A response to “The Case against Conscription of Organs for Transplantation” by Walter Glannon (CQ 17(3)) and “In Defense of Routine Recovery of Cadaveric Organs: A Response to Walter Glannon” by Aaron Spital and James S. Taylor (CQ 17(3))
In 2006 I published an article with an intentionally narrow focus; I attempted to give a clear argument concerning the moral status of organ procurement—not any particular procurement strategy, but for our moral basis for procurement itself.Footnote 1 Although certainly not the only attempt ever made at this issue, the argument was unique insofar as it provided a simple, point-by-point expression of the basic premises in support of a moral obligation to release one's organs upon death. The basic premises are as follows:
Moral presumption: All of us have an obligation to do what we can to save recognizably endangered lives when doing so is possible without risking anything of significant value to us.
P1: Saving a life is a good that is worthy of pursuit, as long as the means are ethically acceptable.
P2: The use of organ transplantation is a medically and ethically appropriate means to saving a life.
P3: Given the current state of technology, those who await organ transplantation must rely on others to achieve a transplant.
P4: The demand for organs is high, and transplantable organs are vital to the patients who need them.
P5: While families may, dead persons themselves have no embodied countervailing interests that could trump the vital interests of potential transplant patients.
Limiting condition: Although some demands on us would require the loss of a significant good in order to be fulfilled, relinquishing cadaveric organs requires no such loss.
Conclusion: Given the basic moral assumption as well as the stated premises and conditions concerning organ transplantation and procurement, upon our deaths each of us has a moral obligation to release our organs for transplantation.Footnote 2
With a more robust expression of and rationale for my argument provided in the earlier article, I take the above argument as successful, offering the moral ground for any future considerations about procurement strategies. No doubt, there may be parts of the argument that others find curious or even dubious. The moral presumption concerning what we owe others, it should be noted, is held by philosophers of many different theoretical stripes—deontologists, utilitarians, and pragmatists alike.Footnote 3 Further, although I take premises P1, P2, and P3 as uncontroversial, P2 may need further argument (not provided here) given the amount of resources (biological, monetary, and human) required to accomplish transplants. P4 is currently uncontroversial, though with the ever-changing nature of medical and transplant technologies—organs developed out of stem cells and artificial technologies on the one hand, better medical practices that stop organ failures on the other—demand may one day reduce for all we know, and thus may push us to reconsider some issues in transplantation. It is premise P5, then, that may cause the strongest doubts to arise. In this light, it should be noted that no obligation can be held in isolation from other moral claims. The moral obligation identified in my argument must still compete, at times, with other pressing obligations and other morally valuable considerations. In the case of a moral obligation to release one's organs, some do make concurrent claims that the dead have significant interests to be considered. However, I would argue that most refusals to release organs are not based on countervailing claims. Even Orthodox Judaism's reluctance to release is not a directly countervailing claim—that is, a claim that organ release is immoral—but is primarily a claim that “brain death” is not, in fact, death. Importantly, the limiting condition focuses the argument squarely on cadaveric donations. Other premises would need to be marshaled in order to make a case that live “donations” are obligatory.Footnote 4 Finally, the conclusion follows: Upon our deaths each of us has a moral obligation to release our organs for transplantation. As such, any procurement strategies must demonstrate serious moral consideration of this obligation.
Since at least the early 1990s, Aaron Spital has been publishing about his concern for the shortage of transplantable organs. Beginning in the mid-1990s, he began calling for alternative strategies to procure organs—first offering “mandated choice,” then suggesting a greater use of living donors, and finally arguing for conscripting organs to help close the gap between need and availability of organs.Footnote 5 In subsequent works, Spital and his co-authors have continued the call for conscription, based primarily on consequentialist reasoning concerning the benefit of bringing organs into the transplant pool versus burdens of forced release on families of the dead.Footnote 6 In support of his position, he cites Dukeminier and Sanders’ utilitarian account approvingly.Footnote 7 As he and James S. Taylor suggest: “Because saving lives is much more important than minimizing emotional distress, and because more lives would be saved under routine recovery than are saved under opting-in, we believe that the former policy is clearly superior to the latter.”Footnote 8 Theirs is a compelling argument. I argue below, however, that Spital's approach, developing a public policy strategy as the consequence of a utilitarian moral calculus is not sufficiently nuanced in either approach or outcome. Be that as it may, however, in 2007, Spital and Taylor cited my moral argument as evidence of support for this strategy.Footnote 9
As a “Perspectives” piece in the summer 2008 issue of Cambridge Quarterly, Walter Glannon, concerned that conscription obliterates choice, argues that Spital's position fails in at least two ways. Glannon states that Spital's position undermines the physician's duty to his/her immediate patient; further, conscription threatens to affect negatively the timing and meaning of death itself.Footnote 10 On the one hand, Glannon argues that “requiring consent from patients and families of noncompetent patients regarding critical care obligates physicians to separate decisions about end-of-life care from decisions about organ procurement.”Footnote 11 A related “deontological constraint” is further articulated in Glannon's concern that “the needs of those in end-stage organ failure are urgent and should be met, but not by disregarding families’ emotional distress and how they deal with grief from the death of a spouse, sibling, son, or daughter.”Footnote 12 Here, then, we can see clearly the contrast between Glannon's and Spital's moral concerns—that is, the traditional split is evidenced between utilitarian and deontological viewpoints—one attempting to maximize benefits at least cost, whereas the other is championing respect for personal choices and other related considerations. After making his case, Glannon concludes that although required removal of organs would not succeed within the prevailing social attitudes toward conscription, some headway might be made on the procurement front if we began to promote a “communitarian obligation” to release organs at death. For Glannon, promoting this obligation arises from the assumption that people “benefited from . . . social goods while alive.”Footnote 13 Given his concern for retaining choice, however, this may seem a surprising statement because any moral obligation is a claim that no other morally acceptable option is available—choice is undone by obligation, save for choosing to be immoral.Footnote 14 Further, for this obligation, Glannon, like Spital and Taylor, cites my work supportively.Footnote 15
How is it, then, that these two conflicting positions both turn to the argument for a moral obligation as positive and significant? I suspect, in part, this is because both Glannon and Spital correctly recognize the force of such an argument while possibly misunderstanding the consequences of it. In what follows, I try to parse these recognitions and misunderstandings in order to argue that in light of our moral obligation to release organs upon death within a Western, liberal democratic culture, the correct procurement strategy for public policy is an opt-out model.
As I stated above, Spital's arguments to date have been focused primarily on identifying the best procurement model, arguing that conscriptionFootnote 16 is morally superior to other strategies. That is, his has been primarily a kind of cost–benefit analysis of different strategies given the seriousness of the problem at hand—namely, people who need organs to survive are not getting them. Again, this is a serious concern, and his is a compelling account, placing a “greater value on maximizing recovery of organs than on respect for autonomy.”Footnote 17 The primary reason for this weighing is Spital's overall motivation to close the gap between need and supply. That is, Spital begins not from a philosophical concern about whether organ procurement is primarily a charitable or obligatory act but from the practical and pressing question—what is the best way to close the gap? This priority, although noble, sets a particular course for the issue that does not always account well for all the important moral considerations—for example, by starting from a concern about the procurement gap, Spital quickly eliminates “choice”-based strategies because they reduce procurement numbers. He and Taylor even argue that “presumed consent” and “opting out” models fail precisely because “life-saving organs are and will continue to be lost because of refusals.Footnote 18 Unfortunately, taking this course of reasoning is precisely what makes people of Glannon's ilk all the more suspicious of utilitarian-based procurement arguments. The fear is that the rush to recover organs will occur without respecting fundamental moral issues such as personal autonomy and consent. As such, Spital's argument is not an adequate response to Glannon's concern for a “deontological constraint” on the acts of healthcare personnel. In fact, the two arguments simply talk past each other.
And lest we think that all of these wranglings about moral perspective and argument are small matter, indeed, some very practical issues turn on what moral grounding is put forth for the act of procurement itself. Stepping back to the prior philosophical concern about how best to characterize morally acts of procurement, we can easily see, for example, that if the best moral rationale concluded that organs are personal property (an argument that, if successful, would be “prior” to a utilitarian calculus—even one that accepted the “property” argument), then market based and charity, not a conscription, strategies for procurement would be contenders. Again, though, if my argument is correct, neither the market nor charity models would do because neither treats the release of organs as a moral obligation.Footnote 19 I believe it is in this vein—namely, a concern for wider moral support—that Spital and Taylor cite my argument as supportive of their position,Footnote 20 and surely, theirs is a model that would contend given my argument. However, as I noted, the moral obligation I argue for is not one easily isolated from other moral/social obligations—it exists within a complex of other pressing moral claims within our society—specifically, a call to support personal autonomy in procurement, a call that we, as citizens of a liberal democracy, should take seriously. Spital's calculus weighs conscription against choice, but that begs the question of whether some other alternative might not be available that can do justice to the concerns that underlie both the rationale for conscription and the fear of losing choice.
Certainly, it is just a concern for personal autonomy and “choice” that exercises Glannon. Generally, we can say that there can be little doubt that the desire for “real, active choice”Footnote 21 in important personal matters is the kind of moral claim for which we must account as we move from moral argument to public policy. Glannon, as flag-bearer here, is understandably concerned about the role of choice in these important matters about disposition of bodies. At the same time, however, his argument that conscription, by eliminating choice of patients and families, creates a conflict of interest for physicians as well as his concern about the cultural erosion of the meaning of “death” are ill founded. For the most part, the problems with Glannon's claims are already well critiqued by Spital and Taylor (and I will not recount them here),Footnote 22 but beyond their arguments, Glannon's own interest in championing a “communitarian obligation” seems to undermine the very conflicts he raises. Specifically, if we recognize a moral obligation to release organs upon death, physicians need not concern themselves with the task of procurement, thereby allowing an unfettered focus on good end-of-life care for their patients. Procurement would happen as a matter of course—based on the fulfillment of the moral obligation—rather than of decision. Thus, the physician who focuses solely on good end-of-life care neither interferes with nor neglects the procurement process—the process is simply something that will occur regardless. In this light, however, as pointed out by Spital and Taylor, it is important here to divide “brain death” procurements from any other form. Glannon seems to conflate all procurements, whether through “brain death” or non-heart-beating protocols; however, there is consensus both legally and medically (though not without some controversyFootnote 23) over the use of neurological criteria for death, and limiting discussion to these deaths minimizes, if not completely eliminates, the conflict of interest issues that Glannon brings up. These conflicts, admittedly, may be more acute in other forms of procurement (e.g., non-heart-beating procurement protocols), but even in these cases, nothing in either Spital's or my arguments makes the conflicts any greater, nor does it make a concern about the timing and meaning of “death” any more pressing than they are under the current model. The concern that we are not properly allowing patients to die before procurement already exists,Footnote 24 and conscription would not change the nature of that concern, though it might change the frequency of it.
What remain unresolved, then, are the tensions between conscription and autonomous choice. It is a central tenet of any liberal democracy that the state must justify any coercive policies to its citizens, and any reasonable dissent marks said policy as, thereby, suspect. That is, state interventions on personal autonomy require significant justification that can withstand reasonable dissent.Footnote 25 Conscription, no doubt, is just such an intervention. If we are to attempt, in policy, to avoid coercive practices and reasonable suspicions, conscription begins to look quite dubious. In this light, we can see that the consequence of a moral obligation to release organs upon death is not, by necessity, conscription of those organs by the state. In fact, the consequence is more nuanced—policy should not treat organs as charity or commodity; instead, they should be treated as resources that morality requires of us to release. Recognizing this requirement in policy can be done in at lease two general ways—one is surely conscription, but another is an opt-out system.Footnote 26 Whereas conscription narrowly interprets the moral obligation in policy, the opt-out strategy succeeds as a policy that both recognizes a moral obligation of citizens and allows choice—even if said choice might itself result in a morally dubious act. On the one hand, we are attempting to recognize, through policy, that there is an obligation on all of us to release our organs (and, in fact, neither Glannon nor Spital seems to disagree with this). On the other hand, our liberal democratic emphasis on and moral support for autonomous decisionmaking have force here as well. An “opt-out” model allows the state to recognize in policy that procurement of organs follows from this social, moral obligation, and yet still provide for the exercise of individual choice. This differs even from a conscription model that allows conscientious objections (CO) in that CO demands a higher threshold than simple “opting out” because, as Mark Wicclair argues, CO requires vetting, whereas an opt-out model as I conceive it, at least, would not.Footnote 27 In an opt-out model, then, one can simply choose to opt out of the system without being required by policy to give reasons.
To be sure, anyone choosing to opt out would need to be aware that such an act could come at a social price. Making what would have to be considered an immoral choice (at least, if my argument is correct in the first place) invites social rebuke. Such rebuke can be as simple as the expression of disappointment by peers or as codified as the significant consequences of losing the opportunity to be listed for an organ transplant yourself or some corresponding requirement to be fulfilled in lieu of releasing organs (analogous to what occurs with conscientious objectors to a military draft). In any case, the opt-out system clearly recognizes both obligation and choice and thus meets criteria for good public policy in the face of a variety of moral considerations.
Would the “opt-out” system fare any better in our society than a conscription model, or than the current “charity/gift” model, for that matter? The data here are ambiguous. The position of the Institutes of Medicine is that “presumed consent” (again, not exactly an opt-out model) would not function well in the United States.Footnote 28 However, information on presumed consent models in Europe holds out some hope that it might.Footnote 29 The questions, then, remain—is it worth the experiment and what would need to be included, as far as infrastructure, public relations, and other means, in order for the experiment to have a fighting chance of success? The purpose of this paper does not entail taking on these questions here, nor as a philosopher am I best situated to do so. I, thus, put forth the call to others to take up this next step in the process of implementing procurement strategies that meet the moral obligation to release organs.
