The failure of the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to produce a consensus report exposed the profound and unresolved ideological dispute over narratives of the subprime mortgage crisis that began in 2007. Even naming this world event the “subprime mortgage crisis” is contested. Herman Schwartz and Daniel Immergluck offer two contrasting but complementary and valuable reference works on the recent bubble and blowup of our housing finance system.
Immergluck's meticulous survey retraces the history of our mixed public/private housing finance system. He argues that while the system was broadly successful in democratizing homeownership, it was flawed by racial exclusion and redlining. Before that problem could be solved, a parallel private high-risk finance system emerged from the deregulation of the 1980s, which produced the destructive boom and bust we have recently experienced. Foreclosed will serve as an essential sourcebook on the causes and effects of the subprime crisis.
Immergluck begins his history of the US home finance system in the nineteenth century with the emergence and growth of building and loan societies, followed by the entry of insurance companies and commercial banks into home lending. While the federal government began promoting homeownership in the early twentieth century, the real origins of the federal role in housing finance are to be found in the New Deal. The 1930s saw the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Those in turn brought us securitization, the thirty-year fixed-rate amortizing loan and mortgage insurance, all products of “a persistent role for government as an innovator, an investor, and a regulator” (p. 17).
The central role of government in the postwar home finance system consisted of two funding circuits: the savings and loans supported by the FHLB, and nondepository mortgage companies making FHA-insured loans and selling them to commercial banks, insurance companies, and Fannie Mae. Thus, prior to the 1980s, the federal government served as regulator, funder, and insurer, at least in part, of both funding circuits.
After detailing the history of the home finance system, Immergluck then turns to the intersection of race and mortgages. Here, in one of his more important contributions, he disentangles the struggles to end racial discrimination in home lending and promote community reinvestment (1970s and 1980s) from the emergence of high-risk subprime lending in the mid-1990s. While these two story arcs often find themselves conflated in crisis narratives that misleadingly equate efforts to promote inclusive home lending with the explosion of unsustainable subprime and alt-A mortgages, Immergluck convincingly debunks this conflation.
He then recounts the emergence and evolution of high-cost subprime lending, beginning with the first subprime refinance boom from 1992 to 1999, followed by the 2002–2007 boom in subprime purchase and equity extraction loans. The collapse of subprime in 2007 is attributed to various market failures, conflicts of interest, and a global capital push, i.e., a glut of savings from Asian economies and oil exporters in search of safe and profitable investments, the latter being the central subject of Schwartz's study. Following this discussion, Immergluck takes on the important and neglected task of assessing the economic and human costs of the foreclosure crisis, the second important contribution of this work. The two concluding chapters catalog the missed opportunities for various regulators to have prevented the crisis, and the author's recommendations for future policy aimed at preventing a recurrence while pursuing the goal of a fair and accessible housing finance system.
Both Schwartz and Immergluck see the subprime crisis as supply driven, in the sense that a glut of capital (identified by Schwartz as the export surpluses of other nations) was continually chasing safe and profitable investments, and found them in US mortgage-backed securities. While Immergluck's attention is focused on government investment, regulation, and subsidy, Schwartz's brief is to link the subprime bubble to its role in funneling world capital to American consumers and sustaining US world economic power.
Despite the title, Subprime Nation's primary inquiry is international. It centers around the paradox that US economic growth from 1990 to 2007 outpaced Europe and Japan while trade deficits mounted, but without constraining US growth or access to capital markets. The mortgage market became a transmission belt in the global economy, helping to recycle our trade deficits and sustain consumption-driven economic growth that consistently beat out our advanced economic rivals in Europe and Asia. The book is divided into chapters analyzing each component of this economic circuit, which evolved during the 1990 to 2007 boom (the “long 1990s”).
Schwartz contrasts the returns earned by the United States as an investor and lender overseas with the consistently lower returns paid to foreign investors on their US debt and equity holdings. This arbitrage, or carry trade, and the net positive returns that result, allowed us to borrow and spend continually for nearly two decades. Most importantly, the United States was unique among rich countries in being able to engage in this arbitrage, and in having a highly liquid mortgage market. Thus did the United States maintain differentially faster economic growth, and hence international power, at least until the bubble burst.
Schwartz describes the virtuous cycle that allowed US economic growth to outpace other advanced economies during the past two decades. American imports of cheap manufactured goods generated export surpluses for developing countries, especially in Asia. The resulting export surpluses of those countries were recycled into savings reinvested in US securities paying relatively low returns, including Treasury and mortgage-backed securities. The borrowing that these securities represented, especially the home equity borrowing and home purchasing, drove American consumption that in turn drove the continuing growth in imports of cheap manufactured goods. Finally, the cycle could be maintained because not all the US economic growth translated into consumption; US-based multinational corporations recycled their profits into overseas investments in developing economies, and earned significantly greater returns on their equity investments in both Europe and Asia than American consumers paid for their housing finance borrowing.
The housing finance system drove differential economic growth not so much because it broadened access to homeownership but because it made home equity more liquid. Consumers who owned homes were enabled to increase their consumption through a cycle of mortgage refinancing that (a) freed up cash for spending and (b) drove up the prices of homes, permitting more and more consumers with homes to do the same thing. This process was self-limiting, because the higher home prices rose, the smaller the share of the population that could afford to service the ever-increasing home debt. Nontraditional loans, like interest-only and negative-amortizing products that came to dominate the mortgage market in the last two years before the crisis, only delayed the inevitable exhaustion of this economic machine.
The cycle feeding US consumption reached its limits when mortgage borrowers and home prices reached their limits.
Schwartz's explanation accounts for only one of the four major sources of capital that fueled the subprime lending boom and US consumption during the long 1990s: foreign investors. At the peak of the subprime bubble in June of 2007, foreign investors held a bit more than a quarter of outstanding non-agency mortgage-backed securities. The government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs), banks, and US institutional investors essentially accounted for the rest. Even if we add GSE mortgage bond issuances (not strictly speaking subprime) to the mix, the picture does not change substantially. Foreign investors in US mortgage bonds helped the bubble along, but were by no means the majority lenders to our subprime borrowers. Schwartz's argument is less an explanation of the subprime bubble than of its connections to United States economic growth in this period.
Schwartz rejects the hollowed-out economy theory according to which US economic power is not sustainable given an economy that trades the elimination of middle-income manufacturing jobs for lower consumer prices resulting from import of cheap goods, i.e., an economy in which mill workers who used to make twenty-five dollars per hour now work in retail or service jobs at ten dollars per hour but can survive on the low prices at Wal-Mart. While he convincingly demonstrates how international investment arbitrage allowed our economy to live on borrowed funds for a decade and a half, his prediction and prescription for the future is ultimately unsatisfying. He concludes that a new cycle of US growth will require rebalancing our highly unequal income distribution, to give the middle class the income and purchasing power to borrow and spend again. At the same time, he recognizes that the elites who benefit the most from international capital flows, including the wealthy holders of most equity investments, are unlikely to acquiesce in redistributive taxation, unionization, or other equalizing policies.
Schwartz is surprisingly optimistic about the ability of the American economy to enter a new growth cycle as we come out of the subprime crisis. While it is certainly true that the dollar remains the international reserve currency, that Europe and Japan seem unlikely to overtake US growth levels, and that overseas holders of Treasury and mortgage securities have few realistic alternatives to continually funding our government and trade deficits, it is less clear how our economy can generate demand with both consumers and government at all levels overwhelmed with servicing the debts accumulated during the boom. Schwartz looks to US equity holdings in emerging markets, and the demand for US exports generated by the growth we produced in those markets, i.e., the hope that Brazilian and Chinese workers will ramp up purchases of iPhones and jet skis, and that our multinationals will repatriate profits made from their operations in those countries. While his analysis of the sources of past global economic power is enlightening, it is not an entirely satisfactory forecast for the future. If the sources of US power are exhausted as a result of the crisis, it is hard to see what the future sources of US economic power will be. Indeed, as the crisis unfolded, the United States was not in a position to stop the collapse unilaterally, but had to engage in multilateral fiscal and monetary interventions that may well presage a period of multipolar international political and economic power.
