For anyone who unquestioningly accepts the seamlessness of the long alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire, Faruk Bilici's fascinating new book will come as a surprise. Historians less than well-versed in the twists and turns of the “special relationship” between sultan and king will discover that it was animated by forces a great deal more intricate than merely the shared interest of the two states in neutralizing the Habsburg Empire.
Known as the closest European ally of the Ottomans for over two and a half centuries, from the time when Süleyman I and François I corresponded during François' captivity in the hands of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V after the battle of Pavia in 1525, France soon gained diplomatic and trading privileges from the Ottomans. Yet, long before Napoleon Bonaparte's peremptory seizure of a large chunk of the sultan's domains in 1798, the vague claims of the French kings to the inheritance of Byzantium gained stark definition with the scheme in 1618 of a former French ambassador in Istanbul, François Savary de Brèves, to conquer the city as part of a wider ambition to destroy Islam. In 1581, England had been granted privileges such as France enjoyed, but as the activities of the Levant Company curtailed the long-term commercial benefits that France had hoped for, the economic argument for maintaining good relations with the Ottomans was weakened. Savary de Brèves proposed a land and sea attack by European forces, supported by an uprising of Ottoman Christians.
This plan came to naught, of course. The next test came in the latter years of the long Ottoman–Venetian war over Crete (1645–69). Cardinal Mazarin, Louis XIV's chief minister, found it hard to support an alliance with the Ottoman Empire when it was fighting Venice, and France took a covert role in the war, assisting Venice financially at first and then militarily.
Bilici writes that Mazarin failed to appreciate that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha wanted to end hostilities when he became grand vizier in 1656 after a debilitating blockade of the Dardanelles by Venetian ships. However, Mazarin's death in 1661 permitted the competing vision of the relationship to take root once more, identified this time with Jean-Baptiste Colbert, controller of France's finances from 1665, who saw good relations with the Ottoman Empire as essential to French commercial well-being. This view won out once peace was agreed, but in the early 1670s, the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz, in a bid to divert the Sun King's attention beyond the confines of Europe, concocted a detailed proposal for the French conquest of Egypt. Friendly relations between France and the Ottoman Empire remained elusive: diplomatic contacts were fraught with misunderstandings, French ships bombarded Chios in 1681, and in the same year the autonomous Ottoman province of Algiers declared war on France, provoking bombardments, which, suggests Bilici, “annonceront la colonisation du XIXe siècle” (p. 36).
The most elaborate designs to take part of the Ottoman Empire came after the failed siege of Vienna in 1683. Louis XIV secretly hoped for the fall of the Habsburg capital and is reported to have flown into a rage when Kara Mustafa Pasha's army was routed. He imagined that, with Vienna lost, his position in continental Europe would be enhanced, and the throne of Charlemagne might be his. Instead, he was cast as accomplice of the infidel, a perception that for a monarch who wanted above all to be seen as protector of the Catholic Church in Europe and the Ottoman Empire clearly needed dispelling. In 1685, then, he took the initiative and sent to the Mediterranean Etienne Gravier, Marquis d'Ortières, an engineer and mariner, for the ostensible purpose of improving commerce by collecting information of use to merchants and correcting Ottoman infringements of trade agreements. The true intent of the mission, however, was to study Ottoman coasts and coastal defenses. Gravier d'Ortières was ordered to observe winds and currents and depths of anchorage and strength of fortifications, as were the several other agents sent by Louis XIV at this time. Accuracy of description was of the essence, and their covert operations produced reports and detailed maps, plans, and sketches in abundance, many of which handsomely illustrate Bilici's study.
Bilici publishes, for the first time, a memoir written by Gravier d'Ortières that is effectively a primer for the capture of the Ottoman capital and its environs. This publication includes, in addition to a detailed description of Istanbul (largely based on the well-known account of Guillaume-Joseph Grelot, published in 1680), an estimate of the forces required to burn the city. This burning was one of the strategies for capturing it (!), the other being first to secure the Yedikule fortress as a base of operations for an invasion. The memoir includes his thoughts on how to reestablish peace with the Ottomans once the French had achieved their aim, and a proposal for how the empire might be partitioned, with France having the major share as the new imperial power in the East.
There is no evidence that these schemes were ever publicly discussed. In any case, the dreams Louis XIV nurtured were soon overtaken by events as much of Europe united against him, and the utility of the Ottoman Empire as an ally against the Habsburgs again became manifest. Capturing Istanbul was surely the last thing on the king's mind. Bilici's book, in a parallel Turkish and French text, reveals the full dimensions of Louis XIV's “Ostpolitik” and makes it impossible for historians any longer to forget that the Ottoman–French alliance was driven by a strong undercurrent of double-dealing and mutual hostility.
