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Differential Access to Price Information in Financial Markets

Part of:JFQA William F. Sharpe Best Paper Award Winner

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 November 2016

David Easley,
Maureen O’Hara and
Liyan Yang
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Abstract

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Recently, exchanges have been directly selling market data. We analyze how this practice affects price discovery, the cost of capital, return volatility, market liquidity, information production, and trader welfare. We show that selling price data increases the cost of capital and volatility, worsens market efficiency and liquidity, and discourages the production of fundamental information relative to a world in which all traders observe prices. Generally, allowing exchanges to sell price information benefits exchanges and harms liquidity traders. Overall, our results suggest that regulations on selling market data can play an important role in improving market quality and trader welfare.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 51 , Issue 4 , August 2016, pp. 1071 - 1110
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2016 

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