressive” and regarded its last sentence to be of utmost importance: “We must wait for some new evidence of the purpose of the great peoples of the Central Powers.”Footnote ¹⁷⁰ American allies were more critical. The French Ambassador Jusserand criticized the administration for not consulting the response with Paris and thought that this neglect would create a bad impression. Other diplomats of the Entente were more positive,Footnote ¹⁷¹ whereas Austria-Hungary's response was ambiguous.

The Viennese Neue Freie Presse paper reported very critically on the president's response. Each of its words apparently demonstrated a “complete lack of sincerity.” The newspaper also analyzed Wilson's statement that Germany was controlled by a Prussian autocracy and pointed to the fact that the German Parliament (Reichstag) was legitimate as of the last election. The newspaper obviously failed to mention the ugly truth that the competence of the German parliament was limited; for example, the chancellor was not held accountable to it. Even the Neue Freie Presse, however, found something positive in Wilson's response. It pointed out to its readers that Wilson did not repeat the old harsh peace terms of the Entente.Footnote ¹⁷²

Hungarian dailies reported much more positively on the president's position. The Budapest newspaper Az Est welcomed it as a “clear and significant support of all genuine supporters of peace and patriots. America is thus unequivocally supporting peace without annexations, which is very important for the Kingdom of Hungary.” The United Party of Independence and 1948 Magyarország newspaper reported along the same lines.Footnote ¹⁷³ Count Michael (Mihály) Károlyi, a critic of the situation in the Kingdom of Hungary, was the leader of this party. In the summer of 1917, Károlyi temporarily became close with Czernin, when he supported him in putting pressure on the Germans to lessen their annexation goals.Footnote ¹⁷⁴ The Americans kept a close eye on the Hungarian leader from the beginning of the war and took notice of his support of Czernin.Footnote ¹⁷⁵ Károlyi visited the United States three times already prior to World War I. His last visit took place in 1914, when he lobbied among the American Hungarians for the Party for Independence.Footnote ¹⁷⁶ The legation in Bern was incorrectly notified that he was in Switzerland attempting to make contact with the French and the British. He did not approach the Americans, however. As per information from Stovall, he was not proposing a separate peace, even though it seemed that Austria-Hungary would do everything in its power to make the Germans end the war as soon as possible. The minister also entertained the possibility that if the right terms were offered to the monarchy, it would be willing to break from its most significant ally.Footnote ¹⁷⁷

Skepticism prevailed and was further perpetuated by the Polish leader Count Jean Marie Horodyski. He told Stovall in mid August 1917 that the chance of a separate peace was minimal because the monarchy was completely dependent on Germany. He said that Czernin apparently underestimated the significance of the United States' entry into the war and stayed in line with the German stance that the U-boats would prevent its participation in the European war.Footnote ¹⁷⁸ In reality, Czernin very reluctantly agreed to the unrestricted submarine warfare and doubted its success.Footnote ¹⁷⁹

In the Austro-Hungarian circles, however, the significance of the United States' role in the ongoing war seemed far more complicated. The army leadership was more skeptical, as it was more influenced by Germany than politicians were. AOK reported that the news released after the United States entered the war with Germany, saying that the United States on its own would be able to cover for the Entente's losses, was not yet confirmed.Footnote ¹⁸⁰ The diplomats had more faith in the United States and its capabilities. Baron Alexander Musulin, the minister in Switzerland, reported in November 1917 that “all of America stands behind Wilson and Washington is the actual center of America.”Footnote ¹⁸¹ Even the diplomatic dispatches were skeptical, especially with regard to an armed attack by the United States in Europe. Based on information from a Swedish informant, the Chargé d´affaires in the Norwegian capital Kristiania (Oslo as of 1924), Count Alexander Hoyos, for example, was quite right to state that the current American units were “absolutely useless” in France.Footnote ¹⁸² This was quickly about to change, however.

At the end of the summer in 1917, the Americans apparently concluded that it needed to reevaluate U.S. policy toward Austria-Hungary. A separate peace was still possible, but it was becoming clear that it was necessary to put more pressure on Vienna.Footnote ¹⁸³ Austria-Hungary's refusal to sign a separate peace, as well as the Entente powers' belief that Vienna was a weaker and a dependent partner of Berlin, only added to the escalation of the United States' stance. Influential politicians such as former president Theodore Roosevelt appealed for a change in course. He stated that “no peace will be just which does not establish a greater Bohemia and a great Slav commonwealth in Austria and which does not join the Italian and Romanian Austrian to their Italian and Romanian brothers.”Footnote ¹⁸⁴

The Italian Foreign Minister Baron Sidney Sonnino took advantage of the anti-Austrian sentiment that was further aggravated by the pope's appeal. He requested that the United States declare war on Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian army just blocked a number of Italian offensives (the so-called eleventh battle of the Isonzo was just under way), and Rome was concerned with the morale of its soldiers. According to the minister, the Italians did not understand why the United States was battling Germany but avoiding conflict with Austria-Hungary, who was the main enemy of their country.Footnote ¹⁸⁵

The declaration of war on Austria-Hungary thus came officially into play. The deteriorating relationship with Austria-Hungary had been making news in the American press for several weeks prior to Sonnino's statement. The New York Times cited unspecified “administration officials” as stating that the United States did not wish to take initiative on this matter, but that the relations between the two countries were not normal and that war could not be ruled out. Austria-Hungary could declare war because of the increased aid the United States was providing Italy.Footnote ¹⁸⁶ It was also possible that the monarchy would shortly be put under great pressure. Hugh Wilson, the secretary of the legation in Bern, noted that the Austro-Hungarian army was under such pressure on the Italian front that German divisions from the Western Front were being moved in to its aid.Footnote ¹⁸⁷ This was just wishful thinking. In reality, it was a concentration of forces for an offensive attack.Footnote ¹⁸⁸

The United States viewed the political development within the monarchy as precarious as well. Ulysses Grant-Smith, a former counselor of the American embassy in Vienna, felt that although the emperor planned to make internal reforms, he did not successfully rebuild the Austrian government and did not engage either Heinrich Lammasch or Foerster.Footnote ¹⁸⁹ According to Grant-Smith, Austria “is not yet ripe for reforms.” The relations within the Imperial Council apparently complicated everything and “the influence of the military party [was] too strong.”Footnote ¹⁹⁰

The latter statement is questionable because it was Czernin who prevented Meinl's group from entering the government in the summer of 1917. Czernin cannot be called a leader of a (virtually nonexistent) wartime party, but the American diplomat was right in many regards. The Hungarian gentry, for example, insisted on the current arrangement of the Kingdom of Hungary (with a few exceptions) and on dualism. As far as the significance of the United States, it is also true that AOK was closer to the view of the German leadership than that of the country's political leaders. His report on the perceptions of peace in the enemy countries could have provided Czernin with information that enthusiasm for the war in the United States was waning. “Strict centralization and strong censorship” to which Americans were unaccustomed was apparently to blame.Footnote ¹⁹¹

Meanwhile, the Italians continued to put pressure on Washington. The Italian Ambassador Count Vincenzo Macchi di Cellere delivered Sonnino's commentary on the Central Powers' stance regarding the pope's peace appeal to Lansing. He believed that Czernin's Budapest speech demonstrated what “little foundation there is in the Vatican's assurances that there is in the Central Empires a disposition to make serious concessions to the Entente.”Footnote ¹⁹² These arguments resonated with the State Department. At this time, Phillips had already started to view Austria-Hungary as a German agent.Footnote ¹⁹³ What was even more important, however, was that the president expressed this same belief in his speech in Buffalo on 12 November 1917.Footnote ¹⁹⁴ This opinion was not quite correct, as the Germans really did not dictate Vienna's policies, but it was nevertheless damaging to the monarchy. Czernin generally coordinated his foreign political initiatives with the Germans, but Wilson did not really have free reign in terms of the Entente, either. Vienna's foreign policy was mindful of the obviously more powerful ally, but this was not actual dependence on Berlin. Regarding Poland and Ukraine, for example, Vienna consistently lobbied for its own goals that were certainly not in line with Berlin's policy (especially that of the army command, so-called Oberste Heeresleitung, OHL) all the way to the end of the war.Footnote ¹⁹⁵ This view of the monarchy obviously pleased Rome. Why couldn't the United States declare war on Austria-Hungary when it was a mere annex of the decision-making Germany with which it was already at war? A conflict with Austria was thus slowly becoming inevitable.

In the fall of 1917, Robert Lansing was convinced that a separate peace with Austria-Hungary was quite unlikely. He felt that the monarchy was afraid of a “German vendetta.” Instead of betting on Austria-Hungary, the secretary of state therefore began to look for another counterbalance to the German influence. He felt that there should be established a group of strong, populous, and independent states “along the Danube and the Adriatic and also along the eastern boundaries of the German Empire … even though this would drive Russia and Austria out of large areas of territory.”Footnote ¹⁹⁶

Lansing was already toying around with these plans at the beginning of summer in 1917. It was then that he changed his mind on the future of Poland. Wilson wrote that all the Allies should respect its independence and should make it their goal.Footnote ¹⁹⁷ Lansing thus recommended that some of the proposals already contained in the Putney memorandum be implemented. President Wilson started liking the idea of a renewed independent Poland.Footnote ¹⁹⁸ At the beginning of October 1917, he approved volunteers to be recruited for the army in France.Footnote ¹⁹⁹ He still had not given up hope on a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, however.

In October 1917, Wilson received additional information on the activities of the Meinl group. Joseph Grew received two important letters from Hugh Wilson. The original letters cannot be found in the American archives, but based on Grew's response, they also concerned the activities of Professor Lammasch. Grew considered the letters from Switzerland to be of such significance that he decided to present them to the president.Footnote ²⁰⁰

The president's stance on the monarchy was greatly influenced by a surprise Austro-Hungarian offensive on the Italian front at the end of October 1917. The army attacked with German support on 24 October 1917, and it was on that day that surprisingly they broke the front near the Italian occupied city of Caporetto. The Central Powers' army managed to take 265,000 Italian soldiers prisoner within a few days, and about 30,000 Italian soldiers were wounded or killed.Footnote ²⁰¹

The Italians' retreat caused great alarm in the United States. The New York Times reported that “Italian Isonzo Front collapses” and speculated that the United States would be forced to provide Rome direct military aid and declare war on Austria-Hungary.Footnote ²⁰² Phillips, who found out about the collapse of the front at the same time as the news correspondents, marked 29 October 1917 as a “black day.”Footnote ²⁰³ The success of the Central Powers' offensive surprised even the American experts. When speaking with Phillips, the chief of the American Red Cross in Italy, George Baker, admitted that up until this point he had considered the Italian army to be in great technical and moral shape.Footnote ²⁰⁴

In this very uncertain situation, Baron Sonnino attempted to convince the American ambassador in Rome, Thomas N. Page, that the United States should declare war on Austria-Hungary. The ambassador fully supported the Italians.Footnote ²⁰⁵ In a letter to President Wilson, T. N. Page admitted that he had underestimated the situation in the beginning. He thought that the Italian command would be careful after their failures during the so-called Conrad Offensive in South Tirol in May and June 1916 and that they would not allow the front to be broken again. The administration in Rome concealed the true state of things from him, and Page was left with a vapid official statement. It thus took him a few days to get to the bottom of things. The ambassador was convinced that the Italians had enough power to withstand an offensive, but everything depended on the situation in the rear. He forewarned that their determination to fight could be swayed by the anti-war coalition of Socialists and the Vatican.Footnote ²⁰⁶ The influential New York Times also supported the wishes of the Italian government and joined in on pressuring the Wilson administration.Footnote ²⁰⁷

At this awkward time, news broke of new Austro-Hungarian peace probes in Switzerland. Malcolm Robertson, the first secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, delivered to Phillips a fairly brief, secret memorandum containing more detailed information. This message claimed that Count Czernin was willing to negotiate peace terms with London. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister was prepared to publish a declaration, regardless of the offensive that was under way, that would guarantee Italy territorial integrity. The British minister in Bern, Sir Horace Rumbold, was put in charge of telling Czernin's contact that London was willing to negotiate, but only after consultation with the allies.Footnote ²⁰⁸

This was probably the beginning of peace probes, this time led in Switzerland by Julius Meinl. Czernin did try to contact the British in other ways as well; for example, he gave a letter to a known businessman in the Netherlands, in which he promised that the Germans would guarantee that Belgium be restored. Meinl contacted the British, the German Minister in Bern, Baron Gisbert von Romberg, and several other officials and notified them of his plan to call a conference on the postwar organization of the world that was supposed to gradually grow into peace talks with the aid of neutralities. The British and Romberg both agreed and Meinl left for Berlin, where he won the support of several highly ranked functionaries. According to Meinl's contact persons, General Ludendorff also seemed to support the idea. The Germans, however, decided that in order for the plan to go ahead, the United States would also have to give its support.Footnote ²⁰⁹

Meinl returned to Switzerland, where the British arranged his meeting with Professor Herron, and then with the American vice-consul in Zurich, Harold F. McCormick, whom Meinl asked to deliver his mission to President Wilson.Footnote ²¹⁰ After several days, Herron told Meinl that President Wilson agreed with the peace mediation under the condition of the aforementioned German statement regarding Belgium. Meinl, together with the American Consul in Geneva Lewis M. Haskel and Vice-Consul Samuel Edelman, negotiated its correct form. Besides the guarantee for Belgium, the Germans were to grant autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine of the degree equivalent to other confederate states of the German Empire and also agree with the transfer of national issues to a general peace conference.Footnote ²¹¹ Meinl returned to Vienna full of optimism on Christmas Eve of 1917. Czernin, however, quickly made it clear that a negotiation based on this arrangement would not be possible. The Germans were not willing to agree to the listed concessions.Footnote ²¹² Hugh Wilson was also skeptical, as he did not believe that German governmental leaders, specifically Ludendorff, would support his initiative.

Czernin had a strong dislike for Meinl and his group, and this sentiment was shared by several other professional diplomats.Footnote ²¹³ Contrary to Meinl's group, the count was not willing to enter a peace agreement without approval from Berlin, and this did not change even later during his statement at the peace conference with Soviet Russia in Brest-Litovsk.Footnote ²¹⁴ In the fall of 1917, the goal of his policy was different. The count explained his intentions in a letter to the emperor in mid October.

Blaming Charles I for an overly hasty progress to achieve peace, Czernin was convinced that the monarchy's foreign policy had only three possible options. Submission to Germany—in other words, a fight for its unspecified goals—was one. Termination of the alliance with Berlin and signing a separate peace was another. Finally, there was a middle ground option. Czernin rejected the first option as it would cause the complete exhaustion and extinction of the monarchy, and he refused the second option because it would mean a broken promise (in German: “kaiserlicher Wortbruch”). He lobbied for the third option. The Germans were to tone down their war goals and agree to the reestablishment of Belgium with the Austro-Polish solution to the Polish issue.Footnote ²¹⁵ This was to secure an overall peace.

In the fall of 1917, many Austro-Hungarian envoys took part in the negotiations. Besides Meinl, the Chargé d´affaires Hugh Wilson negotiated with Count Károlyi at the same time (Stovall was not present). The Hungarian politician arrived in Switzerland under the same auspice as Meinl, who was participating at the Central Organization for Lasting Peace.Footnote ²¹⁶ The emperor and the foreign minister were both informed of his trip. Czernin considered it as early as the spring of 1917, much to the surprise of Károlyi; however, Czernin refused to approve it in the summer. He only changed his mind at the beginning of October 1917. Nevertheless, Károlyi had to promise that he would not meet with any Entente politicians.Footnote ²¹⁷ In spite of this, he had agreed to meet with the American diplomat.Footnote ²¹⁸

Hugh Wilson met with this influential Hungarian politician for the first time before the war, and he did not hesitate to meet him again.Footnote ²¹⁹ The count reiterated that he had always kept an independent stance during the war, that he lobbied for the democratization of the Kingdom of Hungary, and that he was in opposition to the German dominance of Central Europe. The meeting also demonstrated that Károlyi's relationship with Czernin was much worse than it had been three months ago. The count promised that the foreign minister would shortly be overthrown and that he himself would become part of the government. Apparently, it was only a matter of time before the emperor would start to see clearly again after the temporary successes on the Italian war front.Footnote ²²⁰

Károlyi considered the situation in the monarchy to be very serious. If Germany were to win, supremacy of Berlin was a threat, and in the opposite scenario, the reality of a harsh peace awaited Austria-Hungary as Germany's ally. It is for this reason that Károlyi came up with a third suggestion. If he were to become the Hungarian prime minister, the option that the Entente would plan a peace conference should have been on the table, with the condition that occupied territories be relinquished.Footnote ²²¹ The monarchy would then let Germany know that it was no longer able to fight, and Berlin would thus be forced to agree to participate in the peace conference. During the peace talks, the contestable territories—i.e., claims of Italy, Alsace-Lorraine, and Poland—were to be discussed. Károlyi pointed out that a separate peace with Austria-Hungary was impossible because Germany's influence was too strong. He stressed that Berlin had adequate resources to keep fighting for another year and a half. He then posed Hugh Wilson a key question: “Whether the American government would be inclined toward accepting this proposal, or was it absolutely determined to crush Germany.”

Hugh Wilson avoided giving Károlyi a straight answer. He had no instructions for this type of question, and he knew that the count must soon return home. It was not certain when, and if at all, he would be able to visit Switzerland again.Footnote ²²² As Károlyi allegedly told the emperor himself, he could not provide a report of his trip in time because of the objections of Hungarian Prime Minister Sándor (Alexander) Wekerle, and this only occurred in October 1918.Footnote ²²³ Overall peace would have been difficult for the Entente and the Americans to imagine without a prior defeat of Germany. By dismissing the agreement on a separate peace with the monarchy, Károlyi only gave more ammunition to the American administration.

Contrary to the summer of 1917, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George supported the idea of quickly negotiating a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. Only a few months prior, he felt that the exclusion of Austria-Hungary from the war was to be aided by a successful offensive of the Italian army. The attack of the Central Powers, however, completely changed the situation.Footnote ²²⁴ During the Parisian meeting of the Entente's leaders, to which Colonel House was also invited as Wilson's “special representative,” the British prime minister attempted to gain America's support for additional negotiations with Vienna. House agreed, and with his help, Lloyd George managed to convince the initially disapproving Italians and thereby convinced the entire inter-ally conference.Footnote ²²⁵

The reason for Lloyd George's initiative was not Meinl's probes, however, as he probably was not informed about Károlyi's role. At the end of November, a person from the administration (not an influential, private person) reported to the British legation in Bern. As per Czernin's orders, the counselor from the Austro-Hungarian legation in Bern, Knight Ladislaus Skrzynno-Skrzyński, took over the initiative. These preliminary probes then led to a meeting between the former Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Great Britain, Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein, and a member of the British wartime cabinet for the South African Union Jan Smuts in Switzerland.

The declaration of war on Austria-Hungary by the United States could no longer be prevented. First and foremost, it was a question of showing solidarity with the heavily tested Italian ally. In mid November, the situation was so unstable that the ally conference in Paris was postponed by a week. Everyone was also waiting to see if Italy would hold up.Footnote ²²⁶ At the same time, it appeared that a separate peace would still be possible if Vienna were to be pushed more against the wall. In the first half of November, the Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando and Foreign Minister Sonnino stressed to Page how important it was for the United States to declare war on Austria-Hungary, or at least to send one small unit to the Italian front—which was basically the same thing. Italian politicians were concerned with the possibility that the pope would propose a new peace offer, “which would have an unfortunate effect owing to the weariness of the people in the war.”Footnote ²²⁷ Some members of Congress, such as Senator Claude A. Swanson of Virginia, also put pressure on the State Department.Footnote ²²⁸ It was only on 14 November 1917 that Phillips received news that the president was considering declaring war on Austria-Hungary.Footnote ²²⁹

The president's decision was also influenced by Grew's weekly review of the situation concerning the Central Powers, which he received via Lansing with a slight delay on 12 November 1917. Grew was convinced that the offensive in Italy solidified Vienna's allegiance with Berlin.Footnote ²³⁰ The opinion that the monarchy was trailing behind Germany regardless of its peace probes was confirmed. Lansing took a more cautious stance on the issue of war with Austria-Hungary. He realized that the United States would have a hard time providing reasons for war with Austria-Hungary. The memorandum put together by the Department of State Solicitor, Lester H. Woolsey, indicated that “nothing has occurred since the declaration of war against Germany … involving direct and wanton violation of rights of American citizens on the part of Austro-Hungarian Government.” The memorandum only considered several “unfriendly acts” of the monarchy. The attack on the American steamliner Marguerite on 4 April 1917 was one example. Even that was questionable, however, as a sufficient reason to declare war. Woolsey admitted that an unidentified submarine, whose crew apparently spoke an “Austrian language,” sunk the liner. Another curious reason for declaring war was the agreement of the U.S. government with Polish units fighting on the side of the Entente, where the emperor's subjects from Galicia also served. Washington could hardly blame the Viennese government for the creation of these units, however.Footnote ²³¹

Lansing was very well aware of the weaknesses in the solicitor's memorandum. He did send it to the president, but he pointed out that “we have not a very strong case against Austria so far as hostile acts are concerned.” He also suggested that it was necessary to consider the consequences of the war in terms of homeland security, because a large number of immigrants from the monarchy lived in the United States.Footnote ²³² Legal technicalities could not prevent the war, however. Even Lansing did not oppose it directly, and public opinion expected it. On 23 November 1917, The New York Times believed it was a done deal. The newspaper was probably familiar with Woolsey's argumentation, because they listed all the pros and cons of the war a few days later, including an argument regarding the immigrants of Austro-Hungarian origin. The declaration of war would apparently “add the entire Austrian, Hungarian and Czech not yet naturalized population to an already high number of enemy foreigners in this country.” In spite of this, however, The New York Times unequivocally supported the declaration of war on Austria-Hungary.Footnote ²³³

The president decided to take a risk. The well-informed New York Times devoted time and space to his politics in early December. Apparently, Wilson initially believed that if he avoided declaring war on Austria-Hungary, the United States “might keep open the path to advantageous peace terms with Germany.” The administration, however, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to continue with the war by all means until Germany autocracy was completely destroyed.Footnote ²³⁴ According to the newspaper, the significance of the monarchy for U.S. politics had decreased. In reality, Wilson did not give up on the idea of a separate peace with Vienna, but it was supposed to be a way to reach the main goal—the total destruction of Germany.Footnote ²³⁵

Public opinion, Congress, and the administration were all dominated by voices that most lobbied for the war with Austria-Hungary, and in some cases, even war with Bulgaria and Turkey. Even William J. Stone, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, tried to persuade the administration to go to war, though he actually voted against the war with Germany in April 1917. At the beginning of December 1917, Stone wrote Lansing a letter in which he recommended that war also be declared on Bulgaria and Turkey.Footnote ²³⁶ Congress was not unanimous on this matter, however, and some influential Democrats recommended keeping the current status quo.Footnote ²³⁷

It was not clear, even to members of the president's own cabinet until the last minute, how the president would proceed. When the president took the stand to deliver the State of the Union Address on 4 December 1917, most of those present expected that he would only approve immediate aid to Italy. It was generally believed that Vienna itself would then declare war on America. When Wilson asked for the declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, his words sounded “like thunder-clap.” Senators and congressmen jumped from their seats and started to applaud.Footnote ²³⁸

The president cited the Danubian Monarchy's apparent and total dependence on Germany as the reason for his change of policy: “Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress but simply the vassal of the German government,” he declared. He admitted that using this logic, Congress should ask for a declaration of war on Bulgaria and Turkey, but those countries were less significant than the Danubian Monarchy and they did not stand in the way of the United States. He also confirmed his interest in lobbying for the Habsburg monarchy nations' right to self-determination. Wilson stressed, however, that he did not wish “to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they [the monarchy nations] do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands.”Footnote ²³⁹

Wilson's speech was met with a near unanimous consensus. Phillips considered it “the most remarkable of his many messages.”Footnote ²⁴⁰ The New York Times also welcomed war with Austria-Hungary, understanding it to be a conflict of elites, just like the president did. The newspaper also stressed the importance of the monarchy's national problems and recommended that Vienna comply with the founded complaints of its nations. “There is no such being as an Austrian and only a minority of the dwellers of what is known as Hungary are Hungarians,” it stated.Footnote ²⁴¹

Congress approved the president's request on 7 December 1917. Seventy-four senators voted in favor, no one was in opposition, and the only one who abstained was Robert La Follette, a known antiwar senator. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and a very influential Republican publicly criticized the declaration of war for not including Bulgaria and Turkey.Footnote ²⁴² Voting was similar in the House of Representatives: 365 voted in favor; the only opposing voice was that of New York socialist Meyer London.

When Wilson declared war on Austria-Hungary on 11 December 1917, the Ballhausplatz was not surprised with the United States' decision.Footnote ²⁴³ Signals of impending doom came late, but not even an early warning would have allowed Czernin to divert the threat. News that Austria-Hungary was transferring its units from the east and even from Italy to the Western Front was spreading throughout Switzerland and Scandinavia, which would have meant casus belli for the United States. Czernin assumed that war would also be declared on Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire.Footnote ²⁴⁴ The emperor was also informed of the impending danger.Footnote ²⁴⁵ He was very distressed and over the next few days repeatedly demanded additional news.Footnote ²⁴⁶ The rumors made their way to the streets; as a result, the Czech and Slovenian members of the Delegation of the Imperial Council headed by Václav Klofáč interpellated Count Czernin.Footnote ²⁴⁷

The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister reacted to the unofficial news by describing the entry of the United States into war against Austria-Hungary as a stern warning for Czernin's ruling circles. In a speech he delivered in Budapest on 6 December 1917, he admitted that because of “loyal allegiance with Germany, we had to count on the hostility of America,” and that if war with the United States truly did take place, then their Austro-Hungarian nationals would be in a difficult situation. Yet, he honored that Wilson did not wish to interfere with the monarchy's internal affairs and was therefore more tolerant than the Entente.Footnote ²⁴⁸ Czernin further suggested that the president could gradually change his mind as to the future of the monarchy.

Emperor Charles reacted accordingly. He told the representative of the Foreign Ministry Count August Demblin that according to the AOK, there were already 50,000 Americans with artillery on the Western Front, and that the German U-boats had yet to sink a single American troopship. The emperor counted on their numbers increasing to 700,000 by May 1918. He believed that the Central Powers would “probably [not] be able to withstand this power with an equal counterweight.”Footnote ²⁴⁹ That is why over the course of the subsequent months, the emperor attempted to achieve peace through Wilson.