According to the doctrine of eternal generation, the Father eternally begets the Son. Or, more plainly, the eternal Son depends on the Father for his existence, yet the Son is neither created nor made. The doctrine, enshrined in the Creed of Nicaea (325 ce), has been affirmed by Christians for nearly 1,700 years and defended by theological heavyweights such as Athanasius, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Barth. Recently, however, the doctrine has been attacked from an unlikely corner of Christendom, by otherwise orthodox evangelical Protestants. Eternal generation, its detractors contend, is both philosophically and theologically suspect. My aim in this article is to defend the doctrine of eternal generation by proposing a possible model that avoids standard philosophical and theological objections. Eternal generation, I argue, can be understood as a form of essential dependence. To say that the Son is begotten of the Father is just to say that the Son essentially depends on the Father. The essence of the Son involves the Father, but not vice versa.
I begin by presenting the doctrine of eternal generation and by rehearsing standard philosophical and theological objections to the doctrine. Three bad models of eternal generation in terms of causal dependence, modal dependence, and grounding are then briefly entertained in order to disclose desiderata for a philosophical model of eternal generation. I then develop my essential dependence model of eternal generation, demonstrating its virtues and how it avoids the standard philosophical and theological objections. I close by noting how the essential dependence model can be extended to the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit.
Before we get started, a comment on my method and a disclaimer. As an exercise in Christian philosophical theology, my approach will be generally philosophical, but I will also take it for granted that the witness of Scripture, comprised of the Old and New Testaments, carries evidential weight. Indeed, I will cite portions of Scripture in support of my essential dependence model of eternal generation. I will not argue for the evidential value of Scripture here, however; it is simply assumed.Footnote 1 Furthermore, note well that my essential dependence model of eternal generation is just that: a possible model – not a mandate. It is one possible and, I contend, plausible model that aims to show the doctrine of eternal generation's philosophical coherence.
The doctrine
The doctrine of eternal generation is part of the classical Christian doctrine of the Trinity. On the classical Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the one God eternally exists as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. God is one ousia (substance or essence) in three hypostases (persons). The Athanasian Creed puts it this way: ‘So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; and yet they are not three Gods, but one God.’ Most of the ink spilt on the doctrine of the Trinity by contemporary analytic philosophers has focused on how the one God is Triune, what has been dubbed the ‘threeness–oneness problem’ or the ‘logical problem’ of the Trinity.Footnote 2 Difficulties surrounding the doctrine of eternal generation are largely independent from the threeness–oneness problem, and so I will bracket the problem for present purposes.
A central component of the classical Christian doctrine of the Trinity is the divine processions or the eternal relations of origin in God. The Persons are related to one another by eternal relations of origin: the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, and the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father (and the Son or through the Son). As this parenthetical remark suggests, controversy arises over the Son's involvement in the eternal procession of the Spirit. Whether the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father alone (single procession), from the Father and the Son (double procession), or from the Father through the Son is a vexed matter, dividing the Eastern and Western Churches. This controversy, the ‘filioque controversy’, while intimately related to the one concerning eternal generation, falls outside our present focus. My essential dependence model of eternal generation naturally extends to the eternal procession of the Spirit; however, I will return to the filioque controversy only briefly when discussing the virtues of the essential dependence model.
According to the doctrine of eternal generation, the Father eternally begets the Son. The Creed of Nicaea (325 ce), the earliest creed to affirm eternal generation, expresses the doctrine six times and in six different ways: ‘And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father as only begotten, that is, from the essence of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, of the same essence as the Father.’ The ancient Church, responding to Arians wishing to deny the equality of the Father and the Son, placed two critical constraints on the relation of eternal begetting. First, the relation between the Father and the Son is not one of creation. The Father does not create the Son. The relation between the Father and the Son must be importantly different from the relation between the Father and creation. The Son is ‘begotten, not made’. Second, the Son's begetting is neither contingent nor against the Father's will. The Father eternally begets the Son ‘of necessity’. Just as the Son cannot exist without the Father, the Father cannot exist without the Son; they are mutually inseparable. Necessarily, the Father exists if and only if the Son exists. The eternal begetting of the Son is not against the Father's will in the sense that the Father is not under some external compulsion. He willingly affirms the begetting of the Son. Operating within these two constraints, we can formulate a minimal statement of the doctrine of eternal generation as follows:
Eternal Generation
Necessarily, the Son depends on the Father for his existence, yet the Son exists eternally.
Whatever it means for the Father to eternally beget the Son, it means at least this.Footnote 3 The Son depends on the Father for his existence or, equivalently, the Son exists in virtue of the Father. When human parents beget a son, the son (causally) depends on his parents for his existence; similarly, when the Father begets the Son, the Son in some way depends on the Father for his existence. Moreover, the Son exists eternally. There was never a time at which he was not, and there never will be. At minimum, then, eternal generation requires eternal existential dependence.
Before moving on to the standard objections to eternal generation, I'd like to register three reasons why the doctrine matters. First, for the Church Fathers, the doctrine of eternal generation ensures the equality, unity, and distinctness of the Father and the Son. Just as a human father begets a fully human son, the Father's begetting of the Son is supposed to ensure that the Son is fully divine. Like Father, like Son. Eternal generation also ensures the unity of the Father and the Son because they are eternally bound together by a relation of origin. And the doctrine ensures the distinctness of the Father and the Son because they have different personal characteristics. Unbegottenness belongs to the Father; begottenness belongs to the Son.Footnote 4 Second, Christians have creedally affirmed the doctrine for nearly 1,700 years. Surely the tested and established consensus of the Church should not be hastily dismissed. Third (and perhaps most importantly), the doctrine of eternal generation underlies the gospel. The Son is begotten in history because he is begotten in eternity. The Father's sending of the Son in the incarnation reflects the Father's eternal begetting of the Son, and so eternal generation underlies the good news of salvation by grace through faith in Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son.Footnote 5
Objections
Detractors of eternal generation level three main objections against the doctrine. According to these detractors, the doctrine of eternal generation has no biblical warrant, is unintelligible, and entails subordinationism. The first of these objections, the no biblical warrant objection, is the most commonly voiced. The doctrine of eternal generation allegedly finds no support in Scripture. Bruce Ware (Reference Ware2005), for instance, when addressing the divine processions, writes, ‘The conceptions of both the “eternal begetting of the Son” and “eternal procession of the Spirit” seem to me highly speculative and not grounded in biblical teaching.’Footnote 6 To undermine ostensible biblical support for the doctrine, detractors typically argue that the verses in question either refer to the incarnation or rely on a mistranslation of the Greek term monogen ē s, which ought to be translated as ‘only’ or ‘unique’ rather than ‘only begotten’.
The second main objection is that eternal generation is unintelligible. Those who wield the unintelligibility objection claim that the doctrine is meaningless or philosophically incoherent. Millard Erickson (Reference Erickson2009) speaks for many:
Philosophically, [eternal generation] has been deemed by many to draw a distinction that does not make sense: to insist on some sort of eternal derivation of being from the Father, or the Father being eternally the source of the subsistence of the other two persons, yet in such a way that they are not at all created by him.Footnote 7
Eternal generation is philosophically incoherent, at worst, and unclear, at best. In this way, the doctrine's unintelligibility renders it untenable.
The third and most sophisticated objection against eternal generation is the subordinationism objection. Detractors such as William Lane Craig (Reference Craig2003) and Keith Yandell (Reference Yandell, McCall and Rea2009; Reference Yandell2014) contend that the doctrine of eternal generation entails subordinationism, the view that the Son is not fully divine. In particular, the Son lacks two divine attributes: necessary existence and self-existence (aseity). The Son lacks necessary existence because the Son, as Craig puts it, ‘becomes an effect contingent upon the Father’.Footnote 8 Depending on the Father for his existence might seem to impinge on the Son's necessary existence. Moreover, the Son lacks self-existence or aseity because he exists in virtue of the Father. Aseity, according to Yandell (Reference Yandell2014), is ‘the property existing without being caused by anything else’.Footnote 9 On the doctrine of eternal generation, he contends, the Father acts and the Son results, which implies that the Son causally depends on the Father. Since the Son causally depends on the Father, the Son lacks aseity. Instead, the Son possesses what he calls ‘ “next door to aseity” – aseity regarding every being but one’.Footnote 10 Craig (Reference Craig2003) states the worry more generally, without reference to causal dependence: ‘Even if this eternal procession takes place necessarily and apart from the Father's will, the Son is less than the Father because the Father alone exists a se, whereas the Son exists through another (ab alio).’Footnote 11 Craig's suggestion seems to be that if the Son exists in virtue of the Father in any sense (causal or otherwise), then the Son lacks aseity.Footnote 12 Granted that aseity and necessary existence are divine attributes, it follows that the Son is less than fully divine. Eternal generation thus entails subordinationism.
These three objections to the doctrine of eternal generation pose a considerable but not insurmountable challenge. The essential dependence model, I will argue in due course, avoids both the unintelligibility objection and the subordinationism objection. While important, the no biblical warrant objection is more exegetical in nature (as opposed to the philosophical or theological nature of the other two objections) and has been thoroughly addressed by others.Footnote 13 Consequently, I leave the no biblical warrant objection to the exegetes.
Bad models
To set the stage for my essential dependence model of eternal generation, it will be instructive to look quickly at three bad models: a causal dependence model, a modal dependence model, and a grounding model. My criticisms of these models are by no means intended to be conclusive.Footnote 14 Their primary value for our purposes lies in revealing several desiderata for a philosophical model of eternal generation that will be used later to evaluate the essential dependence model.
On a causal dependence model of eternal generation, eternal generation is a form of causation. In its most basic form:
Causal Dependence Model
The Son is eternally begotten of the Father =df. Necessarily, the Father causes the Son to exist eternally.
To say that the Father eternally begets the Son is just to say that necessarily, the Father causes the Son to exist eternally. Problems with a causal dependence model arise immediately. The most serious problem concerns the Son's aseity. Recall that aseity, as defined by Yandell, is the property of existing without being caused by anything else. If the Father causes the Son to exist, then the Son lacks aseity and so is not fully divine. In this way a causal dependence model seems to entail subordinationism.Footnote 15 Furthermore, causation is widely (though not unanimously) regarded to be diachronic. The cause always precedes the effect in time. If the Father causes the Son to exist, then there was a time when the Son was not – that is, a time before the Son existed. But the Son exists eternally, so the Son cannot causally depend on the Father. Similarly, causation is typically thought to relate events, not persons. The Father and the Son, as persons, are not suitable relata for causation.Footnote 16 A causal dependence model of eternal generation, then, appears beleaguered from the start.
On a modal dependence model of eternal generation, eternal generation is a form of modal existential dependence. To say that the Father begets the Son is just to say that the Son modally existentially depends on the Father.
Modal Dependence Model
The Son is eternally begotten of the Father =df. Necessarily, the Son exists only if the Father exists, and the Son exists eternally.
One problem with this model of eternal generation is that modal existential dependence is not asymmetric. The modal dependence model entails that the Son eternally begets the Father. Necessarily, the Father exists only if the Son exists, and the Father exists eternally. The Father satisfies the definiens, not only the Son, resulting in the Father and the Son eternally begetting each other. However, eternal generation is supposed to be asymmetric: the Father eternally begets the Son, but not vice versa. Another closely related problem is that this model generates spurious eternal generation. For example, consider any necessary existent, say, the number 2. Necessarily, the Son exists only if the number 2 exists, and the Son exists eternally. It follows then that the number 2 eternally begets the Son, which is false. Modal existential dependence is too coarse-grained to preclude such unwanted eternal generation. The modal dependence model looks doomed from the start.
Perhaps more promising is a grounding model of eternal generation. While complete consensus on grounding is impossible to come by, grounding is generally taken to be an asymmetric relation of non-causal dependence.Footnote 17 Putative examples of grounding include the relation between sets and their members, truths and their truthmakers, and determinate and determinable properties.Footnote 18 Grounding is widely regarded to be a necessary relation. That is to say, it is metaphysically necessary that if the grounds are present, then the grounded is present.Footnote 19 According to a grounding model of eternal generation:
Grounding Model
The Son is eternally begotten of the Father =df. The Father grounds the Son.
Although a grounding model largely avoids the problems that plague causal dependence and modal dependence models, it does have its own drawbacks. The first drawback is that – unlike causation and modal dependence – the very notion of grounding is extremely controversial. A number of philosophers reject the grounding relation, deriding it as useless and unintelligible.Footnote 20 As far as detractors of eternal generation are concerned, a grounding model simply seems to swap one unintelligible relation for another unintelligible relation. A second drawback is that grounding, at least according to some, is a type of causation. Grounding just is metaphysical causation.Footnote 21 If this is right, then a grounding model inherits the same subordination charge facing a causal dependence model. Because the Father metaphysically causes the Son to exist, the Son lacks aseity and so is not fully divine.Footnote 22 The third drawback is that a grounding model cannot account for the difference between eternal generation and eternal procession. Generation and procession hold between different relata on a grounding model: the Father grounds the Son in the case of eternal generation, while the Father (and the Son) grounds the Holy Spirit in the case of eternal procession. Yet there is no qualitative difference between the relations of generation and procession as relations; they are both just grounding relations. On a grounding model, the relations of generation and procession differ in name only.Footnote 23
The principal benefit deriving from the consideration of these bad models is that they disclose desiderata for a good model of eternal generation. A satisfactory model of eternal generation will involve a dependence relation possessing at least the following features:
• not diachronic
• can relate persons
• non-causal
• asymmetric
• precludes spurious eternal generation
• accounts for the difference between generation and procession.
The essential dependence model of eternal generation, I maintain, satisfies all six of the above desiderata. It is to the essential dependence model that we now turn.
The essential dependence model
Before diving into the details of the essential dependence model of eternal generation, some remarks about the account of essence that I presuppose are necessary. Accounts of essence generally divide into modal accounts, which elucidate essence in terms of de re modality, and definitional accounts, which elucidate essence in terms of real definition. Following Kit Fine (Reference Fine1994), David Oderberg (Reference Oderberg2007), and E. J. Lowe (Reference Lowe2008; Reference Lowe2011), I believe that modal accounts of essence are deeply flawed in that they are insufficiently fine-grained and inappropriately reify essences. Instead, I favour a definitional account of essence on which essence is taken as primitive. That is to say, essence cannot be analysed in modal or any other terms. The essence of an entity is simply what the entity is, or what it is to be the entity. As John Locke, channelling Aristotle, puts it, the essence of a thing is ‘the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is’.Footnote 24 The essence of an entity is not a further entity (e.g. a collection of properties) mysteriously related to the entity in question. Entities have essences. Essences are not themselves entities.Footnote 25
Although primitive, essences are expressed by real definitions. A real definition is a proposition representing the essence of an entity. In a real definition, the definiens will characterize the essence of the definiendum; the definiens will characterize what the definiendum is, or what it is to be the definiendum.Footnote 26 Real definitions typically take the form <To be x is to be y>, where ‘x’ is the definiendum and ‘y’ is the definiens. For example, consider the Aristotelian real definition of a human being: <To be a human being is to be a rational animal>.Footnote 27 The definiendum represents an entity (a human being) and the definiens likewise represents an entity (a rational animal). Notice that the definiens specifies both a genus and a differentia or differentiating feature. In this case the definiens specifies the genus, animal, and the differentia, rationality. When combined, the genus and differentia characterize the essence of the definiendum. What it is to be a human being is just to be a rational animal; that's the essence of humanity, on the Aristotelian view.
Essential dependence, like essence, is best understood in terms of real definition. Essential dependence holds when the essence of an entity involves another entity; one entity is part of what it is to be another entity.Footnote 28 Or, in terms of real definition, essential dependence holds when one entity is a constituent of a real definition of another entity.Footnote 29 Essential dependence comes in two main varieties: rigid and generic. Where ‘y’ and ‘x’ represent entities from any ontological category, rigid essential dependence may be formulated as follows:
Rigid Essential Dependence
y rigidly essentially depends on x =df. x is a constituent of a real definition of y.
For example, non-empty sets rigidly essentially depend on their members. Take Obama and his singleton. {Obama} rigidly essentially depends on Obama. The essence of {Obama} involves Obama in such a way that Obama is a constituent of a real definition of {Obama}. To be {Obama} is to be a collection containing Obama as its sole member that satisfies the axioms of set theory. Obama is part of what is to be {Obama}. In cases of generic essential dependence, one entity essentially depends on a type or sort of entity that satisfies predicate F, namely, some F or other (call these Fs):Footnote 30
Generic Essential Dependence
y generically essentially depends on x =df. (i) Fs are constituents of a real definition of y, and (ii) x satisfies F.
Consider the relation between determinate and determinable properties. The blueness of my sweater generically essentially depends on the navyness of my sweater. For my sweater to be blue is for it to be some determinate shade of blue or other, and navy is some determinate shade of blue or other. Being some determinate shade of blue or other is part of what it is to be blue, and navy satisfies the relevant predicate.
On my essential dependence model of eternal generation, eternal generation is a form of rigid essential dependence. To say that the Son is begotten of the Father is just to say that the Son rigidly essentially depends on the Father. More formally:
Essential Dependence Model
The Son is eternally begotten of the Father =df. The Father is a constituent of a real definition of the Son, and the Son exists eternally.
According to the essential dependence model, the essence of the Son involves the Father. The Father is part of what the Son is, or what it is to be the Son. A real definition of the Son will be of the form <To be the Son is to be the divine person who _______ the Father>, where the blank is to be filled in by some description characterizing the Son's essence. Note that the Son, like the Father and the Spirit, falls under the genus divine person; once filled in, the blank will help specify the differentia, what differentiates the Son from the other Persons.
To fill out the real definition of the Son, we will consult Scripture. Of all the descriptions of the Son in the Old and New Testaments, it seems to me that the following verses characterize the essence of the Son, or what it is to be the Son:Footnote 31
He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation. (Colossians 1:15) who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped . . . (Philippians 2:6) He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature . . . (Hebrews 1:3) ‘Christ, who is the image of God. (2 Corinthians 4:4)
Without getting into exegetical tangles about these excerpts, these verses suggest that to be the Son is to be the divine person who is the image of the Father. The essence of the Son involves being the image of the Father; being the image of the Father is part of what it is to be the Son. In this way, the Father is a constituent of a real definition of the Son, and so the Son essentially depends on the Father.
For the essential dependence model to succeed, the Father cannot essentially depend on the Son. A real definition of the Father must be found in which the Son is not a constituent, so as to show that the essence of the Father does not involve the Son. The form of such a real definition will be <To be the Father is to be the divine person _______>, where the blank is to be filled in by some description characterizing the Father's essence. Once again we consult Scripture to fill out the real definition of the Father:
For it was fitting that he, for whom and by whom all things exist . . . (Hebrews 2:10) For from him and through him and to him are all things. (Romans 11:36) [Y]et for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist. (1 Corinthians 8:6)
Taken together, these verses suggest that to be the Father is to be the divine person on whom all things ultimately depend.Footnote 32 All things, created or not, ultimately depend on the Father. Creation causally depends on the Father, but not all things depend on the Father causally. Most notably, the Son does not causally depend on the Father, yet the Son still depends on the Father. That is, the Son rigidly essentially depends on the Father. To be the Father is to be the divine person on whom all things ultimately depend, causally or otherwise.Footnote 33
Virtues
The essential dependence model, as just described, satisfies all six desiderata listed above. To begin the checklist, essential dependence is not diachronic. It's not as if my sweater instantiates blueness a split second after it instantiates navyness; my sweater instantiates these properties simultaneously. Insofar as essential dependence is in time, it is synchronic.Footnote 34 As a result, essential dependence is perfectly compatible with eternal existence. Furthermore, essential dependence is non-causal. Unlike causation, essential dependence is non-diachronic and can relate entities from any ontological category. Essential dependence is an internal relation, whereas causation is widely assumed to be an external relation.
Essential dependence can also relate persons because, as just mentioned, it can relate entities from any ontological category. Generally when essential dependence relates particulars, it relates particulars that instantiate distinct universals. In the case of Obama and his singleton, for example, Obama and {Obama} instantiate distinct kinds (the kind human and the kind set, respectively). The essential dependence relation between the Father and the Son, however, relates entities that instantiate a single kind, namely, the kind divine. This makes the essential dependence relation between the Father and the Son unusual, but this is exactly what we should expect. Eternal generation is unusual! It's not something you see every day.Footnote 35
Moreover, essential dependence between the Father and the Son can be reasonably regarded as asymmetric. Notice that the Son is not a constituent of the proposed real definition of the Father. As a result, the Father does not rigidly essentially depend on the Son.Footnote 36 It might be thought, however, that the Father generically essentially depends on the Son. Recall that in cases of generic essential dependence, one entity essentially depends on a type or sort of entity that satisfies predicate F, namely, some F or other (or Fs):
y generically essentially depends on x if (i) Fs are constituents of a real definition of y, and (ii) x satisfies F.
On the proposed real definition of the Father, to be the Father is to be the divine person on whom all things ultimately depend. If we let ‘F’ be all things (i.e. some thing or other), then the Father generically essentially depends on every entity whatsoever, including the Son. The Son rigidly essentially depends on the Father, and the Father generically essentially depends on the Son. Despite this deliverance, one could insist that the desired asymmetry between the Father and the Son has been achieved. After all, the Son rigidly essentially depends on the Father, but not vice versa. Others might remain unconvinced, arguing that the desired asymmetry requires that the Father can essentially depend on the Son in no way. The best reply for proponents of the essential dependence model at this point, I think, is to maintain that all things (i.e. some thing or other) cannot serve as the predicate F. This is because all things is not a type or sort of entity in the sense required by the definition of generic essential dependence. In fact, all things is not an entity at all. It is the most general ontological category, the category of entities or beings, to which everything whatever belongs; thus, the category of entities is not a type or sort of entity in the sense required for generic essential dependence. It cannot serve as the predicate F. Therefore, the Father cannot generically essentially depend on the Son – or anything else. The Son essentially depends on the Father, but the Father in no way essentially depends on the Son.
The fifth desideratum on the checklist is precluding spurious eternal generation. Compared to modal dependence, essential dependence is much more fine-grained. Essential dependence precludes the Son from eternally begetting the Father, as we have just seen, and it similarly precludes necessary existents like the number 2 from eternally begetting the Son. In order for the number 2 to eternally beget the Son on the essential dependence model, the Son must essentially depend on the number 2. But the number 2 is not a constituent of the proposed real definition of the Son (or any other plausible real definition of the Son), and so the Son does not essentially depend on the number 2. The essential dependence model in this way precludes spurious eternal generation.Footnote 37
Having satisfied five desiderata, all that remains is to demonstrate how my essential dependence model avoids the unintelligibility and subordinationism objections. (How the model satisfies the sixth and final desiderata, accounting for the difference between generation and procession, cannot be addressed until later when we extend the model to the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit.) First, the unintelligibility objection. Though plenty of philosophers reject the notion of essential dependence, they do not typically reject it on the grounds that it is unintelligible. Essential dependence has been widely regarded as meaningful and philosophically coherent for millennia, dating back to Aristotle, at least. And if essential dependence is meaningful and philosophically coherent in other cases, there is no principled reason why it should not be meaningful and philosophically coherent in this case. So the unintelligibility objection poses no credible threat to the essential dependence model of eternal generation.
The essential dependence model likewise escapes the subordinationism objection. According to the subordinationism objection, the doctrine of eternal generation entails that the Son lacks the divine attributes of necessary existence and aseity. Yet essential dependence is perfectly compatible with necessary existence. To illustrate, consider the number 2 and its singleton. The number 2 necessarily exists and so does its singleton, {2}. Nevertheless, {2} essentially depends on the number 2, since the number 2 is a constituent of a real definition of {2}. Essential dependence is thus entirely consistent with the Son's necessary existence. Similarly, essential dependence poses no threat to the Son's aseity. Yandell (Reference Yandell2014) defines aseity in causal terms, as the property of existing without being caused by anything else. Essential dependence, though, in no way implies that the Father causes the Son to exist. Essential dependence is a form of non-causal dependence and is thereby consistent with the aseity of the Son.
Detractors like Craig (Reference Craig2003) might reply that aseity should be defined more generally in terms of dependence. Aseity is not the property of existing without being caused by anything else; rather, it is the property of existing without depending on anything else.Footnote 38 The Son essentially depends on the Father, so it follows that the Son does not truly possess aseity. At best, the Son possesses ‘next door to aseity’ – aseity regarding every being but one. In rejoinder, proponents of the essential dependence model may invoke the accepted distinction between the divine essence (ousia) and the person (hypostasis) of the Son. By invoking this distinction, we can maintain that the Son possesses aseity with respect to the divine essence, but not with respect to his person. Here we can emulate John Calvin:
Therefore we say that the deity in an absolute sense exists of itself; whence likewise we confess that the Son since he is God, exists of himself, but not in respect of his Person; indeed, since he is the Son, we say that he exists from the Father. Thus his essence is without beginning; while the beginning of his person is God himself.Footnote 39
Because the Son possesses aseity with respect to the divine essence, he possesses something greater than ‘next door to aseity’. Admittedly, the Son does not possess aseity with respect to his person, as opposed to the Father, who possesses aseity both with respect to the divine essence and with respect to his person. But it is not at all clear that this difference entails that the Son is not fully divine. Detractors must supply additional arguments to show why the Son must possess aseity with respect to his person – not just aseity with respect to the divine essence – in order to qualify as fully divine.
If it remains mysterious how one can claim that the Son possesses aseity with respect to the divine essence, but not with respect to his person, there is another familiar distinction that proponents of the essential dependence model can invoke in order to illuminate this claim. Although I have been speaking as if ‘essence’ is univocal, the term can be used to refer to an entity's individual essence or its general essence. Every individual object is an instance of some kind K. ‘If X is something of kind K,’ Lowe explains, ‘then we may say that X's general essence is what it is to be a K, while X's individual essence is what it is to be the individual of kind K that X is, as opposed to any other individual of that kind.’Footnote 40 For example, Barack Obama is an instance of the kind human. Obama's general essence is what it is to be a human, while Obama's individual essence is what it is to be Obama, as opposed to some other human. The individual/general essence distinction similarly applies to the Son. The Son is an instance of the kind divine. The Son's general essence is what it is to be a deity or what it is to be a divine person, while the Son's individual essence is what it is to be the Son, as opposed to some other divine person.
Now, the Son's general essence does not involve the Father. If one were to propose a real definition of the Son's general essence (i.e. what it is to be a divine person), the Father would not be a constituent of this real definition. With respect to the Son's general essence, therefore, the Son does not essentially depend on the Father. In contrast, the Son's individual essence does involve the Father. If one were to propose a real definition of the Son's individual essence (i.e. what it is to be the Son, as opposed to some other divine person), the Father would be a constituent of this real definition.Footnote 41 With respect to the Son's individual essence, therefore, the Son essentially depends on the Father. Putting these two conclusions together, we can say that the Son essentially depends on the Father with respect to his individual essence, but not with respect to his general essence. And if we grant the more general definition of aseity in terms of dependence, this implies that the Son possesses aseity with respect to his general essence, but not with respect to his individual essence. Or, in other words, the Son possesses aseity with respect to the divine essence, but not with respect to his person.
It's worth noting that the individual/general essence distinction also defuses a likely objection to the essential dependence model: the different essences objection. Some might argue that the essential dependence model entails that the Father and the Son are not homoousious – that is, they do not share the same divine essence. After all, the Father and the Son have different real definitions, so they must have different divine essences. According to the classical doctrine of the Trinity, however, there is only one divine essence (ousia); thus, the essential dependence model contradicts the classical doctrine of the Trinity.Footnote 42
The problem with the different essences objection is that it confuses individual essences with general essences. In general, every person has an individual essence, and if two persons are numerically distinct, then they must have distinct individual essences (what it is to be this person and what it is to be that person). On the classical doctrine of the Trinity, the Persons are numerically distinct. Because the Father and the Son are numerically distinct persons, they must have distinct individual essences. If the Father and the Son have distinct individual essences, then they must have different individual essences. (Otherwise, the distinctness of the Father and the Son would be arbitrary, since there would be no difference in their individual essences to account for their distinctness.) The Father's individual essence is what it is to be the Father, as opposed to the Son or the Spirit, and the Son's individual essence is what it is to be the Son, as opposed to the Father or the Spirit. Thus, the Father and the Son must have different individual essences, on pain of denying that the Father and the Son are numerically distinct persons. Now, according to the essential dependence model, the Father and the Son have different real definitions. But these real definitions represent the Father's and the Son's individual essences – not their general essence. It reveals no flaw in the essential dependence model to say that it entails that the Father and the Son have different individual essences, for the classical doctrine of the Trinity itself entails that they have different individual essences. If anything, this is a virtue of the essential dependence model! What would be a flaw in the essential dependence model is if it entailed that the Father and the Son have different general essences. But the model does not entail this. If we were to propose real definitions representing the general essence of the Father and the general essence of the Son, they would be identical. Both real definitions would represent what it is to be a divine person. Therefore, the Father and the Son share the same general essence – that is to say, they share the same divine essence. On the essential dependence model, then, there are two individual essences (bracketing the Spirit) but one general or divine essence, so the different essences objection falls flat.
In closing, I'd like to highlight one final virtue of the essential dependence model of eternal generation – namely, its natural extension to the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit. On an essential dependence model of the eternal procession of the Spirit, eternal procession is a form of rigid essential dependence. To say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father is just to say that the Spirit essentially depends on the Father. Compared to the real definition of the Son, filling out the real definition of the Spirit will be more difficult, given the filioque controversy and the fact that Scripture has far less to say about the Spirit. Here's a rough first stab at a real definition of the Spirit: <To be the Spirit is to be the divine person who is the breath of _______>. How one fills in the blank will depend on one's position on the filioque. Suppose we are single processionists for a moment, filling in the blank with ‘the Father’. Even though both the Son and Spirit rigidly essentially depend on the Father, a qualitative difference persists between generation and procession because the Son and the Spirit have different real definitions. The Son is the image of the Father; the Spirit is the breath of the Father. Generation is ‘imagey’, and procession is ‘breathy’, as it were. The precise nature of the difference between being the image of the Father and being the breath of the Father will probably remain a mystery. Nonetheless, this qualitative difference accounts for the difference between eternal generation and eternal procession, thereby satisfying the sixth and final desiderata.
Yet perhaps the greatest virtue of the essential dependence model is its compatibility with any position on the filioque controversy. Single processionists can fill in the above blank with ‘the Father’ and double processionists with ‘the Father and the Son’. My own preference lies in the middle. If we fill in the blank with ‘the Son’, then the Spirit essentially depends on the Son. The Son, in turn, essentially depends on the Father. Assuming that essential dependence is transitive, it follows that the Spirit essentially depends on the Father through the Son – that is to say, the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. While I'm not sanguine about settling the filioque controversy with this model, I think it does show great promise for a complete essential dependence model of the divine processions in God.
The essential dependence model of eternal generation, I have argued, possesses several virtues and avoids standard philosophical and theological objections to the doctrine of eternal generation. In the end, the doctrine of eternal generation, like all other doctrines, stands or falls with Scripture. My model shows that eternal generation is philosophically coherent and theologically sound. If there are good reasons to reject eternal generation (and I don't think there are), they won't be philosophical.Footnote 43
