Israel's High Court of Justice has long been at the center of the country's most contentious debates on human rights and individual liberties. The court has taken dramatically controversial stands, not least regarding the boundaries of religious authority in the state. As such, Israel is an excellent site for exploring a more general question that has engaged political scientists writ large, namely, when, why, and how do high courts take on heated political questions? Prior theorists have posited an array of explanatory factors focused on the personality and attitudes of justices, the justices' strategic calculation of interest, and institutional factors, among others. In contributing to this debate, Patricia Woods identifies a new variable that she argues is crucial to shaping judicial behavior: “judicial communities.”
Israel's High Court began to embrace an activist, rights-oriented jurisprudence in the early 1970s. However, the court largely avoided the contentious issue of religious authority and freedom, especially in the wake of the stunning rebuke it received in 1969, when parliament overturned the court's decision to disregard rabbinical rulings on “who is a Jew.” For the next nineteen years, the court refrained from challenging the religious authorities. It moved in this direction only in 1988, ruling that women should be granted equal rights to participate in municipal religious councils despite Orthodox rabbinical objections. A series of decisions over the next decade reiterated the court's challenge to the religious authorities on the grounds of “equality” and “administrative legality.” These cases are carefully tracked by Woods.
What explains the court's sudden change of course? Woods rejects some of the most prevalent explanations put forth by analysts of the Israeli scene. According to her, the “personality hypothesis,” which attributes the court's shift to the personality of Justice Aharon Barak, can be rejected because of the timing. Barak joined the court in 1979, well after it had begun adopting a rights-oriented jurisprudence, and became chief justice in 1995, well after the court had ruled on the religious councils case. Woods similarly shows the “hegemonic preservation hypothesis” (Hirschl, 2004), which attributes the court's shift to rights protection to the strategic alliance of neoliberal elites in order to preserve their interests, to be chronologically flawed. The advocacy of neoliberal policies only started in earnest in Israel in the 1990s, but the High Court had moved in a rights-oriented direction two decades earlier. Woods also rejects the “attitudinal hypothesis,” which focuses on justices' preconceived attitudes and preferences as the chief causal agent shaping court behavior, because it does not account for the shift in attitudes witnessed in the justices' rulings, especially the justices' gradual conversion to the idea that “equality” ought to embrace “gender equality.” Finally, Woods rejects a purely “rational choice” approach, which traces justices' rulings to their strategic calculation of interest in the face of given institutional and societal constraints. This approach embraces a static model of preferences and does not account for changes that clearly manifested over time.
Instead, Woods focuses on two factors that shaped the court's shift. She acknowledges a set of enabling conditions that encouraged the proliferation of rights-focused cases before the court. These include: the dramatic growth of social movements in Israel in the early 1970s, many of which adopted litigational campaigns; the stunning paralysis that gripped parliament post 1977, encouraging politicians and citizens to turn to the courts to pursue their agendas; and finally, the new rules of standing adopted by the High Court in 1988 that created almost unlimited access for citizens to petition the court. However, in addition to these enabling conditions, Woods emphasizes the influence of what she dubs the “judicial community.” Defined as “the intellectual community in which justices live,” the judicial community includes High Court justices, legal scholars, social-movement lawyers, government attorneys, clerks, and interns. Through informal interaction and intellectual exchange, this community develops an ever-changing consensus about legal norms. In the Israeli case, a judicial community increasingly populated by social-movement lawyers committed to civil liberties and women's rights brought petitions, cases, and legal arguments before the court and, over time, persuaded the High Court justices to change their normative position on the meaning of equality. The movement lawyers were able to marry a preexisting, foundational legal principle (“administrative legality,” or the obligation to treat citizens equally) with a new conception of equality that included equal treatment of women and had sufficient brio to induce the court to take on the rabbinical establishment with confidence.
With this book, Woods makes a number of important contributions. On a general level, she develops the notion of “judicial communities” and, in a nod to Joel Migdal, explores the way the court and judicial community are “mutually transformative.” The High Court justices “signal” that they are receptive to certain rights cases through their rulings and extra-court publications. Social-movement lawyers respond by providing the briefs and arguments (i.e., the intellectual resources) for the development of new legal norms for the court. In this way, state and society interact to change norms. By showing how norms emerge and evolve in this way, Woods makes an important theoretical advance. More specific to the Israeli case, Woods convincingly pokes holes in the conventional explanations for the shifts in High Court activism. Finally, Woods compellingly identifies the limits to the Israeli High Court's activism on the religious front. Although the court has been willing to challenge the rabbinical authorities on the margins in the name of gender equality and administrative equity, it has proven reluctant to squarely take on the question of “freedom of religion” and follow through on its implications for the constitutionality of Israel's extant “status quo” agreement.
This is an excellent book that is carefully argued and thoroughly researched, mining a host of primary and secondary sources in Hebrew and English and drawing on a number of very compelling interviews with legal activists and scholars in Israel. It is empirically anchored and shows clear familiarity with the Israeli case, a welcome relief from some competing accounts of the Israeli High Court that are long on theory but shockingly fact free and empirically unmoored. The only concern I have with the book relates to the difficulty of defining the boundaries of the judicial community, a priori. If the community is defined by professional status (all justices, scholars, and activists in informal contact with each other), then shouldn't the Israeli Bar Association and known legal scholars such as Ruth Gavison be included? Yet, both are known dissenters from the court's rights-based activism. Does this suggest that the court may pick and choose which norms it wishes to endorse from among those voiced by the community? Also, if so, doesn't that put the causal power back in the seat of justices (rather than the community)? It is clear that Woods is right in arguing that the evolution of legal norms is an interactive process. However, does the term “community” imply consensus that really does not exist?
None of this undermines the important contribution of this excellent study. Judicial Power and National Politics illuminates the dynamics of court activism and the role social forces play in the construction of legal norms in the Israeli case. However, its insights have theoretical utility that can clearly travel elsewhere in the world.
