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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2005
Ecuadorianists have long awaited a book on the country's banana industry, and Steve Striffler has made an excellent beginning with this prize-winning research on the United Fruit (UF) company's Tenguel estate. He wanted his study of the workers' struggle for better wages and land to go beyond previous works that tended to focus on leading capitalistic actors. Casting his work in Marxian terms, Striffler finds that worker power—at Tenguel, at other banana producing regions in Ecuador, and across Latin America—played a decisive role in undermining foreign-owned enclaves. Striffler argues that “class struggle” best explains the emergence of the “contract farming” system that transformed agrarian landscapes. Although Ecuadorian worker efforts did not ultimately improve their lives, Striffler finds that struggles at least provided a base for subsequent popular organizations.
Ecuadorianists have long awaited a book on the country's banana industry, and Steve Striffler has made an excellent beginning with this prize-winning research on the United Fruit (UF) company's Tenguel estate. He wanted his study of the workers' struggle for better wages and land to go beyond previous works that tended to focus on leading capitalistic actors. Casting his work in Marxian terms, Striffler finds that worker power—at Tenguel, at other banana producing regions in Ecuador, and across Latin America—played a decisive role in undermining foreign-owned enclaves. Striffler argues that “class struggle” best explains the emergence of the “contract farming” system that transformed agrarian landscapes. Although Ecuadorian worker efforts did not ultimately improve their lives, Striffler finds that struggles at least provided a base for subsequent popular organizations.
Part I follows the entrance and subsequent decline of United Fruit's Tenguel estate. Part II explores “agrarian restructuring,” decisive changes in the banana industry forced upon capitalists in Ecuador and abroad by “local struggles” (8). Striffler based his study upon multiple interviews with former Tenguel workers, the work and theories of Quiteño historians, the archives of a worker's organization in Cuenca, and a few United Fruit papers found in the US National Archives. In fluent prose, Striffler recalls United Fruit's attempt to organize the Tenguel plantation for efficient production and as a paradise for workers. Panama Disease devastated plantings leading to hundreds of unemployed. In spite of UF's attempt to do everything right, it left in the 1960s beset, according to Striffler's interpretation, by militant Spanish-Catholic worker organizers and land invaders. Land reform laws under the “shadow of state” proved inadequate, leaving most workers landless. Striffler continues that, thanks to the local struggles of labor, other multinationals dismantled their enclaves and left Ecuador soon after.
Striffler's work on the United Fruit workers is laudable, although his broad conclusions, based as they are upon this one case study of coastal Ecuador, raise concerns. Striffler writes that the human face of capitalism must be included, but he actually provides very sparse coverage of it. How would coastal agriculturists, exporters, the multinationals, and coastal historians interpret these events? As Julio Estrada Ycaza—the dean of all historians of coastal Ecuador—once advised, researchers must keep in mind that antagonistic attitudes separate the two principal regions of Ecuador—the coast and the Sierra—and that accounts from the Sierra tend to offer interpretations shaped by geoeconomic conditions that prevail there. Had Striffler commenced his work in Guayaquil rather than Quito would he have adopted the Marxist framework he selected?
A different interpretation of the changes in Ecuadorian labor practices, supply to exporters, and land use is entirely possible. At the time of the Tenguel experiment Communism had been in power in the Soviet Union for over thirty years. Under the ideological wing of the Ecuadorian leftist political parties, a group of “rogue” lawyers and union organizers largely trained and funded in Cuba and funded from behind the Iron Curtain actively promoted land seizures and unionization of labor. Agriculturists recall that the funded organizers first targeted companies and farms that offered the most benefits, paid the highest wages, and had the most workers. These included not only Tenguel, but also Anglo Petroleum, Valdez and San Carlos Plantations, and the Port Authority. Unions charged workers up to forty dollars each every time a contract was negotiated. UF left Ecuador, and Ecuadorian planters recall this as an isolated case. The other plantations turned to outsourcing of labor, a reorientation of labor policies that laid the base for today's contract labor system. Administrators recall the end of Soviet funding, thanks to glasnost (transparency). This allowed them to radically diminish the time allocated to worker problems. Plantations did away with permanent employees and unions faded away. Traditional subsidies of housing, beef, and milk diminished and disappeared. Striffler wrote (194) that the lives of contemporary workers are dismal as plantation owners continue to rid themselves of permanent employees. He concluded that the “struggles” left a base for future populist organization. At present, outsourcing of labor by agriculturists, the result of struggles Striffler covered, jeopardizes future organization.
Striffler's cites a broad transition of agriculture to “contract farming” (209) and concludes this was a “restructuring,” forced upon the “capitalists” by subalterns. Again, a different interpretation was possible, and I turned to coastal agriculturists and exporters for guidance. Informants and their elders recalled that during the 1940s, at the same time that Striffler described the Tenguel labor force as docile (43), banana suppliers multiplied to meet market demand. Farms which had requisite economies of scale to make them viable commercial suppliers took shape. In the 1940s, Lucho Noboa, whose Bonita is now the largest banana exporter, was making agreements with the growing number of suppliers who supplied ninety percent of his demand. He had previously used suppliers for rice export and worked within a traditional framework. Standard Fruit (Dole) had its suppliers then as well; thus, long before worker struggles. An exporter advised that the term “contract farming” was then, and is now, unknown among shippers. Suppliers and exporters used the old handshake agreement: loose on price, based on faith and not on paper or notaries. The supplier practice dated as far back as any could remember, and is in use today by Lucho's Ecuadorian heirs. By the 1950s the coast had displayed many big, medium, and small sized banana farms as urban Ecuadorians, shop owners, widowed heirs, and new industrialists invested. They bought land and planted. Suppliers became multimillionaires. It is difficult to agree with Striffler's interpretation that this multiplication of banana suppliers represented a fragmentation and reconfiguration of coastal Ecuador forced upon capitalists by subalterns.
Taken together, Noboa's Bonita and the Ecuadorian Wong family's Reybanpac dominate Ecuadorian banana production and export. Both own huge plantations, yet as in the 1940s, both depend largely upon suppliers. The histories of these “capitalistic actors,” as Striffler terms them, would be vital to theoretical conclusions about agricultural history here. Standard Fruit's archives at Tulane University should be consulted before attempting to define its adherence to suppliers, a practice it began in the 1940s. Dole now plants but 800 hectares. A Bonita comptroller suggested, “Why should Dole buy land? It uses dependable and flexible suppliers that have no labor problems. A plantation operation in Ecuador would be expensive since it is south of the Panama Canal and political influence is difficult.” Since banana consumption fluctuates as much as fifteen percent, UF turns to Ecuadorian suppliers only in years when their operations in Central America run short. Recently, it has turned to Ecuadorian suppliers on the average of five-year intervals. United Fruit's Chiquita does not play a significant role in the Ecuadorian industry.
Conclusions concerning the relationships of actions taken by workers and actions taken by planters/exporters require more than a Marxist frame of inquiry. As valuable as Striffler's work on Tenguel is to us, events there cannot be looked upon as a pluralistic or typical phenomenon replicated throughout the littoral. In a reassessment historians would probably examine the defining Latin American traditions still strong at Ecuadorian coastal plantations. Have they adapted to global economic change while maintaining their own continuity?