In recent decades, we have witnessed many public policy scandals and controversies in which, compared with laypersons, experts are not necessarily better in either epistemic or moral aspects (Godlee Reference Godlee2010; Jasanoff Reference Jasanoff2003; Wynne Reference Wynne, Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne1996). Following the loss of public trust in expert decision making, new discourses of deliberative democracy for public policy making have appeared (Lengwiler Reference Lengwiler2008). Examples in the new trend of emphasizing public participation are consensus conferences, citizens' juries, citizens' panels, and the like (Abelson et al. Reference Abelson, Forest, Eyles, Smith, Martin and Gauvin2003). Usually, there are two meanings of deliberation: The first is “a particular sort of discussion” that “involves the careful and serious weighing of reasons for and against some proposition” (Fearon Reference Fearon and Elster1998, p. 63). The second is “an interior process” of reason weighing by an individual (Fearon Reference Fearon and Elster1998, p. 63). Deliberative democracy adopts the first meaning, so deliberative democracy fits in Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) group-reasoning situation.
Many theoretical arguments support deliberative democracy, but here I focus on the epistemic aspect of deliberative democracy. According to John Dewey's experimentalist account of democracy, the epistemic power of democracy is inseparable from citizens' collective deliberation. In a democratic regime, citizens are engaged to deliberate collectively over the foreseen consequences of public policies and then choose, test, evaluate, and revise the policies implemented. Accordingly, the discussions among citizens with diverse backgrounds and local knowledge could facilitate the fair recognition of public interest problems and the adoption of public policy proposals that are comprehensive enough. Public policy choice and implementation is like an experiment in whether dynamic feedback from the policy implementation will render another session of democratic deliberation (Anderson Reference Anderson2006). Also, according to another pragmatist, C. S. Peirce, a proposition could be true if it can survive the test of best reasons, evidence, and arguments (Misak Reference Misak, Geenens and Tinnevelt2009). Since almost no one would deem the seeking of truth an unworthy goal, it holds that deliberation in a democratic regime would offer the best chance of achieving this goal (Talisse Reference Talisse, Geenens and Tinnevelt2009).
As already mentioned, the typically adopted concept criteria of deliberative democracy include the state of disagreement among the participants and the task of reaching collective decisions (Thompson Reference Thompson2008). Therefore, a good design of deliberative democracy would be compatible with the propositions by M&S about reasoning for arguments. Accordingly, all individuals, no matter whether they are experts or laypersons, are subject to proactive reasoning. When these individuals deliberate alone, they usually reason to confirm, rather than scrutinize, their original arguments. It is better to conduct group reasoning such that each member can contribute to mutual non-proactive evaluations of arguments and conclusions not in their favor. For M&S, “[a]rgumentation is uniquely effective in overcoming disagreements that are likely to occur, in particular in relatively equalitarian groups” (sect. 1.2, para. 9).
Also, to legitimize the conclusions reached through deliberative democracy, it is usually proposed that in the process of mutual justification (presenting and responding to reasons intended to justify a political decision [Gutmann & Thompson Reference Gutmann and Thompson2004]), deliberative democracy should have such characteristics as public spiritedness (arguments for common good), equal respect for each participant, accommodation (retaining the possibility of collaboration on other issues), and equal participation (no domination phenomenon) (Thompson Reference Thompson2008). The epistemic good of deliberative democracy comes from engaging people with different motivations for group reasoning and subjecting each version of reasoning to mutual scrutiny. Thus, current theoretical proposals have shown that deliberative democracy is one of the best designs for facilitating good public policy, as implied in M&S's theory.
Empirical research into the effectiveness of deliberative democracy is still in its burgeoning stage, but the qualified promise of deliberative democracy demonstrates that deliberation is not an easy task (Ryfe Reference Ryfe2005). A good design of deliberative democracy should establish rules to maintain the theoretical aims, allow people to tell stories to make cultural meanings in addition to making cognitive sense, encourage leadership that facilitates deliberation, endeavor to relate the outcome of deliberation to the participants, and finally create environments to facilitate learning how to deliberate (Ryfe Reference Ryfe2005). All these complicated issues were not addressed by M&S and could supplement their propositions as applied outside of the experimental fields.
Three conditions are needed for deliberative democracy to achieve epistemic good. First, when it comes to equal participation in deliberative democracy, the explicit and implicit standards for the concepts used in the communication might lead to the exclusion of the concepts used by the marginalized groups to make cultural meanings. In this kind of “hermeneutic injustice” (Fricker Reference Fricker2007), the majority's conceptual framework might squeeze out or mask the minority's specific experiences. For example, in John Rawls' formulation of public reason, if the contents of claims contain concepts that are not easily available and assessable by the public, these claims would be excluded from the public domains because they contain no recognition-worthy reasons (Morgan-Olsen Reference Morgan-Olsen2010). However, we should not forget that the frames and ways we observe and analyze things often constrain our decisions and results (Wu Reference Wu2008). Therefore, we should uphold an ethic of epistemic humility by which we take serious novel concepts and experiences presented in deliberation.
Second, we should recognize that if the epistemic goal of deliberative democracy were to seek truth, then the dynamism in the process would only point us to the deflationist version of truth. There is no way we could ascertain the realist version of truth through deliberation over the feedback from the implementation of public policies. Sticking to the realist version of truth would disrupt the function of deliberation, bringing it to a halt. Third, pursuing the previous two conditions, we have to analyze the explicit and implicit operations of microscopic framing powers empirically during group reasoning. Here, I do not insist on the abolition of all these operations of framing powers (Lengwiler Reference Lengwiler2008), but we should understand whether the minority concepts and frames are given their due course for sense making and meaning making. Based on the findings, we could further design the rules that would meet the requirements of epistemic humility.
You have
Access
In recent decades, we have witnessed many public policy scandals and controversies in which, compared with laypersons, experts are not necessarily better in either epistemic or moral aspects (Godlee Reference Godlee2010; Jasanoff Reference Jasanoff2003; Wynne Reference Wynne, Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne1996). Following the loss of public trust in expert decision making, new discourses of deliberative democracy for public policy making have appeared (Lengwiler Reference Lengwiler2008). Examples in the new trend of emphasizing public participation are consensus conferences, citizens' juries, citizens' panels, and the like (Abelson et al. Reference Abelson, Forest, Eyles, Smith, Martin and Gauvin2003). Usually, there are two meanings of deliberation: The first is “a particular sort of discussion” that “involves the careful and serious weighing of reasons for and against some proposition” (Fearon Reference Fearon and Elster1998, p. 63). The second is “an interior process” of reason weighing by an individual (Fearon Reference Fearon and Elster1998, p. 63). Deliberative democracy adopts the first meaning, so deliberative democracy fits in Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) group-reasoning situation.
Many theoretical arguments support deliberative democracy, but here I focus on the epistemic aspect of deliberative democracy. According to John Dewey's experimentalist account of democracy, the epistemic power of democracy is inseparable from citizens' collective deliberation. In a democratic regime, citizens are engaged to deliberate collectively over the foreseen consequences of public policies and then choose, test, evaluate, and revise the policies implemented. Accordingly, the discussions among citizens with diverse backgrounds and local knowledge could facilitate the fair recognition of public interest problems and the adoption of public policy proposals that are comprehensive enough. Public policy choice and implementation is like an experiment in whether dynamic feedback from the policy implementation will render another session of democratic deliberation (Anderson Reference Anderson2006). Also, according to another pragmatist, C. S. Peirce, a proposition could be true if it can survive the test of best reasons, evidence, and arguments (Misak Reference Misak, Geenens and Tinnevelt2009). Since almost no one would deem the seeking of truth an unworthy goal, it holds that deliberation in a democratic regime would offer the best chance of achieving this goal (Talisse Reference Talisse, Geenens and Tinnevelt2009).
As already mentioned, the typically adopted concept criteria of deliberative democracy include the state of disagreement among the participants and the task of reaching collective decisions (Thompson Reference Thompson2008). Therefore, a good design of deliberative democracy would be compatible with the propositions by M&S about reasoning for arguments. Accordingly, all individuals, no matter whether they are experts or laypersons, are subject to proactive reasoning. When these individuals deliberate alone, they usually reason to confirm, rather than scrutinize, their original arguments. It is better to conduct group reasoning such that each member can contribute to mutual non-proactive evaluations of arguments and conclusions not in their favor. For M&S, “[a]rgumentation is uniquely effective in overcoming disagreements that are likely to occur, in particular in relatively equalitarian groups” (sect. 1.2, para. 9).
Also, to legitimize the conclusions reached through deliberative democracy, it is usually proposed that in the process of mutual justification (presenting and responding to reasons intended to justify a political decision [Gutmann & Thompson Reference Gutmann and Thompson2004]), deliberative democracy should have such characteristics as public spiritedness (arguments for common good), equal respect for each participant, accommodation (retaining the possibility of collaboration on other issues), and equal participation (no domination phenomenon) (Thompson Reference Thompson2008). The epistemic good of deliberative democracy comes from engaging people with different motivations for group reasoning and subjecting each version of reasoning to mutual scrutiny. Thus, current theoretical proposals have shown that deliberative democracy is one of the best designs for facilitating good public policy, as implied in M&S's theory.
Empirical research into the effectiveness of deliberative democracy is still in its burgeoning stage, but the qualified promise of deliberative democracy demonstrates that deliberation is not an easy task (Ryfe Reference Ryfe2005). A good design of deliberative democracy should establish rules to maintain the theoretical aims, allow people to tell stories to make cultural meanings in addition to making cognitive sense, encourage leadership that facilitates deliberation, endeavor to relate the outcome of deliberation to the participants, and finally create environments to facilitate learning how to deliberate (Ryfe Reference Ryfe2005). All these complicated issues were not addressed by M&S and could supplement their propositions as applied outside of the experimental fields.
Three conditions are needed for deliberative democracy to achieve epistemic good. First, when it comes to equal participation in deliberative democracy, the explicit and implicit standards for the concepts used in the communication might lead to the exclusion of the concepts used by the marginalized groups to make cultural meanings. In this kind of “hermeneutic injustice” (Fricker Reference Fricker2007), the majority's conceptual framework might squeeze out or mask the minority's specific experiences. For example, in John Rawls' formulation of public reason, if the contents of claims contain concepts that are not easily available and assessable by the public, these claims would be excluded from the public domains because they contain no recognition-worthy reasons (Morgan-Olsen Reference Morgan-Olsen2010). However, we should not forget that the frames and ways we observe and analyze things often constrain our decisions and results (Wu Reference Wu2008). Therefore, we should uphold an ethic of epistemic humility by which we take serious novel concepts and experiences presented in deliberation.
Second, we should recognize that if the epistemic goal of deliberative democracy were to seek truth, then the dynamism in the process would only point us to the deflationist version of truth. There is no way we could ascertain the realist version of truth through deliberation over the feedback from the implementation of public policies. Sticking to the realist version of truth would disrupt the function of deliberation, bringing it to a halt. Third, pursuing the previous two conditions, we have to analyze the explicit and implicit operations of microscopic framing powers empirically during group reasoning. Here, I do not insist on the abolition of all these operations of framing powers (Lengwiler Reference Lengwiler2008), but we should understand whether the minority concepts and frames are given their due course for sense making and meaning making. Based on the findings, we could further design the rules that would meet the requirements of epistemic humility.