This is a book about the different roles shame plays in politics. Shame is not a virtue or a vice, argues Tarnopolsky, but a complex social phenomenon, beneficial or harmful depending on how it is employed. Shame is harmful when used to degrade and demoralize people for their personal characteristics. The attempt to label homosexuals “perverts” is one example; the countereffort on the part of homosexuals to label their oppressors “prudes” is another. In both cases, one group stigmatizes another, begetting social barriers and injustices. But shame can be beneficial to communities if used in ways that respect the individuality and dignity of its target. Shame is the exposure of a gap between the real and ideal in a person or group, between what we are and what we might become. As such it can lead to improvement. Tarnopolsky's question is whether and how we might devise democratic institutions and practices that facilitate respectful shame while avoiding the shame that “isolates certain groups from the public sphere” (8). Her method is to plumb Plato's Gorgias for insights. She also surveys some neuroscientific literature on shame (chap. 6), but this is only to corroborate what she learns from Plato.
The use of Plato's Gorgias is risky because the desire to make it relevant may lead to a misreading of the text. But Tarnopolsky is aware of this danger and navigates it well (8–21). She in fact demonstrates that the Gorgias is fundamentally about the way shame can be used in democratic as well as philosophic discourse. And by taking issue with the view that Plato was an “antidemocrat,” she is able to explore the possibility that the dialogue offers intimations about healthy democratic rhetoric. Plato, she argues, saw that the democratic ideal of frank speech (parrhēsia) overlapped considerably with the philosophical method of elenchus (dialectic debate), especially in demanding honesty on the part of the speaker and a willingness to risk shame. Plato thus tried to promote the ideal of parrhēsia so that the corrupting tendencies of Periclean imperialism could be confronted and transformed (13, 89–113). But this is not all she sees Plato doing.
According to Tarnopolsky, Plato offers a profound meditation on the structure of shame ranging from its preconditions to the kinds of reactions it evokes. Moreover, Plato portrays three approaches to rhetoric, distinguishable by the way they incorporate shame, or, more accurately, manage the painfulness that attends shame. Tarnopolsky labels these flattering shame, Socratic respectful shame, and Platonic respectful shame. Flattering shame is simply flattery, the kind of rhetoric practiced by Polus and Callicles. The label is misleading insofar as flatterers conspire with their audiences to avoid shame and shaming altogether, but Tarnopolsky wants to emphasize that the desire to flatter actually arises from one's keen awareness of the pain that attends shame and that a pained audience is not a happy one. The flatterer therefore tailors his speech to what he knows will please. Tarnopolsky is excellent in showing the political perils of flattery. When public discourse aims only at the pleasant, it renders the pursuit of the good impossible (100, 162–66).
Socratic respectful shame is Socratic elenchus. A speaker (Socrates) shames his interlocutor by showing him that he is not exactly who he thinks he is. It is respectful because it aims at helping to expose conflicts in the soul not for the purpose of stigmatizing but for mutual exploration and growth. The problem, however, is that Socratic elenchus often fails to elicit a positive response, either because it is so blunt and unpleasant that people simply want to escape, or because the twists and turns of argument are too hard to remember, or because it destroys self-understanding without offering a clear alternative or vision of how to rebuild. Here is where Platonic respectful shame comes in. Tarnopolsky argues that Plato discerned the limitations of his teacher's approach and attempted to remedy them. He thus combined some of the vivid and pleasant features of Gorgias's rhetoric with the shaming quality of Socratic elenchus in order to produce more consistently positive responses. Tarnopolsky locates this hybrid Platonic rhetoric in the myth that Plato puts in Socrates's mouth at the end of the dialogue.
An assessment of Tarnopolsky's work must touch on several levels since the book itself is multitiered. On the level of contemporary theory, she contributes significantly to the debate about the proper role of shame in political life. Other voices in that debate have included John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and Bernard Williams (to name only a few); and Tarnopolsky engages their work admirably. Her contribution lies in analyzing the “shame situation” into discrete parts and distinguishing the three types of rhetoric. It also lies in her forceful demonstration of what to avoid. Neither the effort to stigmatize nor the effort to flatter employs shame constructively. Something more like the Socratic or, better still, the Platonic approach holds out more promise. But Tarnopolsky does not say much about where or how this should be instituted. One gathers she would like citizens to be more willing to speak frankly in ways that put certain people to shame, while remaining sensitive to the fact that shame is painful and thus trying to soften the blow. Perhaps this softening could be accomplished by supplying an image (as in Plato's myth) of a possible future, or by trying to stress common ground even in the act of criticism (167–69). But one is left unsure exactly what she envisions.
As a piece of Platonic interpretation, the work is exceptionally fine. Tarnopolsky is eclectic in her approach, as comfortable mapping out an argument as explaining the relevance of literary structure and dramatic detail. As a result she is able to illuminate and explain many puzzling features of the Gorgias. One aspect of the argument that may leave some readers unsatisfied is the lack of support for her claim that one of Plato's purposes in the Gorgias is to respectfully shame Socrates by redressing flaws in his method. The claim depends upon two assumptions, neither of which is critically examined. One is that we can neatly separate the voice of Socrates from the voice of Plato in any given dialogue; the other is that we can date the dialogues chronologically in order of composition and so make speculations about Plato's intellectual development. That the myth qua myth represents Plato's “transitional-period” improvement upon his teacher's method is doubtful. Xenophon portrays Socrates using myth with an incorrigible student in Memorabilia 2.1.21–34. The speech of the Laws in the Crito similarly contains mythical-soteriological elements, though the Crito is thought to be “early” and therefore Socratic rather than Platonic.
But Tarnopolsky's main thesis does not really require an assertion about Plato's intention of correcting Socrates. Take away this claim and she can still argue that the Gorgias distinguishes three types of rhetoric and their relationship to shame. And the study would still be one of the best analyses of the Gorgias we have. Everyone who reads this will learn something from Tarnopolsky—either about the way Socrates's refutations work, or about the psychological makeup of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, or about the way parrhēsia serves to connect this dialogue to democratic Athens. Moreover, I regard Tarnopolsky's analysis of the myth at the end of the Gorgias as the most illuminating to date. She seems literally to have “cracked the code” by noticing how the myth both embodies Socratic elenchus and demonstrates the importance of shame.
