I. INTRODUCTION
For both Edmund Burke and Adam Smith, the possibilities and limits of empire were embodied in the form of Britain’s East India Company, the chartered company that traded in the East Indies for over 250 years starting in the early seventeenth century.Footnote 1 The institution, which enjoyed a trading monopoly in the region for much of its existence, was historically significant in many ways. It was a powerful stimulus for the expansion of the British Empire in the eighteenth century and for the global integration of commercial markets at a time when trading in foreign lands remained a hazardous enterprise. The Company was one of the first firms whose shareholders were granted some form of limited liability protection (Harris Reference Harris2000, pp. 128, 128n38). It introduced the term “civil service” into the modern lexicon (Chapman Reference Chapman1970, p. 9), and organized an administrative system known for its meticulous bookkeeping and innovative accounting practices. While one cannot draw a seamless line from the Company to contemporary structures of capital organization, in many ways the institution presaged the emergence of modern state-backed corporations, bequeathing a unique legacy that has remained a source of controversy in Eastern and Western imperial narratives (Stern Reference Stern2016).
Burke and Smith, contemporaries and mutual admirers, were strong defenders of market economies throughout their lives.Footnote 2 Accordingly, their criticisms of the East India Company’s commercial policy rested on similar premises: the Company arbitrarily intruded into native Indian markets, thereby offending the natural laws of supply and demand; this interference led to the firm’s control of the production and circulation of local goods; such control thwarted natives’ entrepreneurial activities while draining the corporation of wealth; and the institution’s coercive scheme to use tax receipts for foreign trade investment—rather than harness the wealth of free trade to generate revenue—shook the foundations of sound public finance. For both thinkers, these deformities of Indian market order became rampant after the Company exceeded the limits of its initial commercial purposes and acquired territorial sovereignty in India, as secured by the Treaty of Allahabad, which formally vested the Company with the power of diwani, or revenue administration, in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in August 1765.Footnote 3
Yet the scope of Burke’s and Smith’s commentaries on the firm transcended the boundaries of supply-and-demand laws. The two thinkers addressed broader matters of imperial sovereignty, just structures of governance, and the role of prudence in commercial policy, all of which inspired their philosophical and historical views on the mercantile system and the British Empire. They both grasped that the institutional problem posed by the Company in the late eighteenth century illuminated a multitude of seemingly contradictory traits: it was a commercial enterprise yet exercised administrative and military functions; it was created by the British Crown and received formal sanction from Parliament but was not seriously held accountable by either; it was an English joint-stock company headquartered in London but a foreign governmental body operating in India; its initial high standards for commercial propriety were compromised by its perpetration of bribery and extortion; and its chartered aim to advance the commercial interests of the British Empire transformed into a mandate for abuse that imperiled the empire’s finances and threatened the well-being of Indian natives. It is for these reasons, and others, that Smith characterized the firm’s anatomy as a “strange absurdity,” a political sovereign wrapped inside a commercial enigma that was subject in theory, but not in fact, to the British government (WN, II, p. 637).Footnote 4
Nevertheless, while Burke endeavored to preserve the East India Company’s government charter, Smith supported its termination. This cleavage between the two men was somewhat unusual: Robert Bisset, an early biographer of Burke, once reported that Smith, according to Burke, “told him, after they had conversed on subjects of political economy, that he was the only man, who, without communication, thought on these topics exactly as he did” (1800, p. 429). Yet the question over the Company’s institutional merit marked a telling moment in which they differed on a concrete matter regarding commercial policy. My purpose is to explain and comprehend the intellectual foundations of this disharmony.Footnote 5
The friction between Burke and Smith on the East India Company remains an understudied area of their intellectual relationship. To the extent that it has been addressed, Donald Winch frames his brief treatment of the matter in the context of their respective views on political economy (1996, p. 212). Jennifer Pitts suggests that Burke’s commentary on British India, including his defense of the trading company, derived from a deeper engagement with imperial politics in the eighteenth century (2006, pp. 55, 59–60; see also pp. 70–71). Frederick Whelan writes that Burke generally agreed with Smith’s economic indictment of the firm but opposed the annulment of the charter based on his opposition to political rationalism (1996, pp. 39–41). Such observations touch upon the truth, but they do not provide a full exploration into the intellectual origins of their variance in judgment, however.Footnote 6
The contribution of this article, therefore, is to present the first systematic comparative study of Burke’s and Smith’s perspectives on the firm. In this spirit, factors relating to political economy, engagement with imperial politics, and political rationalism certainly played a role in separating Burke’s and Smith’s position on the East India Company. I argue, however, that the root of their divergence arose from dissimilar frames of reference through which they assessed the credibility of the corporation. While Burke examined the firm’s legitimacy through the lens of British prescriptive, imperial, and constitutional history, Smith evaluated it as part of his larger attack on the mercantile system. These different frames of reference were responsible for the further incongruities in their thought on the Company relating to the role of prescription and imperial honor in political communities, the qualifications of traders to rule, and the appropriate tempo of policy reform, all of which will be elaborated on below. By identifying the sources of Burke’s and Smith’s digression, we will understand why the firm represented one glaring exception to their general compatibility on matters relating to political economy. This investigation will also allow us to grasp the subtle differences in their imperial thought, and to achieve a greater command of the novel challenges of colonial liberalism that the Company forced the British Empire to confront in the late eighteenth century.
II. DIFFERENT FRAMES OF REFERENCE: PRESCRIPTION, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM
Burke’s assessment of the East India Company most fully developed in the mid-1770s to the early 1780s, when a flow of reports on the firm’s maladministration sharpened his awareness of the Company’s progressively abusive rule over Indian natives. Ever since his first session in Parliament in 1766, he had consistently defended the charter of the firm against attempts by the British government to acquire its resources and wealth.Footnote 7 Yet inauspicious developments in the next fifteen yearsFootnote 8 signaled to Burke that the institution lacked the will and the means to temper its pattern of misconduct in India. As a leading member of the House of Commons’s Select Committee on India in the early 1780s, he was the principal author of committee reports—including Ninth Report, an exhaustive study of the firm’s corruptions of market order that will be quoted from below—that described such misconduct with an unsparing eye and a richness of empirical detail.
Smith had been critical of exclusive trading companies dating back at least to the early 1760s (LJ, p. 363).Footnote 9 Yet, like Burke, the germ of his thoughts on the East India Company grew into mature form in the 1770s and early 1780s (Rae Reference Rae1965, pp. 361–362), when reports on the firm’s misrule also alerted him to its swelling administrative delinquencies. And Smith’s tenure as Commissioner of Customs, starting in 1778, enabled him to deepen his knowledge of customs data, which he incorporated into the third edition of the Wealth of Nations that was published in 1784 (Coats Reference Coats, Skinner and Wilson1975, p. 220).Footnote 10 These developments, combined with his personal experiences relating to East India affairs,Footnote 11 provided ample opportunity to fortify his criticism of the mercantile system in the text.Footnote 12 The most significant additions to the third edition included a new chapter, “Conclusion of the Mercantile System,”Footnote 13 and a new section titled “Of the Publick Works and Institutions which are necessary for facilitating particular Branches of Commerce,” both of which highlighted the grave inefficiencies of mercantile policy (WN, I, “General Introduction,” p. 42).
As early as 1772, Burke and Smith were considered qualified enough to formally assess the East India Company in a public body. During the summer of that year, when the institution’s governing behavior overseas was facing increasing scrutiny from the British government, Burke was offered to serve as a supervisor on a commission in India tasked with investigating the corporation’s political and financial practices.Footnote 14 Burke was aware of the Company’s improprieties at the time,Footnote 15 but he declined the position (CEB, II, p. 319–321). Most likely soon thereafter, Smith was considered for a similar appointment (CAS, p. 164). Yet even though Burke and Smith held an elevated interest in the Company, and acquired an impressive array of knowledge about its administrative practices, they did not arrive at the same conclusions about its institutional credibility.
Burke, Prescription, and Constitutional Order
One significant source of Burke’s and Smith’s disagreement over the East India Company was the greater emphasis Burke placed on the role of “prescription” in conferring legitimacy upon political institutions. While this term originated from Roman private law and was legally distinct from “custom,” Burke articulated a political conception of prescription in the eighteenth century that incorporated this legal definition with his philosophical inclination to conserve and modify institutions that promoted the common good.Footnote 16 For Burke, prescription was the idea that property, institutions, and constitutions, even if established under dubious circumstances,Footnote 17 carried a heightened level of legitimacy over time because they had been exercised repeatedly throughout generations and because they provided a utility to the public. Most important, prescription threaded a web of protection around property to safeguard it against those seeking to acquire it based on claims of abstract right, serving not as a defense of dead tradition but as a support for an evolving social order. This notion related to Burke’s endorsement of the Company in at least three ways: it conveyed the public recognition of, and public confidence in, institutions; it was the anchor of the British constitution; and it secured corporate property rights.
Burke defended the legitimacy of the East India Company in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, which he presented in Parliament in December 1783 as a member of the Fox–North coalition (WS, V, pp. 378-451). The oration addressed a bill that was introduced by Charles Fox, a fellow Whig, in November 1783; historical evidence strongly suggests Burke’s influence in drafting it, however (Sutherland Reference Sutherland1952, p. 397; WS, V, pp. 22, 379).Footnote 18 The legislation proposed a commission consisting of seven members taken from and selected by Parliament,Footnote 19 as well as a group of assistant commissioners, to oversee the Company’s administrative and commercial activities in India (Sutherland Reference Sutherland1952, pp. 398–399; Bourke Reference Bourke2015, pp. 560–561). The purpose of Fox’s India Bill was to provide tighter oversight of the Company’s governing structure, effectively shifting political and juridical authority of British India from the corporation’s shareholders and directors to the commissioners.
Burke did not specifically use the term “prescription” in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, but his defense of the credibility of the East India Company rested strongly on its guiding principles. For Burke, the Company’s institutional legitimacy was prescriptive because its chartered liberties had received state authorization repeatedly throughout its history. These chartered rights of the Company were “secured to that body by every sort of public sanction.” They were “stamped by the faith of the King” and “stamped by the faith of Parliament” (WS, V, p. 384). Five years later, Burke reiterated this point in his opening speech on the impeachment of Warren Hastings, explaining that the firm was gifted a royal charter (and subsequent parliamentary sanction) and “several grants and Charters,” as well as the authorization of diwani, from the Mughal emperor (WS, VI, p. 280; see also p. 133). Throughout his life, Burke also avowed that the firm’s acquisition of Indian land was justified on the grounds of the right of conquest during war (Bourke Reference Bourke2015, pp. 365–366). At this point in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, however, his specific argument was not that the prescriptive legitimacy of the Company derived from the gradual expansion of its territorial sovereignty in India, but that repeated constitutional sanction in Britain had conferred upon it a firm measure of public faith—and thus public legitimacy—throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Burke’s summoning of prescriptive principles clarifies why he did not call to annul the British government’s charter of the East India Company in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, and why he affirmed the corporation’s territorial legitimacy in India based on the seal of this charter and the formal assent of Parliament. “I therefore freely admit to the East India Company their claim to exclude their fellow-subjects from the commerce of half the globe,” Burke maintains (WS, V, p. 384). The institution had a right to “administer an annual territorial revenue,” to “command an army,” and to govern “the lives and fortunes” of natives (WS, V, pp. 384–385). Company rulers possessed all of these powers “by charter and by acts of parliament … without a shadow of controversy” (WS, V, p. 385).
Burke’s understanding of the difference between his position and those who supported terminating the firm’s charter was animated by his distaste for abstract theory,Footnote 20 a type of speculative philosophy liberated from the guidance of historical perspective that he cherished in his political thought. “I do not presume to condemn those who argue a priori, against the propriety of leaving such extensive political powers in the hands of a company of merchants,” he acknowledges in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, possibly referring to Smith (WS, V, p. 386).Footnote 21 Yet Burke goes on to explain, “I feel an insuperable reluctance in giving my hand to destroy any established institution of government, upon a theory, however plausible it may be” (WS, V, p. 387; see Whelan Reference Whelan1996, pp. 39–41).Footnote 22 He is attempting to distinguish his support for the historical credibility of mercantile administration from the stance of others who, in Burke’s judgment, held the misguided categorical belief that traders could never be good rulers.Footnote 23 Yet for Burke, the East India Company—a company that received its royal charter from Queen Elizabeth in 1600 and parliamentary authorization starting in 1698—was such an “established institution” that warranted legal protection (WS, VI, p. 280n1). For Burke, traditional institutions rooted in the cement of prescription should not be eliminated simply because abstract philosophy sought to refute their credibility. The test of time invested useful establishments with just authority.
Burke reinforced his embrace of prescription in Speech on Fox’s India Bill when he asserted that Fox’s bill, and related reform bills, were intended to be the “Magna Charta of Hindostan” (WS, V, p. 386), a belief he echoed thirteen years later.Footnote 24 As Burke would argue in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), the Magna Carta was not a treatise based on a priori theory, using his language in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, but rather a historical document that protected the chartered liberties of Englishmen. Throughout its constitutional history, England built upon this prescriptive foundation to increase and fortify these liberties as a defense against political tyranny (WS, VIII, pp. 81–83). Similarly, the “Magna Charta of Hindostan”—Fox’s India Bill and related bills—established constraints on the arbitrary power of the East India Company over Indian natives, and was not an expression of the “a priori” thinking Burke condemned in Speech on Fox’s India Bill for justifying the nullification of the firm’s charter.
Burke weighed a deeper constitutional concern, however. “Prescription” was not simply the repeated public authorization of a trading company’s commercial monopoly; it also marked the constitutional sanction of a corporate body’s chartered liberties and property rights. This implication contains two interrelated points that informed Burke’s treatment of the East India Company. First, prescription preserved the equilibrium of British constitutional government. If the British government took full control of the Company’s foreign possessions, this action would aggrandize power in the Crown and generate more opportunity for executive lucre at the expense of Company shareholders and servants. Thus any attempt to intervene in Company’s affairs was, in the judgment of Burke and his fellow Whigs, a threat to the delicate balance of powers undergirding the British constitution. Such reasoning is why Burke asserted in 1772 that the firm’s charter “ought to be held inviolable” (WS, II, p. 372); why he opposed North’s Regulating Act of 1773, which intended, but failed, to enhance government oversight of the Company (the Act also selected Warren Hastings as Governor General of Bengal);Footnote 25 and why he did not endorse the repeal of its charter in Speech on Fox’s India Bill.
Second, the shield of prescription provided security for the corporate property of the East India Company. Burke harbored the firm conviction that claims to private property asserted by a central power, such as a king or national legislature, or justified by abstract appeals to rights, such as during the French Revolution, should be resisted because they repudiated the authority of time, utility, and the real natural right to property.Footnote 26 (And, as mentioned, Burke contended that the institution’s landed possessions in India were legitimate based on the right of conquest during war.) When Lord North proposed resolutions in 1773 imperiling the Company’s Indian possessions based on the public right to its property, Burke blasted this reasoning. “If you have a right to all the Company’s territorial acquisitions, you truly begin a redress of their grievances in a peculiar manner; to restore the ruined state of their finances, you plunder them of their property,” he declaimed (WS, II, p. 391). In the case of the Company, then, prescriptive property protected its independent wealth and landed possessions from the grasping indulgences of the British government, thereby safeguarding the constitutional liberties of the firm and the integrity of its charter.
One chief parliamentary complaint about Fox’s bill, however, was that it did threaten the chartered rights of men by expanding the government’s influence over the corporation. Furthermore, Burke has been accused of holding inconsistent positions on the role of Parliament in East India Company affairs: in 1773, when he was in the opposition, Burke condemned the Regulating Act for its intrusion into the firm’s governing practices; yet a decade later, in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, he was arguing passionately for parliamentary reform of the corporation. Conor Cruise O’Brien thus writes that while Burke maintained consistent positions on Anglo-American relations, “there is no such overall consistency” in his views on India (1993, p. 257; see Cone Reference Cone1964, pp. 96–98, 107). Such seeming inconsistencies require elucidation.
We begin with Burke’s argument in Speech on Fox’s India Bill that any reform of the East India Company would not put at risk the chartered rights of men. He expounds this point by distinguishing between the real “chartered rights of men” and the chartered liberties of the Company (WS, V, p. 384). The former constituted the “natural rights of mankind,” expressed and secured by law, such as the Magna Carta (WS, V, pp. 383–384). The firm’s charter, however, did not derive from natural rights but instead was an imprimatur of commercial privilege: “Magna charta is a charter to restrain power, and to destroy monopoly. The East India charter is a charter to establish monopoly, and to create power” (WS, V, p. 384). Yet the latter was still a legal instrument, which is why Burke admitted that the Company was vested with the public authority to operate in India. Changing the design of the firm’s administration at this point, therefore, did not endanger its chartered liberties but ameliorated the pernicious deformities of its governing substructure. As Burke professes in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, “I am certain that every means, effectual to preserve India from oppression, is a guard to preserve the British constitution from its worst corruption” (WS, V, p. 383). Institutional reform of the corporation retained the integrity not only of the firm’s charter but also of the British constitution.
Still, even if institutional reform did not place the East India Company’s charter in jeopardy, how can one reconcile Burke’s support for government intrusion into the firm’s affairs in 1783 with his opposition to the Regulating Act of 1773? One explanation is that he was unaware of the depth of Company malfeasance in the mid- to late 1760s and early 1770s. Additionally, Burke insisted during this period that the underlying motivation of parliamentary oversight—unlike, in his judgment, Fox’s India Bill—was to target the firm’s wealth and charter, not to reform its worst abuses, which had noticeably worsened by the early 1780s.
Burke also contended that government intervention in the corporate affairs of the East India Company could be vindicated only on the grounds of gross “delinquency” or “necessity” (Bourke Reference Bourke2015, p. 366). His growing apprehensions in the 1770s and early 1780s of the East India Company’s corrupt governance prompted him to acknowledge that delinquency and necessity had indeed become entrenched in the firm’s administrative practices, which steered him to the conclusion that the institution needed fundamental reform. This is why Burke argued in Speech on Fox’s India Bill that the Company had strayed so far from its original mission that reform of its misrule would not threaten its charter but restore its integrity. And his distinction in itself between the chartered rights of men and the chartered privileges of the Company in Speech on Fox’s India Bill validated his confidence in prescription as a glowing touchstone to assess the Company’s credibility.
More so, the East India Company was vindicated by its utility, another pillar of Burke’s conception of prescription. In his judgment, the Company did perform a service to the British public by advancing the cause of commercial and fiscal prosperity. England, prior to the firm’s acquisition of diwani responsibilities, “was considerably benefitted both in Trade and in Revenue,” Ninth Report asserts (WS, V, p. 223). Burke argued elsewhere that a monopoly was tenable if it was granted for “the good of the whole.” This good included “encouraging [men] to great risks in useful undertakings” (William Reference William, Earl Fitzwilliam and Richard Bourke1844, p. 460). For Burke, commercial enterprise in a distant land was a hazardous endeavor; if the trading company discovered or extended trade in that region, it provided a tangible utility to the public.
Burke held this belief dating back to the 1750s, when he co-authored a book on the history of European colonization, An Account of the European Settlements in America, in 1757 with William Burke, his friend and distant relative. In the writing, the Burkes maintain that exclusive trading companies “may probably be useful to nourish an infant trade. They may be useful too for a very distant one, where the market is to be nicely managed, and where it is under the dominion of foreign and barbarous princes” (Burke and Burke 1760, II, p. 8). But firms with commercial privileges that traded in regions “of the same prince, under the protection of his laws, carried on by his own subjects, and with goods wrought in his own country” would be “equally absurd in their nature, and ruinous in their consequences to the trade” (Burke and Burke 1760, II, pp. 8–9). Burke, then, made a distinction between chartered monopolies for companies trading in foreign lands, such as India, and chartered monopolies for companies trading in English-speaking regions of the British Empire, the latter of which was untenable from his perspective.
The combination of the East India Company’s prescriptive basis and commercial utility inspired Burke to invoke a conception of honor to defend the firm as a national prerogative, underscoring an implicit mandate that grew out from the authority of its inaugural charter. The institution, Burke said in his speech on the opening of Hastings’s impeachment in February 1788, “had its origin about the latter end of the reign of Elizabeth” and was tasked with “increasing the commerce and the honour” of Britain. He declared, “For to increase its commerce without increasing its honour and reputation would have been thought at that time, and will be thought now, a bad bargain for the Country” (WS, VI, p. 282). This development was the product of a supernatural force that pulled the British Empire toward India: for Burke, there was “something of a divine providence” in English nabobs’ accumulation of wealth on the subcontinent (Agnani Reference Agnani2013, p. 166). The merging of prescription with imperial honor granted the Company the blessing of institutional credibility.
But the convergence of prescription and imperial honor for Burke did not mean that the British Empire should unleash its might across the globe. The animating principle of his thought on imperial politics—regarding not just Anglo-Indian relations but also Anglo-American and Anglo-Irish affairs as well—was that sovereign dominion demanded moral governance, an imperative Burke stresses in Speech on Fox’s India Bill. In the case of India, the sanction of public legitimacy from the Crown and Parliament invested a heightened level of “trust” in the East India Company to rule Indians in an ethical fashion (WS, V, p. 385). The responsible fulfillment of diwani duties required that the Company “observe the laws, rights, usages and customs of the Natives, and to pursue their benefit in all things, which was the nature, institution and purpose, of the office which they received” ( WS, VI, p. 281). Because the firm broke this trust and drained itself of utility, Burke believed that the solution was to remedy the defects of its maladministration and punish Company servants for their misbehavior, not to immediately abolish the institution (although he never completely dismissed this possibility). Such is why he championed Fox’s India Bill with resolute conviction—and why he did not plead to nullify its charter.
Smith and the Mercantile System
Like Burke, Smith held history and traditional authority in high regard. Smith harbored a conception of prescription (LJ, pp. 14, 32–37, 461);Footnote 27 admired the rich heritage of British constitutional traditions (LJ, pp. 271–272); highlighted birth and fortune as two wellsprings of authority in political communities (WN, II, p. 714); and recognized that landed aristocrats and gentlemen were most averse to monopoly (WN, I, p. 461). Yet Burke’s notion of prescription incorporated a conscious defense of chartered trading companies as corporate bodies that deserved constitutional protection. Smith never endorsed the Company on this broader prescriptive ground. Instead, he evaluated the East India Company in Wealth of Nations, and in Lectures on Jurisprudence, primarily through the lens of the wider commercial order, as symbolized by the mercantile system, rather than of constitutional or prescriptive order.
To understand the thinkers’ varying degrees of emphasis on this matter, it would be instructive to observe the separation in their beliefs over the merit of corporate rights. Burke was a firm champion of the corporate rights of the East India Company, but Smith identified corporate rights as a curse to the commercial system. “[M]erchants and manufacturers” were “accustomed to that exclusive corporation spirit which prevails in them,” Smith writes in Wealth of Nations when rebuking traders for combining together to thwart market competition, in contrast to the independent spirit of landed aristocrats and farmers (WN, I, p. 462). He applied his stand against corporate monopoly to both domestic and foreign commerce,Footnote 28 including the Company’s activities; Burke, while a strong advocate of free trade within the British Empire,Footnote 29 did not extend this principle to the institution, for the reasons listed in the previous subsection.Footnote 30
For Smith, the iniquities of the corporate spirit were rooted in the authorization of an exclusive monopoly in the first place, which represented the worst traits of the mercantile system that he denounced in Wealth of Nations. Trade monopolies disturbed the basic laws of supply and demand “by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate” (WN, I, p. 78).Footnote 31 As a consequence, the commercial privileges of corporate firms disrupted the circulation of capital and steered it to inefficient enterprises. The mercantile regulations that impact America and the East Indies in particular, Smith remarks in Wealth of Nations, “derange” the natural distribution of stock (II, pp. 630) by confining the flow of commodities to predetermined buyers and sellers.
This process discouraged goods from reaching markets in high demand of them, and encouraged goods to enter markets with little demand for them: such derangement was “hurtful to the society in which it takes place; whether it be by repelling from a particular trade the stock which would otherwise go to it, or by attracting towards a particular trade that which would not otherwise come to it” (II, pp. 632–633). The derangement of stock fueled the misallocation of resources and enhanced the overall cost of trade, in turn choking the fullest potentialities of free commercial intercourse and curbing market competition from traders spanning the globe.
At their most elemental level, these deformities of market freedom corrupted the ideal paradigm of Smith’s “system of natural liberty” that served as the theoretical basis for his economic thought (WN, II, pp. 687–688). Under this system, the sovereign’s responsibilities included the protection of its subjects from foreign threats, the administration of justice, and the selective establishment of public works and public institutions, but not the enactment of laws encouraging or discouraging the trade of specific commodities, as was the case under the mercantile system. And trade restrictions revolted against Smith’s treasured standard for measuring the vigor of market competition: freedom of entry (Anderson and Tollison Reference Anderson and Tollison1982, p. 1239).
Smith furnished a key distinction that marked how his critique of the East India Company was woven into his larger condemnation of the mercantile system’s tendency to divert capital to counterproductive enterprises. For Smith, a monopoly of colonial trade governed simply by import and export restrictions, such as Britain’s rule over the American colonies, attracted a “greater proportion of the stock” that would otherwise go to it (WN, II, p. 631). But a legally recognized monopoly of commercial enterprise in a distant land, such as the Company, was a more brazen exercise of imperial malice. This form of monopoly “may sometimes attract stock towards the particular trade in which they are established”—like Britain’s control of the American trade—“and sometimes repel it from that trade according to different circumstances,” like the exclusive privileges granted to trading monopolies (WN, II, pp. 631–632).
The East India Company thus embodied the monopolistic practices Smith loathed so much (see Skinner Reference Skinner1996, p. 185). Monopoly, he writes in Wealth of Nations, “seems to be the sole engine of the mercantile system” (WN, II, p. 630). And a monopoly in perpetuity was “merely to enable the company to support the negligence, profusion, and malversation of their own servants” (WN, II, p. 755). The Company’s presence in India exhibited the nefarious consequences of this system, stretched to their extreme: traders and manufacturers exploited their monopolistic political and economic power to pursue selfish pecuniary reward that did not align with the public interest of Indians. The “real interest of the [Company] servants is by no means the same with that of the country,” Smith observes (WN, II, p. 640). And the “genius of exclusive companies” has “probably been the principal cause of the little progress which they have made in the East Indies” (WN, II, pp. 634–635). The forced aggrandizement of the Company’s lucre was the mercantile system distilled to its essence. For Smith, unlike Burke, such gross perversions of supply and demand laws naturally emerged from the congenital defects of chartered trading companies; consequently, the Company’s monopoly and the mercantile system were untenable.
Therefore, while Burke placed a greater emphasis on appraising the East India Company based on the standards of prescriptive and constitutional authority and national honor, Smith tended to assess the firm, and all chartered joint-stock companies, through a cost-benefit analysis guided by the benchmarks of British wealth and industry.Footnote 32 In Wealth of Nations, Smith concludes that joint-stock companies,
which are established for the publick spirited purpose of promoting some particular manufacture, over and above managing their own affairs ill, to the diminution of the general stock of the society, can in other respects scarce ever fail to do more harm than good … [T]he unavoidable partiality of their directors to particular branches of the manufacture, of which the undertakers mislead and impose upon them, is a real discouragement to the rest. (II, p. 758)
The wealth of nations diminishes when chartered institutions such as the Company give a leaning to particular industries over others.
Accordingly, even though Smith in Wealth of Nations, similar to Burke, diagnosed the East India Company’s adverse commercial influence in India, he, unlike Burke, did support revoking the firm’s chartered monopoly. “[U]pon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought certainly to determine,” Smith asserts, conveying that its charter should not be renewed (WN, II, pp. 754–755). The Company possessed the legal right to continue trading in the East India as a joint-stock company—but it should do so without enjoying the exclusive privilege of monopoly. “The East India Company, upon the redemption of their funds, and the expiration of their exclusive privilege, have a right, by act of parliament, to continue a corporation with a joint stock, and to trade in their corporate capacity to the East Indies in common with the rest of their fellow-subjects,” Smith writes (WN, II, p. 755).Footnote 33 The self-interest of trading companies should be subordinate to the imperatives of market competition. Corporate rights were tenable if exercised in a free commercial market, not in a hardened monopolized society.
It must be emphasized that Smith was not a radical opponent of the East India Company. He did recognize the legitimacy of the East India Company’s landed possessions in India, and he concluded that such legitimacy was drawn from the authority of the British government. “The territorial acquisitions of the East India company,” Smith remarks in Wealth of Nations, were “the undoubted right of the crown, that is, of the state and people of Great Britain” (WN, II, p. 945). Yet he did not endorse the merit of the firm’s exclusive charter on the reasoning that its liberties were “secured to that body by every sort of public sanction,” as Burke had. Smith did not profess Burke’s argument about the importance of protecting “any established institution” from the dictates of theory.Footnote 34 Neither, unlike Burke, did Smith go as far in arguing that Company rulers held institutional credibility “by charter and by acts of parliament … without a shadow of controversy.” Smith conceded the political validity of these laws, but he insisted they lacked the sufficient authority to justify the continual renewal of the institution’s charter.
In this light, Burke’s portrayal of Smithian opposition to the East India Company as being grounded in a priori reasoning was unfair.Footnote 35 While Smith did declare that the mercantile administration of a chartered monopoly was perhaps the “worst” of all governments (WN, II, p. 570), his repudiation of the Company did not rest on a body of theoretical propositions disconnected from history—the most significant, in Burke’s judgment, being the rigid maxim that merchants could never serve as efficacious rulers. This was the case for a number of reasons. As noted, Smith verifies the legitimacy of the Company’s landed possessions in India. In addition, he acknowledges in Wealth of Nations that temporary monopolies might initially serve a useful purpose because of the elevated “risk and expence” of commercial enterprise in foreign lands (WN, II, p. 754; see pp. 731–732). Indeed, in Wealth of Nations Smith praises Company merchants for the relative prosperity of their commercial success before they obtained political sovereignty: “While they were traders only, they managed their trade successfully, and were able to pay from their profits a moderate dividend to the proprietors of their stock” (II, p. 819).Footnote 36 Smith also presents a nuanced treatment of joint-stock companies in general: although he criticizes the Royal African Company and South Sea Company in Wealth of Nations, he actually commends the Hudson’s Bay Company for being able to “carry on their trade with a considerable degree of success” prior to the Seven Years War due to the firm’s “small number of proprietors” and “moderate capital” (WN, II, p. 744).Footnote 37
Smith, moreover, summoned empirical information in Wealth of Nations to expose the counterproductive incentive structure of government-backed firms.Footnote 38 He outlined the historical trajectory of the Company to highlight the events in the mid-eighteenth century that converted the institution into a domineering political force (WN, II, pp. 746–754); and he appealed to history when he questioned that merchants lacked adequate capital to invest in trade in distant lands, a notion he insisted was “contrary to the experience of all nations” (WN, II, p. 633). Smith also referenced information compiled by the Abbé André Morellet, a French economist, who showed that over fifty joint-stock companies had failed from misrule, according to Smith (WN, II, pp. 755–756). And Smith harnessed historical knowledge to spotlight the corruptions of market order fueled by chartered firms in foreign territories, including not only Britain’s East India Company but also the Dutch East India Company (WN, II, pp. 635–636). In fact, Smith, in employing such empirical evidence to unmask the failures of joint-stock companies, was in many ways demonstrating a keener sensitivity to history than Burke. In short, Smith’s reproach of chartered corporations was not inspired by the kind of a priori theory that Burke suggested in Speech on Fox’s India Bill was driving opposition to the Company, but instead reflected a statement of practical reason uncovering the historically verifiable flaws of mercantile administration.Footnote 39 Regardless of the British government’s sanction of the firm’s charter, then, the essential shortcomings of the mercantile commercial system overrode any Burkean considerations of constitutional balance or prescriptive integrity, according to Smith.
Furthermore, although Smith was certainly conscious of the immoral nature of the East India Company’s rule over Indians,Footnote 40 he was less likely than Burke to publicly frame the Company’s actual administrative relationship with natives through a vocabulary of ethics and trust, and more likely to draw attention to the firm’s structural imperfections. Burke was mindful of the importance of institutional incentives—hence his support for Fox’s India Bill—but he placed a sharper accent on the dereliction of the Company’s ethical obligations to the Indian people, as Jennifer Pitts notes (2006, pp. 59–100).Footnote 41 For Smith, if there was a natural incoherence in mercantile sovereignty, then the ethical improvement of imperial administration, with or without government oversight, would still not alleviate the institutional contradictions of chartered trading companies.
This was because Smith demonstrated sharper awareness than Burke of the principal–agent conundrum in the East India Company’s governing structure. Since the directors of chartered joint-stock companies manage the investments of other shareholders, “it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance” compared with partners in a private trading firm (WN, II, p. 741). The directors of such companies would not experience the immediate consequences of injudicious financial investments; as a result, they had a greater incentive to engage in risky trade. For Smith, morality could not overcome this elemental institutional deficiency of trading monopolies.
On this note, I depart from Sankar Muthu, who writes that Smith’s argument against international trading companies was “straightforwardly a moral and humanistic critique” (2008, p. 193; see Hanley Reference Hanley2014, p. 375; and Pitts Reference Pitts2017, pp. 146–147). There were obvious underlying moral implications to Smith’s analysis of the East India Company of which Smith was aware, but his self-articulation of the debate was expressed primarily through a commercial lens rather than a moral one. (Of course, as Smith knew, the two were not mutually exclusive.)
The irony is that Smith actually commended the success of Fox’s India Bill in the House of Commons. In a letter to William Eden, a member of the Commons, Smith wrote, “I heartily congratulate you upon the triumphant manner in which the East India Bill has been carried through the Lower House. I have no doubt of its passing through the Upper House in the same manner” (CAS, p. 272). (Smith was too optimistic; the House of Lords rejected the bill.) While Smith’s fiercest reprimand of the Company was published in Wealth of Nations, his support for the bill in his letter to Eden signaled his appreciation of parliamentary efforts to subdue the excesses of the firm’s rule, even if the law would not have ended its chartered monopoly.Footnote 42 For Smith and Burke, taming the firm’s rampant abuses, at the very least, was a course of action they both supported.
III. THE QUALIFICATIONS TO GOVERN AND THE PACE OF CHANGE
The Qualifications to Govern
The enigmatic character of the East India Company’s governing structure rested on the question of whether traders were qualified to be effective rulers. Burke retained a more optimistic outlook on the potential of mercantile administration for credible governance, while Smith believed it was doomed to fail. We must first acknowledge, however, that Burke was aware that the self-interested motives of merchants would seek to exploit the commercial system for individual gain. They “frequently advised” governments “not for the general good of trade, but for their private advantage,” Burke wrote in 1769 (WS, II, p. 201), voicing a critique of traders exceedingly similar to that expressed by Smith in Wealth of Nations seven years later. Burke recognized that prejudice aroused merchants to support protectionist measures that hurt the common good,Footnote 43 and he showed a discerning comprehension of the hazards of mixing commercial activity with civil administration, as evidenced by Ninth Report. Even more, Burke stated during the impeachment proceedings of Warren Hastings that the Company, when it had assumed political sovereignty to go along with its existing commercial monopoly, “became that thing which was supposed by the Roman Law so unsuitable, the same power was a Trader, the same power was a Lord” (WS, VI, p. 283), a criticism shared by Smith as well (WN, II, p. 819).
Yet Burke maintained that the presence of the East India Company in India could be reconciled with the interests of the Indian people. Burke initially admits in Speech on Fox’s India Bill that “if we are not able to contrive some method of governing India well … a ground is laid for their eternal separation.” But then he claims, “I am however far from being persuaded that any such incompatibility of interest does at all exist” (WS, V, p. 383). This plausible harmony derived from Burke’s sanguine belief that traders possessed the effectual capacities for judicious governance. “I have known merchants with the sentiments and the abilities of great statesmen; and I have seen persons in the rank of statesmen, with the conceptions and character of pedlars,” he states (WS, V, p. 387).
Historical precedent did not demonstrate otherwise, for the assertion that traders could never be wise statesmen was based on an abstract theory detached from empirical reality: “My experience in life teaches me nothing clear upon the subject” of giving political power to merchants (WS, V, p. 387). By merging his aversion to a priori thinking with his belief in the possibilities of sagacious trader-rulers, Burke is declaring that the real conflict was not the inherent contradictions of mercantile administration under the old system of the East India Company, as Smith emphasized, but the firm’s acquisition of diwani in 1765.
Five years after Speech on Fox’s India Bill, in his opening speech on the Hastings impeachment, Burke’s approbation of mercantile rulers reached an even higher pitch of intensity. He noted that the “mercantile constitution” of the East India Company, before Hastings corrupted it, was “so great, so excellent, so perfect” that “human wisdom has never exceeded it” (WS, VI, p. 295). The firm “produced a discipline and order which no State should be ashamed to copy,” due in no small part to the transparency and accuracy of its public record-keeping practices (WS, VI, pp. 296–298). Burke goes so far as to argue that other states should emulate this kind of public management, bestowing upon traders a shine of political and administrative dignity that Smith never does.
Although Burke’s warm depiction of traders may appear to belie his more famous endorsement of the landed aristocracy in Reflections, it captured a pattern in his thought and action that championed the interests of merchants and other middlemen throughout his life. Nevertheless, in these other instances, Burke defended their activities when they were carried out in the realm of market competition, not mercantile administration.Footnote 44 With this observation in mind, one suspects that Burke’s advocacy of merchants in Speech on Fox’s India Bill was more than a simple endorsement of their capacity to govern. His deeper motivation appears to have been to further buttress his defense of the East India Company as a credible commercial organization of the British Empire grounded in the authority of prescription and the British constitution. If it could be demonstrated that merchants did not possess an inherent defect in their fitness for just governance, then a prescriptive defense of the corporation could stand on a firmer ground of practical reason and experience.
Smith’s suspicions of mercantile administration can be extracted from his ambivalent attitude toward merchants in Wealth of Nations.Footnote 45 Smith recognized that they were the trigger for commercial vibrancy in the mercantile system (WN, II, p. 612). Yet he bitterly condemned merchants in the text for acting as sovereigns, or in an advisory capacity to sovereigns, because they would frequently champion commercial policies that would advance their own self-interest to the detriment of the common good. The proposal for a new trade regulation derived from men “who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the publick, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it” (WN, I, p. 267).Footnote 46 Dealers aimed both to enlarge the market for goods and narrow competition for that market; the latter endangered the public welfare by restricting the amount of products and services consumers could purchase in a commercial economy. Smith remarks critically that, in regard to the belief that the protection of a trade was necessary for the defense of the commonwealth, “particular companies of merchants have had the address to perswade the legislature to entrust to them the performance of this part of the duty of the sovereign, together with all the powers which are necessarily connected with it” (WN, II, p. 733). Governance driven by the commercial self-interest of the few invited the malicious effects of mercantilism that Smith assailed in Wealth of Nations.
As we have read, Burke in many ways agreed with these observations. Yet the difference was that he did not apply his critique of merchants in the wider commercial order with the same measure of force to his specific treatment of the East India Company, due to his confidence in the efficacy of mercantile administration. Smith did, however. Smith’s distrust of traders in the mercantile system thus commanded a far greater influence in informing his censure of the merchant-rulers of chartered trading companies in Wealth of Nations. “The government of an exclusive company of merchants is, perhaps, the worst of all governments for any country whatever,” he states (II, p. 570). In Speech on Fox’s India Bill, Burke thought that the Company’s government was “absolutely incorrigible”—but only “in its present state,” that state being a pattern of lawlessness that emerged after 1765 (WS, V, p. 433). Smith thought that mercantile rule was absolutely incorrigible prior to 1765.
Unlike Burke, then, Smith maintained that an incurable conflict persisted between the responsibilities of political rulers and those of commercial traders even before the Company acquired the power of revenue collection.Footnote 47 Englishmen had to pay dear prices not only for Company goods but also for the “extraordinary waste which the fraud and abuse, inseparable from the management of the affairs of so great a company, must necessarily have occasioned,” he states in Wealth of Nations (II, p. 631; italics added). Therefore, Smith writes later, a “company of merchants” was “incapable of considering themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such” (WN, II, p. 637).
Smith’s point is that when merchants assumed political authority over a territory, their instinct for profit corrupted their duties to govern responsibly with long views. Their natural tendency to shackle competitionFootnote 48 occasioned the suppression of local Indian markets, which discouraged native cultivation of surplus produce in those governed territories, thereby making it difficult for natives to meet their own demand for provisions and sell their goods overseas for a profit.Footnote 49 And mercantile administrators upended sound principles of public finance: they preferred “the little and transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and permanent revenue of the sovereign” (WN, II, p. 638). The responsible sovereign pursued a commercial policy that generated steady receipts for the state, but traders’ attraction to the sparkle of quick gain subverted the governing imperative to implement a secure revenue system. For Smith, unlike Burke, this deformity of statesmanship was fundamental to—not at odds with—the mercantile disposition of the East India Company.
The Pace of Reform
Burke’s and Smith’s attitudes toward the East India Company also diverged based on their varying perspectives on the appropriate pace of change for institutional reform. Two interrelated examples cast light on this difference.Footnote 50 First, in 1773 Parliament amended but did not fully repeal a law supporting grain export bounties. In the 1778 edition of Wealth of Nations, Smith inserted additional comments about the legislation, noting that even with its imperfections, it was “the best which the interests, prejudices, and temper of the times would admit of” (I, p. 543). Second, these remarks possibly reflected a conversation between Smith and Burke, following the first publication of Wealth of Nations in 1776, concerning the wisdom of lowering trade regulations such as the bounty law incrementally rather than immediately. According to an anecdote communicated by Francis HornerFootnote 51 in 1804, Burke, in response to Smith’s lament during the conversation that the bounty law had not been fully repealed, reportedly told Smith that “it was the privilege of philosophers to conceive their diagrams in geometrical accuracy; but the engineer must often impair the symmetry, as well as simplicity of his machine, in order to overcome the irregularities of friction and resistance” (Viner, pp. 26–27, in Rae Reference Rae1965).
These examples illustrate the central importance of prudence in the political philosophy of Burke, who stated in Reflections on the Revolution in France that it was the “first of all virtues” (WS, VIII, p. 113; see also IV, p. 383.) The mixture of Burke’s embrace of prudence with his position as an elected representative of Parliament, then, most likely served as a cool check against his competing desires for more fundamental reform of commercial policy, such as in regard to the watered-down Free Port Act of 1766 and the Irish trade bills (Collins Reference Collins2017). Burke’s plan to reform the East India Company can be explained by this factor. Without a doubt, the bill’s proposal to relocate the firm’s authority in London was significant in itselfFootnote 52 and received a harsh amount of criticism; but Burke preferred this option over the more radical idea of ending the charter in the first place.
Accordingly, the idea to abrogate the East India Company’s charter collided with practical considerations, the first of which was the settled presence of the British Empire in India. “[W]e must do the best we can in our situation,” Burke says in Speech on Fox’s India Bill. “The situation of man is the preceptor of his duty” (WS, V, p. 404). In 1781, during parliamentary debate over amending the Regulating Act of 1773, when Burke defended the continuation of the firm’s charter, he claimed that no alternative company could attain the same level of commercial pre-eminence as Company traders had in Asia. “[W]ith all their connections, all their stock, all their powers of continuing the trade, it was absurd to suppose any other description of persons could so well pursue the same line of traffick,” he declared, blending his prudential instincts with his recognition of the firm’s utility (WS, V, p. 133). At this point in his political life, Burke was not wholly resistant to government reform of the institution, and in fact had made efforts in 1780 and 1781 to begin inquiries into the Company’s delinquencies (WS, V, p. 16). But, as exemplified by his comments above, he maintained steadfast support for the Company’s charter throughout his parliamentary service. In addition, in 1782 he said that “it would be impracticable” to relinquish the British Empire’s presence in India; besides, in doing so it would “leave the miserable natives in a worse situation than before” (Gazetteer 1782). For Burke, removing the institution from Indian soil would create a power vacuum for local authorities and the French to exploit at the expense of the vulnerable native population (Bourke Reference Bourke2015, p. 562). Hence the Company was in a far better position than these other rulers to safeguard the lives of Indians—if, of course, the firm remedied its institutional defects.
Smith also recognized the primacy of prudence in the reform of commercial policy. He called for the “moderate and gradual relaxation” of Britain’s laws that steered the trade of the North American colonies to their imperial ruler. And he observed that “[t]o open the colony trade all at once to all nations” might give rise to a “permanent loss” to traders in existing colonial industries (WN, II, p. 606). But he did not apply this conception of prudence to the East India Company—or, to the extent that he did, Smith believed that the prudent course of action was to annul its trading monopoly, not maintain it. Therefore, Smith was more inclined than Burke to support the repeal of the firm’s charter because he displayed a greater willingness to question the foundational basis of practices that obstructed optimal commercial development, of which he believed the Company was guilty.Footnote 53
Burke’s position as a Whig legislator perhaps also inspired him to marry his prudential considerations with his attention to the constitutional implications of reforming the East India Company, as discussed in section II. Burke was a committed proponent of Whiggism, a political tradition keenly sensitive to any attempt by the Crown to limit the chartered liberties of corporate bodies. Consequently, Burkean prudence—and party politics—dictated that efforts to reform corporations like the Company be carried out in a careful and incremental fashion. Smith was just as attentive as Burke to the dangers that arose from the concentration of power. But Smith’s more detached engagement in parliamentary politics, this article contends, conditioned him to assign less weight to constitutional and prudential concerns than Burke did. Smith thus demonstrated a greater readiness than Burke to endorse policy reform that broke from established political and imperial traditions. Of course, Burke’s focus on prudential and constitutional questions, combined with his broader defense of empire, may have diverted his attention away from diagnosing the underlying structural defects of the global mercantile system as shrewdly as Smith.
IV. CONCLUSION
While Ninth Report issued a vicious condemnation of the East India Company’s misconduct in India, it offered somewhat modest recommendations, calling on the corporation to “fix its Commerce upon a Commercial Basis” (WS, V, p. 242). The report stressed that the institution must do so governed by the gentle hand of prudence: “To make a sudden Change … might destroy the few Advantages which attend any Trade, without securing those which must flow from one established upon sound Mercantile Principles, whenever such a Trade can be established” (WS, V, p. 269). Beyond considerations of political economy, Burke emphasized a return to the rule of law as a remedy to curb the firm’s extravagance (WS, VI, pp. 68–69). And, of course, he hoped that the enhancement of government oversight proposed by Fox’s India Bill would mollify and reform the Company’s pattern of arbitrary rule.
In Wealth of Nations, Smith argued that the British government should purchase the military institutions held by the Company; assume responsibility for public administration in India, thereby displacing the corporation as political sovereign; and ensure that trade “be laid open to all the subjects of the state” (not unlike Ninth Report’s recommendation), all in the service of strengthening British public credit and promoting Smith’s system of natural liberty (II, p. 755). Later in the text, Smith writes that Britain should perhaps “lighten” natives’ tax burden and “preven[t] the embezzlement and misapplication” of its fiscal system in order to generate more revenue for the British treasury (WN, II, pp. 945–946).
Neither thinker got what he wanted. Fox’s India Bill was defeated in the House of Lords, which prompted the dismissal of the Fox–North coalition. A subsequent attempt at reform, William Pitt’s India Act of 1784, provided weaker government oversight while preserving the East India Company’s commercial autonomy (WS, V, p. 452–459). Burke criticized the bill, but later acknowledged that it was informed by the same principles as Fox’s India bills (CEB, VIII, pp. 427–428). He would progressively direct his energies in the mid-1780s to building the prosecution’s case against Warren Hastings, who had resigned as governor general of Bengal and returned to England in 1785. (Hastings was acquitted on all charges in 1795.) The Company lost most of its commercial privileges in India in 1813, yet its armed forces continued to expand its military footprint in the country, and its administrators adopted a more aggressive, Anglocentric approach to governing Indian affairs (Lawson Reference Lawson1993, pp. 144–162). The institutional reforms of the firm established by Pitt’s Act, however, generally remained in place until the corporation was taken over by the British Crown in 1858. The company was formally dissolved in 1874.
The significance of the friction between Burke and Smith on the East India Company surpassed considerations of institutional reform, for the conflict reflected a deeper chasm in their thought that the firm merely brought to the fore. Accordingly, while scholars often locate the two in the same intellectual tradition (Himmelfarb Reference Himmelfarb2005; Dunn Reference Dunn1941; Herzog Reference Herzog1998; O’Neill Reference O’Neill2007), we must re-evaluate this tendency. Burke and Smith placed varying degrees of emphasis on the importance of history, prescription, constitutionalism, corporate rights, and imperial morality in molding their beliefs on political economy. Therefore, while the two thinkers supported market liberty, these deeper philosophical differences shaped how their respective commitments to the principles of supply and demand manifested themselves in a variety of ways in their individual assessments of national policy.
Even with this disjunction, Burke’s and Smith’s proposed reforms harbored one chief similarity: they failed to resolve elemental questions raised by the East India Company. Was there not an inherent conflict between an imperial power and a native people in the first place? Would Indian subjects, even before the Company assumed diwani responsibilities, have agreed with Burke’s belief that a providential force steered the British toward the subcontinent?Footnote 54 Would the transfer of administrative and military authority to the British government, as Smith suggested, actually have fully restored Indian market activity and disciplined the government’s imperial temptations?
Yet perhaps these unresolved ambiguities disclose more about the contradictions of empire than about the relative merit of their proposals, as the sliding behavior of the East India Company introduced complex questions about imperial liberalism in the late eighteenth century that even distinguished thinkers such as Burke and Smith could not settle. In the end, however, their awakened vigilance to the Company’s oppression of the Indian people cast light on the menace inherent in combining sovereign dominion with mercantile privilege. For even with the disharmony in their views on the credibility of the firm, both Burke and Smith resisted this odious development of British imperial rule with sturdy fortitude, laying bare for the ages the incompatibility between political and commercial monopoly and the liberal spirit.
