Textbook treatments of international politics tend to associate the phrase “dialogue among civilizations” with former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. Shortly after his election in 1997, Khatami proposed a General Assembly resolution asking the United Nations to commit to the phrase's aspirations. In effect, he was asking for a different world order—one that contrasted with years of Cold War and anticipations of a clash of civilizations in its wake. Around the same time, American political theorist Fred Dallmayr published a number of works promoting a line of inquiry he called comparative political theory (e.g., Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002]). For Dallmayr, comparative political theory involves a dialogical approach, interpreting unlikely pairs of thinkers together and finding common ground across cultural divides. In recent years, his efforts have caught on. Comparative political theory has become a burgeoning subfield of political science in Europe and North America—a disciplinary formation where the postcolonial turn transforming other corners of the social sciences and humanities has generally been absent.
Beyond Shariati, Siavash Saffari's first monograph, brings together Khatami's better-known and Dallmayr's lesser-known calls for a “dialogue among civilizations,” applying Dallmayr's approach to a group of contemporary Iranian intellectuals known as neo-Shariatis. In the early 2000s, as Khatami's presidency continued to spark hope, neo-Shariatis entered a newly invigorated public sphere with their own distinct brand of reformist discourse. Positioning themselves against Abdolkarim Soroush—whose concept of “minimal religion” they misread—they argued for a pragmatic form of indigenous modernity, one that took the “public presence and social functions of religion” as a given while casting suspicion on Western-style liberal democracy (pp. 98–99, 172–73).
Following Dallmayr, Saffari situates neo-Shariati ideas in a “wider context of debates on modernization, secularization, and Westernization” (p. 15). The book successfully draws parallels to registers more familiar to English-language audiences: other iterations of modern Islamic political thought (Chapter 2); Euro-American debates about public religion (Chapters 3 and 4); and postcolonial theory (Chapter 5). In the end, neo-Shariatis appear to offer a compelling response to nearly all of the concerns animating a loose coalition of post-Marxist leftists today: a commitment to socioeconomic justice tempered with an equally resolute commitment to sociopolitical rights, while affirming the need for plural forms of spirituality in public life.
Like the shahid he famously celebrated in the early 1970s—a living presence that persists in the people's hearts and minds despite physical death—Ali Shariati (d. 1977) haunts the pages of this book. Shariati was an Iranian intellectual and self-described sociologist of Islam who garnered wide appeal among university students from lower middle-class backgrounds. He did not live to see the uprising. Nonetheless, his ideas have been taken up, first as a clarion call for revolutionary action and later as an ambivalent site of political contest. For instance, in his rendering of Islamic liberalism, Soroush charges Shariati with turning religion into ideology and hence sowing the seeds for postrevolutionary authoritarianism and nativism. Neo-Shariatis read him in direct contrast—as offering a vision of sustainable change from below (pp. 87–88, 100).
For his part, Saffari's book poses a formidable challenge to prominent readings of Shariati in English-language scholarship, which echo Soroush in depicting Shariati as a harbinger of all that went wrong in postrevolutionary Iran. This scholarship focuses on a narrow selection of texts and speeches from 1968 to 1972. Saffari, by contrast, follows neo-Shariatis in reading for an “overall” orientation. Doing so, we can extract the essence of Shariati's ideas from their immediate historical context.
For instance, where detractors harp on his discussion of “guided democracy”—a call for vanguard political leadership—as proof of a fundamentally authoritarian politics, neo-Shariati readings locate these ideas in a Bandung moment when many Third World activists and thinkers saw vanguards as a viable form of leadership in the pursuit of self-determination. Now that we no longer live in a Bandung moment, they claim, Shariati's “overall” orientation can address a shared object of critique: authoritarian tendencies in postrevolutionary Iran.
In a similar fashion, where detractors point to Shariati's discussion of “a return to self” as evidence of nativism, neo-Shariatis concede that the concept relies on civilizational divides between “East” and “West” no longer applicable in today's world. In fact, they argue, nativist iterations of the concept only appeared when the postrevolutionary state “hijacked” it. “A return to self” may be reinterpreted as a call for moving toward a new universal grounded in the particular (pp. 156–161). From this perspective, we can appreciate Shariati as an early pioneer of efforts to challenge perceived binaries between Islam and modernity, and neo-Shariatis as paradigm shifting theorists of “postcolonial cosmopolitanism” (pp. 134–142, 165–169).
Reading Shariati for an “overall” orientation parallels the modes of reading characteristic of Islamic modernism and reformism. Here, Saffari's content and form artfully merge. In Chapter 2, he smartly argues for continuity—first, between Islamic modernism and reformism, as they pursue the original spirit of Islam in its founding moment, and second, between those schools of thought and Shariati's “historical-inspiration approach” (p. 92). Reading for the “overall” can also concede the terms of the argument one wishes to dispel—that certain texts of Shariati's were in fact authoritarian, and that we should move beyond the Bandung moment altogether. Here, Saffari enters murky waters. Beyond Shariati draws a sharp distinction between Islamic modernism and reformism, on the one hand, and Islamist political thought, on the other. The latter, it claims, insists on literal readings of texts (akin to the selective literalism of Shariati's detractors). The juxtaposition is too reductive. The exemplary figure of Iranian Islamism, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, engaged modernism and jurisprudence at once, troubling the dichotomy. More to the point, the juxtaposition comes dangerously close to repeating the “good Muslim, bad Muslim” dichotomies Mahmood Mamdani rightly warned against (e.g., Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror [New York: Vintage, 2004]).
This shortcoming is a byproduct of what Saffari does well. Beyond Shariati is most parts intellectual history, adeptly synthesizing common themes in neo-Shariati thought by drawing on close readings of primary texts and unique first-hand interviews. Saffari's intervention lies in the invisible work of translation. And yet, while he delivers on his promise to follow neo-Shariatis as they go beyond Shariati, he generally does not move far beyond the neo-Shariatis themselves. Their prejudices become his.
The reader should not take the work of translation lightly. Even the most sympathetic English-language scholarship has been inattentive to Shariati's present-day intellectual heirs (pp. 13–14). Saffari's book is a much-needed corrective to considerations of Iranian political thought—scholarship that has spent the better part of at least two decades ignoring knowledge production in Iran. At the same time, the anthropological tendency latent in the approach should not go without critique. Done in excess, that tendency may repeat an undesirable fetish for the authentic. For Saffari, the stakes are high. Insofar as neo-Shariatis disavow claims to authenticity, it remains unclear how an anthropological approach coheres with his efforts to follow in their footsteps.
Why not begin with indigenous modernity as an interpretive approach? Instead of searching for resonances with familiar theoretical concepts across presumed differences in culture or civilization, why not mine differences in historical circumstance for new concepts altogether? What would comparative political theory look like beyond dialogue?
