Over the past few decades, two trends have shaped congressional politics: the polarization of the two parties and the centralization of decision making at the party-leadership level. In this environment, congressional politics is often portrayed as a battle between two competing partisan factions, and the roles that individual legislators play is often ignored. In Legislative Style, William Bernhard and Tracy Sulkin seek to remind us that the U.S. House of Representatives is not composed of mere partisan blobs, but rather of 435 individuals who bring a variety of ideas, goals, and strategies to Congress.

Bernhard and Sulkin leverage a large amount of data on how individual members spend their time and deploy their resources in Congress to make their case that individual legislative style matters for understanding Congress. The 16 components of legislative style they identify include data on bill introductions, floor speeches, newspaper editorials, staff in the district, and fund-raising for all members of the 101^st–110^th Congresses (1989–2008). With these data, they employ cluster analysis of these components to demonstrate that most House members fall neatly into one of five style categories. These include district advocates, who focus on constituent service; party builders, who work to distribute resources to other party members; ambitious entrepreneurs, who often seek a statewide or national reputation in order to pursue higher office; party soldiers, who faithfully toe the party line and rarely work across the aisle; and policy specialists, who tend to focus on particular issues without seeking a large amount of outside attention.

Policy specialists are the largest group in Bernhard and Sulkin’s data, with just over 30% of members, followed by party soldiers and district advocates at just over 25% each, party builders at around 12%, and, finally, ambitious entrepreneurs, who make up less than 4% of members in a given Congress. It is noteworthy that even in today’s polarized political environment, policy specialist, not party soldier, is the modal category of legislator. Further, the proportion of party soldiers actually declined from the 101^st to the 110^th Congress. Some of these soldiers surely morphed into party builders, the category that has grown the most during the time period analyzed by the authors, but it was nevertheless surprising to see that the proportion of members classified as policy specialist has grown over this time period as well.

Bernhard and Sulkin find that, for most members, legislative style is relatively “sticky” from one Congress to the next, especially beyond a member’s first couple of terms. Party soldier is the category that members are most likely to transition away from, as it appears to be a default category for many new members. In fact, more than half of new members fall into this category. Initial style can often foretell how a member’s political career will progress as now household names like Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT) adopted the ambitious entrepreneur style early in their respective careers.

The bulk of the empirical analysis focuses on the correlates of legislative style. Two chapters focus on factors that explain a member’s initial style and what leads to style change. Members’ initial style can be predicted by demographics, district characteristics, and a member’s ideological leanings (as determined by their voting record). The results largely conform to the authors’ expectations. For example, ideological moderates rarely become party soldiers and, instead, often focus on policy or on being district advocates.

Perhaps more interesting are the factors that are associated with a member changing his or her style. This is where the nuance in Bernhard and Sulkin’s analyses really pays off. They are able to assess how shocks to a member’s career, such as gaining an important committee assignment or suffering a close electoral call, can affect a member’s stylistic choices. For example, those who are party builders are more likely to maintain this style if they receive “good shocks” (i.e., a plum committee assignment or leadership position), but tend to move away from this style if they find themselves in electoral peril. Similarly, members are less likely to transition to being party builders if they find themselves newly in the minority party.

This topic is followed by analyses of the consequences of legislative style for a member’s career in the House and electoral fortunes back in the district. These analyses are tricky from a causal point of view as a member’s style is surely endogenous to his or her perceived political situations and career ambitions. Nevertheless, Bernhard and Sulkin are able to tease out a number of interesting relationships. For example, policy specialists are more successful at pushing bills through the chamber. Similarly, for members who are good ideological fits with their district, the devotion of resources to district advocacy produces no discernible electoral payoff, whereas for members who fit less well with their district, the advocate style can be electorally advantageous in vote share and in deterring high-quality competition. These findings will not surprise those who have read any of Richard Fenno’s work on how members choose to represent districts, but Bernhard and Sulkin add to that with the broad scope of their data analysis.

Legislative Style is an important contribution to the literature on the U.S. Congress and is essential reading for congressional scholars. It provides a nuanced take on member behavior that combines large-scale data analysis with enough illustrative examples to keep the prose moving along. It complements work by Richard Fenno and Justin Grimmer on how members relate to their districts, and serves as an important counterpoint to scholarship that posits a single goal or strategic orientation for members. Overall, the book is well written, and the authors present a careful, if at times tedious, analysis of a large amount of data on member behavior in the U.S. House.