In the early 1990s and right after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (TEU), most books published on law and politics of the European Union fell into two categories. The first were either collections of articles, case-books, or descriptive-type books weighing heavily on the legal, political, and structural aspects of the community (see, for example, L. N. Brown and T. Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1995). The second category focused almost exclusively on the impact of economic integration and the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in that process. In this category, while some books focused directly on the jurisprudence and doctrinal impact of ECJ's case decisions on member states, others used existing theories and analyses of international relations to explain the role of the Court of Justice in the process of European integration. Some examples of the latter category of contributions include Renaud Dehouse's The European Court of Justice, 1998; Ann Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, and J. H. H. Weiler's The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence, 1998; and Karen Alter's Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Jurisprudence, 1995.

In Justice Contained, Lisa Conant takes an approach in examining the European Court of Justice that is radically different from that of previous scholars. She explores the interaction between the ECJ, law and politics, and the impact of the Court's own decisions tied to its effects and the implications of its rulings on those affected in the real world. She sets a bold course to challenge the proposition that an “activist” European Court of Justice has brought about pro-found policy and institutional change within EU member states. To that end, she examines the “scope of ECJ's authority” in European politics and its policymaking process. She questions how the Court contributed in taming sovereign states who previously were combatants in one of the deadliest wars of the twentieth century to accept its rulings, which undermined their control over sovereign regulatory regimes. Undeniably, Conant is intrigued by prospects of the ECJ, a centralized international institution claiming to exert influence over sovereign member states in the absence of any mechanism of coercion.

Underscoring a widely held view of ECJ's judicial activism, Conant argues that since the Court, as do domestic courts in liberal democracies, depends on the support of powerful organized interests to gain compliance of its rulings, its influence is not predicated on its “activist” rulings alone. For example, she posits that the ECJ exercises its influence beyond the courtroom largely through the efforts of member states and societal actors who come to support its decisions. This, she argues, explains the Court's influence, rather than its activism. Drawing on the wide array of existing scholarship on the United States Supreme Court, Conant depicts the limits that the ECJ and other tribunals have. In the eight chapters of this book, she illuminates these limitations and traces ECJ's decisional impact and effect. She does so in four case studies on “market competition and national competition” in the EU (see Chapters 4–7, pp. 96–212). In the last chapter, she anticipates and sums up the Court's legal interpretations that are likely to inspire major reforms.

Initially, Chapter 1 does more than set the agenda for the source and conditions of judicial power in the EU. It challenges the conventional view that the impact of ECJ can be attributed to the compelling legal and functional logic of its decisions to include the strategic accommodation of national interest and support for national courts (pp. 15–49). Chapter 2 establishes that broader policy effects of ECJ decisions are a function of the reaction of organized societal and institutional actors supporting legal claims. Conventional explanations, Conant maintains, place too much emphasis on the enforcement of many ECJ decisions by national courts, as well as on the difficulty that unanimous voting poses for overturning decisions through treaty revision. Drawing from Charles Epp's theory of “support structure for legal mobilization” in Rights Revolution (1998), she styles her study with the contention that judicial influence over major processes of reform relies on a much broader mobilization of pressure for policy change.

In Chapter 3, Conant argues that while the ECJ and its case law command respect in the EU, the operation of an effective supranational legal system does not necessarily lead to judicial control over policy outcome. This is the case because compliance with the Court's decisions cannot be equated with policy change. It is argued that existing accounts often treat innovative Court rulings as binding policy prescriptions. This, she contends, conflates the application of legal interpretation in particular cases with the adoption of general reforms. By exploring how legal institutions generate fragmented patterns of authority, this chapter identifies gaps between ECJ case law and policy processes within the EU and its member states (pp. 50–94).

In Chapters 4 and 5, Conant presents case studies demonstrating institutional constraints that characterize the European legal system. In Chapter 4, she establishes that the evolution of interests and mobilization of pressure associated with telecommunications liberalization contributed to a dramatic instance of reform. Furthermore, she demonstrates that while member states retained a substantial degree of control over the process of regulatory policymaking, the competing interests associated with liberalization foreclosed the capacity of national governments to either actively evade or passively accept legal obligations (p. 96). In Chapter 5, Conant chronicles the evolution of legal obligations by tracing the policy responses and competing interests connected to the mobilization of pressure and policy outcomes. She establishes that the concentration and intensity of interests affecting the liberation of electricity contributed to a political process that limited the scope of policy change (pp. 122–50).

Writing with a distinctive style, Conant joins those who argue that pressure groups and institutions contribute to judicial policy impact in both the EU and the United States. Her analysis, however, develops a general theoretical frame-work to explain the origins and consequences of variable pat-terns of legal and political mobilization. Her arguments contribute to an understanding of judicial power by assessing the type of mobilization that is likely to occur across issues and by tracing the views in which the mobilization of pressure mediates policy outcomes. The debate, she argues, addresses a common question, namely, whether courts can impose their decisions against the will of states and governing majorities.

Conant sums up Chapter 8 with a comparative analysis of judicial power, identifying the ECJ as an institution with greater similarities to domestic courts than to international organizations. She maintains that while specific constraints on judicial influence vary across polities, the procedures and formal competencies assigned to courts usually operate to check the scope of judicial control in all democratic systems. Summarily, Justice Contained advances a deeper and yet unique understanding of the ECJ's contributions to EU integration and the economics of litigation and reform. It demonstrates that institutional and political processes mediate judicial authority and argues that far from dictating policymaking in the EU, the ECJ acts in concert with other institutions.

The only shortcoming of the book lies perhaps with repetitiveness. However, scholars interested in comparative courts and judicial politics, especially the ECJ in the process of European integration, should not hesitate in reading this very interesting book. Faculty teaching graduate seminars in law and politics of the European Union will also find in it a suitable course addition.