Introduction
In June 1964, a report by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) about a funding request by the European Union of Film and Television Technicians (EUFTT) highlighted the latter’s loyalty to the former, noted new challenges of border-crossing ‘competition’ among workers brought on by the European Economic Community (EEC), warned about the influence of communist French and Italian unions ‘in this important field of mass communications’ and claimed it was in ‘the entertainment industry and in particular … the TV and Film industry that technical, professional and trade union issues are intimatetly [sic] connected’.Footnote 1 The comments revealed some of the intricate ways postwar international trade unionism could weave into and out of the stories of Western European economic integration, the cultural Cold War and the practice of internationalism. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the ICFTU hoped its allies in several entertainment fields would join in the creation of a new international trade secretariat (ITS), which was a form of trade union organising specific to an economic sector.Footnote 2 National unions for musicians, actors, variety artists and television and film workers were to unite in one ICFTU-aligned group from which communist unions were banned. While a new International Secretariat for Entertainment Trade Unions (ISETU) finally emerged in March 1965, this article covers the preceding decade because repeated ICFTU failures to form a new organisation revealed much about the international conditions entertainment workers faced during the first two postwar decades in Europe, about the ways the ICFTU and its opponents in this sphere conducted a form of cultural Cold War and about the diverse internationalisms circling about their efforts.
Though the ICFTU, formed in 1949 by anti-communist trade unions after a split with the communist unions of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), began sustained efforts to create a new entertainment group in 1956, both opposition by existing internationals for musicians, actors and variety artists as well as hesitation by some European and US labour leaders consistently blocked or undermined that goal. The ICFTU’s position in postwar Western corporatism and its vision of ‘free trade unionism’ that refused to cooperate with communists led it to clash especially with the International Federation of Musicians (Federation Internationale des Musiciens; FIM). This musicians’ group, founded in 1948, claimed that since its work focused only on functional tasks such as bargaining and dealing with national and international legislation, cooperation with unions from the Eastern bloc or with communist unions from Western Europe was not only helpful, but paramount. As meetings and conferences were variously held or cancelled across the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, three broad groups of trade union leaders were involved. Non-communist French and Italian unions, the European film and television workers’ group and the ICFTU usually cooperated with each other. The FIM and other existing internationals often opposed them. In the middle sat groups, such as the Swedish Musicians’ Union (Svenska Musikerförbundet; SMU), the American Federation of Musicians (AFM) and the leadership of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), who, respectively, switched sides over time, remained non-committal for years as they pursued their own agenda, or were hesitant to press their compatriots into line with the ICFTU. Only after enough of this third group threw substantial weight behind the first, around mid-1963, did the ICFTU’s goal finally move towards fruition. It was a swirling mix that spanned a decade of serious attempts to form a new group for entertainment trade unionists by the most powerful international Western trade union organisation in the early Cold War.
Exploring the vortex of acronym alignments that feature in this article can shed light on several important elements of the experiences of entertainment trade unionists, and those working with them, in the first two postwar decades. First, entertainment workers on both sides of this contest faced new challenges in the increasingly powerful transnational employers with whom they had to negotiate, in the expansion of the film and especially television industries (aided by the first satellite transmissions after 1962) and in the integrating world of the EEC, which threatened to increase competition for entertainment jobs. Second, the ICFTU-FIM contest was one element of the cultural Cold War. While the analysis below does not explore the specific content of cultural productions, it covers the beliefs and arguments of its producers, illustrating the types of arguments made and paths trod especially by those comfortable with working with communist unions and those hesitant to back firmly the anti-communist side. Third, the specific alignments of entertainment trade union leaders shifted in numerous and sometimes unexpected ways across the decade analysed here. At important moments, in fact, stridently anti-communist unions threatened to wrest control of the entire endeavour away from ICFTU leaders. Exploring the diverse internationalisms revealed by this story shows us the contingent and multi-faceted nature of the drive towards a new anti-communist entertainment trade union organisation. Combined, these trends show us that the Cold War was less important in shaping the contours of the ICFTU’s path to a new entertainment international than both the economic conditions of workers (along with related treaty structures, shifting technologies and FIM claims of cross-ideological organising success) and the competing agendas among diverse anti-communists and non-communists.
While the ways these topics link to existing literature appear in more detail below, a few general comments will help to start off. Works on the ICFTU do not mention this entertainment sector story, and the few works that exist on the FIM or the British Musicians’ Union (BMU) do not connect to the ICFTU.Footnote 3 More broadly, examining the ICFTU’s repeated failures reflects the recent scholarly emphasis on avoiding the appearance of inevitable progress or ‘rise’ for international organisations (in this case of an aspect of postwar Western European integration or of automatic cooperation among non-communist entertainment trade unionists) in favour of, as Talbot Imlay puts it, exploring ‘clusters of activity, some interconnected and some not, occurring in multiple spaces, at various speeds and intensities, and with different durations’.Footnote 4 Similarly, this analysis participates in, as a recent work on international organisations puts it, seeing such groups ‘as sites of conflict, mediation, and as bridges between various camps, states, networks, individuals, and agendas’.Footnote 5 It also examines what the same volume describes as ‘complex interconnections’ in which ‘histories of internationalism and international organizations go far beyond that of the Cold War, but the context created by Cold War oppositions had a major influence on the way that these organizations operated’.Footnote 6 The ICFTU’s drive to create its own entertainment international was certainly in part a Cold War story. Yet the ICFTU’s repeated failures stemmed most centrally from worker concerns about new or increasingly powerful transnational economic forces, from the way the FIM's demonstrated ability to help workers bolstered its claims that cross-bloc cooperation brought concrete gains and from myriad forms of intra-Western competition. The narrative below first provides a summary of the road to the ICFTU's new group and then explores what that path shows us about entertainment workers’ concerns in early Cold War Europe, about the practices of participants in the cultural Cold War and about the internationalisms swirling around these endeavours.
The Organising Story
In the early 1950s, the ICFTU's efforts never got far, though meetings in 1950 and 1951 on white-collar workers included entertainment industries as areas of potential organising, and the ICFTU played a role in the creation of the International Federation of Variety Artists (IFVA).Footnote 7 In 1952, a new International Federation of Actors (Federation Internationale des Acteurs; FIA) formed, though, as Ranier Fattmann has shown, it kept its distance from the ICFTU.Footnote 8 Another major player on the ICFTU side, the EUFTT, formed in 1953.Footnote 9 Intermittent contacts between the ICFTU and the musicians’ international also occurred during the early 1950s, though the ways those interactions revealed larger issues will be expanded upon below. The FIM's long-serving president was Hardie Ratcliffe, who for more than two decades simultaneously led the BMU, and its general secretary was President Rudolf Leuzinger of the Swiss Musicians’ Union (Schweizerischer Musikerverband/ Union Suisse des Artistes Musiciens).Footnote 10 By 1956, independent action by French and Italian anti-communists, who created their own International Federation of Entertainment Workers (IFEW), led the ICFTU in March 1957 to host a broad meeting of entertainment trade unionists with the goal of forming a new ITS.Footnote 11 Despite the fact that, as the US embassy in London put it, ‘34 delegates from ten countries representing 21 trade union organisations and four international bodies’ were present, the meeting witnessed splits both over the acceptability of crossing Cold War boundaries and between anti-communist groups about whether existing or new organisational forms best met their goals.Footnote 12
ICFTU efforts in the late 1950s and early 1960s likewise came to naught. A committee created at the early 1957 gathering met in November 1957 and March 1958, but these sessions failed to generate momentum towards a formal founding conference and FIM leaders clashed with the ICFTU during the first and refused to attend the second.Footnote 13 A third meeting in September 1958 decided to pause any further action.Footnote 14 The ICFTU's hopes subsequently rose as it seemed the Americans might finally throw their weight behind the ICFTU's efforts.Footnote 15 Another formal gathering took place in December 1959 alongside the ICFTU's Sixth World Congress in Brussels, with seven leaders from US entertainment unions present, and the idea again seemed to have some traction.Footnote 16 Yet AFM President Herman Kenin then did not conduct his promised canvas of US entertainment union leaders’ thoughts until August 1960 and, despite initial support for the ICFTU's goal, when officials from US entertainment unions met in New York in January 1961, they decided instead to form a group for the Western Hemisphere.Footnote 17 ICFTU leaders felt they had no choice but to support the move, and they provided funding for meetings in Costa Rica in May 1961 and Peru a year later that led to an Inter-American Federation of Entertainment Workers (IAFEW).Footnote 18
Yet ICFTU leaders still hoped for success in Europe. The entertainment leaders’ gathering at the Sixth World Congress had created a liaison committee, which met in October 1961 and July 1962, though no progress occurred.Footnote 19 Finally, in June 1963 representatives from the United States, Sweden, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands and the EUFTT met at the ICFTU's headquarters to restart the process.Footnote 20 A newly formed committee then held meetings in April and September 1964, and the ISETU emerged from a March 1965 conference, with the IAFEW, EUFTT and others to ‘harmonise their structure and activities with the ISETU over a two-year period’, as an early 1966 ICFTU report put it.Footnote 21 While the new group now had a constitution, two committees and publications and while research and activities such as summer schools began, the latter report had to note, ‘The words “within the ICFTU” are included in the title as the permanent secretariat is composed of ICFTU staff and the organisation is therefore not yet a full international trade secretariat.’Footnote 22 Indeed, as Fattmann has shown, the ISETU was extremely weak until the early 1970s, made up largely of ‘technical white and blue-collar workers in radio, film and television’ and having ‘to rely on the support of the ICFTU in matters of finance, personnel and office space’.Footnote 23 It had taken the ICFTU and its allies a decade to create a new entertainment ITS, and the repeated failures shed light on several aspects of the experiences of European entertainment workers, the cultural Cold War in Europe and the practice of forming and reforming international networks during the 1950s and early 1960s.
Workers and Transnational Economic Forces
Both the ICFTU and its opponents certainly thought primarily of entertainment workers as, first and foremost, workers. They needed to be able to bargain collectively and influence both working conditions and legislation. In his study of the FIM, Martin Cloonan's identification of contextual elements that were ‘particularly pertinent to musicians’ is applicable more broadly to the international entertainment sector under discussion here, namely that shaping influences included ‘changing technologies, the state of the music industries, competition from other musicians’ as well as the fact that these were ‘internationally organised industries characterised by intense competition, in which the supply of labour generally exceeds the demand’.Footnote 24 He also points out how ‘recording, publishing, live music and broadcasting’ were important FIM concerns, with the latter including the way musicians’ work increasingly appeared on television in the form of ‘the public use of recorded music’.Footnote 25 Some of the topics noted below are found in Cloonan's analysis of the FIM simply because most entertainment workers were dealing with similar issues at the time. Even as the ICFTU and FIM sparred, their confrontation revealed entertainment workers on both sides of the contest were especially grappling with three new developments in their industries: stronger transnational employers, the expanding influence of recent and new technologies and the impact of the EEC.
One of the most basic roles of trade unions is, of course, protecting workers’ interests, and many labour leaders felt they faced new tests in the need to negotiate with increasingly powerful transnational employers who were difficult to confront when they operated across borders. In fact, some entertainment unions refused to attend the ICFTU's first major meeting for the sector in early 1957 because the FIM, FIA and IFVA were already successful, having achieved ‘a collective agreement with the European Broadcasting Union’, which was made up of public sector broadcasters.Footnote 26 Likewise, the recalcitrant groups insisted on avoiding ‘ideological’ divisions ‘since the organisations defending the performing artists find themselves up against a group of employers who pay no regard to possible political divergences’.Footnote 27 At the meeting itself, the head of the (British) Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT), who was a lukewarm ally and then a lukewarm opponent of the ICFTU, revealed several issues everyone was dealing with when he wondered ‘whether an international body would make it easier for British film technicians to work in France. Would it be able to stop work declared black from being performed in another country? Would it promote joint international productions? Would it be able to exchange international data?’Footnote 28 One of the best summations of the problems all these groups sought to tackle during this era appeared in a press release celebrating the late 1959 gathering alongside the ICFTU's Sixth World Congress, where US figures were finally present in large numbers. In addition to a general uplift of entertainment workers’ ‘economic and social interests’ and a desire to avoid government or political interference, the new international was to address problems related both to ‘unemployment and exploitation arising from various causes such as automation and other technological devices’ and to ‘employers who leave their customary country of production for the purpose of seeking lower wages and working conditions elsewhere, thereby setting up competition between the workers of the different countries’.Footnote 29 These were some of the general ways both the ICFTU and its opponents faced challenges related to cross-border employers, legislation and conditions within industries, and more examples are noted below in the section on the cultural Cold War contest.
The broader spread of existing technologies, such as film and television, and the advent of new ones, such as satellite communications, also confronted entertainment trade unions with questions in early Cold War Europe. At a late 1955 IFVA congress, a resolution noted that ‘performers’ rights, Eurovision’ were key issues.Footnote 30 In mid-1956, the ICFTU reported that ever since a meeting in April 1954, the three non-aligned internationals had ‘been cooperating closely … on the question of international television relays’.Footnote 31 The EUFTT, an ICFTU ally, of course had as a main constituency workers in the television industry, and its constitution noted it would advocate ‘on the European level’.Footnote 32 At the large meeting in early 1957, one ICFTU official, when defending the idea of a new international, noted that ‘film, radio and television … were making claims on the services of actors, musicians and variety artistes beyond the strict limits of their trade’.Footnote 33 In 1961, when the non-aligned ACTT tried to hold ‘an international conference of European film and television technicians’ unions’, the EUFTT got the ICFTU to protest to the British TUC over the likely presence of French and Italian communists, and the meeting failed to materialise.Footnote 34 Yet the proposed agenda revealed how labour leaders were dealing extensively with issues brought on by the expansion of film and television in postwar Europe. It included, ‘International exchange of television programmes … the rights of technicians and performers … co-production in films … problems in connection with the common market … conditions of work and remuneration … future cooperation between unions of film and television technicians’.Footnote 35 ICFTU concerns over the effect of new technologies expanded even further after the advent of the Tel-Star satellite in 1962, which, according to historian James Schwoch, ‘allowed national TV networks to hook up for intercontinental and cross-oceanic TV program exchanges and newsfeeds’.Footnote 36 At the June 1963 meeting that restarted the process for the ICFTU, a West German ally listed ‘the implications of Tel-Star’ as an area ‘of common interest to entertainment workers’ and the AFM's Kenin spoke of ‘questions of common interest, Telstar for example’.Footnote 37 Indeed, during its inaugural year, an article in the new ISETU ‘Newsletter’ covered, in part, ‘the problems which the AFM has had to face in securing benefits for its members who provide music for film and television’.Footnote 38 Beyond merely the fact that there now existed more workers in the latter industries, workers in the ancient crafts of music, arts, acting and theatre production faced new challenges as they dealt with the ways the growth of newer technologies could undermine their bargaining position, pay or voice in the workplace.
Entertainment unions in Western Europe also had to start operating in a region that was more integrated economically by the early 1960s. For workers in entertainment fields, one of the most relevant aspects of the 1957 Treaty of Rome that created the EEC (Common Market to the ICFTU and its allies) was that workers could more easily cross national borders. This presented potentially thorny situations, even among trade union allies, in smaller entertainment fields where, as noted above with Cloonan's words, competition for work was often already high. In addition, the initial EEC members were only those of the prior European Coal and Steel Community, which meant that while important entertainment unions in France, Italy and West Germany shared certain interests and problems, British, Swedish and Austrian unions still stood outside this set up in the early 1960s. The ICFTU approach to the EEC is too broad to explore here, but it did try to strike a balance, declaring in late 1958 that it affirmed ‘the principle of European economic integration’, while also expressing ‘anxiety about the possible effects of both the European common market and the free trade area on countries outside these areas’.Footnote 39 In the entertainment realm, in early 1961, the EUFTT claimed that if the proposed ACTT-led meeting noted above included communists, it would ‘work against the application of the European Common Market treaty and the realisation of European unity’.Footnote 40 They issued a similar warning later the same year when the FIM and FIA held a ‘Conference on European questions’.Footnote 41
By the time of the June 1963 meeting, a French ally of the ICFTU warned, ‘The problems of entertainment workers in Europe were bound up with the Common Market but organisations in this field closely connected with the ICFTU had no point of contact.’Footnote 42 When asking for money two months later, the EUFTT both noted the EEC when it wrote about how the end of ‘national barriers to competition’ presented a challenge and described the communist accusation that the EUFTT undermined ‘our film and TV industries through the agency of the European Economic Community and thus favour[ed] the American film industry to the detriment of the European Workers [sic]’.Footnote 43 By the time of a January 1965 EUFTT conference, almost every agenda item included connections to the EEC.Footnote 44 Likewise, in 1964, one of the pre-founding sub-committees tackled both the benefits and the potentially detrimental competition stemming from cross-border work, with the ‘ever-increasing freedom of circulation of labour within the European Common Market’ a significant part of the conversation.Footnote 45 In fact, the day after the March 1965 founding conference, many of the entertainment trade union leaders present in Brussels met with EEC representatives.Footnote 46 While both sides invoked the EEC when lobbing Cold War accusations, it appeared most often as a potential problem of labour competition among Western entertainment trade unionists during the early 1960s. Both these concrete concerns and the rhetoric related to the EEC reflected how trade unions, despite failures ‘to exert much influence on European cooperation as it evolved around them’, still pursued transnational connections in such an environment, as Matthew Broad has shown regarding how ‘the [British] TUC and its European retinues, knowing full well the frustrations that international unionism could bring, nonetheless continued to engage with one another when responding to the integration schemes of the 1950s’.Footnote 47 Entertainment trade unions thus participated in the larger contingent path of postwar European integration, dealing with ‘ideas and ideals’, in this case in the form of reactions to increased competition, that were ‘working across national frontiers, crosscutting member states’.Footnote 48 In sum, along with concerns over powerful transnational employers and the roles of new and expanding technologies, anxiety over the EEC's impact illustrated the centrality of transnational economic trends affecting entertainment workers’ status that were not linked directly to the Cold War.
Practitioners of the Cultural Cold War
Over the last three decades, historians have done much to explore the way the Cold War operated in cultural realms, including in diverse artistic fields, dance and jazz tours and US government cultural propaganda.Footnote 49 The ICFTU did not produce its own cultural artifacts, however, and though its allies in national-level entertainment unions certainly did, the focus here will be on how the ICFTU clashed with existing entertainment internationals over whether or not to work with Eastern bloc and Western European communists. ICFTU leaders did not make a particularly novel argument about the threat they saw in communist participation in the entertainment sector, apart from their general view that communist unions were merely appendages of state power and therefore did not truly represent workers’ interests. More broadly, since the musicians’ and actors’ groups refused to cut their ties to communists, this section echoes scholars’ portrayal of how ‘studying international organizations helps us see, the, in many ways, porous nature of the “Iron Curtain”’.Footnote 50 It likewise reflects how analysing ‘the many-sided “actorness” of civil society’ can show how ‘resisting bipolar Cold War dichotomies’ was in fact a significant trend among European transnational actors.Footnote 51 Finally, it builds on work ‘focusing on the (semi)permeability of the Iron Curtain’, including a recent edited volume on workers who traversed physical boundaries in Cold War Europe.Footnote 52 This section thus examines the international organising endeavours by creators of and participants in Cold War culture, and it also builds on the theme of cross-border working conditions because the FIM and others often framed their cooperation with communists as an element of bettering those conditions. Thus, as they deemphasised the Cold War divide, the views and actions of the ICFTU's opponents on the issue of cross-ideological cooperation further revealed the importance of the international economic landscape in shaping the contours of the ICFTU's path towards a new entertainment international.
Unsurprisingly, ICFTU leaders believed that ‘free trade unionism’ was the best way to improve workers’ pay, benefits, employment conditions and industrial voice, whereas communist unions were merely fronts for state power that actively undermined workers’ hopes. The communist-led WFTU was ‘nothing but a tool of the Soviet Government’, a 1954 ICFTU circular proclaimed.Footnote 53 Thus, ICFTU reports on existing internationals in entertainment fields often contained either complaints that others were working with communists or chagrin over communist leadership of the actors’ international or particular national unions. Even when aiding the variety artists’ group early on, which the ICFTU had helped form, a French ICFTU board member in May 1955 supported funding for them ‘in order to combat the spread of communism in this profession’.Footnote 54 When ICFTU leaders thought about inviting the musicians’ international to their biennial world congress the same year, both the latter's inclusion of French and Italian communist affiliates and its expulsion of a non-communist French union, due to a refusal to pay dues after the entry of a communist group, played a role in deciding against an invitation.Footnote 55 In mid-1956, the ICFTU's first significant report on the entertainment sector stated broadly that its own efforts had thus far failed in part because entertainment trade unionists ‘did not wish to renounce collaboration with organisations led by Communists or by people carrying out the policy of the Communist Party’, with special vitriol reserved for the communist leaders of the actors’ international.Footnote 56 At a board meeting a year later, a top ICFTU official described the latter group as ‘under a communist president’ and the FIM as ‘particularly neutralistic’.Footnote 57
A year after that, another board report complained about the ‘unwarranted suspicion of the ICFTU's motives’ by the variety artists and musicians, which was in part based on the ICFTU's insistence that a new group would force the end of ‘organisational ties with unions in communist countries and communist unions in democratic countries’.Footnote 58 A report created for the ICFTU's late 1959 meeting contained a significant section on divisions it had with the FIM, claiming, ‘The ICFTU could not accept the position in which an associated ITS had unions in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland, as well as WFTU-affiliated unions in France and Italy.’Footnote 59 These claims continued into the early 1960s with no change in tenor or style. ICFTU allies echoed them, though at times, as seen below, they did so for their own purposes. As shown above, in 1961 the EUFTT twice complained to the ICFTU about European-wide meetings that were to include communist unions. Anti-communist trade unionists also criticised claims by existing internationals that they were just professional groups, not official trade unions, who dealt only with technical details related to working conditions and legislation. At the large early 1957 meeting, after a representative of the variety artists claimed his group ‘dealt with purely professional matters … and was not concerned with the political aspects’, an Italian ICFTU ally condemned working with communists and claimed that ‘the stress on dealing with technical problems was merely camouflage’.Footnote 60 The ICFTU and its allies believed it impossible to trust the motives of communist labour leaders during this era. They insisted that any new international prohibit all such ties, presenting a problem for existing groups who had communist members.
The nature of the existing internationals’ defence of their continued connections to communists, in which they offered evidence of concrete successes instead of philosophical arguments, further revealed the impact that addressing real-world working conditions had on the ICFTU's path to a new entertainment group. In emphasising the things they had achieved and the possibility of further victories, they leveraged the concerns noted above regarding the cross-border nature of work in many entertainment fields as they argued for continued cooperation. At the March 1957 meeting, the FIM's Leuzinger rejected accusations of extensive communist influence and argued that including communist unions both in the FIM and in any new group could in fact dilute their influence, which ‘was one way of combating communism’.Footnote 61 He further claimed that cooperation in the name of ‘common goals’ was paramount, not ideological purity.Footnote 62 The British ‘performers’ unions’ who had refused to attend the same meeting spelled out similar rationale in a ‘Joint Statement’ when they emphasised both that the non-aligned internationals ‘have a record of substantial achievement’ and that rejecting communist members was detrimental ‘because there are now few political barriers to the exchange of entertainment programs; companies and performers visit all countries and performances are carried everywhere by radio, television, films, and records’.Footnote 63 When Ratcliffe informed the ICFTU in early 1958 that the FIM would no longer participate in its efforts, he emphasised the worth of working with communist unions when he explained that US musicians had benefited during a recent strike due to the FIM both blocking any work ‘transferred to London’ and getting its French communist affiliate ‘to refuse such work’.Footnote 64 As an example of how some entertainment unions framed their confrontation with the ICFTU, a ‘journal’ of that same French union had also recently emphasised that ‘the three existing Internationals’ were ‘putting defence of workers’ interests before politics’.Footnote 65
In an August 1958 meeting between TUC leaders and the heads of six British entertainment unions regarding support for the ICFTU's goal, one of the latter emphasised both that in their fields ‘foreign travel was frequently involved, necessitating good relations’ across the continent and that ‘the existing Internationals … had managed to achieve this’.Footnote 66 Likewise, Ratcliffe ‘cited examples of useful cooperation’ with both US and Soviet musicians and a third British entertainment union leader emphasised that achievements by the FIM and FIA ‘in negotiating international agreements covering European countries, and in gaining representation on international committees, on matter such as copyright … would have been impossible … if the organizations had not had contacts “in all parts of Europe”’.Footnote 67 Similarly, in March 1960, Ratcliffe wrote the TUC to defend cross-bloc cooperation in the face of the potential ‘fullest cooperation’ between broadcasters that might result from a new ‘television network covering Eastern and Western Europe’.Footnote 68 He finished the letter by doubling down on his view that ‘whatever may be the position in other fields, cooperation between East and West is possible in ours. This is something that, regrettably, the ICFTU seem unable to grasp’.Footnote 69 Thus, the existing internationals consistently defended their cooperation with Eastern bloc and Western European communist entertainment unions by sticking to the practical achievements they had gained and by claiming that cross-bloc unity was the best way to face international challenges. While they largely adhered to forms of non-communist progressive or social democratic thought, they promoted a type of usable middle ground in the cultural Cold War as they rejected the strict conflation of their organisations’ various goals with Western cultural and political superiority that was sometimes found in other Western organisations, such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom with its Central Intelligence Agency funding.Footnote 70 They conducted the practice of the cultural Cold War largely by pointing to the real-world benefits they had brought to workers. Given that their lack of cooperation with the ICFTU, along with intra-Western divisions, effectively blocked a new international for years, their reasoning revealed how Cold War divisions were secondary to concerns over international economic and working conditions in shaping the ICFTU's path towards a new entertainment international.
It is also worth emphasising that even on the issue of whether or not to work with communists, some important Western trade unionists adopted a sort of ‘centrist’ approach between strict anti-communism and extolling the worth of cross-ideological cooperation. The British TUC tended to fall in this camp, in part because British entertainment unions were a core part of the FIM. So did the American musicians, even as they finally began to cooperate with the ICFTU. In fact, when a top ICFTU official laid out a plan at the June 1963 meeting to have ‘a nucleus’ of ICFTU allies at the core of the new international who ‘would not be obliged to treat any of the existing federations as fully representative of workers in its own field’, the AFM's Kenin replied that ‘the existence of other bodies comprising communist unions would have to be recognised’, even if only so that ‘consultations’ occurred instead of ‘formal relationship[s]’.Footnote 71 Regarding the British, as early as May 1955 TUC General Secretary Vincent Tewson was hesitant to affirm the ICFTU decision not to invite the FIM to its congress, and in August 1958, as noted above, TUC leaders failed to convince British entertainment trade union leaders to back the ICFTU's plans.Footnote 72 Likewise, twice in the early 1960s TUC General Secretary George Woodcock refused to further pressure his compatriots. In late 1963, he told an ICFTU meeting that ‘the British TUC … would not require its affiliates in the entertainment industries to participate in an additional or rival ITS for Europe’, claiming that the TUC backed ‘their right, in protecting their trade interests, to maintain contact with other European unions, in France for example, which perhaps were communist’.Footnote 73 At a December 1964 ICFTU meeting, Woodcock even said he agreed with recent criticisms of the ICFTU's goal of a new entertainment international, calling it ‘unnecessary and in fact disruptive’.Footnote 74 When ICFTU General Secretary Omer Becu defended the idea, Woodcock warned that ‘the British TUC may well lose some affiliated unions on account of this activity’, and he reiterated that most ‘British unions were associated with other bodies and considered the ISETU as disruptive’.Footnote 75 While ICFTU officials met Woodcock halfway on a funding amount, and thus he ended up supporting some money for the new group, his opposition illustrated the hesitancy at forcing a break with communists among some labour leaders who were not part of the existing internationals and who were otherwise anti-communist.Footnote 76 When it came to conducting the Cold War in fields where cultural conflict often abounded, the international economic context, filtered through the FIM's successful organising and its related arguments in defence of further cross-bloc cooperation, could undermine appeals to strict anti-communism among Western labour leaders when it came to a new ICFTU entertainment international.
Entertainment Trade Union Internationalisms
The practice of competing and changeable international alignments, especially among anti-communists, made the nuanced hesitation above look simple by comparison. Recent studies of diverse forms of internationalism have expanded our understanding of the ways nongovernmental organisations, loose networks of actors and ideas have interacted in the international sphere, especially in the period between the late nineteenth century and the early Cold War.Footnote 77 As entertainment trade unionists cooperated, opposed each other or stood on the sidelines between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s, they reflected several themes other historians have identified in similar types of networks. At a general level, the ICFTU and the FIM constructed, respectively, anti-communist and Iron Curtain-crossing ‘internationalist imageries’ and ‘collective dreamworlds’.Footnote 78 Yet that sense of bilateral struggle is also too simple, because a clear break did not occur until late 1957 and early 1958 and non-communist Western Europeans often acted outside the ICFTU's control, contributing to several starts and failures across the years. Analysing the instability of these networks thus reflects Daniel Laqua's emphasis on ‘transience’, Talbot Imlay's focus on how ‘shared commitment … fluctuated over time’, the warning by other historians against seeing ‘Eastern and Western cultural identities in a static and essentialist way’ and the description by the editors of a recent forum on the WFTU of ‘labor internationalism as a contested, heterogenous, and generative field of social struggle’.Footnote 79 Victor Silverman has also analysed ‘unionists’ faltering and intermittent internationalism’ during the 1940s.Footnote 80
Emphasising these discontinuities also participates in challenging ‘narratives of progress’ within the history of postwar Western European integration, which works by Laqua as well as by Michele Donato and Mathieu Fulla have noted.Footnote 81 In addition, the fact that many of these contested relationships were among anti-communists (as opposed to just non-communists) means they fit the pattern identified by historians of anti-communist networks of ‘a complex mosaic of anti-communist motives and movements’, marked at times by ‘constant competition for public and private funds and official recognition’.Footnote 82 Finally, this analysis of entertainment trade union internationalisms affirms the focus by historians on ‘practice’, which included ‘concrete effort[s] at transnational cooperation and engagement’ as well as sites and moments where actors ‘debated, manoeuvred, and (sometimes) disagreed’.Footnote 83 In fact, as Imlay lays out regarding socialist internationalisms, exploring practice can help reveal why failures occurred.Footnote 84 For our purposes, the ICFTU failed across the better part of a decade to form a new entertainment international not just because of the FIM's intransigence, but also because its anti-communist allies often pursued their own, usually more specific or even self-interested, goals. This shows us that, in addition to international economic conditions, intra-Western competition and caution contributed to the ICFTU's failure as much as its inability to convince the FIM to abandon cross-bloc contacts. The types of internationalisms at play can be seen in the ICFTU's various relationships with existing internationals, its anti-communist allies, another group of unions initially wary of choosing sides and the EUFTT.
Before 1958, the ICFTU actually worked somewhat well with the musicians and variety artists, though never with the actors whom ICFTU leaders believed were controlled by communists.Footnote 85 FIM President Ratcliffe attended a large ICFTU forum for white-collar workers in April 1951, though he defended the group's approach to international affiliations.Footnote 86 ICFTU and FIM officials even attended each other's congress meetings in 1953, and ICFTU General Secretary J.H. Oldenbroek was present at the FIM's 1956 gathering as well, where the musicians passed a resolution containing vague promises of ‘discussions’ and ‘closer collaboration’ between the two organisations.Footnote 87 Ratcliffe and Leuzinger then, as noted above, attended the two meetings in 1957, though after that point they abandoned any serious attempt to work with the ICFTU. The variety artists’ international, which the ICFTU helped found in the early 1950s, was also amenable at first, with the ICFTU sending an ‘observer’ to its late 1955 meeting and an ICFTU board report about six months later noting the ‘close contact’ between the two.Footnote 88 By the March 1957 meeting, however, the IFVA's head was willing both to echo the musicians’ view in emphasising the ‘professional’, as opposed to ‘political’, nature of his group and to condemn the new anti-communist entertainment group, discussed next, that had emerged the prior year.Footnote 89 The variety artists also quit the ICFTU's project after that point, and by mid-1958, as noted above, ‘suspicion’ marked the relationship.Footnote 90 While these connections all soured by the end of the decade, they had shifted from previously cooperative alignments in earlier years.
That earlier form of internationalism in fact spurred the advent of another one, which included Americans though was mainly driven by anti-communist Western Europeans upset with the slow pace of ICFTU organising. Starting in early 1956, the heads of two non-communist Italian and French entertainment unions, the Federazione Unitaria Lavoratori dello Spettacolo (led by Claudio Rocchi) and the Federation Syndicaliste des Spectacles FO, began an effort to create a new anti-communist entertainment international because, they declared, the ICFTU failed to block its affiliates ‘from maintaining relations with international Communist-dominated bodies’.Footnote 91 After some initial setbacks, that September in Rome they founded the new IFEW, with AFM backing.Footnote 92 In fact, three months earlier a top AFM official both met with the future French and Italian IFEW leaders, who criticised the ICFTU's general secretary for a ‘lack of cooperation’, and heard from two members of the Danish Musicians’ Union (Dansk Musiker Forbund) about their doubts that the ICFTU would quit working with the FIM at that point.Footnote 93 Using the excuse ‘that the proposed organisation [the IFEW] would be too limited in scope’, the ICFTU called an initial meeting at its headquarters in November 1956, where ‘grave differences of opinion’ over ‘the political attitude of the different internationals’ marked the conversation, which included all the existing groups other than the actors.Footnote 94 When everyone met again at the larger March 1957 meeting, an ICFTU official similarly noted the gathering was ‘to clarify the situation created by the establishment’ of the IFEW ‘and seek a more comprehensive, world-wide organisation’.Footnote 95 It was clear, however, that the ICFTU feared the new anti-communist group might eclipse its own, to that point, largely theoretical efforts.
In fact, at that meeting intra-Western tensions were as important as the ICFTU-FIM contest for understanding the forces impacting the ICFTU's path towards a new entertainment international. When Oldenbroek claimed that the recently formed group ‘wanted to be regarded as an ITS recognized by the ICFTU’, Rocchi seized on his words and ‘took official note of the fact’ that the IFEW ‘was to be considered an organisation within the framework of the ICFTU’.Footnote 96 Another IFEW supporter was more blunt, rejecting the ICFTU's proposals and claiming that a new ICFTU-backed group ‘would mean a death blow to the Rome International’, and later Rocchi said the ICFTU's ideas put his organisation ‘in a very difficult situation’.Footnote 97 Rocchi even unsuccessfully introduced a proposal to make the IFEW formally the new ICFTU-approved international.Footnote 98 When the conference passed the ICFTU's proposals instead, the IFEW's leaders ‘abstained’ because, as later related by the US embassy in London, ‘in private discussions’ the key man in Europe for the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), Irving Brown, had convinced them not to oppose the ICFTU proposals openly by arguing both ‘that an uncompromising position at this time would throw most of the European representatives, especially the Germans and Austrians who are decisive on the continent, into the hands of the British or into the hands of those who do not want to see the International definitely linked to the ICFTU’ and that moving forward with the ICFTU's ideas ‘would create a serious internal problem for Ratcliffe and the Musicians since he would eventually have to choose between the ICFTU and those few Communist unions with whom he still has relationships and affiliations’.Footnote 99 IFEW leaders attended subsequent meetings and a mid-1958 ICFTU report noted that they were now fine with their own ‘dissolution … so that their affiliates can join the new Federation’.Footnote 100 Both the Italian-French-US alignment and the IFEW itself subsequently dissolved, with Rocchi attending the meeting during the late 1959 Sixth World Congress only as head of his national union.Footnote 101 Yet the short-lived group's actions sparked broader ICFTU movement and its attempts to preserve its position within the ICFTU's larger goals illustrated one internationalism that stimulated tension among anti-communists in the entertainment sector in the mid-1950s.
A third kind of internationalism came from entertainment trade unionists who watched events warily and moved cautiously, with groups from Sweden, West Germany and Austria most prominent among them. By the time of the March 1958 meeting, which the FIM did not attend, the head of the German Musician's Union (Deutscher Musiker-Verband, part of the post-1949 Gewerkschaft Kunst; GK), which belonged to the FIM, said his group would not attend until the ICFTU-FIM relationship was clarified.Footnote 102 In addition, the Austrian arts union (Gewerkschaft Kunst und Freie Berufe) had come out against a new organisation when ‘three sections … had voted against participation’ with ‘only the film section being in favour’, but the Swedish musicians were by then leaning towards joining.Footnote 103 Another West German trade unionist present at the early 1958 meeting, from the International Artists’ Lodge (Internationale Artisten-Loge, also in the GK), invoked both the conditions entertainment workers faced and the Cold War environment when he said his group quit the IFVA after the latter sought connections with ‘East European organisations’, and he blamed his East German counterparts in language revealing the stark divisions at play, ‘A sharp struggle was going on at present between the East and West German variety artistes’ organisations, the former having obtained a boycott of West German productions in East German newspapers and attempting to split off the West Berlin section from the main organisation.’Footnote 104 West German and Swedish representatives also attended the meeting at the late 1959 Sixth World Congress, though the Austrians did not, and when prodding US unions to act in late 1960, Becu told the AFM's Kenin ‘the situation is liquid in England, Germany and Austria’, although support in Italy, France and Sweden was stronger.Footnote 105
By mid-1963, echoing the Western European pressure on the ICFTU in the mid-1950s, West German, Swedish and Israeli ‘requests’ led the ICFTU to call the meeting that would restart its efforts.Footnote 106 Dutch groups also followed this pattern of initial hesitation and then embrace of the ICFTU's goals, though the experience of the Swedish musicians most clearly illustrated these patterns.Footnote 107 In 1953 and again in mid-1959, the SMU tried to shift the musicians’ international towards more cooperation with the ICFTU via constitutional changes or conference resolutions, but failed both times.Footnote 108 By late 1959, the Swedish group decided to quit the FIM and was out by mid-1960.Footnote 109 The next year, however, ‘the musicians in Stockholm’ tried to reverse the choice and SMU leaders hoped, in vain, that movement by US unions was forthcoming because they were likely one of the ‘two European unions’ that a mid-1960 ICFTU report described as ‘in an extremely embarrassing position’ due to exiting existing internationals with nowhere to go.Footnote 110 SMU President Gustaf Montelius was then on the new committee set up at the late 1959 gathering and was present at its October 1961 meeting, though the US detour into Latin America sidelined that effort for a further two years.Footnote 111 Thus, a risky move left the Swedish musicians in the organisational wilderness for years. Overall, this cautious internationalism by Central and Northern European groups first undermined ICFTU efforts in the late 1950s and then supported them in the early 1960s.
A final type of internationalism visible in this story was that of a consistent ICFTU ally, the European film and television workers’ EUFTT. Formed in 1953, its general secretary was Julian Jenger, who also led a French union of film and radio workers.Footnote 112 Jenger was involved in virtually every meeting related to a new entertainment international during the next few years, and by late 1959 the ICFTU rewarded that loyalty by granting the EUFTT's request ‘to be recognised as an associated ITS’ as long as it still supported the ICFTU's larger goal.Footnote 113 For the next five years, the EUFTT acted as a sort of placeholder for an ICFTU-aligned entertainment international, working to undermine gatherings where communists might be present, as noted above, and publicly voicing support for the ICFTU's goal, as in a mid-1960 resolution calling for the ICFTU to work with US entertainment unions.Footnote 114 The relationship was still complicated, though, because in September 1962 the EUFTT openly considered a new Europe-specific organisation for entertainment unions and the ICFTU twice denied money for its meetings in April 1962 and January 1963, though largely over internal ICFTU technical issues related to how money was to be appropriated.Footnote 115 Funding began to flow again after the restart in mid-1963 because, as Becu told AFL-CIO President George Meany that August, the EUFTT had ‘cooperated very closely with the ICFTU in a field where communists and fellow-travelling organisations had made their influence felt’ and ‘has for a long while been the only internationally organised sector in the European entertainment industry accessible to us’.Footnote 116 In an ICFTU report on another EUFTT request for funds in June 1964, quoted above to open this article, concerns over working conditions, the EEC and potential communist influence all appeared.Footnote 117 Furthermore, the report noted that ‘the EUFTT has from the outstet [sic] strongly supported’ the ICFTU's pursuit of a new entertainment international, and it likewise noted the EUFTT's status ‘as the only ITS active in the entertainment field in Europe associated with the ICFTU’.Footnote 118 Thus, even as the larger Western international sought to one day replace the European film and television group, they formed yet another type of entertainment trade union internationalism in practice. It was one that largely aided the ICFTU's project, though even this alignment contained ripples of disunity when the EUFTT wanted to elevate its own status or hinted it might go its own way and when ICFTU funds were not immediately forthcoming.
Conclusion
After 1965, the new ICFTU-aligned entertainment international was relatively weak until the 1980s and, like its parent organisation earlier, was at odds with the FIM, FIA and other groups until the final years of the Cold War.Footnote 119 Yet the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, when consistent ICFTU efforts to form a new entertainment international failed, revealed much about the ways entertainment trade unionists thought about work, conducted the cultural Cold War and practiced nuanced and shifting internationalisms. Both ICFTU-FIM cooperation up to the mid-1950s and the similar concerns held by both the FIM and the ICFTU's allies regarding the expanding impact of both cross-border employers and the EEC indicated that the two sides could sometimes align or recognise similar interests. The ICFTU's social democratic-driven opposition to working with communists was standard fare, but the way the musicians’ international defended its cooperation with communist unions by emphasising practical results revealed that addressing concrete worker concerns bolstered the arguments of the ICFTU's opponents that cross-bloc cooperation was required. Furthermore, the varied internationalist practices pursued by anti-communist or initially neutral entertainment trade union leaders had substantial impacts on the course of events.
Thus, international economic changes and intra-Western competition influenced the ICFTU's path towards a new entertainment international more directly than the Cold War contest, particularly when the FIM could provide evidence of its organising successes and when otherwise anti-communist Europeans pursued their own goals or would not support the ICFTU's agenda. International entertainment trade unionism in Europe during the early Cold War was a contested, variable landscape of temporary alignments and cross-ideological connections. It was a story that flowed into and out of the progression of the Cold War, illustrating how worker and trade union concerns about both international economic conditions and the process of Western European economic integration, as well as the direct experience of diverse types of intra-Western trade union competition, often eclipsed the primacy of the Cold War in the minds of many European entertainment trade unionists in the first two postwar decades.
Acknowledgements
I want to thank the reviewers for their engagement with the manuscript and their very helpful feedback. Part of this material was obtained with Regent University travel and research grants. I would also like to thank Sjors Schaap, who as a graduate student at Leiden University obtained some of the IISH material via one of these grants. The author made use of DeepL to translate most of one primary source from French, with Google Translate used for the final page, both on January 30, 2026. A free version of DeepL was used at https://www.deepl.com/en/translator without modification. No direct quotes, only summary, from that document appear in the article.
Kevin E. Grimm is an associate professor of history at Regent University, where he studies the varied intersections of international labour organisations, modernisation and development ideologies and African nations in the early Cold War. His work on the ICFTU has appeared in Diplomatic History, Cold War History, the Journal of West African History and Labor History. He is currently working on a book on the ICFTU and Ghana during the 1950s.
