For more than 30 years Walter Lippmann regularly supplied a column on economics and politics for the New York Herald Tribune. Eventually syndicated, the column, entitled “Today and Tomorrow,” appeared three times a week beginning in 1931 (in old age, Lippmann reduced the weekly count to two). Through his column Lippmann spoke to millions of Americans during their morning coffee or post-dinner digestif. He was also an early contributing editor at the New Republic, and he went on to write 11 books. In Walter Lippmann: Public Economist, Craufurd Goodwin chronicles and explains Lippmann's broad and long-lived appeal, explaining in the Introduction that, although Lippmann “was neither a professional economist nor a conventional journalist…he had innate brilliance, a wide range of contacts, and a commitment to self-education. Much of his secret was in his style…” (p. 4). This combination allowed Lippmann to have a remarkable impact on the public discourse on economics and politics from the Great Depression to Vietnam.
Born in New York City in 1889, Lippmann benefited from a cultured upbringing in an upper-middle class Jewish family. He matriculated at Harvard in 1906 and graduated in the class of 1910, which included Stuart Chase and Heywood Broun. (Charles Nourse, an early football legend, and Ernst “Putzi” Hanfstaengl, Hitler's publicist, were contemporaries.) Though Lippmann became both a harsh critic of the New Deal and a devotee (though never really a member) of the Austrian school of economic thought, as a young man he flirted with socialism. Soon after leaving Harvard he began working for Lincoln Steffens. The Great War intervened, and after serving as an intelligence officer in France, he settled into a career as an editor and journalist. Intellectually, he quickly moved from outright socialism to progressivism, and over time he continued to shift to the right.
Goodwin allocates much of the middle of the volume to Lippmann's views on the New Deal. Lippmann supported the minimum wage, public works, and unemployment insurance, but he rejected other federal entitlements, including welfare and old-age relief. Broadly speaking, he supported “labor” in theory but had little patience with the tactics of unions in practice. During his socialist days he had strongly supported organized labor (when it was weak), but by the onset of World War II, the impact of the National Labor Relations Act, which placed the coercive powers of the federal state behind organized labor, he feared the impact on the economy from the monopoly power unions wielded. He favored the right to organize but not to bargain. It is possible his cosseted upbringing blinded him to the practical inconsistency of such a position. More generally, he criticized the Roosevelt administration for promoting cartelization of the United States economy through the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National Industrial Recovery Administration. His fear of monopolization led him to an appreciation of the writings of Friedrich von Hayek and the other Austrians (though, it should be noted, he continued to embrace Keynes's view of the efficacy of public works projects). Somewhat ironically given the mutual admiration between Hayek and Lippmann, in 1943, writing to the editor at Little, Brown, Lippmann summarized his thoughts on the manuscript for Road to Serfdom with: “I'm afraid it will have few readers” (p. 256). Lippmann appreciated the Austrians’ critique of the New Deal, but when war came to the United States again in 1941, Lippmann threw away his Hayek and advocated central planning, though he argued it must be accompanied by a commitment to the protection of private property.
As one might expect from such an intelligent observer who viewed the world through a wide lenses, Lippmann could be uncannily prescient. Following World War I, he predicted with Keynes, that reparations would only increase the probability of another major war; toward the end of World War II, he advocated the creation of a post-war recovery plan along the lines eventually taken by the Marshall Plan; his writings on free trade foreshadowed GATT; in the 1950s he foresaw disaster for the United States should the country attempt to replace France as a power in Indochina; and he recognized the inherent conflict between the Bretton Woods system and America's financial commitment to the Cold War and the Great Society programs. Of course, the author of thousands of opinion pieces is also likely to be wrong now and then. In addition to badly forecasting the popularity and staying power of Hayek, Lippmann thought deficit spending during the Great Depression would be inflationary, and he clung to the gold standard even after the cost of its fetters had been revealed. After World War II, as the economics profession moved to a more mathematically-based methodology, Lippmann shifted his focus from economics to politics. (He could read and grasp Keynes but not Debreu.)
Readers seeking a traditional biography of Lippmann should look elsewhere. Goodwin, for example, offers little on Lippmann's family or home life. (Ronald Steel's Walter Lippmann and the American Century offers more as a general interest bio.) Furthermore, the volume focuses narrowly on Lippmann's views on the economy and the theory and practice of economics, and it is almost exclusively through economics and the economy that the reader encounters Lippmann's broader political and social views. But Goodwin makes this approach clear in the Introduction, and though narrow in conception, the volume is exhaustively researched and unusually well-written for an academic tome.
For nearly 40 years Lippmann was one of the country's leading social commentators, or “pundits,” as they are more colloquially known today. He met the market test. Goodwin summarizes Lippmann's relationship with his readers as that of a “trusted advisor, teacher, confidante, mentor, and friend” (p. 353). It is a fitting epitaph, and one any of us might reasonably envy.
