If success is synonymous with fame, the Pinkerton Detective Agency undoubtedly remains the most successful detective agency and private security provider in American history (although it is likely that a business that places secrecy at a premium would dictate that an agency lacking in fame was a successful one). No other American private organization claimed (in Max Weber's famous phrasing) “legitimate violence” during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In its early years, the agency's founder, Allan Pinkerton, published a series of sensational texts describing his and his agents’ exploits taming the countryside in the name of capital. “The Pinkertons” were real, but they also existed in the popular culture industry of dime novels and “true crime” magazines devoured by the Gilded Age reading public. S. Paul O'Hara is clearly enamored of the era's literary aesthetic, as shown by his intentionally archaic book title, as well as his deliberate homage to Victorian novels demonstrated by how he names his chapters (e.g., “In which the Pinks serve as a private army for capital,” “In which the disgrace of Pinkertonism is subjected to public scrutiny”). Befittingly, he commands a broad knowledge of Pinkerton's own self-aggrandizing writings, as well as the fanciful writings about him and his employees. And yet O'Hara does not trivialize the brutality that defined the organization. The agency was undeniably a force of violence that defied industrial workers’ constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. “If corporate managers were the ‘visible hand’ of the market,” O'Hara writes, “the Pinkertons were the market's visible fist; they were the shock troops of industrial order” (9).
Allan Pinkerton was a Scottish emigrant who ended up in Illinois not long before the Civil War. He attached himself to the Republican Party and the Union cause (no doubt inspired by his murky connections to the British Chartist movement), and procured an appointment as Lincoln's spymaster via George McClellan. Accounts of his utility to federal victory differ. It is very likely Pinkerton provided bad intelligence to the Army of the Potomac, although he probably did save the Union trouble with the capture of a female spy, and it is possible that he saved Abraham Lincoln from an 1861 assassination conspiracy in Baltimore. More importantly, Pinkerton used his tenuous Lincoln connections to build a postwar reputation as a domestic patriot, and an embodiment of the industrial victory the war ultimately represented (it is no coincidence that one of the greatest railroad barons of the 1870s, Tom Scott, had been Assistant Secretary of War during the Lincoln administration). As Northern and Southern whites reconciled in the decades that followed, Pinkerton's Union partisan identity melted away but his connection to Lincoln was social capital that paid dividends long after his 1884 death.
After the war, Pinkerton concentrated his efforts on the outlaws who attempted to continue the Southern cause, exploited postwar disorder, or, like the James/Younger gang, both. Jesse James may not have become an idiomatic name had his competition with Pinkerton not been preserved in fictitious form by countless dime novels. Pinkerton's failure to capture James and his gang was probably his agency's greatest failure, not only because the train robber was brought low by the state of Missouri instead of Pinkerton, but also because the legend of their chases cast James in the role of agrarian hero and Pinkerton in the role of villain (Pinkerton agents’ killing and maiming of a woman and child related to James in 1875 did not help). Jesse James gained the sympathy of white Missourians by conflating Pinkerton with federal forces, and Pinkerton was forced to retreat (the agency's besting of the “Wild Bunch” decades later served as a redemption as far as storied Western outlaws went). Soon thereafter, Pinkerton's agency brought to justice members of the Molly Maguires, a secretive organization that combined Irish nationalism with workers’ revolt in the coalfields of Northeastern Pennsylvania. Local Pennsylvanians smarted at the agency's smarmy tactics, but on a national level, the operation was considered a success.
For the rest of his life Pinkerton propagated the theory of “a conspiratorial cabal of communists who had tapped into and corrupted the vast populations of shiftless tramps and immigrant labor” (65). The Railroad Uprising of 1877 and the events surrounding the Haymarket Riot nine years later seemed to bear this out to many Americans, especially those already fearful of foreign-tongued working class immigrants. Pinkerton already counted capitalists, particularly railroad owners, as his primary clients, and had since before the Civil War. But O'Hara insists that it was not until the 1880s, when Pinkerton's sons were gradually taking over the business, that the agency truly became “in essence a private army on the side of the industrialists” (73). Readers who still hearken to the “incorporation” historiography of Richard Maxwell Brown, David Thelen, and Alan Trachtenburg (all of them influenced by Robert H. Wiebe's The Search for Order) would probably be unconvinced, and interpret practically every Pinkerton operation since the Civil War as the same program.Footnote 1 O'Hara's failure to address this (dated, but relevant) historiography is noticeable since he seems to echo it, particularly when pointing out that, in the 1860s and 1870s, the Pinkertons were often at odds with the preindustrial mores of communities just being drawn into the postbellum web of railroads.
The transformation was complete by the time of the 1892 Homestead strike in Southwestern Pennsylvania, when Andrew Carnegie's lieutenant Henry Frick employed the Pinkertons in a bloody battle with striking steelworkers. The American public found the agency's tactics repugnant, and the result was a heightened federal oversight over industrial relations, as well as national and state regulations over Pinkerton and similar agencies. Despite Allan Pinkerton's sons’ attempts at positive public relations, the agency's reputation was permanently damaged, although it persisted as a business. By the time it was investigated by the congressional La Follette Committee during the New Deal, it was a shadow of its former self. Still technically a firm (although now owned by a Swedish holding company), Pinkerton lives on, O'Hara suggests, in organizations like Blackwater, and other mercenary organizations who carry out transnational operations with even greater impunity than did the Pinkertons at the time of Homestead. Inventing the Pinkertons ultimately serves not only as a scintillating Gilded Age history, but also as an instructive cautionary tale for those of us living through the Second Gilded Age.
