Robert Higgs's life work has been dedicated to analyzing the reasons for the persistence of erroneous explanations for economic ills and the application of remedies which only make them worse.

This collection of essays looks first at the Great Contraction of 1929–33 and its long aftermath, one of the specific crises identified in his 1987 milestone work Crisis and Leviathan. It has the flavour of a dual quest: first, to dislodge from their pride of place in the popular imagination the propaganda myths surrounding the origins of prosperity and war-making as a cure for economic problems; second, to offer a holistic approach to the interpretation of economic history, in clear opposition to many professional mainstream econometricians whose esoteric, laboratory-style experiments have led them into mere scientism, entirely detached from the complex needs and purposefulness of human action and experience.

The overwhelming popular response to crisis and difficulty, especially economic crisis, is to look for someone to do something, anything, to alleviate it and drive the economy out of depression. In America, since the mid-nineteenth century, that someone has increasingly been government, often in the person of the President. In the popular imagination both are vested with power greater – and are therefore seen as being more effective – than any other group, sector or individual in society.

FDR's electoral appeal in 1932 rested on the belief, conveyed by his powerful oratory, that he would indeed be the deus ex machina for all of America's pressing hardships. But he and his New Deal policy team turned out to be no wiser at finding the right solutions than the common citizen and, as Higgs argues, actually perpetuated and worsened the crisis by their actions.

The later chapters of this book document corruption in the military–industrial–congressional complex and focus on the workings of the militarized economy. The emphasis here is both empirical and philosophical; practical examples of the distortions which arise when military procurement is wedded to politicians' constituency interests support two key arguments: that the defense contracting system implemented during and immediately after World War II – the national security state – conditioned the economic climate throughout the Cold War (and is still with us today), and that the influencing of public opinion in favor of military spending is itself a weapon used by the defense policymakers.

A reading of the distressingly true facts and arguments in these essays raises fundamental questions as to what can be done: how to find and apply the necessary correctives to the popular and scholarly willingness to remain emotionally invested in erroneous explanations, and how to avoid responding to social and economic problems by waging destructive war. This most recent addition to Robert Higgs's body of work is an invaluable guide in that further quest.