In the several decades since the publication of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice a number of political theorists and moral philosophers have stepped up to the plate to offer their own accounts of the appropriate norms of distributive justice within democratic societies. In this volume, Albert Weale, Professor of Political Theory and Public Policy at University College London, provides us with his own somewhat distinctive answer to the question “What is democratic justice?”
All arguments seeking to model distributive justice have to build upon some foundational moral intuitions. Weale's animating assumptions to serve that role are, first, the contractarian assumption that distributive norms that can claim moral legitimacy are those terms that would be reached in a bargain among rational self-interested parties. These contracting parties are not required to choose behind some form of a veil of ignorance but are instead presumed to have the normal important but imperfect knowledge found among real-world human beings. The additional constraint needed to make the agreement democratic is that the contractors must bargain in a situation of “roughly equal strength” (xii). These assumptions narrow the range of possible outcomes out of the box. They would not require a presumptively just bargain to reflect a deliberative consensus or to embody abstract impartiality. They would serve to disqualify the kind of bad bargain Rousseau condemns in his second Discourse and purely libertarian bargains that do not filter background situations of social, economic, and political inequality. These assumptions also consider the distributive consequences of natural inequalities and brute luck to be morally acceptable. And these assumptions leave no essential place for claims of need or for communitarian norms of a “larger self” or civic friendship in shaping the outcome of the bargain.
These assumptions also provide Weale with an opportunity to derive the outcome of a democratic agreement on terms of social cooperation from inferences grounded in empirical observation instead of from the more usual kind of formal rational-choice modeling. For the real world can afford us with examples of agreements that have been reached in situations that broadly comport with the “equal strength” constraint. Thus Weale seeks to develop an argument that represents a strategy for pursuing what he calls his “idee fixe—that justice can be understood by reference to empirical social contracts in which the power of the parties is equalized” (xvii).
The best extant empirical examples of real-world distributive agreements reached by people bargaining in a situation of roughly equal power, Weale argues, are the economic arrangements found in the kind of common-property-resource regimes most famously examined in the work of Elinor Ostrom. And when we look at the distributive principles that emerge from these paradigmatic situations we find the crucial rules to be, first, that “participants receive the full fruits of their labor” (69), and second, that the participants acquire this entitlement within constraints that allocate to each participant equal access (usually through a system of rotating use of the various sections of the common property) to the relevant means of production.
The question then becomes whether we can infer how these principles should be operationalized and institutionalized within the quite different circumstances of large scale societies with advanced industrial economies. Weale argues that we can by analogical reasoning discern relevant ways that the core principles of equal access and full fruits of one's labor can be given force in these “great societies.” First, the mandatory “roughly equal strength” of the members of the society politically speaking can be institutionalized by the cumulative force of equal protection of the laws, universal suffrage, proportional representation, and majority rule. The “full fruits of one's labor” principle is implemented in the first instance by marketplace allocations in proportion to each producer's marginal product. These market allocations are only legitimate prima facie, however, because corporate structures represent command economies internally; and the proceeds from the common endeavors of those within the organization are skewed by their very unequal power within the organization's decision procedures. That deviation from the “rough equality of strength” principle makes it not only permissible but a demand of justice that some of the collective goods created by the division of labor and economies of scale in such societies be allocated via progressive income and inheritance taxes to common overheads of infrastructure and to compensation for the unequally allocated costs of collectively valuable practices (in the form of, for example, unemployment insurance).
As for institutionalizing the equal access principle in the context of advanced industrial economies, Weale argues that this is best accomplished not by instantiating worker-owned enterprises, which suffer from several weaknesses. Instead, the best approximate embodiment of the equal access principle is the allocation of public resources to create an “equalization of human capital, so far as this is possible” (220). And that task is best accomplished through “high quality education available to all” (220) in conjunction with job training programs available to all who need them. In addition, welfare state programs such as social security and child care subsidies comport with the principles of democratic justice, so long as these are not redistributions from producers to nonproducers but rather a collectible scheme “of income smoothing across the life cycle” (206).
Advocates of other normative conceptions of democratic justice will find here claims to criticize, and many of these criticisms will have some traction. Disciples of Hayek will be skeptical about the propriety of taking economic allocative arrangements characteristic of a subset of relatively primitive economies to be applicable to larger and more developed societies. Nozickeans will challenge the propriety of placing constraints upon background inequalities that are not a product of rights violations. Rawlsians and luck-egalitarians will complain about the absence of principled constraints to correct for the effects of morally arbitrary brute luck, including unequal natural talents. Many may have humanitarian concerns about the apparent absence of any principled grounds for claims of need. Communitarians may well doubt the plausibility of supposing that a civic culture of democratic justice can be developed and sustained without an ethos of civic friendship. And there are multiple ways in which critics might challenge the analogical inferences Weale makes in imagining the structural equivalents of the core features of common-property regimes within “great societies.”
I shall not attempt to explore, much less to adjudicate, these disputes of judgment here. Instead I would recommend Weale's empirically derived model of democratic justice to those interested in this important topic as a thoughtful, credible, and valuably provocative theory worthy of their attention and considered response.
It may also be worth noting in conclusion that Weale's argument can be seen as providing a distinctive pathway to a theoretical model of justice that joins a family of conceptions of distributive justice occupying a middle ground between the polar deontologies of libertarian individualism and egalitarian communalism. This is a middle ground that incorporates and legitimizes a robust domain of private contractual allocations of goods and resources while also providing principled grounds for public redistributions of a subset of goods and resources necessary to sustain democratic civic equality and to provide the structures of opportunity and personal development required to make plausible the democratic aspiration to create what Benjamin Barber has termed an “aristocracy of everyone.” Illustrative members of this middle-ground family are Michael Walzer's social-democratic communitarianism (Spheres of Justice, Basic Books, 1983), A. K. Sen's capabilities-cultivation regime (The Idea of Justice, Harvard University Press, 2009), and Stuart White's neo-civic-republican conception of the mutual responsibilities of democratic citizens (The Civic Minimum, Oxford University Press, 2003). These theorists do not by any means speak with one voice but they do bear a Wittgensteinean “family resemblance” to each other. Now they have a new member of the extended family, this one of contractarian lineage.
