Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2005
The growing interest in bioethics has given rise to a new group of experts: experts in bioethics. They come from different walks of life and their motives, claims, and qualifications for expertise are manifold. Various academic disciplines can be said to contribute to one's status as an expert in bioethics. Studies and research in, say, philosophy, law, anthropology, history, theology, and sociology with an emphasis on bioethical matters are often thought of as suitably qualifying a person as a bioethicist. In addition to these academic qualifications there are two routes to becoming a bioethicist. I will call these the self-nomination (self-styled) and the through-work-experience routes. Self-nominated expertise is most common with medics who have strong religious or other ideological views about ethical matters. Another path to self-nominated expertise starts with strongly held ideological views with interest in bioethical matters. For this category of bioethical experts there does not have to be any institutional acknowledgment of their status; they are experts because they think they are. The other nonacademic type of expert in bioethics emerges through administrative channels. When the various ethics committees and regulatory bodies that now abound were first founded, there were no experts in bioethics to sit on these committees. People became experts by serving in these institutions for sufficiently long periods of time. This still happens with ethics committees in which just a few of the members are experts in ethics. People join the committees as experts of other fields, but are thought to have become experts through the fact that they have served on such committees.
The growing interest in bioethics has given rise to a new group of experts: experts in bioethics. They come from different walks of life and their motives, claims, and qualifications for expertise are manifold. Various academic disciplines can be said to contribute to one's status as an expert in bioethics. Studies and research in, say, philosophy, law, anthropology, history, theology, and sociology with an emphasis on bioethical matters are often thought of as suitably qualifying a person as a bioethicist. In addition to these academic qualifications there are two routes to becoming a bioethicist. I will call these the self-nomination (self-styled) and the through-work-experience routes. Self-nominated expertise is most common with medics who have strong religious or other ideological views about ethical matters. Another path to self-nominated expertise starts with strongly held ideological views with interest in bioethical matters. For this category of bioethical experts there does not have to be any institutional acknowledgment of their status; they are experts because they think they are. The other nonacademic type of expert in bioethics emerges through administrative channels. When the various ethics committees and regulatory bodies that now abound were first founded, there were no experts in bioethics to sit on these committees. People became experts by serving in these institutions for sufficiently long periods of time. This still happens with ethics committees in which just a few of the members are experts in ethics. People join the committees as experts of other fields, but are thought to have become experts through the fact that they have served on such committees.
The roles that bioethicists occupy in the public field can be crudely characterized as the following: demagogues, firefighters, window dressers, and academics. Demagogues often start with strong and coherent normative frameworks that they then apply to bioethical issues. These black-and-white views resonate well in those holding similar views and provoke counterattacks from opposing camps. Firefighters operate with a slightly different methodology, making topicality the main point. This is the group of people who feel that answers should be provided to bioethical dilemmas as soon as they are raised. Because of the urgency of these responses they are very seldom based on any thorough analysis, but rather it seems that the assumed expertise in bioethics of these people is thought to be enough to make their intuitive responses valuable. Window dressing is still very much looked down on by bioethicists of all persuasions, but with the growing desire of business corporations to engage in ethical discussions it seems likely that bioethics consultancy and related activities are a thing of the future. Academics can and do occupy all these roles in bioethical discussions, but I would argue that there should be a limit to how much they engage in nonacademic activities and especially that academic bioethicists should make extra efforts to ensure that their unique expertise that comes from their original disciplines is not forgotten. In what follows I will, as an example, take a closer look at bioethicists with a philosophical training to see what their roles are and what they, perhaps, should be.
A person with a philosophical training doing bioethics can be expected to have knowledge of the issues, theories, and arguments relevant to the field. She is also expected to possess the skills necessary for critical thinking and analysis. Acquaintance with the theories and the ability to construct ethical arguments should enable philosophical bioethicists to provide answers to bioethical dilemmas. However, there is a limit to the scope of these answers. The normative frameworks are based on certain premises about which there is no agreement, and, whether this is admitted or not, the philosopher's answer is only sound as long as the premises are shared. This is one of the reasons why philosophers often give conditional answers to normative questions. (That is, if we believe x, y, and z, then A is the right choice.)
From what I have just said, it should be obvious that there are problems when philosophers decide to turn into demagogues or firefighters. Although most philosophers do have their own normative beliefs, and they probably think that their answers should be accepted by everyone, there is nothing in their philosophical expertise to justify this. When it comes to the very basic premises of their beliefs, their claim to know the right answers is not radically different from anyone else's similar claims. Philosophers should, therefore, I would argue, be extra cautious when they start acting like demagogues.
Philosophers do not fare much better as firefighters, because this approach undermines the very foundations on which philosophers rest their expertise. Philosophy is, to a large degree, about arguments and their validity and soundness. An activity that does not allow thorough analyses with explicated premises and steps of inference cannot be judged on philosophical criteria, and it is not, therefore, something that philosophy qualifies one to do.
The problems that we have as window dressers are somewhat different. Let me illustrate these in the light of two examples, one from fiction and the other from academia. In her futuristic novel Oryx and Crake, Margaret Atwood describes a degree program in “Problematics,” also known as “Spin and grin,” which includes studies in applied rhetorics and medical ethics and qualifies the students to work as window dressers for various biotech and other companies.1
Atwood M. Oryx and Crake. New York: Random House; 2003.
Danda RK. Guiding Icarus: Merging Bioethics with Corporate Interests. New York: Wiley-Liss; 2002.
If I let the firefighter in me roam free, it would scream how wrong this is, and that bioethicists should hold on to their dignity and refuse to partake in any such activities. However, after some cooler analysis, I am inclined to think differently. If my views on the nature of philosophical bioethical expertise are accepted, then the role of bioethicists as window dressers becomes, rather unexpectedly I would assume, less problematic than their role as “independent” ethicists.
Our very basic beliefs—whether we are liberal or conservative, religious or secular, and so on—shape our normative views much more than our academic qualifications. (These can, of course, influence one another, but nonetheless.) Whenever we speak as experts of ethics about normative questions, our normative beliefs shape the answers we give. It is very difficult to imagine a truly impartial position to ethical questions. Ethicists often picture themselves on the back of a moral high horse judging serenely the activities of others. And up to a point, particularly in the assessment of arguments and their consistency, they can rightfully claim this position. But when it comes to the case of many ethicists riding in different directions, philosophy provides us with limited tools to rise to a further meta-level.
Taking seriously the fact that when bioethicists offer normative answers they are in any case committed to some framework, I would argue that being paid to assume a particular view is not necessarily a bad thing. I would further claim that philosophical training in ethics can also be seen purely as providing one with the knowledge of the relevant theories and arguments and the abilities to make use of them. Looking at the matter from this perspective, I would see no obvious wrong in bioethicists working in the corporate world—provided that they make their connections explicit and do not pose as independent experts. This is, of course, only applicable if we believe that the corporate world is not somehow inherently evil in the first place.
Bioethicists already hold various positions that arguably influence the views they present in public. Many eminent bioethicists hold positions in international organizations (such as the World Health Organization and UNESCO) that are not without their political agendas. And most bioethicists are somehow connected to various national and local regulatory bodies or work in church-related universities, and these can influence the views they put forward. I would argue that declaring these interests is quite as crucial as being open about one's connections with the corporate world. Provided that bioethicists are open about who pays their bills, there is nothing inherently wrong in having these connections.
The work of a salaried window dresser, however, does not presuppose academic expertise in bioethics. The other experts of bioethics might qualify just as well. To be a successful ethics consultant or representative requires some knowledge of bioethics, but deeper knowledge is not necessary if the person is otherwise skillful.
There is, however, one unique type of activity that bioethicists with academic qualifications can truly claim as their own, and that is academic research. This is where our expertise is measured against the methodologies and theories of our own disciplines. This field is ours alone, although others too can claim, and have claimed, the status of bioethicists in the public domain. If we do not want just to blend in and become part of the heterogeneous group of demagogues and firefighters, we should guard the dignity of our work by going back to our original disciplines. To justify our existence as a reputable field of study among others, we should have academic journals and series that measure the quality of submitted contributions based on their academic merit and not merely on their topicality. We should also, as academic bioethicists, refrain from giving simple normative answers to emerging bioethical dilemmas. A philosopher's answer is only as good as the justification given, and if there is no room to explicate the whole argument, she should refrain from giving her view in the first place.
Philosophical training in bioethics gives us many tools for dealing with bioethical dilemmas, and sharing and displaying these tools in the public forum can only enrich the discussion. To provide people with new arguments and viewpoints, considerations, and insights is compatible with the sort of expertise we have. However, when we start to give simplified normative answers and accept these from others, we step away from our field of expertise and become part of the politics of bioethics. In this game, we might be better equipped than many other players, but as regards the aim of these discussions, our expertise counts for nothing. We are arguing for a cause, whatever that may be, beyond our expertise.
Rigorous academic research is also needed for us to stay equipped with tools to tackle our increasingly complicated environment. If we spend our time chasing new developments in biosciences, our own discipline will die out, and it will no longer be able to contribute to the discussions. There are plenty of people doing the politics of bioethics, and perhaps some academics are better fitted for that game, but surely there is also a need for purely theoretical and methodological academic work in bioethics.