Anyone who follows American politics has heard the complaint that the federal judicial confirmation process has become painfully inefficient and highly politicized. Nominees face intense public scrutiny, long delays in the process, and, potentially, the ire of interest groups and politicians. Jurists worry about the effect of a politicized process on the rule of law. Politicians, frustrated by the confirmation slog, threaten to invoke the (dramatically dubbed) “nuclear option.” Yet despite wide agreement that the process is broken, there is less agreement on what contributed to its deterioration and the factors that cause a nominee to run into trouble.
Enter two excellent books by Amy Steigerwalt and Sarah Binder and Forrest Maltzman, respectively. These books provide rich context through which to understand the institutional dynamics of the confirmation process, such as the mechanisms employed to delay and/or defeat a nominee, as well as insight into the motivation of obstructionists. In addition, the authors offer their thoughts on the prospects for reform and, in the case of Binder and Maltzman, specific proposals to improve the confirmation process. Yet the authors do not paint a sanguine picture about the prospects of reform or, should it come, of its chances of success.
In Battle over the Bench, Steigerwalt offers a theoretical “four tracks framework” through which to understand the lower-court confirmation process. Each nominee finds him- or herself on one track but may switch tracks as the nomination process proceeds. Steigerwalt analogizes this process to a train operating on a track that may be switched onto different tracks as it encounters certain switch points on its voyage (p. 24). The four tracks are the noncontroversial track (nominee encounters no opposition; p. 31), senatorial courtesy track (senator—usually of the nominee's home state—objects to appointment; p. 33), private political track (senator[s] use parliamentary procedures to delay or kill the nomination; p. 37), and public partisan track (high levels of interest-group activity; p. 42). From 1985 to 2006, Steigerwalt's period of study, most nominees (77.4%) are on (and stay on) the noncontroversial track and are confirmed relatively quickly (p. 32). When a nominee shifts to another track, things move slowly and with less certainty. It is in the analysis of these other tracks that Steigerwalt makes her most important contributions.
The existence and usage of senatorial courtesy is well known, but Steigerwalt reveals several hitherto unexplored motivations for employing it. While ideology matters when courtesy is invoked (p. 61), Steigerwalt reveals that it is used most often when a senator retaliates for the treatment of past nominees (p. 63). Courtesy is also frequently used to enforce the institutional norm of presidential consultation with a home-state senator as to his or her preference for appointment (p. 60). Moreover, senators regularly employ holds on judicial nominees as part of the legislative bargaining process, often on unrelated legislative matters (p. 80). Since holds are anonymous, they can also be employed in retaliatory fashion without directly challenging the Senate's norms of collegiality (p. 81). Interest groups can influence the decision of a senator to obstruct by signaling support for opposition and, at least for Democratic senators, provide important information on the qualifications and ideology of nominees (p. 104). Steigerwalt comes by these findings through a combination of archival research, interviews with critical actors, and quantitative analysis. While I cannot comment on the sophistication of all methods employed, the book is a model of method use to derive answers to important questions, rather than method driving which questions to ask.
In Advice & Dissent, Binder and Maltzman approach the appointment process for lower-court judges with an acute institutional focus. In what is their most significant contribution, the authors examine the origins and evolution of veto points in the Senate and reveal that the practice of blue slipping started as a means of assessing opposition in committee (pp. 49–50). They reveal that this practice began in 1913, which is much earlier than scholars previously placed its genesis. The blue slip was originally informational, not an institutional veto, which explains why home-state senators from the minority party were solicited in the blue slip process (p. 52). What began as a management tool evolved into its current practice, which, if not an absolute veto, gives home-state senators significant influence over the fate of the president's nominee and guarantees an enhanced role in the appointment of district-court judges.
Their attention to the propensity of rules to be used in unintended ways due to changing incentives enables the authors to tie institutional development to the politicization of the confirmation process. As courts played a more significant role in national policymaking, senators used the rules and practices that could produce an institutional veto to ensure ideologically acceptable nominees. But in a story of path dependency, the more senators exercised ideologically driven vetoes, the more these rules threatened the successful operation of the nomination process, which, in turn, gave rise to the threat of reform, including the nuclear option that would have eliminated the institutional veto by prohibiting the filibuster of judicial nominations (pp. 145–47). These are fascinating insights and make the book well worth reading on their own, but there is also an interesting chapter on the bicameral construction of the federal bench and the bargaining process between the majority and minority parties when the federal bench is expanded. Finally, this is an elegantly written book with the clarity to be consumable by advanced undergraduates and with the methodological rigor to serve as a model for graduate students and scholars alike.
Looking at these two books in concert, several things become clear. First, institutional reform to the judicial confirmation process is unlikely, or unlikely to be successful. The development of the blue slip, the hold, and the filibuster arose out of a desire by senators to exert greater influence in determining who serves on the federal bench. Inasmuch as these practices and rules give senators significant negotiating leverage with the president and their peers, it is unclear why senators would willingly give up the wellspring of their influence. Increased polarization of party politics only contributes to the disincentives for senators to support reform. But even if reformers had their way (and Binder and Maltzman highlight several interesting reform proposals; p. 147), these two books suggest that other institutional rules would evolve to produce similar leveraging effects. In other words, eliminate the filibuster and the importance of the hold increases. Temper the usage of the hold and the blue slip becomes more prominent in logrolling. The external political environment operates on the internal institutional practices of the Senate. Until the external environment changes, senatorial rules and practices will reflect the ways senators seek to leverage their influence.
Second, legislators are not simply single-minded seekers of their reelection. Obstruction of lower-court nominees rarely elevates the profile of a sitting senator. The anonymous nature of holds eliminates credit claiming or position taking. The expenditure of political capital to oppose nominees yields little direct electoral benefit. Yet senators regularly act in ways that demonstrate a commitment to a highly qualified and ideologically balanced judiciary. These actions reflect a range of motivations. Senators jealously guard what they perceive as their institutional right to consult the president on appointments to the lower federal courts. Failure by the president to consult home-state senators exacts a blue slip objection. Senators act spitefully by retaliating against a nominee when one of “their” candidates fails to be appointed or confirmed. Moreover, even when senators (and interest groups, too) may wish to oppose a nominee, they must consider inherent limitations, such as time and political capital. Engaging in the politics of obstruction is costly, and so senators end up supporting (or not opposing) most nominees to the lower courts even when those jurists may be ideologically incongruent. While none of these practices are necessarily inconsistent with reelection, most fail to advance reelection in anything but the most tangential fashion. Both books reveal robust senatorial motivations that more parsimonious arguments miss.
Third, these books make it clear that processes reflect the institutions responsible for carrying them out. Certainly the judicial confirmation process is affected by the various rules and practices that shape the course (or tracks) of a nominee's confirmation. But it is also clear that the business of the institution affects the form of the politics. The Senate is in the business of legislating, and its members are experts in the passage and obstruction of legislation. By vesting this same body with the authority over confirmations, the process closely resembles traditional lawmaking. Senators employ parliamentary procedures in the name of obstruction; they bargain and logroll to push the process forward. Interest groups lobby senators and further their desired ends by providing vital information. In short, the confirmation process has taken on many of the hallmarks associated with the traditional legislative process. Complaints about the confirmation process are, in many ways, complaints about the legislative process.
In sum, both books make significant contributions to the literature on the judicial confirmation process and will help shape the field for years to come.
