The common image of mid-twentieth-century ‘neo-Darwinism’, as portrayed in the classic works of Ernst Mayr and Will Provine and publicized by innumerable popular-science books, is of a bold reductionist programme with the ambition of unifying diverse scientific disciplines within a coherent framework. Across the relatively new fields of transmission genetics, population genetics and evolutionary biology, there spread broad agreement not only that natural selection is the central mechanism of evolutionary change, but that progressive, slow and continuous diversification of organisms characterizes both microevolution and macroevolution.
In the light of Richard Delisle's new book, however, this image needs revising. Delisle reveals neo-Darwinism as accommodating quite different positions about the mechanisms of evolutionary change – positions which, moreover, were packaged with incommensurable metaphysics and epistemologies. On Delisle's showing, the label ‘neo-Darwinism’ denotes not a single project but a complex set of different and irreducible broad programmes. Julian Huxley, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Bernhard Rensch, G.G. Simpson and Ernst Mayr had agendas bearing a family resemblance to each other, but nothing more; these men developed not a common enterprise derived from some necessary principles upon which everybody agreed, but something that might be visualized as a chain of overlapping differences and similarities. In sum, far from a coherent, clear and smooth ‘evolutionary synthesis’, neo-Darwinism was eclectic, variegated and pluralistic, encompassing diverse aims and implications.
The differences between individual neo-Darwinians are important, and are given full attention here. For some, it was the metaphysics that mattered. Within Julian Huxley's broad cosmological view – the upshot of a very eclectic philosophy which included among its sources Conwy Lloyd Morgan, Henri Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin – there was room for several processes beyond natural selection. For Huxley, the demonstration of universal progress in the cosmos – mirrored in an ascending Darwinian tree of life in which man's place was assured – was in any case far more important than the partitioning of responsibility among the different possible causes of evolutionary diversification. Dobzhansky followed a similar path. Like Bergson, he believed that evolution was a creative process; like Chardin, he held that such a process had a progressive directionality. However, in order to avoid the consequence of considering natural selection a teleological mechanism of organic improvement, Dobzhansky preferred to distinguish between the progressive and directed tree of life, on the one hand, and the blind and contingent mechanisms responsible for evolutionary changes on the other. But his attempts to reconcile these ideas left him with quite an intricate set of problems. Rensch was different again. Often overshadowed by his neo-Darwinian peers, Rensch shared in the progressivist enthusiasm, though within a different metaphysical context. With his Spinozan unitary ontology, his distinction between cladogenesis (taxonomical diversification) and anagenesis (phylogenetical development), and his references to Schopenhauer's idealism regarding the evolution of cognition, Rensch forged a synthesis that sought to transcend the old dichotomies of determinism and creativity, atomism and organicism, and contingency and directionality.
These metaphysical issues – of the progress of the cosmos, the ascending trend of life's tree and the problematic place of man within it – were not, however, the only philosophical issues that moved neo-Darwinian thinkers. Epistemic issues, as well as concerns about the scientific enterprise as such, were also in play, as the cases of George Simpson and Ernst Mayr well attest. Simpson rejected any notion of a teleological trend in evolution, defending a strictly mechanical and materialist epistemology. But in doing so, he left open the possibility that the riddle of the evolution of human intelligence might require the positing of a historical directionality which would effectively make man the trustee of his future and, as such, the crowning achievement of evolution. This seeming compromise between a meaningless process and meaningful human life threatened the coherence of the whole Simpson project. With the uncompromising Mayr, the extreme consequences of epistemological materialism became conspicuous. As he saw it, if we can recognize any progress throughout the tree of life, it is the effect of a completely blind, mechanical and deterministic evolutionary process. Progressivist metaphysics was abhorrent to him, not least, perhaps, because of his sympathies for some of the methodological prescriptions endorsed by the neo-positivist philosophers of the day (Delisle mentions the Vienna circle), who forbade speculating on issues clearly outside possible scientific verification.
One comes away from Delisle's book with a vivid impression that, for all their importance, Darwinism and Mendelism were but two elements in a much more diverse and complex discussion at mid-century about what we might usefully label ‘transformism’. As he rightly says, there was no ‘essence’ of neo-Darwinism – no necessary and sufficient criteria which might allow historians to pick out the ‘real’ neo-Darwinians. His analysis might have been strengthened by the addition of historical information regarding the context in which the thinkers studied here developed their ambitious philosophies. Likewise, it would have been good to learn more about the rationale behind the choice of individuals studied; it is not hard to think of other, equally important neo-Darwinians who have been largely excluded. Nevertheless, Les Philosophies du néo-darwinisme is a landmark work, not only for scholarship on modern evolutionary science and its intellectual contexts, but also for the general attempt to explore the connections between scientific theories and philosophical issues. Here is history and philosophy of biology with the big questions where they belong, fully in view.
