I. INTRODUCTION
David Ricardo had a vision of social order achieved both through a fully operating free market and on the basis of an extension of the franchise to the working class. This was a vision that in many respects could have been endorsed by his radical contemporary, Thomas Paine. Ricardo answered the needs of radicals in outlining a system that could operate without visible control and did so at a time when radicals, such as Paine, were being politically persecuted in the wake of concerns about the direction taken by the French Revolution. Like the radicals, he diagnosed the country as held back by institutionalized corruption, founded on political monopoly, and benefiting the aristocracy. Free trade had political significance as an alternative to privileged manipulation of the market, allowing freedom to all interests. Paine may have championed liberty but he was close to Ricardo in insisting that its benefits could only arise from the pursuit of interest, “it is on this ground that I take my stand” (1791, p. 212).
We can apprehend the pursuit of interest as more than just constitutive of a free economic realm when it is looked at through Paine's work. Freely pursued interest was the actual alternative to a world of status, so if given free range “prejudice will fall in a battle with interest” (1791, p. 161) and monarchy will not withstand “reason and interest” (1791, p. 174). In this light it would be a mistake to consider political economy as the economic side, subsequently to be integrated with the political; any system that envisaged an alternative to privileged control was political from the start. The market, as the full sway of all interests, was a political institution, but not obviously so since its merit lay in the demotion of political prerogative. Consistent with this, Ricardo defended freedom of speech, as well as religious tolerance (1951-73, V, pp. 278-80, 324, 330, also XI, pp. xxii-xxiv, in relation to Ireland VIII, p. 50, 369) and supported a free press as a check on despotism (V, pp. 496-7). Ricardo objected to slavery as a “stain” that he “ardently desired to see wiped away” (V, p. 483).Footnote 1 His views suggest a consistent vision of political order for which the market was as much a political as an economic arrangement. The key was accumulation since this would produce the wealth, use values, on which everyone could claim through their money revenues. Political economy has always argued from interest; Ricardo extended this argument to extension of the franchise. The working class was the political backbone for Ricardo's long run view, his abstraction, against the immediate interference not just of the landlords but of particular manufacturers. He differed from Smith who saw the “labourers” as “incapable either of comprehending that interest [of society], or of understanding its connection with his own” (1976, p. 266).Footnote 2 For Ricardo, working class interest in the health of the whole system was a better guarantor of accumulation than those with particular benefits. As Ricardo chose to put it, extension of the franchise was vital because, “Of all the classes in the community the people only are interested in being well governed” (V, p. 498).
II. PREVIOUS VIEWS
Ricardo's reputation has not been formed in context but rather isolated in terms of an imagined methodological vice. Ricardo's abstraction supposedly demonstrated a divorce from political and economic realities. There has been guarded praise that he developed the method of model building (O'Brien Reference O'Brien1975, p. 3) but the stress has fallen on that “Ricardian Vice” of “bundling up as large parts of [the general system] as possible, and put[ting] them in cold storage” and then adding one simplifying assumption to another until “the desired results emerged almost as tautologies” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, pp. 472-73, O'Brien Reference O'Brien1975, p. 3, also Keynes Reference Keynes and Moggridge1973-9, X, p. 95, Bagehot Reference Bagehot and Holt Hutton1888, p. 197, Jevons Reference Jevons1970, p. 67, Toynbee 1927, p. 2). Given this view it shouldn't surprise that Ricardo's political thought has been treated but not adequately as one with his economic thought. William Grampp (Reference Grampp1965), who did examine “The Political Ideas of the Classical Economists,” recognized the disparity of these economists defending market choice when such choice “implies a democratic form of government.” This, said Grampp, “suggests the classical economists should have favoured such a government. But they did not” (1965, p. 40, p. 52).
Denis O'Brien addressed democracy when he argued that classical economists were not dogmatic about laissez-faire. They recognized “the allocative mechanism of the market” but realized it had to operate within a framework of restrictions “designed to ensure the coincidence of self and community interest” (1975, p. 272). Reconciliation of self and community interest in a market society appeared to have no principle and so “the exact framework required was to be revealed by experience, as defects in the operation of the system were discovered” (1975, p. 272). Given this lack of principle, it was reasonable to conclude that for classical economists, “There was a danger in a democracy that everyone would try to increase the power of the State and use it to their own advantage” (1975, p. 273). In fact, Ricardo held the opposite view, seeing democracy as the means of depriving interests of privileged influence.
Defenses of Ricardo's practicality have tended to fall short of presenting a complete vision.Footnote 3 Neither Samuel Hollander (Reference Hollander1979) nor Murray Milgate and Shannon Stimson (1991) go to the heart of Ricardo's system of political order. Hollander argues that it was Ricardo's “predilection” for long-run analysis that allowed him to appear “divorced in his intellectual interests from “day to day” considerations” (1979, p. 657). However he then shows that “Ricardo was in fact preoccupied with “short-run” matters relating both to theory and policy.” (1979, pp. 657-58) Ricardo's position is defended as a pragmatic willingness to take on short-run analysis. In giving instances of such pragmatism, Hollander effectively treats economic theory and political concerns as separate strands in Ricardo's thought. This leaves Ricardo's reputation perilously balanced on a slim margin of material and, most importantly, concedes the impracticality of Ricardo's long-run perspective and abstraction.Footnote 4
Milgate and Stimson (Reference Milgate and Stimson1991) do argue for the full integration of Ricardo's economics and politics. They have drawn attention to a political perspective that contradicts his reputation as the abstract economist of Processpolitik. Their case is undermined since they do not take up recognized elements of Ricardo's economic thought. Their treatment of abstraction does not see it as central to his political thought but, rather, accepts the usual charges, then denies they hold. In addition, Ricardo's argument from interest has an unclear position in their account. Ricardo is assessed in terms of a proto-social democratic position depending on the special virtues of the working class. They reject consideration of his theory of value. If we are to determine whether Ricardo was coherent it must be in terms of his abstraction, his argument from interest, and his theory of value, three elements that, in conjunction, may seem incongruous to the modern sentiment.
III. ABSTRACTION: CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY
Ricardo's long run perspective was not simply a methodological choice but was necessary to conceiving how a system could be self-regulated without the immediate hand of powerful short run interests. To understand Ricardo's abstraction we examine it in the context of the system of corruption. Ricardo's specific concerns were taxation, expenditure, market interference, the position and prospects for the classes and reform of parliament. These themes were the basis of the identification of the British establishment as “Old Corruption” (E. P. Thompson Reference Thompson1965, P. HarlingReference Harling1996, W. Rubinstein Reference Rubinstein1983).
Taxation and representation had been key in the American Revolution. British radicals, such as Richard Price (Reference Price1789), celebrated both the American and French revolutions as advancing in the tradition of the Glorious Revolution. It was Price whom Edmund Burke took to task in his Reflections on the French Revolution, and Price whom Thomas Paine defended at the start of his Rights of Man. Price had argued the general idea of liberty to be “self-direction” and so argued, as fundamental, “The right of a people to give and grant their ‘own money’” (1775, p. 49). Price saw democratic reform—overcoming corruption—as essential to the controlling and funding of debt. That reform and taxation were inseparable can be seen in the matter of the sinking fund, where Price anticipated Ricardo (Reference Price1772 p. 40).
What Price called the “system of corruption” was also Paine's target in The Rights of Man. Paine's advocacy of democracy was founded on his confidence in the civilizing benefits of trade across the division of labor. Democracy would prevent partial control for narrow interests. As with Price, Paine and other radicals, Ricardo, too, looked to a system of interest freed from privilege. In addressing the Corn Laws, taxation, rent, wages, and democracy Ricardo took on key political issues for radicals and showed how they could be resolved within a system of political economy. Just as Paine had upheld against Burke that “Every age and generation must be free to act for itself” (1984 p. 41), so Ricardo argued against tradition, denying “that the present generation ought to be bound down by all that had been done by their ancestors” (V, p. 283). In answering the question of how an order could be achieved without tradition, political economy had a distinctive contribution.
Of course, Smith also looked to a “system of liberty.” The significance of Ricardo is that he advocated extension of the franchise and advocated reforms in the period of reaction following the French Revolution. The visible hand, even if Old Corruption's, had come to seem, even to liberals, a hand of order. Ricardo resisted these fears, envisaging a system that could be self-sustained rather than needing the “Gentleman.” Abstraction was practical for this vision because it looked beyond the immediate allure of patronage and privilege to an underlying, permanent, order. Corruption was not straightforward; the aristocracy and rank in general were seen by some as essential to preserving order. Patronage could be argued as securing stability (Harling Reference Harling1996, p. 35). We may interpret as something more than narrow self-interest the claim, justifying prosecution of Paine, that Paine “destroyed every principle of subordination and established nothing in their turn” (Whatmore Reference Whatmore, Stefan, Richard and Brian2000, p. 152). In this context of uncertainty, abstraction was necessary to presenting a system of permanent yet underlying principles. Ricardo's political economy, on this ground, made a vital contribution to a vision of social order sustained without privilege.
We might object that Ricardo never referred to his abstraction as political, but his opponents were aware of its significance. They knew he looked to deny short-run claims exercised through the political process. These opponents set in motion the charge of abstraction. Henry Brougham, asserted, famously, that Ricardo “argued as if he had dropped from another planet” (V, p. 56) and later described him as “abundantly theoretical,” someone who followed a “right principle” to its consequences “without duly taking into account in practice the condition of things to which he was applying it” (V, p. xxxiii). Ricardo was not, despite Brougham's characterization, a naïve methodologist let loose on matters of state, nor was Brougham idly interested in methodology. Rather, he sought to undermine Ricardo's opposition to intervention. This is also clear in the debate with Malthus. Malthus chose to criticize Ricardo's abstraction, claiming that Ricardo lacked realism. Malthus preferred to examine “things as they are,” the proper point of departure if “one's writings . . . were to be . . . practically useful to society” (195 xx VII, pp. 121-22). He complained of Ricardo's “oversimplification” (1989, p. 6) and the “tendency to premature generalization” (1989 p. 10). Ricardo was clear about his own position, choosing to criticize Malthus for his focus on the “temporary” while he, himself, fixed his “whole attention on the permanent state of things” (VII, p. 120). In comparing “temporary” and “permanent” Ricardo made it clear that the issue was about more than choosing different time periods. Ricardo's abstraction was not a methodological cul de sac, but was essential to his context and practical purpose.
Ricardo's abstraction valued a permanence underlying immediate, existing, if temporary, conditions. Those who wanted to seek intervention for prices, to be active in the immediate, had to counter his approach. Ricardo found adherents of the “artificial system” needed to attack political economy.Footnote 5 He told how “he had frequently to repel the attacks which were made upon the science of political economy” (V, p. 248). When it was suggested that the principles of political economy varied every two or three years, Ricardo replied that “the principles of true political economy never changed; and those who did not understand that science had better say nothing about it” (V, p. 296). “The [very] words ‘political economy’,” he complained, “had of late, become terms of ridicule and reproach. They were used as a substitute for an argument” (V, p. 307). The contrast was, on one side, pleas to undermine the claims of science and, on the other, a defense of “argument”—the same contrast as that between “wrong notions of commercial policy that urged partial views on behalf of one set of men or another” (V, p. 104) and, on the other, “sounder principles.”
The usual charge of abstraction sets up an opposition between abstraction and the facts that is deceptive since the former, posited as the general conditions which lie behind the facts, is not necessarily less real than the facts themselves.Footnote 6 Anybody who emphasized the “facts,” especially at the expense of theory, had effectively defended existing partial interests, and in this respect abstraction was practical, looking to an underlying order. Recent investigation (Depoortère Reference Depoortèe2005) has restored some credibility to Ricardo's abstraction by giving it an intellectual pedigree, following a line back through Dugald Stewart to Thomas Reid's common sense philosophy. Here is a defense of Ricardo that opens “a new prospect about the role played by abstraction in Ricardo's method” (2005, p. 27). Reid asserted that we are confronted not by simple facts, from which we build up, but by existing complex objects.
So, understanding required abstraction from immediate facts to find key common elements. We can take this further than method, since the complex object to be understood was composed of “this conflict of contending interests and prejudices” (Stewart Reference Stewart and William Hamilton1877, p. 12). Abstraction was then the process of looking through “contending interests” to the general, or as Stewart called it, the “permanent” interest (1877, p. 12). This was all the more necessary when the situation confronted was “the insolence of rank, and the selfishness of opulence” (1814, p. 212). Abstraction could not then, as Ricardo's critics have suggested, be replaced by something more “realistic” since this could only mean theoretical and practical capitulation to the serious interests of his day.
IV. THE MARKET, INTERESTS, AND REFORM
A large proportion of the legislation considered after Waterloo consisted of private bills concerning particular revenues. “The House,” Ricardo complained, “was assailed on all sides for protecting duties” (V, p.219). Their object, as he said in the case of a duty proposed on foreign tallow, was to put “money into the hands of the landed interest by taking it out of the pockets of the rest of the people” (V, p. 291). He believed that, “once [free trade had been properly] arrived at . . . the House would no longer be tormented with these discussions and with constant solicitations to sacrifice the public good to particular interests.” (V, p. 190) The House had to recognize the priority of the general over particular interests but argument alone was insufficient; there had to be reform. The aristocracy, who benefited from high agricultural prices, would oppose good government since “it may prevent them from having the same emoluments, advantage or power, which they would have if government . . . chiefly concerned itself about the happiness of the few ” (V, p. 498).
In Parliament, Ricardo declared that he “consulted the interests of the whole community” (V, p. 49). He rejected the notion that particular interests, such as landlords, were so important that they should be “forced at the general good” (V, p. 47). The duty of the legislature, he argued, was to look not at the “partial loss which would be endured by a few . . . but to the general interests of the nation” (V, p. 49-50). When an attempt was made to identify “the agricultural interest as the basis of all others” (V, p. 81) Ricardo complained of special pleading in which the “interests of landlords were chiefly considered” (V, p. 81) and in the matter of Timber Duties, Ricardo was unmoved: “it was useless,” he argued, “to urge partial views in behalf of one set of men or another. [This] house,” he added, “ought not to look to the right or left, but consider merely how the people of England, as a body, could best employ their capital and labour” (V, p. 104).Footnote 7
Ricardo approached political order for a market society when “all men, in all situations, act . . . under the influence of motives” (V, p. 288). He rejected “virtual representation” in which an enlightened group acted on behalf of the interest of another group. Terry Peach has questioned this rejection but is unconvincing since he does not tackle Ricardo's expressed support for a fully extended franchise. Also, while Ricardo supported the role of political economists in parliament this was not virtual representation since political economists would never be an economic class with majority power in parliament. Virtual representation implied that one class could represent the interests of another; belief in such a system would have been contrary to the basic assumption of Ricardo's political economy. For Ricardo the free play of self-interest was not only compatible with order but was necessary for its achievement.
The importance of a political economy of interest is illustrated in debate with Trower. When conceding to Trower the superiority of the mixed constitution over a republic, Ricardo shifted focus to the more fundamental issue of determining to whom “would you refer the question for decision?” (VII, p. 320). The peers and King were ruled out in favor of those who had no “sinister interest.” Ricardo's case was that, given the superiority of the mixed constitution, the people themselves would select it. Trower feared that the power of the people would grow to be “irresistible” but for Ricardo this was not the point; Trower must prove that such a power would be used for “mischief” and to do that Trower must “show an adequate motive for such an abuse” (VII, p. 321). Ricardo had to argue from interest even with his fellow political economists. He saw workers’ interests coinciding with accumulation as essential to his argument for extension of the franchise.
This is quite a different interpretation of Ricardo's case from one made by Milgate and Stimson that “the legitimacy of public demands seems to have rested on the sheer numbers of those making such demands” (1991, p. 24). They also argued, referring to the working class, that “Ricardo simply held that these individuals were to be represented as a matter of principle” (1991, p. 64). This is not the case and contradicts their own argument that Ricardo trusted in the adequate knowledge of the working class. Whatever their argument, whether numbers, principle, or knowledge, their claims that Ricardo harnessed “the science of political economy to the science of politics” (1991, p. 16) and that he grounded his arguments “upon a model of economic functioning” (1991, p. 17) are not adequately upheld. Such claims must, given the nature of political economy, be founded on an argument from interest. Indeed, where they present Ricardo's theory as an argument for a knowledge of the general interest they replace the virtue of an elite by the virtue of the people.
Milgate and Stimson are aware of the problem, making the point that Ricardo “expressed a general distrust of any idea of virtue which was too far removed from self-interest” (1991, p. 34). However, the implication is not driven home; we find, soon after, that Ricardo trusts to the ability of the common man “to reason about matters touching on the public good” (1991, p. 34.) This leads us to a revealing confusion arising from their eclectic approach. They point to Ricardo's recognition of the correctness, conformable to political economy, of working class positions on machinery and apprenticeship. In both instances the correctness stood opposed to the positions of employers. Such cases reinforced Ricardo's support for the representation of common opinion, grounded on his economic thought (1991, p. 61). They believed this countered Ricardo's usual reputation: “None of this sounds like the friend of the bourgeoisie” (1991, p. 61). Here is a seeming paradox, since on the poor laws Ricardo “did not advance far beyond the opinions of other reformers” (1991, p. 63, emphasis added). Indeed, worse still, being so wedded to the position of Malthus, “he proposed no policies which might alleviate the sufferings of the poor if, on that principle, they would contribute to further population increase” (1991, p. 63).
Milgate and Stimson's Ricardo appears somewhat mixed-up, no friend of the bourgeoisie, yet not advancing to produce welfare measures. To present Ricardo in terms of this failure to advance is a political anachronism. Ricardo actively opposed “policies to alleviate the sufferings of the poor” since they went against all he believed in. Ricardo thought the market was as much an opportunity for the working class as for anyone else; gradual poor law reform, allowing independent responsibility with scope for the virtues of “prudence and forethought” (Ricardo Reference Ricardo and Sraffa1951, p. 107) would provide the opportunity for wages to rise.
The machinery question is intriguing but did not give Ricardo evidence that the working class could be trusted since his proposals for the franchise had already been developed. In any case, the machinery question poses a problem, but it has to be said it was not one that loomed large for Ricardo. He did not support obstruction to the introduction of machinery and argued that there was no alternative (V, p. 303).Footnote 8 Ricardo may not have been a “friend of the bourgeoisie” but he was a staunch defender, against all particular interests, of accumulation. Understanding abstraction as more than a choice of methodology, concerned with the general as opposed to partial interests, helps clear the way. Ricardo championed accumulation for the growth of use values, not for the existing money revenues of partial interests; this could put him in conflict even with capitalists. It is true that Ricardo's theory indicated an inverse relation between profit—the motive to accumulate—and wages. But we shall see below, having dealt with value, that Ricardo does reconcile wages positively to accumulation, and in this machinery, enabling the lowering of costs was crucial.
The significance Ricardo attached to the free operation of self-interest is also revealed by his treatment of how partial legislation should be ended. He favored a gradual approach. “Many persons,” he argued on one occasion, had “vested their capital on the faith of the continuance of the restrictive system, and therefore, however injurious that system might be, nothing could be more unjust than, by the immediate abolition of that system, to occasion absolute ruin of those who vested large capital on the faith of laws so long established as restrictive laws” (1951-73, V, pp. 43-44.) Hollander considers this gradualism to be at variance with Ricardo's principles, but it can be interpreted in a different light. For in so far as gradualism was seen by Ricardo as a means of allowing individuals to adjust, and the end of free trade was never compromised, it was a means of employing self interest to achieve the general interest.
Consider an instance when Ricardo gave self-interest short shrift. A plea had been made in a reform debate on behalf of those with vested interests in boroughs. This appears similar to the case Ricardo made for gradual adjustment of vested interests in capital but in fact he reacted strongly against it as a “most extraordinary proposition.” “Could those pretended rights be considered in the light of property?” he asked (V, p. 285). He contrasted those who had invested in good faith, given the restrictive system, with, in this case “a certain set of persons [who] had, for corrupt purposes, enjoyed the privilege for many years of preventing the people from being well governed” (V, p. 285). If we allow Hollander's claim that Ricardo is pragmatic, these different responses to “vested interests” would be difficult to distinguish. If, however, we see the concessions Ricardo made to vested interests as part of a process of establishing free trade and universal rights on a secure basis, the inconsistency disappears. It could be argued that Ricardo was inconsistent in the treatment of landlords whose special interests he appeared to deny in all instances. But he was always careful to distinguish what he considered their legitimate from their illegitimate interests. “Let it not be supposed that [I wish] to deprive the aristocracy of that just influence which it derived from its wealth and respectability; but [I think] it [has become] pernicious when it [is] exercised for the purposes of influencing elections” (V, p. 284).
Political reform was central to economic management; was there anything, Ricardo asked, “in our institutions to retard our progress?” (V, p. 499). He likened defense of existing institutions to the opposition to steam engines that argued that we “had flourished without them, and why not let well enough alone?” (V, p. 500). The existing franchise allowed disproportionate influence to the landed interests that “had already too many regulations in their favor” (V, p. 291). The purpose of reform was not to curtail self-interest but to establish a framework in which it would promote the general interest. The ideal arrangements, for Ricardo, were those in which all sanctions “concur to make it the interest of all men to be virtuous, which is the same thing as to say, to use their best endeavour to promote the general interest” (V, p. 500). He did not trust that people would act with self-denying virtue.Footnote 9 Political representatives were economic agents: “Let me know what the state of their interests is and I'll tell you what measures they recommend” (V, p. 500). Self-interest should neither be denied nor restricted, but to give it its due all interests must be given free rein and no group allowed to exercise political advantage. For Ricardo “reform was the most important question which could come before [the] house” (V, p. 112). The House had to be made representative of the public voice (V, p. 470, also p. 112), and “It was absolutely necessary that we should have a House of Commons which should represent the people fully and efficiently, instead of representing only a small proportion of the people of England” (V, p. 484). Since the House was chosen by peers “the really efficient power of government is . . . in the hands of the wealthy aristocracy” (V, p. 496). Where power and influence were divided between monarchy and aristocracy, the only means by which people could act on the constitution was the threat of insurrection but this was irregular in its influence (V, p. 497). Against a situation where “ministers were not unfrequently obliged to favour particular interests” (V, p. 478), Ricardo wanted “a House of Commons free from party, where the interests of the public would alone be considered, in which a deaf ear would be turned to all partial application” (V, p. 478). The reforms necessary to achieve such a House were extension of the franchise, secret ballots, and frequent elections. These would exclude “all those, whether high or low, who had interests separate and distinct from the general interest, we should have a controlling body whose sole business and duty it should be to obtain good government” (V, p. 498). With fair representation “ministers [could not] . . . pursue a career . . . diametrically opposite to the general opinion of the country” (V, p. 470).
Ricardo's economic advice reveals this wider context he had in mind. This is evident in the case of the currency. As a private bank, the Bank had frequently acted “according to the caprice or interest of a company of merchants” (V, p. 310). The issue of which standard should be used, and at what value, took second place to the need to fix the currency to a standard in the first place, as this alone would prevent discretion on behalf of private interests (V, p. 310). Policy could not be trusted when its framework allowed self-interest to act against the public interest. Ricardo argued that along with a fixed standard the central bank function should be entrusted to appointed commissioners (IV, pp. 271-300, also see IV, pp. 45-46, 114). Economic analysis was insufficient; the premise of a sound monetary policy was institutional.Footnote 10
Similar issues arose in fiscal matters. The burden of national debt was “a very serious evil” (V, p. 268). “Taxation pressed on every interest; and did he not propose to benefit mankind when he said we ought to endeavour to get rid of the debt?” (V, p. 268). Despite all this, Ricardo opposed a sinking fund for planned debt reduction. It would place money in the hands of ministers who, responsible to a House of Commons “constituted like ours” (V, p. 25), from a franchise that fostered a “disposition to ministerial compliance” (V, p. 269), would be under no pressure to use it for its intended purpose. Ministers would use it as a “resource of which they might avail themselves when they were under any difficulty” (V, p. 24, also 269). The fund, he argued, was nothing but a “delusion on the public.” The government's own statements revealed the “real object of the fund [was to] enable us to fight . . . a war.” (V, p. 251) Control of expenditure could not be trusted to existing constitutional arrangements. Fiscal policy required democratic reform to put power into the hands of the people since only they had a genuine interest in controlling expenditure as it was “the expenditure of their own money” (V, p. 288). Democratic reform would remove privileged control over policy.
Ricardo's support for a universal franchise was based on a conviction that self-interest was the compelling force of society. The people could be trusted for their good sense because it was in their interest. Citing Athens and Rome, he rejected the view that enfranchising the people would lead to political disturbance “instead of selecting demagogues and disturbers of the public peace, as was unjustly apprehended, the people, if left to the unrestricted exercise of their choice . . . act[ed] wisely and prudently” (V, p. 289). Furthermore, he thought that “the present generation possessed not only as much wisdom as any of those which had preceded it, but a great deal more” (V, p. 283). This was not a disinterested wisdom but one intimately informed by self-interest.
V. THEORY OF VALUE
“A nation is rich, not according to the abundance of its money, nor to the high money value at which its commodities circulate, but according to the abundance of its commodities, contributing to its comforts and enjoyments” (IV, p. 22). If there were self-sufficiency this wouldn't need saying; claims on and the production of wealth would be the same, and, therefore, getting the maximum wealth would perfectly conform with expending the least labor necessary. Under the division of labor the claim on wealth is exercised through the market as a money claim. Partial interests look to maximize their money revenues deriving from market price but, given competition, this money price will conform with the natural price, the “quantity of labour necessary to . . . production” (I, p. 90). In this way Ricardo's theory of value configures the relation between self-interest and general interest in terms of money prices, carrying particular interests, conforming to natural prices where the general interest is achieved. In a debate on acquisitions for the coronation, he argued it was better to buy cheaper from abroad since “they must be purchased by the produce of our own industry” (V. p. 69). The central point was that the most profitable application of labor was “most profitable for the country” (V. p. 82).
Ricardo may not, as Milgate and Stimson argue, have made direct appeal to value theory in his political thought but he hardly had to since it was the foundation of his thought. On one side, money price, lay the temporary, short run, actual price and self-interested claim. On the other, natural price was associated with the permanent, long-run, primary price and the production of wealth. Short of self-sufficiency, no good could actually sell at natural price; rather, market price could conform to natural price, so an hour acquiring one good could, in exchange, acquire any other product of an hour of labor. For the individual, however, the distinction between money claim and wealth had no impelling meaning. Ricardo observed that while few would dissent from the distinction “many look with the greatest alarm at the prospect of the diminution of their money revenue, though such reduced revenue should have so improved in exchangeable value, as to procure considerably more of all the necessaries and luxuries of life” (IV, p. 22). The general case was that adjustment must be achieved through money prices but since partial interest acted through money income, adjustment could be obstructed because of the “unwillingness that every man feels to sell his goods at a reduced price” (VII, p. 67). Periods of adjustment could be longer or shorter depending on “the degree of information, or the strength of the prejudices of those who offer [resistance]” (VII, p. 67; also I, p. 265).
Old Corruption was a system where politically enabled claims on wealth held sway with, as Ricardo put it, the House “assailed on all sides for protecting duties” (V, p. 219). Ricardo argued that duties paid on sugar meant that “the people of England paid grievously for their sugar” and what they paid was “swallowed up in the fruitless waste of human labour” (V, p. 189). This interfered with the economy of labor; Ricardo argued, in the case of sugar, that “the mischief in such cases, was there was much human labor thrown away without any equivalent” (V, p. 190). This problem was aggravated in the case of corn since, with interference, the tendency was for the natural price itself to rise as labor was required to produce on less fertile land. The problem here was that in such cases rent would rise, so that unlike for the manufacturers, “Country gentlemen, then, have not only a temporary but a permanent interest in prohibitions of the importation of corn” (I, p. 312, also p. 313). Ricardo, with a more consistent theory of value, could reverse Smith's position on these respective interests of manufacturers and landlords.
Ricardo's system becomes clearer in comparison with Malthus. The distinction between temporary/permanent appears in the debate with Malthus; for Ricardo self-interest appears on the side of the temporary, market price. For Malthus this temporary is the condition of the economy or, “things as they are” as Malthus said, complaining of Ricardo's approach. Their differences are entangled in the headline difference over effective demand. When Malthus complained of Ricardo's oversimplification—his abstraction—it was exactly because of Ricardo's dismissal of so many of the factors, demand especially, that Malthus saw determining the fate of the system. Here the shorter run perspective is crucial since at any one time many possible determinants might act on price, and so the realization of profit. Hence, where Ricardo asserted labor embodied, Malthus looked to labor commanded. Ricardo's theory of value was concerned with production and an order underlying exchange. Malthus instead looked to the conditions of exchange, hence labor commanded, as eventually determining, through actual profit the prospects for production. Ricardo did not object to the factors that could influence price. He knew there was a short run, but he did object to the fact that for Malthus this was the path through which the economy moved. In Malthus's perspective the temporary and permanent were collapsed into each other. Wealth was inseparable from the exchange value by which profit was realized: “it will be found that in the real state in which man is placed on earth, wealth and exchangeable value, though still by no means the same, are in many parts nearly connected” (1989, pp. 337-38). If the market price for a production was insufficient then “such wealth will not be produced in future” (1989, p. 341). So for Malthus “the market prices of commodities are the immediate causes of all the great movements of society in the production of wealth, and these market prices always express clearly and unequivocally the exchangeable value of commodities at the time and place at which they are exchanged” (1989, p. 342 emphasis added). Malthus did use the term natural price but to no purpose since it was, as he said, the “average relation of the demand to the supply” (1989, p. 84). Natural price simply followed market price rather than being, for Ricardo, the governor, outside partial interests of those prices. Malthus's system took a path set by market prices and so for Malthus, the “progress of society consists of irregular movements, and . . . to omit the consideration of causes which for eight or ten years will have a great stimulus to production and population, or a great check to them, is to omit the causes of the wealth and poverty of nations” (VII, p. 122). A system dependent on prices at particular times and places could also be dependent on particular interests, something Malthus expressed in terms of motives: “By inquiring into the immediate causes of the progress of wealth I clearly mean to inquire mainly into motives” (IX, p. 10). This was essential to grasp “the necessary motive to the greatest continued production” (IX, p. 19). Once the focus was on motives, accumulation or the general interest, was understood to depend on money prices, hence existing interests. This was not lawlike in Ricardo's terms, but it was essential to Malthus's own claim to science, to study “things as they are.” This perspective required a demand sufficient for an adequate profit or motive. An “unproductive consumption” was required, a demand not arising from supply. Only rent fitted the requirement, giving the corn laws a special importance, and so delivering the fate of the free market system into the pockets of the landed proprietors.
Ricardo could see what was going on and considered that Malthus supposed the key issues, such as “making labour productive,” or the “enjoyment of abundance” to be “much too closely connected with money price” (IX, p. 83). Ricardo held firm on labor embodied established outside the immediate play of interests. Demand might influence market prices but these were not the “permanent state of things,” so demand “only produced temporary effects” (V, p. 212). Since questions of quantity were subsumable under questions of demand and other accidental causes, we can get a true picture of the gulf between the different perspectives in Ricardo's own judgment that studies of quantity, that is, the temporary, were “vain and delusive” while studies of “proportion” might lay down a “tolerably correct [law]” and was thus subsumable under science (VIII, pp. 278-79). Labour embodied enabled a proper study of proportion. Ricardo had in mind a lawlike system with permanent abstract conditions that did not require, indeed could only be obstructed by, the immediate hand of privilege.
When Malthus analyzed the post-war depression he rejected the argument “that the losses at present sustained by farmers are merely the natural and necessary consequences of overtrading” (1986, vol. 7, p. 153) on the grounds that he believed these were no ordinary losses. They were occasioned in part by the end of hostilities, and their scale lifted them out of the sectional category. “Individual losses of course become national, according as they affect a greater mass of the national capital, and a greater number of individuals” (1986, vol. 7, p. 154). Ricardo remained adamant; Malthus, he said, “dwells with much stress on the losses of agricultural capital . . . He laments the loss of that which by the course of events has become of no use to us . . . We might just as fairly have been told, when the steam engine, or Mr Arkwright's cotton machine was brought to perfection, that it would be wrong to adopt the use of them, because the value of the old clumsy machinery would be lost to us” (IV, p. 33 also, I, pp. 263-72). Where Malthus wanted to ensure the “motives” of existing interests, Ricardo argued that “it became the legislature . . . not to look at the partial loss which would be endured by a few, who could not cultivate their land profitably, at a diminished remunerative price, but to the general interests of the nation” (V, pp. 49-50). Progress threatened particular interests, but “by increasing production, though you may occasion partial loss, you increase the general happiness” (I, p. 271). Ricardo's principled lack of compromise over partial losses explains the critical view of his abstraction and illustrates his vision of an accumulation that was not beholden to any particular interests, not even capitalists themselves. The advocacy of an economic system where free interest, not status, came to the fore was itself political. Treating the theory of value as simply a theory of price loses the political significance of allowing prices to be free. Ricardo did not need to appeal directly to a theory of value but he did use such a theory, in his debates over reform, to present a self-regulated alternative to privilege.
In one special issue relating to interests, the labor theory was central. Despite their argument that the labor theory of value added nothing substantial to what was in the Essay on Profits, Milgate and Stimson concede that the labor theory was needed when we move from the single to heterogeneous commodity world. For them, this was not sufficient to move the labor theory to the center of analysis. Despite this, Milgate and Stimson appeal to the labor theory of value in the matter of wages. If interest is the key to political economy then the inverse relationship of wages and profits must be confronted. Milgate and Stimson quite rightly point out the importance of the difference between the use and the value contents of the wage. Clearly the qualitative difference is important since it allows for the value content of the wage to fall just as the use value content rises. In the Principles Ricardo argued that if “the wages of the labourer should be found to have fallen, it will not the less be a real fall, because they might furnish him with a greater quantity of cheap commodities than his former wages” (I, p. 50). In Notes on Malthus he spelt his position out more fully. It was never his wish, he wrote:
to see . . . profits increased at the expense of the labouring class . . . What we should desire is to increase the quantity of commodities without increasing their value . . . if labour falls from 2/- to 1/8d per day, the labourer may be better off, as with 1/8d he may get more than he got with 2/- before. The rate of profits will be increased . . . but it will not be at the expense of the labouring class,—it will follow only from the increased productiveness of labour (II, p. 373).
This kind of argument convinces Milgate and Stimson that there need not be an irreconcilable conflict between the capitalists and workers. Important as this is, they miss a more emphatic point concerning interest. Through the wage the working class was tied to accumulation in a way that no other class was. If the content of the wage was to rise above subsistence while value fell, then a vibrant accumulation was needed to keep demand for labor buoyant. This depended on the wage basket being heterogeneous, allowing for its content to diversify while its value fell. This was central to social order: the wage could rise along with profits. The working class claim on wealth was uniquely tied to the health of the system. Standing outside property, the working class was interested in a free system, a laissez-faire that would maximize the demand for labor. A virtuous circle could ensue with free trade reducing the cost of wage goods, so reducing the value content of the wage; hence accumulation could rise, allowing productivity to reduce yet more the labor content of wage goods just as the use content continued to diversify.
The working class did not have special virtues and indeed, contrary to Milgate and Stimson's analysis, they were not only tied to accumulation but were the linchpin, given democracy, of bourgeois society. Nor was this some version of social democratic welfare Ricardo had in mind. His discussion of the poor laws is important. It was not just that the poor laws depressed wages but also that their abolition would bring out the best qualities of the working class. What better way was there to teach the “poor man to depend on his own exertions only” (VII, pp. 124-25) than a perfect system of political economy in which “the labouring classes . . . receive the recompense for their labour rather in the shape of wages than in bounty?” (VII, p. 124). What better way to impress “on the poor the value of independence?” (I, p. 107). So the wage would be unified, without administered elements, and the people brought into immediate contact with accumulation as the source of demand for labor. In place of relief, Ricardo advocated Savings Banks to enable workers to “lay up a provision . . . for extraordinary calls” (VII, p. 248). The aim was that the “labouring classes [should] know how to regulate their own affairs, and understand and foresee the circumstances which are to procure them happiness” (IX, p. 261). This was a vision of responsibility. Ricardo did not make a once and for all assessment of the knowledge of the working classes, as implied by Peach, but rather saw it developing with appropriate legislation. His interim positions were not indicative of what he saw as the realization of political economy. He wanted to secure good legislation “which shall give the greatest encouragement to the acquiring of information amongst all classes of the people” (IX, p. 261).
There was little doubt in Ricardo's mind what lessons would be learned. Any temptation to re-divide property would “annihilate half the productive industry of the country, and . . . be more fatal to the poor labourer than to the rich capitalist himself” (V, p. 501). Although Ricardo stipulated that in reform “the rights of property should be held sacred” (V, p. 501), he saw no dangers in extending the franchise to the workers; there was no inconsistency between the qualification of respect for property and full extension of the franchise, since the interests of workers coincided with the security of property. Exclusion from property gave the laboring classes a more general interest in its security than direct owners who related to the system via particular properties. Ricardo stopped short of proposing a universal franchise immediately; he recognized the fears this engendered. Yet, he thought, the limits imposed would be temporary because even incomplete reform could demonstrate benefits that would increase “the knowledge and intelligence of the public” so that it would be safe to “extend the right of voting for Members of Parliament to every class of the people” (V, p. 503). If this would not be achieved immediately it was also unambiguous that given appropriate reforms full extension would follow quickly (V, p. 503).Footnote 11 We should not confuse gradualism in the process of reform with moderation of its ends. Respect for property and effective knowledge of political economy were prerequisites for the franchise. However, this did not mean that his support for democracy was inconsistent since, for Ricardo, bourgeois order was the true system of order, and workers would not only recognize this but had begun to do so because it was in their interest.Footnote 12
VI. REVOLUTION AND FEAR OF THE MULTITUDE
Ricardo's proposals could appear to provide conditions ripe for the fears of Malthus and Trower. They both regarded the French Revolution as demonstrating that reform was dangerous. Indeed, because of its advanced conditions it was Britain that faced the greater threat. When Trower defended the “mixed constitution” he warned that “the balance of the Constitution, which is essential to its wholesome operation, and even its existence, is most in danger from the popular part of the Constitution; from that force . . . which if not regulated and restrained, must eventually destroy our Constitution” (VII, p. 310, also VIII, p. 15). The danger, as he saw it, was that people could only get stronger with “the growth of wealth and the diffusion of knowledge” (VIII, pp. 13-14). Reform had to be kept in check to prevent it maturing into “a force, which when let loose would be incalculable in its objects, and irresistible in its effects” (VII, p. 310). Malthus believed reform would raise hopes that could not be satisfied, “when [the people] found themselves . . . entirely disappointed.” He wrote, “massacre would in my opinion go on till it was stopt by military despotism” (VIII, pp. 107-108). He also thought the situation would be worse relative to France where “the manufacturing population was comparatively small” (VIII, p. 108).
Trower expressed a common fear when he argued, in the wake of Peterloo, that meetings of “countless multitudes” should be regulated: “Why not limit meetings for political purposes to parishes, and thus diminish the danger by breaking down the masses?” (VIII, p. 111). He opposed what he called “Owenism” in similar terms, because it would convert “the whole country into a great Manufactory . . . Surely, with a view to the health, happiness and morality of the poor, the great object is not to collect them into large masses . . . but to break them down into small, unconnected societies . . . Not to collect them into great Towns, but to scatter them over the face of the country in small villages, and detached cottages” (VIII, pp. 42-43). This would allow “every Gentleman resident in the country . . . an opportunity of . . . exerting that influence among them, the feeling and the expressing of which cannot fail to produce the happiest effects” (VIII, p. 43). Despite the general alarm, Ricardo opposed the Seditious Meeting Prevention Bill and argued for large meetings as a means of “showing such a front to ministers as would afford a hope that bad measures would be abandoned” (V, p. 28).
To Trower he asked, “What security for freedom should we have if no meeting, larger than a parish meeting, was legal?” (VIII, p. 133). Indeed, Ricardo was so confident he argued that “the fear of insurrection, and of the people combining to make a general effort are the great checks on all governments” (VIII, p. 133). Without reform it was only the “fear which the government and the aristocracy have of an insurrection of the people . . . [that] keeps them within the bounds which now appear to arrest them” (V, p. 497). For Malthus and Trower the independence of the people posed a threat and the multitude had to be mediated by the “Gentleman”: for Ricardo independence was the keystone of stability since it was contact with the laws of political economy which were the permanent guarantee of order.
Peach considers that, for Ricardo, lack of knowledge constituted sufficient obstacle to reform. Yet Ricardo showed a remarkable confidence in the people. Trower complained that there was a “senseless and mischievous spirit now abroad” which “seems to threaten danger to all” (VII, p. 45). Ricardo remained calm; he felt the “outrages” were understandable given the stagnation of trade and, anyway, did not perceive them as a threat to order. The people, he argued, “are both improved in morals and in knowledge, and therefore . . . are less outrageous under these unavoidable reverses than they formerly used to be” (VII, p. 49). This emerging knowledge was not an abstract understanding of political virtues, but an effective grasp of political economy. “I am in hopes too that as they increase in knowledge they will more clearly perceive that the destruction of property aggravates and never relieves their difficulties” (VII, p. 49). Writing to Malthus, who had complained that reforms would lead to unreasonable demands, Ricardo asked, “Do you think that any great number of the people can really be deluded with the idea that any change in the representation would completely relieve them from their distresses?” (VIII, p. 129). His opinion was that those who would seek “to appropriate to themselves the property of others” would be “a very limited number” (VIII, p. 129).
Despite rejecting the “alarmists” (VII, p. 273), Ricardo recognized a potential threat, but it came from incomplete capitalist development. As he said to Mill, “The only prospect we have of putting aside the struggle . . . between the rich and the other classes, is for the rich to yield what is justly due” (IX, p. 45). He upheld Place's estimation of the grievances of the laboring classes “oppressive laws—such as combination laws, corn laws, restraints on commerce and many others” (IX, pp. 61-62). When writing on Ireland he generalized on the need for “timely concessions to the people. Reform is the most efficacious preventative of Revolution, and may in my opinion be at all times safely conceded . . . I think the disaffected would lose all power after the concession of Reform. Reform may be granted too late, but it can never be too soon, if the people are sufficiently well informed to know the value of it” (VIII, pp. 49-50 also VII, p. 381). The key to reform was a proper democracy that would remove legislative interference and so enable the full implementation of political economy and hence the prevention of revolution.
VII. CONCLUSION
Hutchinson saw Ricardo as indulging in “abstract model building” that separated “political economy from political and moral philosophising” (1964, p. 134). It is ironic that this common view takes Ricardo's abstraction outside its context, Old Corruption. Ricardo needed to look beyond the claims of power to an underlying order. While arguing from interest, he put forward an understanding of a system, structured by labor embodied, that could stand on its own. While a system of accumulation, it could not be trusted to the competing interests of property. Only one group was dependent on the system as a whole; through a properly functioning democracy, the interest of the working class would govern bourgeois society. It might have been Ricardo rather than Paine who described privilege as holding a watch over “prosperity as its prey” and permitting “none to escape without a tribute” (1984, p. 160). Certainly Ricardo believed that Reform would free interest from this immediate hand and so implement a lawlike political economy allowing all to prosper.
