Peter Clarke, former professor of modern history at Cambridge University, has produced seven books to acclaim, but The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire represents his first foray into the field of imperial history. Clarke modestly acknowledges that this, his latest publication, is not an exertion of scholastic history. Yet it must be recognized, at the outset, that Clarke's book is a popular history built upon exemplary scholarly insight and understanding.

The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire traces Britain's decline as an equal member of the Allied Great Powers to a position of vassalage under American tutelage. Commencing his analysis with the Second Quebec Conference of 1944 Clarke reassesses Britain's status within the Big Three—Britain, Russia, and the United States. Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's ambiguous interpretation of both the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the Anglo-American special relationship were pivotal to the dynamics of his foreign policy and the future of the British Empire. Nevertheless, this ambiguity permitted President Franklin D. Roosevelt and America to dictate a different vision of British foreign policy—one without an empire—much to the chagrin of the foreign secretary Anthony Eden and the Foreign Office. As the war progressed, Churchill's star waned in Roosevelt's eyes and Marshal Stalin's grew. However, Roosevelt's foreign policy was unique to himself—as Clarke's analysis of the Malta and Yalta Conferences testifies. American foreign policy, in particular the critical relationships between the Big Three, was hostage to the president and his failing health. With the death of Roosevelt and the accession of Harry S. Truman to the presidency a power vacuum developed in Allied wartime policy during the crucial period between the Yalta and the Potsdam Conferences (February–July 1945). At the same time in Britain, Churchill's wartime coalition government was dissolved, and the prime minister was deposed by the electorate in favor of Clement Attlee and a Labour government promising a new social reform agenda. It was left to Attlee and his foreign secretary Ernest Bevin to reestablish the Anglo-American special relationship within a postwar context. This was dominated by Britain's bankruptcy and the burden of empire.

Indeed, the ambiguity that first created the Lend-Lease agreements, to both American and British advantage earlier in the war, now served against the British Empire. America, as the stronger partner, was best placed to take advantage of this and thereby dictated the terms of Britain's reconstruction loan and the dynamics of the postwar world. Even with the onset of the Cold War, Britain was subservient to the whims of its senior partner. This senior partner failed to appreciate both the depths of Britain's structural decline and the complexities of its global responsibilities. Clarke's case studies of Greece, India, and Palestine reveal not only the burden of international public opinion upon British foreign policy but also how unsophisticated the American judgment of such issues was in the period 1945–47—an immaturity that was shared by both the politicians and the public alike.

Into this narrative Clarke has woven vivid illustrations of Churchill, Roosevelt, Attlee, and Truman. In addition, the waspish Sir Alexander Cadogan, permanent secretary at the Foreign Office; the ever dependable Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff; the taciturn Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, viceroy of India; and the publicity-seeking Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery are all portrayed by the author with panache—even to the extent that they intellectually eclipse General Dwight Eisenhower and other supposed heroes of the hour. The strength of Clarke's study is his ability to bring to life numerous characters outside of the inner circle of the usual suspects—for example, the Right Honourable Richard Crossman and Henry Morgenthau Junior. Likewise, Clarke extracts sympathy for Edward Stettinius after Truman's blunt dismissal of his secretary of state following Stettinius's successes at the San Francisco Conference in establishing the United Nations. Attlee's troubled relationship with Truman exacts similar emotion and is in itself worthy of mention as many historians of this era depict Bevin as the sole guardian of British foreign policy. Therefore, the human dimension of the analysis reveals the all encompassing brilliance of Clarke's popular history.

Finally, it is important to return to Clarke's modest claims about this being his first venture into imperial history and one that is not an academic work. Imperial historians may wish to take issue with some of Clarke's thesis and argue that, despite the loss of India, Burma, and Palestine, the Second World War actually strengthened the imperial bonds. But to do so would be to misconceive the nature of this study. This is a popular history about diplomacy and imperial high policy at its best. It is enjoyable and thought provoking, frustrating and infuriating, and it is of value to both scholars and more general readers alike; therefore it deserves to be welcomed.