1. Introduction

All of the participants in the 2006 Vancouver symposium called “Towards a More Political Philosophy of Science” agreed that philosophers of science are well advised to pay more attention to the relationship between scientific ideas and the sociopolitical context in which they originate and are applied. John Beatty's talk on the widely differing attitudes of twentieth-century philosophers toward Darwinism underlined the general point. However, as in almost all areas of philosophy, unanimity quickly disappears when we delve into the details. Granted that routine philosophizing about scientific theories and methodology can be socially useful: philosophical clarifications of the concepts of design, complexity, race, and sexual dimorphism have certainly played an important role in current controversies. Granted that critiques of modeling and statistical techniques in climatology, brain science, and medical research can head off premature conclusions that could have very harmful consequences. But is the philosopher of science obligated to keep issues of social justice and welfare in mind when choosing his or her area of research? (Should we all “tithe” or make charitable contributions in our philosophical lives?) And as we work on philosophical problems that impact on society, should we favor positions that are deemed politically progressive?

I will return briefly to these more controversial questions at the end of this essay. Let us begin by looking at the specific points made in the papers before us.

2. Success Bias in Funded Research

In “Politics, Method, and Medical Research,” James Brown (Reference Brown2008, in this issue) vividly describes dysfunctional aspects of scientific research that is funded by pharmaceutical companies. Some problems are intrinsic: We should not expect private corporations answering to shareholders to invest in research on the efficacy of lifestyle changes or the potency of vitamins or materials that can’t be patented. Neither should we be surprised at their emphasis on “me too” drugs when patents on older drugs are about to expire. But the data Brown presents on the strong correlation between the results of supposedly scientifically respectable scientific research and the funding of that research are shocking! I think that even the most cynical among us would have believed that the scientific institutions of peer review and personal integrity (especially when graduate students are watching!) would have moderated the inevitable temptations posed by conflicts of interest.

As an example of the problem, Brown cites one study of 107 articles in which all of the published results were favorable to the company funding the research. In another study, 96% of the positive reports on calcium channel blockers had industry ties; only 37% of the unfavorable reports had a financial connection. Brown presents this as an empirical finding that the present funding system is distorting research. Just as science itself taught us about the importance of placebos or rinsing test tubes with distilled water three times, so these studies indicate that conflicts of interest can seriously distort scientific results.

Citing the discouraging results of efforts by Catherine DeAngelis, the editor of JAMA, even to require authors to disclose full information about sources of their funding and other relevant financial matters, Brown concludes that regulations are unlikely to solve the problem and calls for socialized medical research as a natural extension of socialized medicine, a system which most developed countries find to be both just and practical.

Brown's case study surely deals with a phenomenon that should be of great concern to citizens and scientists alike. As such, it certainly deserves the attention of any public intellectual, but do philosophers of science have any special skills or expertise that can be brought to bear on this problem and its solution? Like Brown, I think philosophy of science can be very relevant. However, the results of such analyses may differ from his!

3. Alternative Solutions

The empirical results he summarizes certainly seem to show the corrupting effects of funding on research, but philosophers of science are especially well situated to ask questions about possible alternative hypotheses, and when we look more closely we indeed find there may be other factors at play. For example, letters to the editor and other articles in JAMA (e.g., Friedberg Reference Friedberg1999; Sawka Reference Sawka and Thabane2003) mention other relevant circumstances: journals are sometimes reluctant to print results that show no difference between the efficacy of two procedures. Furthermore, medical studies that are large enough to yield statistically significant results are expensive, so drug companies may not even undertake them unless they have preliminary data or other reasons to believe that the outcome will be positive to their marketing concerns. Either of these partial explanations of the shocking data that Brown cites suggest that the problem would be mitigated by the attempts that are already under way to require drug companies to register experiments as soon as they begin so that the public can find out about studies that were never completed or never published.

As for Brown's proposed solution to the admittedly problematic status of research undertaken by pharmaceutical companies, can philosophy of science once again provide some insights? Brown candidly admits that he doesn’t have a general theory about which aspects of society work best under market forces and which require state supervision. He says public education works well (although some might argue that private schools and universities provide an important innovative leadership role), but no one wants government to get into the restaurant business. Given the sorry state of medical research in the market sector, it looks to him like nationalization is the way to go. In evaluating Brown's conclusion, Popper's doctrine of piecemeal social engineering (Reference Popper1945) may be helpful. Popper argues that when we lack a good theory of how a complicated system works and when a lot is at stake if it fails to function, the best and the safest way to study it is by introducing small changes and monitoring the results. (Of course we don’t need Popper in order to realize that at least in the United States we are unlikely to switch overnight to a system of socialized medical research!) At this point it looks like political philosophy, as opposed to philosophy of science, might be an excellent source of expertise. And indeed in her remarks at the Vancouver meeting Helen Longino made a plea for philosophers of science to draw more on resources in political philosophy. I would add economics and behavioral decision theory to that list.

4. Doing Well by Doing Good

Janet Kourany's paper “Philosophy of Science: A Subject with a Great Future” (Reference Kourany2008, in this issue) argues that although the interests of philosophers of science are no longer as narrow as those of their logical positivist forebears, nevertheless there is still a systematic neglect of the ethical aspects of scientific inquiry. She suggests that philosophers of science could help strengthen the rather vague and incomplete codes of ethics that have been adopted by scientific associations. I am in broad agreement with both points, but it is probably more useful here to articulate some points of disagreement.

First, as to the history of our discipline, I’m quite sure that a statistical study of papers in Philosophy of Science would support Kourany's thesis. Yet, as I believe she would grant, there have been some very important exceptions: Michael Ruse's testimony at the McClean v. Arkansas trial in 1981 about whether “scientific” creationism was a science (Ruse Reference Ruse1981); Philip Kitcher's Reference Kitcher1985 critique of sociobiology; David Hull's Reference Hull1988 book on the role of credit and competition in science. Each of these initiatives generated extended philosophical discussions. From the very beginnings of our discipline, philosophers of science have analyzed the flawed reasoning and social harms inherent in pseudoscience. One of my earliest recollections of a PSA meeting was a session on the so-called Velikovsky affair. (One issue, as I recall, was whether it was legitimate to boycott his publisher, Macmillan.) These few examples—and there are many others—illustrate how philosophers of science can simultaneously do good philosophy and contribute directly to the social welfare.

Kourany might well point out that none of the above examples require us philosophers of science to move out of our comfort zone and tackle ethical issues head on. They all still center on the internal, cognitive aspects of science. But scientists today are struggling with issues where ethical or political considerations may conflict with the efficient search for elegant scientific explanations—embryonic stem cell research is a paradigm case. Our present codes of scientific ethics try to provide guidance on the use of human and animal subjects, conflicts of interest, ownership of scientific data and discoveries, authorship, and interactions with sources of scientific funding. Since these dilemmas are now an integral part of scientific life, shouldn’t professional philosophers of science be involved in analyzing them and proposing remedies?

5. Proper Role for Codes of Ethics

Although religion professors played a prominent role at the beginning, research ethics has now become an independent discipline, with its own journals and meetings (Whitesides Reference Whitesides2004). Because many of the jobs available are in medical schools, issues in biomedical ethics often take center stage. But philosophers of science could undoubtedly make contributions to research ethics. To give a simple example, in the professional ethics literature, plagiarism is usually said to be wrong primarily because it is a form of stealing. Yet science prides itself on producing knowledge that is freely available to the public. What exactly is being stolen? Well, one can point to the importance of awarding credit fairly. But more important than taking credit is taking responsibility for the integrity of the results. That a plagiarist cannot do. Furthermore, in science there is the additional possibility that if two papers present the same experimental data, one might mistakenly conclude that the experiment has been replicated. (For a current example, see Aldhous Reference Aldhous and Reich2007.) Thus, one could hope that a philosopher of science would come up with a more sophisticated ethical analysis of why plagiarism is harmful as well as pointing out why the scientific practice of doing literature searches makes plagiarism less unlikely to go undetected in science.

Yet to the extent that philosophers of science share the scientist's quest for clear solutions to well-defined problems, they may find research in the ethics area frustrating. The controversy over federal funding of stem cell research raises the old conundrum of the moral status of so-called nascent life. But as Scott Gilbert has argued (Reference Gilbert2006), the details of developmental biology really don’t provide much guidance here. Can the philosopher of science really be expected to have any uniquely valuable expertise to bring to bear? Controversies about the moral status of animals, on the other hand, do seem open to input from specialists on animal consciousness. Unless philosophers of science want to take up research ethics or technology assessment as a second career, they will have to be selective in their choice of research problems.

Kourany believes that scientific research would become more socially responsible if the present codes of ethics were made more detailed. For example, she faults the Chemist's Code of Conduct for leaving completely undefined what their responsibilities “to avoid pollution and to protect the environment” really amount to, especially since they are also enjoined “to protect the legitimate interests of their employers.” She calls on philosophers of science to help scientists put some real teeth into these codes. Although I favor a wider discussion and clarification of the civic responsibilities of scientists (as well as those of journalists, politicians, and university professors), I would actually oppose efforts to make professional ethics codes more binding.

The grounds for my reluctance can be illustrated by the troubling example of the institutional review boards (IRBs) that govern all research on human subjects that takes place in universities, regardless of whether it is funded. For some years the American Association of University Professors has been a forum for discontent with the chilling effect of the IRB regulations, especially on research in the social sciences. (Recently a story about these concerns made the front page of the New York Times; see Cohen Reference Cohen2007.) The board members are undoubtedly well intentioned, but their insistence on overseeing every detail of the research and being advised of the most minor changes in protocols has not only had unfortunate effects on the choice of research topics, but also, as one social scientist remarked, “made low-grade liars of us all.” I have attended workshops intended to raise scientists’ awareness of ethical issues that turned into sharing of stratagems for getting your research proposal past the IRB!

The social issues surrounding chemical research into genetically modified foods, nanotechnology, or chemical weapons are much too complicated to be arbitrated by a code of ethics. Neither do philosophers occupy any privileged position from which to sort things out, although I would hope that any op-ed page columns they write would be unusually cogent and wise! More promising than refining ethics codes might be an educational approach whereby future scientists (and lay citizens) are given an opportunity to discuss actual episodes of scientific practice where ethical issues loom large. At present certain federal training grants mandate formal instruction in research ethics. Scientists are sometimes at a loss to know how to lead such courses. Here is a good opportunity for philosophers of science to be of service (and strengthen ties with science departments).

6. Sagesse Oblige

In a 1968 essay, “The Moral Responsibility of the Scientist” (reprinted in Popper Reference Popper and Notturno1994), Popper introduced the doctrine of sagesse oblige, whereby special obligations accrue to scientists because of their profession. He writes, “Formerly, the pure scientist had only one responsibility beyond those which everyone has—that is to search for truth [Popper Reference Popper and Notturno1994, 121]. … [But now] since the natural scientist has become inextricably involved in the application of science, he should consider it one of his special obligations to foresee as far as possible the unintended consequences of his work and to draw attention, from the very beginning, to those which we should strive to avoid” (Popper Reference Popper and Notturno1994, 129).

If we apply the doctrine of sagesse oblige to philosophers of science, we find that their primary special obligation is to analyze and evaluate the inferences and methods that are used in various areas of science. Are scientists reporting possible sources of error? Are they taking alternative explanations seriously? Are there hidden inconsistencies between mutually relevant theories? It is no surprise that philosophers of science have concentrated on the cognitive core of science. But just as Popper noted that today scientists have additional responsibilities because they are “inextricably involved in the application of science,” so philosophers of science should extend their domain of interest to include the effects of science on society.

However, I would end on a note of caution. Popper exhorts scientists to foresee bad consequences “as far as possible,” but his whole approach to science emphasizes the fallibility of scientific predictions. When we take on the job of making moral and/or political pronouncements about the possible outcomes of various scenarios involving science, we must recognize that there are now two sources of uncertainty—the empirical fallibility always present in science and the uncertainty inherent in all judgments of value.

Philosophers of science are well aware of the first limitation; as we extend our involvement into the second we will have to fight against the temptations of political correctness and moral certitude lest we lose our reputation for being cautious and critical.