This year's U.S. presidential candidates may want to bring Edward Lincoln's book on any vacation they manage to squeeze into their summer schedule. It is a timely reminder of the political impact of economic globalization, and includes a set of policy recommendations that, while not aimed at a particular candidate, provides a starting point for important revisions to U.S. domestic and international policymaking.
The book addresses economic winners and losers within the United States, and at the global level. One of Lincoln's main arguments is that without the establishment of a greater domestic social safety net, U.S. public opinion will lead to bad economic policymaking, particularly greater protectionism. Though not mentioned in the book, most public opinion polls in recent years reveal high levels of skepticism about free trade and foreign investment (inward and outward). To slow or reverse this trend, Lincoln argues, more must be done to alleviate the anxieties of the losers. At the international level, he calls for greater levels of sensitivity to economic issues. His “three-legged stool” metaphor suggests that the United States in recent years (and the author is rather critical of the Bush administration) has viewed international affairs too much through military and, to a somewhat lesser degree, political lenses, and not nearly enough through an economic lens. The purpose of the book is to raise the profile of global economic issues.
Essentially, Lincoln contends that “peace and prosperity ought to be easier to achieve today because the rationale for war has diminished and the architecture of international economic engagement has improved” (p. 52). In other words, if the world trades and invests more across borders, then every country will experience greater economic prosperity, thereby reducing the probability of war and conflict. This is not a novel idea, but Winners Without Losers is written in a way that brings the reader up to speed quickly with international economic developments since the end of World War II. After an introduction that lays out the author's argument, Chapter 1 summarizes the major economic changes of the past two centuries, including economic institutions (like the concept of property rights and the creation of the corporation), growing affluence, the collapse of imperialism and communism, the rising importance of institutions like the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund, and technological change. Chapter 2 connects economic change with international relations, arguing that economic growth has reduced the incentives for individuals and countries to choose the risky option of war.
The next four chapters examine how economics have transformed specific countries or regions: the United States, the European Union, East Asia, and areas of poverty. The countries/regions are not compared systematically. This is not necessarily a problem, since the circumstances of each are different (e.g., the factors underlying European integration are fundamentally different from the economic development of Japan and China). However, one can quibble with some of the topics selected (such as the increasing number of international students who attend university in the United States), and left out (including China's political and social challenges). The final chapters include a range of policy recommendations.
Lincoln does not break new theoretical ground. His argument is framed within Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's work on complex interdependence. Lincoln uses Kenneth Waltz's levels of analysis from Man, the State, and War (1959) to illustrate how the economic transformation of the world affects international relations, and he briefly mentions the work of John Mearsheimer, Hans Morgenthau, and other realists in criticizing their focus on military power and narrow national self-interest. But advancing international relations theory is not Lincoln's purpose here. This is clearly a book for “the prince,” his or her advisors, and opinion formers. That should not be surprising, given Lincoln's Beltway experience with the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations. Yet the book is appropriate for undergraduate courses on international political economy, current issues in international relations, and international business. Although the author is an economist, his prose is extremely readable, avoiding economics jargon, equations, and graphs. Even his section on macroeconomic imbalances in the United States explains the importance of a technical issue like current-account balances in a manner that virtually any reader can understand.
Not everyone will like this book. Lincoln's arguments and policy recommendations are mostly centrist. He clearly believes in markets and is a strong proponent of openness in trade and investment. But he recognizes that something must be done to win over those segments, especially in the United States but also abroad, that are globalization's losers. He acknowledges that income disparity in the United States is widening and that some companies are trimming pension and health benefits. As a result, “[p]eople who are dissatisfied and anxious about their personal lives are more likely to support bad policy ideas such as protectionism” (p. 102). Among his policy recommendations are greater levels of U.S. government support for displaced workers, a national health policy, and measures to reduce economic inequality. Critics on the Right will counter that such plans are too expensive, interfere with markets, and expand the role of government. They would disagree with other recommendations, too, including placing economic policy on a par with security policy and embracing China and other transition economies as partners rather than adversaries. Critics on the Left will agree that Lincoln has identified important problems, but suggest that his proposals do not go far enough in reducing economic inequality and curbing the power of big business and the paychecks of CEOs. Nor will they like his recommendation that the United States make completion of the WTO's Doha trade round a top foreign policy priority. On the other hand, few readers would disagree with his call for greater transparency in the IMF and World Bank.
The only serious weakness of the book is that Lincoln appears to underestimate the obstacles to his “economic ties lead to perpetual peace” thesis. For example, he notes that systemic shocks like financial and health crises “are conceivable, but they are not very probable” (p. 65). But the global ramifications of the recent subprime mortgage crisis or the impact of the rapid rise in food prices on the world's poorest people suggest that such crises are likely and can wreak havoc simultaneously. Another possible problem he cites is governments that choose “bad policies” (i.e., those that obstruct trade, investment, and economic liberalism), but that seems to be the precise direction that policymaking in the United States and a number of other countries is taking. Also, while Lincoln rightfully connects aspects of terrorism and ethnic conflict to poverty, no amount of wealth will eliminate some conflicts based on nationalism, ethnicity, or religion, and the road to economic growth in some of these countries will be painfully long and winding.
Nonetheless, it would be nice if Winners Without Losers were read widely by candidates and the electorate alike. It is a good primer on the impact of economics on current U.S. and global events, and provides a sound basis for discussion about important public policy issues.
