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Market design for the provision of social insurance: the case of disability and survivors insurance in Chile

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2009

GONZALO REYES*
Affiliation:
Pensions Supervisory Authority, Chile
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Abstract

As part of the pension reform recently approved in Chile, the government introduced a centralized auction mechanism to provide the Disability and Survivors (D&S) Insurance that covers recent contributors among the more than eight million participants in the mandatory private pension system. This paper is intended as a case study presenting the main distortions found in the decentralized operation of the system that led to this reform and the challenges faced when designing a competitive auction mechanism to be implemented jointly by the Pension Fund Managers (AFP). When each AFP independently hired this insurance with an insurance company, the process was not competitive: colligated companies ended up providing the service and distortions affected competition in the market through incentives to cream-skim members, efforts to block disability claims, lack of price transparency, and the insurance contract acting as a barrier to entry. Cross-subsidies, inefficient risk pooling, and regulatory arbitrage were also present. The Chilean experience is relevant since other privatized systems with decentralized provision of this insurance may show similar problems as they mature. A centralized auction mechanism solves these market failures, but also gives raise to new challenges, such as how to design a competitive auction that attracts participation and deters collusion. Design features that were incorporated into the regulation to tackle these issues are presented here.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
Figure 0

Figure 1.Insurance premium rate and total fees as % of total salaries

Figure 1

Figure 2.Disability Insurance Premiums as % of total operational costs

Note: (1) The premium of the disability and survivorship insurance is registered as a separate item in accounts as from 1988, the date on which the accounting system for these expenses was modified.
Figure 2

Table 1.Pension system participation as of September 2008

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Table 2.Structure of D&S insurance contracts, October 2008

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Figure 3.Dispersion in D&S insurance cost by AFP (1996–2007)

Note: * Due to accounting problems, the average insurance cost between 2004 and 2005 is used for this AFP both years.
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Table 3.Regression results of AFP D&S insurance cost on members' characteristics

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Figure 4.Monopolistic competition equilibrium with and without bundled provision of D&S Insurance

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Figure 5.Total fees vs. fees net of insurance cost by AFP (2006)

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Table 4.Results from the first auction process: received bids

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Table 5.Results from the first auction process: accepted bids by gender:Accepted Bids: Men

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Note: *Accepted Bids: Women