Different policy issues and public attribution of administrative responsibility to central–local levels

Multiple theories have sought to explain political trust in China. The cultural approach attributes sources of political trust to Confucian cultural heritages (Shi Reference Shi2014; Zhai Reference Zhai2018). The political control approach views trust in government as the outcome of state censorship of the media such as information control and sophisticated framing (Wu and Wilkes Reference Wu and Wilkes2018). Among these factors, government performance is particularly relevant. China has undergone rapid economic development in the past few decades, and ordinary people’s standard of living has improved substantially. Moderate levels of satisfaction with government’s economic performance have helped increase the Chinese public’s trust in government. However, government performance is not merely confined to the economic realm. Rather, it comprises various policy domains, ranging from social to political. Previous studies have demonstrated that, when evaluating practical government performance, the public distinguishes between policy outputs in the economic and political fields (Bratton and Mattes Reference Bratton and Mattes2001; Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler Reference Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler2008; Zhai Reference Zhai2019). The present study examined government performance in various noneconomic policy domains, such as income inequalities, political corruption, environmental protection, and so on.

First, in terms of wealth distribution, China’s Gini coefficient has surpassed that of the USA (Xie and Zhou Reference Xie and Zhou2014). Widening income disparities have reached very high levels (among the world’s worst), triggering widespread public discontent and even mass protests (Lin Reference Lin2016; Zhou and Jin Reference Zhou and Jin2018; Lei Reference Lei2020). Unsatisfactory performance in ameliorating income inequality may have negative effects on the public’s trust in government. Second, corruption is associated with government’s political performance, becoming an important element of public evaluation (Saich Reference Saich2016; Habibov et al. Reference Habibov, Fan and Auchynnikava2019). Beginning in 2012, President Xi Jinping launched a high-profile crackdown on government corruption. The paradox of an anticorruption campaign is that, on the one hand, punishment of corrupt officials helps the current administration obtain public support. On the other hand, disclosing corruption makes people aware of the issue’s severity. Thereby, the untrustworthiness of the government is underscored. The anticorruption campaign is a double-edged sword, and its effects require systematic evaluation. The above-mentioned income inequality and political corruption are important policy domains of government performance (which are unrelated to economic growth). They affect public trust in the government.

Moreover, improvement of average citizens’ standard of living has promoted a gradual shift in attention, from basic economic security to quality-of-life issues (such as environmental pollution and food safety problems). Air pollution, such as PM 2.5 (particulate matter with diameters of 2.5 micrometers or less), has aroused public concerns about personal health. In a Pew’s survey, 76% of Chinese people ranked air pollution as a problem, indicating that it is one of the public’s top concerns (Gao Reference Gao2015; Kahn Reference Kahn2016). As a result, ordinary people have begun to doubt the government’s capability and efforts in tackling this issue (Zheng Reference Zheng2015; Lo Reference Lo2017). Food safety is another concern that imposes new challenges to government performance. Melamine-tainted milk powder, the gutter oil incident, illegal use of Sudan dye as a colour additive, and various food safety scandals have resulted in growing public concern and fury (Liu et al. Reference Liu, Pieniak and Verbeke2013; Han and Zhai Reference Han and Zhai2022). Thus far, the effects of government performance in these quality-of-life areas on public trust have not been fully investigated. Some studies address government performance in a certain policy domain, yet do not incorporate results with performance in other policy domains. Therefore, it is impossible to systematically examine their overall effects on public trust in government. The present study examined the effects of government performance in various policy domains (including economic, social, and political) on public trust.

Citizens’ evaluations of government policy performance may vary across different levels of government. The political hierarchy has multiple levels of government (Lieberthal Reference Lieberthal1995), with central–local government relations controlled by an authoritarian unitary system. Within the formal political system, the central government has dominant power over local governments. Personnel control and resource control are two major means by which this authority is exerted. The central government has the power to appoint and promote local governments’ officials, as well as the power to evaluate local governments’ performance (O’Brien and Li Reference O’Brien and Li2006; Cai Reference Cai2008; Han and Zhai Reference Han and Zhai2022). The careers of local government officials depend on the evaluation of the central government. These assessments are not necessarily capability based. Connections play an important role in officials’ promotion, creating room for patron–client relationships and corruption. There are no true elections; thus, government officials choose to respond to upper-level governments rather than to ordinary people. In addition, the central government has the final say on resource allocation between itself and local governments. Tax sharing and fiscal transfer further strengthen the dominant role of the central government (Wang and Ma Reference Wang and Ma2014; Fan Reference Fan2015). Delegating part of the fiscal and policy-making power to local governments is both pragmatic and instrumental. The true aim is to provide incentives for local governments to promote economic development. Decentralisation never means a pluralist power structure and independent local governments. Moreover, it does not indicate a weakened capability of the central government to control local governments (Zhang Reference Zhang, Garnaut, Golley and Song2010). Despite certain degrees of fiscal decentralisation and social autonomy, an authoritarian political system with high levels of political control remains intact in China (Li Reference Li2010; Choi Reference Choi2016; Chung Reference Chung2016).

Although China has a unitary government, a division of power exists between the different levels of the government. The concentration of power means the concentration of responsibility and blame (Weaver Reference Weaver1986; Cai Reference Cai2008). The one-party system relies heavily on the politics of central–local relations. The multilevel government system reduces pressure from popular resistance forces by granting a certain degree of power to local governments and allowing them to handle several instances of resistance (Cai Reference Cai2008; Han and Zhai Reference Han and Zhai2022). On the one hand, citizens’ attribution of responsibility to the different government levels is affected by perceptions of the formal administrative structure. In general, the central government plays a leadership role in policy-making and conducts top-down supervision. The local government implements various policies. In most cases, both central and local governments have separate responsibilities in a specific policy domain. On the other hand, the central government tends to shift citizens’ dissatisfaction toward local governments to avoid public blame. Local governments are responsible for a wide range of activities, such as the enforcement of regulations and public service delivery. Moreover, political control such as media censorship prohibits criticism of the central government and leads citizens to attribute administrative responsibility to local governments. In particular, when a specific government performance is severely unsatisfactory, the Chinese public complains and blames local governments. This attribution of responsibilities to different levels of the government helps enhance the resilience of the authoritarian political system.

This study established a framework to examine citizens’ evaluations of government policy performance based on the perceived administrative responsibility of different government levels. Further, this framework enables the investigation of the effects of their evaluation of government performance in various policy domains on central–local political trust. As shown in Figure 1, aside from the economy, government policy performance is considered in several policy domains, including environmental protection, income inequalities, and political corruption. Citizens’ political trust is divided into trust in the central and local governments. Political trust is affected by the perceived administrative responsibility of the two levels of government by the citizens. Three parties are believed to assume administrative responsibilities for various policy performances: the central government, local governments, and both the central and local governments. The attribution of administrative responsibility depends on citizens’ perception of the level of government that bears primary responsibility for specific public policy issues.

Figure 1.

The theoretical framework for the effects of government performance in various policy domains on political trust in multilevel governments.

Because of the multilevel government system, people disburse responsibility across different levels of government (Ferrer Reference Ferrer2020; Han and Zhai Reference Han and Zhai2022). Such stratification creates indeterminacy as to which level of government is responsible for a specific policy area (Li Reference Li2010). The public attributes major responsibility for various policy domains to either the local or central government, based on individuals’ perceptions of which level should bear chief accountability. For example, citizens may attribute major responsibility for different policy domains to either the central or local government, respectively. Examples of these areas include environmental protection, corruption, and food safety. Moreover, the effects of government policy performance on public trust in government vary across different levels of government. Unsatisfying government performance in a certain policy domain may undermine public trust in local governments, but does not affect trust in the central government, and vice versa. Nevertheless, these are not simple either or questions; rather, it is possible for both local and central governments to lose public trust due to poor performance in a particular policy domain. Empirical examination is required to assess specific effects of performance in various policy domains on public trust in local and central governments, respectively.

Public trust in different levels of government and central–local political trust patterns

Public trust varies across different levels of government. In most countries, public trust in local governments is higher than in the central government. Diverging from this pattern, the Chinese public tends to have a higher level of trust in the central government than in local ones (Li Reference Li2004, Reference Li2016; Chen Reference Chen2017; Wu and Wilkes Reference Wu and Wilkes2018). This Chinese exception to the central–local political trust pattern is labelled as “hierarchical trust.” The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) has documented the dynamics of public trust in China’s local and central governments over the past two decades. We analysed the data from four waves of ABS. The results are presented in Figure 2. The number of Chinese people trusting the central government has been above 90% since the 2000s. The number of people trusting local governments has fluctuated between 60% and 80%. Longitudinal, empirical evidence demonstrates that public trust in the central government has consistently been higher than in local governments.

Figure 2.

Public trust in the local and central governments in China (2002–2016).

There are various reasons for such central–local political trust pattern. First, authoritarian political culture constructs a benevolent image of central authorities, kindly caring for ordinary people’s welfare (Pye Reference Pye1988; Perry Reference Perry2008; Zhai Reference Zhai2017). “Central policies are very good, but they are all distorted when they reach lower levels” (Li Reference Li2004, 232). Under the socialisation of authoritarian culture, ordinary people believe that central authorities make policies favourable to people’s interests. In contrast, they see local governments as violating these policies and harming people’s welfare. Second, the multilevel structure of government cultivates such hierarchical trust. Local policy processes and outcomes can be affected by nonlocal factors and actors (Laffin Reference Laffin2009). Beyond their actual performance, low levels of public trust in local governments are related to China’s power structure and power division. Local governments must deal with various issues, including public sentiment and unpopular policies. In addition, arbitrary means of addressing these issues exacerbate public distrust in local governments (Cai Reference Cai2008; Wu et al. Reference Wu, Yang and Chen2017). Less satisfying performance is a major reason for lower trust in local governments. Third, the CCP’s ruling strategies political control may account for hierarchical trust (Wu and Wilkes Reference Wu and Wilkes2018). When social problems occur, the CCP stresses that the party stands behind with the people, blaming local authorities for betraying people’s confidence (Li Reference Li2004; Steinhardt Reference Steinhardt2017). Ultimately, the Chinese public has a higher level of trust in the central government than in local ones.

The multilevel government system engenders further examination of central–local political trust patterns. Previous studies have attempted to construct central–local political trust patterns in accordance with the differences between trust in local governments and trust in the central government (Li Reference Li2016; Wu and Wilkes Reference Wu and Wilkes2018). Accordingly, central–local political trust relationships are divided into three patterns. Trust in the local government is a) equal, b) higher, or c) lower than in the central government. These three central–local political trust patterns were termed parallel trust, pyramidal trust, and hierarchical trust (Wu and Wilkes Reference Wu and Wilkes2018). We used this typology to analyse the effects of government performance in various policy domains on people’s adherence to specific central–local political trust patterns.

The central–local trust pattern has important political implications. As previously stated, hierarchical trust is dominant in China. High levels of hierarchical trust can explain seemingly paradoxical phenomena in China’s politics. During the past few decades, a variety of protests have arisen. Particularly in the early 1990s, the labour movement was rampant in major cities (Lee and Friedman Reference Lee and Friedman2009). Workers who had been made redundant from the previously dominant state-owned corporations (SOCs) walked out in protest when they were declared bankrupt. In rural regions, there have been protests on a number of issues, such as tax collection, land expropriation, and corruption in village committees (Bernstein and Li Reference Bernstein and Li2000; Guo Reference Guo2001; O’Brien Reference O’Brien2002). In urban areas, the middle class has been mobilised to protect the environment. They consider themselves to have a natural “right” to enjoy a healthy environment. A famous case was the protests in Xiamen (Amoy), Fujian Province, which successfully forced the government to relocate a chemical plant. Some observers viewed this rising tide of popular protests as a challenge to both political stability and the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule (Chang Reference Chang2001; Gilley Reference Gilley2004; Pei Reference Pei2012, Reference Pei2016). However, these protests target local governments and specific officials rather than the central government. Accordingly, they have not shown signs of lethal threat to the authoritarian regime (Lee and Friedman Reference Lee and Friedman2009; Perry Reference Perry2009; Wasserstrom Reference Wasserstrom2009). Moreover, grassroots protests even utilise the central government’s regulations or policies to stress the legitimacy of their activities, a practice known as “rightful resistance” (O’Brien and Li Reference O’Brien and Li2006). Hierarchical trust indicates that, in the midst of growing social contestation, the Chinese public has a heavy reliance on (and trust in) the central government.

Citizens’ level of satisfaction with government performance may affect different central–local political trust patterns. Maintaining high levels of hierarchical trust is beneficial to the maintenance of the CCP’s authoritarian rule. Thus far, it is unclear how government performance in various policy domains affects central–local political trust patterns. Does government performance in a certain policy domain facilitates hierarchical trust, pyramidal trust, or parallel trust? As there are variations in government performance in different policy domains, specific and separate effects should be examined. If government performance in a certain policy area increases pyramidal trust, or suppresses hierarchical trust, a real threat to the CCP’s rule is indicated. Such a tendency would mean that the public is withdrawing its trust in the central government. Declining trust in the central government endangers the survival of China’s authoritarian system.

Data and methods