Tulia Falleti has written a thoughtful account of the attempts of reformers to decentralize the state's delivery of public services. We learn that decentralization can have very different consequences depending, to a large extent, on the sequence by which the process unfolds. Her book represents a novel, rigorous, and careful approach to an extraordinarily important topic. It is not the last word on the many complicated aspects of decentralization, but it is a must-read for those interested in that phenomenon, as well as in institutional reform more generally.
Falleti's approach will feel instantly familiar to comparativists. The author follows in a rich tradition of political scientists who have taken historical institutionalist approaches to macropolitical change. Hers is a systematic approach to history in which she analyzes a handful of carefully selected cases using a rather pluralistic set of methods and operating at a highly conceptual level. Think Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier's Shaping the Political Arena (1991) or Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens's Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992). Like other political scientists who have taken Gabriel Almond's “historical cure,” Falleti embarks on a decidedly systematic treatment of historical material, which is less about anecdotes, agency, and microprocesses and more about the dynamics of macrostructural variables told through the comparison of a small set of comparable settings. Of course, a hallmark of work in the historical institutionalist tradition is the attention to sequencing, and this is the predominant theme in Falleti's account. Indeed, if Paul Pierson's Politics in Time (2004) reminds us of the importance of path dependence and increasing returns, Falleti's book represents a demonstration of the way in which one might test such ideas empirically. Indeed, her particular approach—something she introduces and labels as the “comparative sequential method”—may well represent an advance in the technology of historical institutionalism.
The author's question—whether decentralization puts more power in the hands of subnational actors—may lead some to scratch their heads. The answer is “yes,” by definition, is it not? After all, Falleti sometimes even defines decentralization with these very outcomes, as the “set of policies, electoral reforms, or constitutional reforms that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government” (p. 34).
Any tautology recedes as we come to understand the many and varied forms that decentralization reforms take—some of these reforms result in real power shifts to the periphery; some do not. So, we should more properly understand her study as a question of whether the same policy outputs lead to the same outcomes.
Falleti analyzes four cases—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico—that are central to the discussion of decentralization in Latin America, and probably to comparative politics more generally. To her great credit, her research design is sensitive to issues of analytic equivalence. The cases—the largest countries in Latin America, all with similar political and economic conditions—are comparable enough. But what is more, within each case she focuses on a comparable period that she identifies as the postdevelopment phase—a phase in which states have moved from heterodox, interventionist policies to market-driven approaches. There is something appealing about this sampling strategy. For one, decentralization is widely thought to be a consequence, or at least incidental to, the transition to democracy and markets. Yet these four cases all experience comparable periods of economic and political liberalization, but with marked contrasts in decentralization outcomes.
The author's chosen cases share many attributes and, indeed, are viewed to have undergone similar processes of decentralization. So one wonders how much variance there really is in the change of the balance of power between center and periphery. How do we know how much a state has really decentralized? In measuring this outcome, Falleti adopts a multidimensional approach that distinguishes among economic resources, legal authority, and organizational capacity. These dimensions roughly parallel her classification of reform types (as we will see), but—perhaps curiously—Falleti does not seem to intend them necessarily to map onto one another. Or, at least, she does not connect one classification system to the other. She develops several indicators for each dimension, and thus builds a fairly nuanced portrait of decentralization outcomes. Still, in her discussion of changes, she aggregates the dimensions into a single metric of decentralization. By this measure, Brazil and Colombia experience relatively large increases in decentralization, compared with only small-to-moderate increases in Argentina and Mexico, respectively.
As the rather filigreed causal story unfolds, we learn that sequence matters enormously. Critical to Falleti's explanation is her classification of the type of reform. She distinguishes among administrative, fiscal, and political reforms. One may quibble about whether her notion of administrative elements overlaps with that of political (constitutional) ones, but overall, hers is a useful classification and, very likely, a contribution unto itself. Indeed, one suspects that the conceptualization will serve other researchers well, both in theory building and empirical testing. Decentralization does seem to exhibit real, not just theoretical, dimensionality. Anyone familiar with gripes from subnational actors about unfunded mandates (devolved administrative functions without devolved revenue) will know that these dimensions do not strictly covary. In her four cases, we learn that the degrees of decentralization across these dimensions can be strikingly orthogonal to one another at any given moment. Moreover, it turns out that the sequence by which states enact these reforms on any given dimension matters.
As Falleti sees it, subnational and national actors are involved in an extended process of negotiating their respective responsibilities and their degree of authority. In such a protracted bargaining situation, gaining leverage early can mean substantial gains in subsequent negotiations. For national actors, according to the author, this means that the preferred sequence of reforms starts with administrative ones, followed by fiscal and finally political reforms. The idea is that shifting bureaucratic responsibilities to subnational units before providing them with either funds or political bases of power weakens them in the next round of negotiations. Conversely, subnational actors would prefer political/constitutional power first, which would endow them with leverage in subsequent negotiations over resources, and finally in those over administrative reforms. So the order for preferences over sequence is AFP (administrative–fiscal–political) for nationals and PFA (political-fiscal-administrative) for subnationals, letters that political actors battling over power should think about committing to memory.
Falleti's logic is compelling but, it would seem, rests on a number of assumptions, which probably deserve more scrutiny. One is that the reforms are indeed taken sequentially and, relatedly, that they are independent of one another. One might think that at least administrative and fiscal decisions might be negotiated jointly in some states. A second assumption is that the decisions reached in an initial stage (say, those over fiscal reforms) are relatively stable. If they are easily revoked or revised, then presumed gains (and thus leverage) may be fleeting and illusory, and her sequential logic unravels. A third has to do with the choice of starting points in her analysis, a concern about which she is quite conscious. Specifically, if sequences and history matter, then one wonders about whether the previous century and a half of battles between the center and periphery have shaped the outcomes she examines. Falleti's empirical work in each of the country chapters provides a strong sense of comfort about these assumptions, but still, one cannot help wonder about them.
Another dimension to the book stems from the fact that the author does not treat the sequence of decentralization reforms as exogenous. Rather, she views the choice of the initial type of reform as a function of the constellation of partisan and “territorial” alliances in a country. Here, we see that Falleti views actors as having not only strong partisan and ideological positions, which intuition suggests should affect policymaking, but also strong preferences about the balance of power between center and periphery. Whether and the degree to which the governing coalition is unified with respect to its territorial interests will, in part, determine which type of decentralization reform it initiates in the first stage of reforms. For example, a governing coalition split by party but unified in their desire for centralized power will prefer to start with an administrative reform, while a coalition split by party but uniformly pro-subnational will prefer fiscal or political reform to start. Other combinations of preferences result in other paths.
The empirical component of the book is really quite extraordinary in the care with which Falleti treats a broad and diverse collection of data. For each of the four cases, she presents a comprehensive set of statistical evidence, historical documentation, and excerpts and insights from around 150 in-depth interviews with relevant actors. The work shows a great deal of care and expertise that, in the end, renders the evidence remarkably compelling. Some chapters are more thorough then others, but there is not a weak case in the group.
In general, Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America impresses on many levels. It is a thoroughly incisive look at an important phenomenon and one that deserves a careful read.
